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SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


THE  UNITED  STATES 

MAX  FAKRAND,  Editor 


I COLONIAL  BEGINNINGS,  by  Winfred  T.  ' 
Root,  Professor  of  History,  University  of 
Wisconsin. 

II  GROWTH  OF  A NATION,  by  Max  Farrand, 
Professor  of  History,  Yale  University. 

Ill  SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR,  by  Charles  R. 
Lingley,  Professor  of  History,  Dartmouth 
College. 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


BY 

CHARLES  RAMSDELL  LINGLEY 

Professor  of  History,  Dartmouth  College 


(0*5  H 0 S 


NEW  YORK 
THE  CENTURY  CO. 
1923 


Copyright,  1920,  by 

The  Century  Co. 


Printed  in  U.  S.  A. 


?7i^,  S 

L7j-j- 

Sas 


TO 

MY  WIFE 


0.5  ^06 


PREFACE 


To  write  an  account  of  the  history  of  the  United 
States  since  the  Civil  War  without  bias,  without  mis- 
statements of  fact  and  vdthout  the  omission  of  matters 
that  ought  to  be  included,  would  be  to  perform  a mir- 
acle. I have  felt  no  wonder-working  near  me.  I can 
claim  only  to  have  attempted  to  overcome  the  natural 
limitations  of  having  been  brought  up  in  a particular 
region  and  with  a traditional  political,  economic  and 
social  philosophy.  I have  tried  to  present  as  many 
sides  of  every  question  as  the  limitations  of  space  per- 
mitted and  to  look  s^onpathetically  upon  every  section, 
every  party  and  every  individual,  because  the  sym- 
pathetic critic  seems  to  me  most  likely  to  discover  the 
truth. 

It  used  to  be  believed  that  liistory  could  not  be  writ- 
ten until  at  least  half  a century  had  elapsed  after  the 
events  which  were  to  be  chronicled.  It  is  of  course 
true  that  only  after  the  lapse  of  time  can  students  gain 
access  to  ample  documentary  material,  rid  themselves 
of  partisan  prejudice  and  attain  the  necessary  perspec- 
tive. Unhappily,  however,  the  citizen  who  takes  part 
in  public  affairs  or  who  votes  in  a political  campaign 
cannot  wait  for  the  labors  of  half  a century.  He  must 
judge  on  the  basis  of  whatever  facts  he  can  find  near 
at  hand.  Next  to  a balanced  intelligence,  the  greatest 
need  of  the  citizen  in  the  performance  of  his  political 
duties  is  a substantial  knowledge  of  the  recent  past  of 
public  problems.  It  is  impossible  to  give  a sensible 

vii 


PREFACE 


viii 

opinion  upon  the  transportation  problem,  the  relation 
l)etween  government  and  industry,  international  rela- 
tions, current  politics,  the  leaders  in  public  affairs,  and 
other  peculiarly  American  interests  without  some  un- 
derstanding- of  the  United  States  since  the  Civil  War. 
I have  tried  in  a small  way  to  make  some  of  this  in- 
formation conveniently  available  without  attempting 
to  beguile  myself  or  others  into  the  belief  that  I have 
written  with  the  accuracy  that  will  characterize  later 
work. 

Some  day  somebody  will  delineate  the  spiritual  his- 
tory of  America  since  the  Civil  War — ^the  compound  of 
tradition,  discontent,  aspiration,  idealism,  materialism, 
selfishness,  and  hope  that  mark  the  flonndering  prog- 
ress of  these  United  States  through  the  last  half  cen- 
tury. He  will  read  widely,  ponder  deeply,  and  tune 
his  spirit  with  care  to  the  task  which  he  undertakes.  I 
have  not  attempted  this  phase  of  our  history,  yet  I be- 
lieve that  no  account  is  complete  without  it. 

I have  drawm  heavily  on  others  who  have  written  in 
this  field — Andrews,  Beard,  Paxson  and  Peck,  and  es- 
pecially on  the  volumes  written  for  the  American  Na- 
tion series  by  Professors  Dunning,  Sparks,  Dewey,  La- 
tane  and  Ogg.  Haworth’s  United  States  in  Our  Own 
Time,  1865-1920,  was  unfortunately  printed  too  late  to 
give  me  the  benefit  of  the  author’s  well-known  scholar- 
ship. Many  friends  have  generously  assisted  me.  My 
colleagues.  Professors  F.  A.  Updyke,  C.  A.  Phillips,  G. 
R.  Wicker,  H.  D.  Dozier,  and  Malcolm  Keir  have  read 
the  manuscript  of  individual  chapters.  Professor  E. 
E.  Day  of  Harvard  University  gave  me  his  counsel  on 
several  economic  topics.  Professor  George  H.  Haynes 
of  the  Worcester  Polytechnic  Institute,  Professor  B.  B. 
Kendrick  of  Columbia  University,  Professor  W.  T. 
Root  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin,  and  Professors 


PREFACE 


IX 


L.  B.  Richardson  and  F.  iNI.  Anderson  of  Dartmouth 
College  have  read  the  entire  manuscript.  Officials  at 
the  Dartmouth  College  Library,  the  Columbia  Uni- 
versity Library,  and  the  Library  of  Congress  gave  me 
especial  facilities  for  work.  Two  college  generations  of 
students  at  Dartmouth  have  suffered  me  to  try  out  on 
them  the  arrangement  of  the  chapters  as  well  as  the 
contents  of  the  text.  Harper  and  Bros,  allowed  me  to 
use  a map  appearing  in  Ogg,  National  Progress,  and 
D.  Appleton  and  Co.  have  permitted  the  use  of  maps 
appearing  in  Johnson  and  Van  Metre,  Principles  of 
Railroad  Transportation;  A.  J.  Nystrom  and  Co.  and 
the  McKinley  Publishing  Co.  have  allowed  me  to  draw 
new  maps  on  outlines  copyrighted  by  them.  At  all 
points  I have  had  the  counsel  of  my  wife  and  of  Pro* 
fessor  Max  Farrand  of  Yale  University. 

Charles  R.  Lingley. 

Dartmouth  College, 

June  14, 1920. 


CHAPTER 


PAGE 


CONTENTS 


I Keconstruction  and  Its  Aftermath  ...  3 

II  In  President  Grant’s  Time 32 


4i^-III  Economic  Foundations  of  the  New  Era  . . 55 

IV  Political  and  Intellectual  Background  of 

THE  New  Issues 78 

V The  New  Issues 103 

' — VI  The  Administration  of  Rutherford  B.  Hayes  123 
^ VII  The  Politics  of  the  Early  Eighties  . . . Ii7 

VIII  The  Overturn  of  1884 171 

^ IX  Transportation  and  Its  Control  ....  194 
X Extreme  Republicanism  .......  218 

t-'  XI  Industry  and  Laissez  Faire 242 

XII  Democratic  Demoralization 260 

XIII  The  Trend  of  Dipomacy 281 

^ XIV  The  Rise  of  the  Wage  Earner  ....  303 
XV  Monetary  and  Financial  Problems  . . . 327 

XVI  1896  350 

XVII  Repurlican  Domination  and  War  with  Spain  377 

XVIII  Imperialism 401 

XIX  The  Beginning  of  a New  Century  . . . 424 

XX  Theodore  Roosevelt 448 

XXI  Politics,  1908-1912  473 

XXII  Economic  and  Political  Tendencies  Since 

1896  500 

XXIII  Later  International  Relations  ....  520 

XXIV  Woodrow  Wilson 543 

XXV  The  United  States  and  the  World  War  . . 575 

Index 613 


MAPS  AND  DIAGRAMS 


PAGE 


The  growth  of  the  United  States  from  1776  to  1867  . . 10 

Popular  vote  in  presidential  elections,  1868  to  1896  . . 35 

Economic  interests,  1890  58 

Kelative  prices,  1865  to  1890  65 

The  New  West 70 

Railroad  mileage,  1860  to  1910,  in  thousands  of  miles  . 195 
Map  of  the  United  States  showing  railroads  in  1870  . . 197 
Map  of  the  United  States  showing  railroads  in  1890  . . 199 


(The  maps  showing  the  railroads  are  from  Johnson  and  Van 
Metre,  Principles  of  Railroad  T ransportation,  by  courtesy  of 
the  publishers,  D.  Appleton  & Co.) 

Financial  operations,  1875  to  1897,  in  millions  of  dollars  330 
Total  silver  coinage,  1878  to  1894,  in  millions  of  dollars  337 
Net  gold  in  the  treasury,  by  months,  January,  1893,  to 


February,  1896,  in  millions  of  dollars  ....  346 

The  presidential  election  of  1896  375 

The  Philippines 391 

The  Spanish- American  War  in  the  West  Indies  . . . 394 

Campaign  about  Santiago 396 

The  chief  foreign  elements  in  the  population  of  the  United 

States 425 

The  cost  of  food,  1900  to  1912 429 

Morgan-Hill  railroads  as  listed  shortly  after  1900  . . . 433 

Daily  newspaper  circulation,  1918 437 

Election  of  1904  by  counties 462 

Caribbean  interests  of  the  United  States 524 

Election  of  1916  by  counties 572 

The  Western  Front 595 

Strength  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Force,  July  1, 

1917,  to  November  1,  1918  597 

The  United  States — 1920  602 

The  cost  of  food,  January,  1913,  to  January,  1920  . . 605 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


CHAPTEB  I 

BECONSTRUCTION  AND  ITS  AFTERMATH 

Abraham  Lincoln  in  the  presidential  chair 
was  regarded  by  many  of  the  politicians  of  his 
party  as  an  “unutterable  calamity”;  and  while  the 
news  of  Lincoln’s  assassination  was  received  with  ex- 
pressions of  genuine  grief,  the  accession  of  Vice-Presi- 
dent Andrew  Johnson  was  looked  upon  as  a “Godsend 
to  the  country.”  As  the  Civil  War  came  to  a close, 
Lincoln  opposed  severe  punishments  for  the  leaders  of 
the  Confederacy;  he  urged  respect  for  the  rights  of  the 
southern  people;  he  desired  to  recognize  the  existence 
of  a Union  element  in  the  South,  to  restore  the  states 
to  their  usual  relations  with  as  little  ill-feeling  as  pos- 
sible, and  in  the  restoration  process  to  interfere  but 
little  withihe  normal  powers  of-  the  states.  Johnson, 
on  the  contrary,  “breathed  fire  and  hemp.”  “Trea- 
son,’?'he  asserted  over  and  again,  “should  be  made 
odious,  and  traitors  must  be  punished  and  impover- 
ished. Their  great  plantations  must  be  seized,  aiid 
divided  into  small  farms  and  sold  to  honest,  indus- 
trious men.”  For  a time  it  seemed  that  the  curtain 
would  go  down  on  the  tragedy  of  Civil  War  only  to 
rise-  immediately  on  the  execution  of  the  Confederate 
leaders  and  the  confiscation  of  their  property.  A large 
and  active  group  of  Washington  politicians  believed  in 


4 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


the  necessity  of  a stern  accounting  with  the  “rebels.” 
Lincoln’s  gentleness  seemed  to  these  bitter  northerners 
like  a calamity;  Johnson’s  vindictiveness  like  a God- 
send to  the  country.  In  the  conflict  between  the  policy 
of  clemency  and  the  policy  of  severity  is  to  be  found 
the  beginning  of  the  period  of  reconstruction. 

Andrew  Johnson  was  a compact,  sturdy  figure,  his 
eyes  black,  his  complexion  swarthy.  In  politics  he  had 
always  been  a Democrat.  So  diverse  were  his  char- 
acteristics that  one  is  tempted  to  ascribe  two  person- 
alities to  him.  He  was  a tenacious  man,  possessed  of 
a rude  intellectual  force,  a rough-and-ready  stump 
speaker,  intensely  loyal,  industrious,  sincere,  self-re- 
liant. His  courage  was  put  to  the  test  again  and  again, 
and  nobody  ever  said  that  it  failed.  His  loyalty  held 
him  in  the  Union  in  1861,  although  he  was  a senator 
from  Tennessee  and  his  state  as  well  as  his  southern 
colleagues  were  withdrawing.  His  public  and  private 
integrity  withstood  a hostile  investigation  that  in- 
cluded the  testimony  of  all  strata  of  society,  from  cab- 
inet officers  to  felons  in  prison.  Later,  at  the  most 
critical  moment  of  his  whole  career,  when  he  had 
hardly  a friend  on  whom  to  lean,  he  was  unflurried, 
dignified,  undismayed. 

Although  Johnson  was  born  in  North  Oarolina,  the 
greater  part  of  his  life  was  spent  in  eastern  Tennessee. 
His  education  was  of  the  slightest.  His  wife  taught 
him  to  write,  and  while  he  plied  his  tailor’s  trade  she 
read  books  to  him  that  appealed  to  his  eager  intellect. 
When  scarcely  of  voting  age  he  became  mayor  of  the 
town  in  which  he  lived  and  by  sheer  force  of  char- 
acter made  his  way  up  into  the  state  legislature,  the 
federal  House  of  Representatives  and  the  Senate. 
President  Lincoln  made  him  military  governor  of 
Tennessee  in  1862.  In  1864  many  Democrats  and  most 


RECONSTRUCTION 


5 


Republicans  joined  to  form  a Union  party,  and  in 
order  to  emphasize  its  non-sectional  and  non-partisan 
character  they  nominated  Andrew  Johnson  as  Lincoln’s 
running  mate.  And  now  this  unschooled,  poor-white, 
slave-holding,  Jeffersonian,  states-rights  Democrat  had 
become  President  of  the  United  States. 

It  was  scarcely  to  be  expected  that  a man  who  had 
fought  his  way  to  the  fore  in  eastern  Tennessee  dur- 
ing those  controversial  years  would  possess  the  char- 
acteristics of  a diplomat.  Even  his  friends  found  him 
uncommunicative,  too  often  defiant  and  violent  in  con- 
troversy, irritating  in  manners,  indiscreet,  and  lack- 
ing flexibility  in  the  management  of  men.  The  mes- 
sages which  he  wrote  as  President  were  dignified  and 
judicious,  and  his  addresses  were  not  lacking  in  power, 
but  he  was  prone  to  indulge  in  unseemly  repartee  with 
his  hearers  when  speaking  on  the  stump.  He  ex- 
changed epithets  with  bystanders  who  were  all  too 
ready  to  spur  him  on  with  their  “Give  it  to  ’em, 
Ajidy !”  and  “Bully  for  you,  Andy!”  giving  the  presi- 
dency the  “ill-savor  of  a corner  grocery”  and  filling  his 
supporters  with  amazement  and  chagrin.  The  North 
soon  looked  upon  him  as  a vulgar  boor  and  remembered 
that  he  had  been  intoxicated  when  inaugTirated  as  Vice- 
President.  Unhappily,  too,  he  was  distrustful  by  na- 
ture, gLilig  his  confidence  reluctantly  and  wfith  re- 
ser^'e,  so  that  he  was  almost  without  friends  or  spokes- 
men in  either  house  of  Congress.  His  policies  have 
commended  themselves,  on  the  whole,  even  after  the 
scrutiny  of  half  a century.  The  extent  to  which  he  was 
able  to  put  them  into  effect  is  part  of  the  historj"  of  re- 
construction. 

The  close  of  the  Civil  War  found  the  nation  as  well 
as  the  several  sections  of  the  country  facing  a variety 
of  complicated  and  pressing  social,  economic  and  po- 


6 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


litical  problems.  Vast  armies  had  to  be  demobilized 
and  re-absorbed  into  the  economic  life  of  the  nation. 
Production  of  the  material  of  war  had  to  give  way  to 
the  production  of  machinery,  the  building  of  railroads 
and  the  tilling  of  the  soil.  The  South  faced  economic 
demoralization.  The  federal  government  had  to  deter- 
mine the  basis  on  which  the  lately  rebellious  states 
should  again  become  normal  units  in  the  nation,  and 
the  civil,  social  and  economic  status  of  the  negro  had 
to  be  readjusted  in  the  light  of  the  outcome  of  the  war. 
Most  of  these  problems,  moreover,  had  to  be  solved 
through  political  agencies,  such  as  party  conventions 
and  legislatures,  with  all  the  limitations  of  partisan- 
ship that  these  terms  convey.  And  they  had  obviously 
to  be  solved  through  human  beings  possessed  of  all  the 
prejudices  and  passions  that  the  war  had  aroused: 
through  Andrew  Johnson  with  his  force  and  tact- 
lessness; through  able,  domineering  and  vindictive 
Thaddeus  Stevens ; through  narrow  and  idealistic 
Charles  Sumner  and  demagogic  Benjamin  F.  Butler; 
as  well  as  through  finer  spirits  like  William  Pitt  Fes- 
senden and  Lyman  Trumbull. 

In  their  attitude  toward  the  South,  the  people  of  the 
North,  as  well  as  the  politicians,  fell  into  two  groups. 
The  smaller  or  radical  party  desired  a stern  reckoning 
with  all  “rebels”  and  the  imprisonment  and  execution 
of  the  leaders.^  They  hoped,  also,  to  effect  an  imme- 
diate extension  to  the  negroes  of  the  right  to  vote.  It 
was  this  faction  that  welcomed  the  accession  of  John- 
son to  the  Presidency.  The  other  group  was  much  the 
larger  and  was  inclined  toward  gentler  measures  and 

1 Jefferson  Davis,  the  President  of  tlie  Confederate  States,  was  lield 
in  prison  until  1867  and  then  released.  He  died  in  1889.  Suggestions 
that  General  Lee,  the  most  prominent  military  leader,  be  arrested  and 
tried  met  with  such  opposition  from  General  Grant,  the  Union  leader, 
that  the  project  was  dropped.  Lee  died  in  1870. 


EECONSTEUCTION 


7 


toward  leaving  the  question  of  suffrage  largely  for  the 
future.  Lincoln  and  his  Secretary  of  State,  Seward, 
were  representative  of  this  party.  The  attitude  of  the 
South  toward  the  North  was  more  difficult  to  deter- 
mine. To  be  sure  the  rebellious  states  were  beaten, 
and  recognized  the  fact.  There  was  general  admission 
that  slavery  was  at  an  end.  But  careful  observers  dif- 
fered as  to  whether  the  South  accepted  its  defeat  in 
good  faith  and  would  treat  the  blacks  justly,  or 
whether  it  was  sullen,  unrepentant  and  ready  to  adopt 
any  measures  short  of  actual  slavery  to  repress  the 
negro. 

In  theory,  the  union  of  the  states  was  still  intact. 
The  South  had  attempted  to  secede  and  had  failed. 
Practically,  however,  the  southern  states  were  out  of 
connection  with  the  remainder  of  the  nation  and  some 
method  must  be  found  of  reconstructing  the  broken 
federation.  President  Lincoln  had  already  outlined  a 
plan  in  his  proclamation  of  December  8,  1863.  Ex- 
cluding the  leaders  of  the  Confederacy,  he  offered  par- 
don to  all  others  who  had  participated  in  the  rebellion, 
if  they  would  take  an  oath  of  loyalty  to  the  Union  and 
agree  to  accept  the  laws  and  proclamations  concerning 
slavery.  As  soon  as  the  number  of  citizens  thus  par- 
doned in  each  state  reached  ten  per  cent,  of  the  num- 
ber of  votes  cast  in  that  state  at  the  election  of  1860, 
they  might  establish  a government  which  he  would  rec- 
ognize. It  was  his  expectation  that  a loyal  body  of  re- 
constructed voters  would  collect  around  this  nucleus, 
so  that  in  no  great  while  the  entire  South  would  be 
restored  to  normal  relations.  At  the  same  time  he 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  under  the  Constitution 
the  admission  into  Congress  of  senators  and  represen- 
tatives sent  by  these  governments  must  rest  exclusively 
with  the  houses  of  Congress  themselves.  In  pursuance 


8 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


of  liis  policy  he  had  already  appointed  military  gw- 
eriiors  in  states  where  the  federal  army  had  secured 
a foothold,  and  they  directed  the  re-establishment  of 
civil  goveniment.  The  radicals  opposed  the  plan  be- 
cause it  left  much  power,  including  the  question  of 
negro  suffrage,  in  the  hands  of  the  states.  A contest 
between  Congress  and  the  executive  was  clearly  immi- 
nent when  the  assassin’s  bullet  removed  the  patient  and 
conciliatory  Lincoln. 

Lincoln’s  determination  to  leave  control  over  their 
restoration  as  far  as  possible  in  the  hands  of  the  states 
was  in  line  with  Johnson’s  Democratic,  states-rights 
theories.  Moreover,  the  new  executive  retained  his 
predecessor’s  cabinet,  including  Seward,  whose  influ- 
ence was  promptly  thrown  on  the  side  of  moderation. 
To  the  consternation  of  the  radicals  the  President  is- 
sued a proclamation  announcing  a reconstruction  pol- 
icy which  substantially  followed  that  of  Lincoln.  Like 
his  predecessor  he  intended  to  confine  the  voting  power 
to  the  whites,  leaving  to  the  states  themselves  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  ballot  should  be  extended  to  any  of  the 
blacks.  Wherever  Lincoln  had  not  already  acted,  he 
appointed  military  governors  who  directed  the  estab- 
lishment of  state  governments,  the  revival  of  the  func- 
tions of  county  and  municipal  officials,  the  repeal  of  the 
acts  of  secession,  the  repudiation  of  the  war  debts,  and 
the  election  of  new  state  legislatures,  governors,  sena- 
tors and  representatives.  The  Thirteenth  Amendment 
to  the  Constitution,  abolishing  slavery,  was  ratified  by 
most  of  the  new  legislatures  and  declared  in  effect 
December  18, 1865. 

During  the  last  half  of  the  year,  the  President’s  pol- 
icy met  with  wide  approval  among  the  people  of  the 
North,  where  both  Republicans  and  Democrats  ex- 
pressed satisfaction  with  his  conciliatory  attitude. 


EECONSTRUCTION 


9 


The  South  was  not  unpleased,  as  was  indicated  by  the 
speed  ^^ith  which  men  presented  themselves  for  par- 
don and  assisted  in  setting  up  new  state  governments. 
Nevertheless  there  were  disquieting  possibilities  of  dis- 
sension. Northern  radicals  could  be  counted  upon  to 
oppose  so  moderate  a policy.  There  was  a reaction, 
too,  against  the  great  power  which  the  executive  arm 
of  the  government  had  exercised  in  war  time.  Con- 
gress felt  that  it  had  been  thrust  aside,  its  functions 
reduced  and  its  prestige  diminished.  It  could  be 
looked  to  for  an  assertion  of  its  desire  to  dominate  re- 
construction. Finally  when  ex-confederates  began  to 
be  elected  to  office,  many  a northerner  shook  his  head 
and  wondered  whether  the  South  was  attempting  to 
get  into  the  saddle  once  more. 

When  Congress  convened  in  December,  1865,  its 
members  held  a wide  variety  of  opinions  in  regard  to 
the  best  method  of  restoring  the  confederate  states  to 
the  Union.  On  one  point,  however,  there  was  some 
agreement — that  Congress  ought  to  withhold  approval 
of  executive  reconstruction  until  it  could  decide  upon 
a program  of  its  own.  Led  by  Thaddeus  Stevens,  the 
radical  leader  of  the  House,  a joint  congressional  com- 
mittee of  fifteen  was  appointed  to  report  whether  any 
of  the  southern  state  governments  were  entitled  to  rep- 
resentation in  Congress.  F or  the  present,  all  of  them, 
even  the  President’s  ovm  state,  were  to  be  denied  rep- 
resentation. With  Stevens  as  chairman  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Reconstruction  and  Johnson  in  the 
President’s  chair,  a battle  was  inevitable,  in  which 
quarter  would  be  neither  asked  nor  given. 

Unhappily  for  themselves,  the  southern  states  played 
unwittingly  into  the  hands  of  Stevens  and  his  radical 
colleagues.  The  outcome  of  the  war  had  placed  upon 
the  freedmen  responsibilities  winch  they  could  not  be 


10 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


expected  to  carry.  To  many  of  them  emancipation 
meant  merely  cessation  from  work.  Vagabondage  was 
common.  Rumor  was  widespread  that  the  government 
was  going  to  give  each  negro  forty  acres  of  land  and  a 
mule,  and  the  blacks  loafed  about,  awaiting  the  di- 
vision. The  strict  regulations  which  had  surrounded 
the  former  slave  were  discarded  and  it  was  necessary 
to  accustom  him  to  a new  regime.  “The  race  was  free, 
but  without  status,  without  leaders,  without  property, 
and  without  education.”  Fully  alive  to  the  dangers  of 
giving  unrestricted  freedom  to  so  large  a body  of  ig- 
norant negroes,  the  southern  whites  passed  the  “black 
codes,”  which  placed  numerous  limitations  on  the  civil 
liberty  of  ‘ ‘ persons  of  color.  ’ ’ In  some  cases  they  were 
forbidden  to  carry  arms,  to  act  as  witnesses  in  court 
except  in  cases  involving  their  own  race,  and  to  serve 
on  juries  or  in  the  militia.  Vagrancy  laws  enabled  the 
magistrates  to  set  unemployed  blacks  at  work  under 
arrangements  that  amounted  almost  to  peonage.  It  is 
now  evident  that  the  South  was  actuated  by  what  it 
considered  the  necessities  of  its  situation  and  not 
merely  by  a spirit  of  defiance.  Yet  the  fear  on  the 
part  of  the  North  that  slavery  was  being  restored 
under  a disguise  was  not  unnatural.  Radical  northern 
newspapers  and  leading  extremists  in  Congress  exag- 
gerated the  importance  of  the  codes  until  they  seemed 
like  a systematic  attempt  to  evade  the  results  of  the 
war.  As  Republican  leaders  in  Congress  saw  the  satis- 
faction created  in  the  South  by  the  President’s  policy, 
and  discovered  that  northern  Democrats  were  rallying 
to  his  support,  the  jealousies  of  partisanship  caused 
them  still  further  to  increase  their  grip  on  the  processes 
of  reconstruction.  A disquieting  by-product  of  the 
Thirteenth  Amendment,  abolishing  slavery,  also  began 
to  appear.  Hitherto  only  three-fifths  of  the  negroes 


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The  acquisitions  made  by  the  United  States  from 
1776  to  1867  are  shown  by  different  colors. 

The  boundaries  of  the  States  and  Territories  at  the  close 

of  1S67  are  outlined  by  solid  grreen  lines: 

The  Capitals  of  the  States  and  Territories 
in  1867  are  shown  on  map  by:  © 


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RECONSTRUCTION 


11 


had  been  counted  in  apportioning  representation  in  the 
House  of  Representatives.  As  soon  as  the  slaves  be- 
came free,  however,  they  were  counted  as  if  they  were 
whites,  and  thereby  the  strength  of  the  South  in  Con- 
gress would  be  increased.  It  was  hardly  to  be  expected 
that  the  North  would  view  such  a development  with 
satisfaction. 

The  first  action  of  the  leaders  in  Congress  was  the 
introduction  of  a bill  to  continue  and  extend  the  powers 
of  the  Freedmen’s  Bureau,  a federal  organization  which 
supervised  charitable  relief  given  the  negroes,  pro- 
tected them  in  making  contracts  for  labor  and  as- 
sumed a sort  of  guardianship  over  the  race  in  making 
its  transition  out  of  slavery.  The  new  measure  was  in- 
tended to  continue  this  federal  tutelage  of  the  blacks. 
The  President’s  veto  of  the  bill,  February  19,  1866, 
served  to  widen  the  breach  between  him  and  Congress 
and  thereby  postponed  still  further  the  admission  of 
the  representatives  of  the  southern  state  governments. 
Three  days  later  Johnson  addressed  a crowd  which  col- 
lected before  the  White  House.  In  the  course  of  his 
speech  he  lost  control  of  himself  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  indulge  in  undignified  remarks  and  personalities, 
and  even  to  charge  leaders  in  Congress  with  s’eeking  to 
destroy  the  fundamental  principles  of  American  gov- 
ernment. Thoughtful  men  everywhere  were  dismayed. 
In  the  meantime  a Civil  Rights  bill  was  pending  in 
Congress,  the  purpose  of  which  was  to  declare  negroes 
to  be  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  to  give  them 
rights  equal  to  those  accorded  other  citizens,  notwith- 
standing local  or  state  laws  and  codes.  The  President 
objected  to  the  bill  as  an  unconstitutional  invasion  of 
the  rights  of  the  states,  but  it  was  promptly  passed  over 
the  veto.  Scarcely  any  members  of  Congress  now  sup- 
ported him  except  the  Democrats.  The  conservative 


12 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


or  conciliatory  Republicans  were  lost  to  him  for  good. 
Throughout  the  North  it  was  felt  that  protection  must 
be  accorded  the  freedmen  against  the  black  codes,  and 
when  the  President  opposed  it  he  lost  ground  outside 
of  Congress  as  well  as  in  it.  “From  that  time  John- 
son was  beaten.” 

Stevens  in  the  House  and  Sumner  and  others  in  the 
Senate  were  now  in  a position  to  press  successfully  a 
stern,  congressional  reconstruction  policy  to  replace 
that  of  the  executive.  The  first  item  in  the  radical  pro- 
gram was  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  which  passed 
Congress  in  June,  1866,  although  it  did  not  become  of 
force  until  1868.  It  contained  four  sections:  (1)  mak- 
ing citizens  of  all  persons  born  or  naturalized  in  the 
United  States  and  forbidding  states  to  abridge  their 
rights;  (2)  providing  for  the  reduction  of  the  repre- 
sentation in  Congress  of  any  state  that  denied  the  vote 
to  any  male  citizens  of  voting  age  except  those  guilty  of 
crimes;  (3)  disabling  confederate  leaders  from  holding 
political  office  except  with  the  permission  of  Congress ; 
and  (4)  prohibiting  the  payment  of  confederate  debts. 
The  first  section  was,  of  course,  designed  to  put  the 
civil  rights  of  the  negro  into  the  Constitution  where 
they  would  be  safe  from  hostile  legislation.  The  sec- 
ond sought  to  get  negro  suffrage  into  the  South  by  in- 
direction at  a time  when  a positive  suffrage  amend- 
ment could  not  be  passed.  The  third  was  to  take  the 
pardoning  power  out  of  executive  hands. 

At  this  point  there  came  a halt  in  the  controversy 
until  the  country  could  be  heard  from  in  the  congres- 
sional elections  of  1866.  Both  sides  made  unusual  ef- 
forts to  organize  political  sentiment.  Both  attempted 
to  demonstrate  their  thoroughly  national  character  by 
holding  conventions  attended  by  southern  as  well  as 
northern  delegates.  Each  angled  for  the  soldier  vote 


RECONSTRUCTION 


13 


by  encouraging  conferences  of  veterans.  Late  in  July 
occurred  an  incident  which  the  radicals  were  able  to 
use  to  advantage.  A crowd  of  negroes  attending  a 
convention  in  New  Orleans  in  behalf  of  suffrage  for 
their  race  became  engaged  in  a fight  with  white  anti- 
suffragists  and  many  of  the  blacks  were  killed.  The 
riot  was  commonly  referred  to  in  the  North  as  a 
“massacre,”  the  moral  of  which  was  that  the  negroes 
must  be  protected  against  the  unrepentant  rebels.  But 
it  was  Johnson  himself  who  furnished  greatest  aid  to 
his  adversaries.  Having  been  invited  to  speak  in  Chi- 
cago, he  determined  upon  an  electioneering  trip, 
“swinging  around  the  circle,”  he  called  it.  Again  he 
was  guilty  of  gross  indiscretions.  He  made  personal 
allusions,  held  angry  colloquies  with  the  crowd  and  at 
one  place  met  such  opposition  that  he  had  to  retire 
unheard.  It  mattered  little  that  the  greater  part  of  his 
speeches  was  sound  and  substantial.  His  lapses  were 
held  up  to  public  scorn  and  he  returned  to  Washington 
amid  the  hoots  of  his  enemies.  It  was  commonly  be- 
lieved that  he  had  been  intoxicated.  Probably  no  ora- 
tor, The  Nation  sarcastically  remarked,  ever  accom- 
plished so  much  by  a fortnight’s  speaking.  There 
could  be  little  doubt  as  to  the  outcome  of  the  elections. 
The  Republicans  carried  almost  every  northern  state 
and  obtained  a two-thirds  majority  in  each  house  of 
Congress,  with  which  to  override  vetoes. 

As  if  impelled  by  some  perverse  fate  the  southern 
whites  during  the  fall  and  winter  of  1866-67  did  the 
thing  for  which  the  bitterest  enemy  of  the  South  might 
have  wished.  Except  in  Tennessee,  the  legislature  of 
every  confederate  state  refused  with  almost  complete 
unanimity  to  ratify  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Nat- 
ural as  the  act  was,  it  gave  the  North  apparently  over- 
whelming proof  that  the  former  “rebels”  were  still  de- 


14 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


fiant.  Encouraged  by  the  results  of  the  election  and 
aroused  by  the  attitude  of  the  South  toward  the  Amend- 
ment, Congress  proceeded  to  encroach  upon  preroga- 
tives that  had  hitherto  been  considered  purely  execu- 
tive, and  also  to  pass  a most  extreme  plan  of  recon- 
struction. 

The  first  of  these  measures,  the  Tenure  of  Office  Act, 
was  passed  over  a veto  on  March  2,  1867.  By  it  the 
President  was  forbidden  to  remove  civil  officers  ex- 
cept with  the  consent  of  the  Senate.  Even  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Cabinet  could  not  be  dismissed  without  the 
permission  of  the  upper  house,  a provision  inserted  for 
the  protection  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  the  Secretary  of 
War.  Stanton  was  in  sympathy  with  the  radical  lead- 
ers in  Congress  and  it  was  essential  to  them  that  he  be 
kept  in  this  post  of  advantage.  General  Grant,  who 
had  charge  of  the  military  establishment,  was  made  al- 
most independent  of  the  President  by  a law  drafted 
secretly  by  Stanton.  On  the  same  day,  and  over  a veto 
also,  was  passed  the  Reconstruction  Act,  the  most  im- 
portant piece  of  legislation  during  the  decade  after  the 
war.  It  represented  the  desires  of  Thaddeus  Stevens 
and  was  passed  mainly  because  of  his  masterful  lead- 
ership. At  the  outset  the  new  Act  declared  the  exist- 
ing southern  state  governments  to  be  illegal  and  inade- 
quate, and  divided  the  South  into  five  military  districts.. 
Over  each  was  to  be  a commanding  general  who  should 
preserve  order,  and  continue  civil  officers  and  civil 
courts,  or  replace  them  vfith  military  tribunals  as  he 
wished.  Under  his  direction  each  state  was  to  frame 
and  adopt  a new  constitution  which  must  provide  for 
negro  suffrage.  When  Congress  should  approve  the 
constitution  and  when  a legislature  elected  under  its 
provisions  should  adopt  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
the  state  might  be  readmitted  to  the  Union. 


RECONSTRUCTION 


15 


The  Reconstruction  Act  was  remarkable  in  several 
features.  The  provision  imposing  negro  suffrage  was 
carried  through  the  Senate  with  difficulty  and  only  as 
the  result  of  the  tireless  activity  of  Charles  Sumner. 
Sumner  and  other  radicals  were  determined  that  the 
blacks  should  be  enfranchised  in  order  that  they  might 
protect  themselves  from  hostile  local  legislation  and 
also  in  order  that  they  might  form  part  of  a southern 
Republican  party.  Even  more  noteworthy  was  the 
military  character  of  the  Act.  The  President  had  al- 
ready exercised  his  prerogative  of  declaring  the  coun- 
try at  peace  on  August  20,  1866,  more  than  six  months 
before  the  Act  was  passed.  In  the  decision  in  the  Mil- 
ligan case,  which  preceded  the  Act  by  nearly  three 
months,  the  Supreme  Court  had  decided  that  military 
tribunals  were  illegal  except  where  war  made  the  op- 
eration of  civil  courts  impossible.  Military  reconstruc- 
tion was  illogical,  not  to  say  unlawful,  therefore,  but 
Congress  was  more  interested  in  a method  that  prom- 
ised the  speedy  accomplishment  of  its  purposes  than 
it  was  in  the  opinions  of  the  executive  and  judicial  de- 
partments. 

Despite  his  dissent  from  its  provisions,  the  President 
at  once  set  military  reconstruction  in  operation.  When 
he  mitigated  its  harshness,  however,  where  latitude  was 
allowed  him.  Congress  passed  additional  acts,  over  the 
veto,  of  course,  extending  and  defining  the  powers  of 
the  commanding  generals.  Armed  with  complete  au- 
thority, the  generals  proceeded  to  remove  manj'’  of  the 
ordinary  civil  officers  and  to  replace  them  with  their 
ovm  appointees,  to  compel  order  by  means  of  the  sol- 
dierj’',  to  set  aside  court  decrees  and  even  to  close  the 
courts  and  to  enact  legislation.  In  the  meanwhile  a 
total  of  703,000  black  and  627,000  white  voters  were 
registered,  delegates  to  constitutional  conventions  were 


16 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


elected,  constitutions  were  drawn  up  and  adopted  which 
permitted  negro  suffrage,  and  state  officers  and  legis- 
lators elected.  In  conformity  with  the  provisions  of 
the  Act,  the  newly  chosen  legislatures  ratified  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution,  sent  rep- 
resentatives and  senators  to-  Washington,  where  they 
were  admitted  to  Congress,  and  by  1871  the  last  con- 
federate state  was  reconstructed. 

The  commanding  generals  were  honest  and  efficient, 
in  the  main,  even  if  their  stern  rule  was  distasteful 
to  the  South,  but  the  regime  of  the  newly  elected  state 
officers  and  legislators  was  a period  of  dishonesty  and 
incapacity.  Most  of  the  experienced  and  influential 
whites  had  been  excluded  from  participation  in  poli- 
tics through  the  operation  of  the  presidential  procla- 
mations and  the  reconstruction  acts.  In  all  the  . 
legislatures  there  were  large  numbers  of  blacks — some- 
times, indeed,  they  were  in  the  majority.  Two  parties 
appeared.  The  radical  or  Republican  group  included 
the  negroes,  a few  southern  whites,  commonly  called 
“scalawags,”  and  various  northerners  known  as  “car- 
pet-baggers.” These  last  were  in  some  cases  mere  ad- 
venturers and  in  others  men  of  ability  who  were  at- 
tracted to  the  South  for  one  reason  or  another,  and 
took  a prominent  part  in  political  affairs.  The  old- 
time  whites  held  both  kinds  in  equal  detestation.  The 
other  party  was  called  conservative  or  Democratic,  and 
Avas  composed  of  the  great  mass  of  the  whites.  Many 
of  them  had  been  Whigs  before  the  war,  but  in  the  face 
of  negro-Republican  domination,  nearly  all  threw  in 
their  lot  Avith  the  conservatives. 

Not  all  the  actiAuties  of  the  legislatures  Avere  bad. 
Provisions  were  made  for  education,  for  example,  that 
Avere  in  line  Avith  the  needs  of  the  states.  Neverthe' 
less,  their  conduct  in  the  main  Avas  such  as  to  drive 


RECONSTRUCTION 


17 


the  South  almost  into  revolt.  In  the  South  Carolina 
legislature  only  twenty-two  members  out  of  155  could 
read  and  write.  The  negroes  were  in  the  majority  and 
although  they  paid  only  $143  in  taxes  altogether,  they 
helped  add  $20,000,000  to  the  state  debt  in  four  years. 
In  Arkansas  the  running  expenses  of  the  state  in- 
creased 1500  per  cent. ; in  Louisiana  the  public  debt 
mounted  from  $14,000,000  to  $48,000,000  between  1868 
and  1871.  Only  ignorance  and  dishonesty  could  ex- 
plain such  extravagance  and  waste.  Submission,  how- 
ever, was  not  merely  advisable;  it  presented  the  only 
prospect  of  peace.  Open  resentment  was  largely  sup- 
pressed, but  it  was  inevitable  that  the  whites  should  be- 
come hostile  to  the  blacks,  and  that  they  should  dis- 
like the  Republican  party  for  its  ruthless  imposition  of 
a system  which  governed  them  without  their  consent 
and  which  placed  them  at  the  mercy  of  the  incompe- 
tent and  unscrupulous.  A system  which  made  a negro 
the  successor  of  Jefferson  Davis  in  the  United  States 
Senate  could  scarcely  fail  to  throw  the  majority  of 
southern  whites  into  the  ranks  of  the  enemies  of  the 
Republican  organization.^ 

One  step  remained  to  ensure  the  continuance  of  negro 
suffrage — the  adoption  of  a constitutional  provision. 
In  1869  Congress  referred  to  the  states  the  Fifteenth 
Amendment,  which  was  declared  in  force  a year  later. 
By  its  terms  the  United  States  and  the  states  are  for- 
bidden to  abridge  the  right  of  citizens  to  vote  on  ac- 
count of  race,  color  or  previous  condition  of  servitude. 

While  radical  reconstruction  was  being  forced  to  its 
bitter  conclusion,  the  opponents  of  the  President  were 
maturing  plans  for  his  impeachment  and  exclusion 
from  office.  By  the  terms  of  the  Constitution,  the  chief 
executive  may  be  impeached  for  “Treason,  Bribery,  or 

1 A number  of  these  states  later  repudiated  their  debts. 


18 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


other  high  Crimes  and  Misdemeanors.”  Early  in  the 
struggle  between  President  Johnson  and  Congress  a 
few  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  urged 
an  attempt  to  impeach  him.  Such  extremists  as  James 
M.  Ashley  of  Ohio,  and  Benjamin  F.  Butler  of  Massa- 
chusetts, believed  that  he  had  even  been  implicated  in 
the  plot  to  assassinate  Lincoln.  A thorough-going 
search  through  his  private  as  well  as  his  public  career 
failed  to  produce  any  evidence  that  could  be  inter- 
preted as  sufficient  to  meet  constitutional  demands,  and 
a motion  to  impeach  was  voted  down  in  the  House  by  a 
large  majority.  So  indiscreet  a man  as  the  Presi- 
dent, however,  was  likely  at  some  time  to  furnish  a 
reason  for  further  effort.  The  occasion  came  in  the 
removal  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  Edwin  M.  Stanton. 

Stanton,  although  of  a domineering  and  brusque  per- 
sonality, had  ably  administered  the  War  Department 
under  Lincoln  and  Johnson.  During  the  controversy 
between  the  President  and  Congress,  Stanton  had  re- 
mained in  the  Cabinet  but  was  closely  in  touch  with  his 
chief’s  opponents  and  had  even  drafted  one  of  the  re- 
construction acts.  Johnson  had  tolerated  the  ques- 
tionable conduct  of  his  Secretary,  despite  the  advice  of 
many  of  his  supporters,  until  August  5,  1867,  when 
he  requested  Stanton’s  resignation.  The  latter  took 
refuge  behind  the  Tenure  of  Office  Act,  denying  the 
right  of  the  President  to  remove  him,  but  yielding 
his  office  at  Johnson’s  insistence.  This  episode  had 
occurred  during  a recess  of  Congress  and,  in  accord 
with  the  law,  the  removal  of  Stanton  was  reported 
when  it  convened  in  December.  The  Senate  at  once 
refused  to  concur  and  Stanton  returned  to  his  office. 
The  President  now  found  himself  forced,  by  what  he 
regarded  as  an  unconstitutional  law,  into  the  unbear- 
able position  of  including  one  of  his  enemies  within  his 


RECONSTRUCTION 


19 


official  family,  and  once  more  he  ordered  the  Secretary 
to  retire.  But  meanwhile  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives had  been  active  and  had  on  February  24, 1868,  im- 
peached the  President  for  “high  crimes  and  misde- 
meanors.” 

The  trial  was  conducted  before  the  Senate,  as  the 
Constitution  provides,  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  acting  as  the  presiding  officer.  The 
House  chose  a board  of  seven  managers  to  conduct  the 
prosecution,  of  whom  Thaddeus  Stevens  and  Benjamin 
F.  Butler  were  best  known.  The  President  was  de- 
fended by  able  counsel,  including  former  Attorney- 
General  Stanbery,  Benjamin  R.  Curtis,  who  had  earlier 
sat  upon  the  Supreme  Court,  and  William  M.  Evarts, 
an  eminent  lawyer  and  leader  of  the  bar  in  New  York. 
The  charges,  although  eleven  in  number,  centered  about 
four  accusations:  (1)  that  the  dismissal  of  Secretary 
Stanton  was  contrary  to  the  Tenure  of  Office  Act;  (2) 
that  the  President  had  declared  that  part  of  a certain 
act  of  Congress  was  unconstitutional;  (3)  that  he  had 
attempted  to  bring  Congress  into  disgrace  in  his 
speeches;  and  (4)  that  in  general  he  had  opposed  the 
execution  of  several  acts  of  Congress.  The  Presi- 
dent’s counsel  asked  for  forty  days  in  which  to  prepare 
their  case.  They  were  given  ten,  although  members  of 
the  House  had  been  preparing  for  more  than  a year 
to  resort  to  impeachment.  The  trial  lasted  from  early 
March  to  late  May. 

As  the  trial  wore  on,  it  became  increasingly  evident 
that  the  House  had  but  little  substance  on  which  to 
base  an  impeachment,  and  that  the  force  back  of  it 
was  intense  hatred  of  the  President.  It  was  made 
clear  to  senators  who  were  inclined  to  waver  towards 
the  side  of  acquittal  that  their  political  careers  were 
at  an  end  if  they  failed  to  vote  guilty.  The  general 


20 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


conference  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  even 
appointed  an  hour  of  prayer  that  the  Senate  might  be 
moved  to  convict.  The  lawyers  for  the  defense  so  far 
outgeneraled  the  prosecutors  that  one  who  reads  the 
records  at  the  present  day  finds  difficulty  in  thinking 
of  them  as  more  than  the  account  of  a pitiful  farce. 
At  length  on  May  16  the  Senate  was  prepared  to  make 
its  decision.  The  last  charge  was  voted  upon  first. 
It  was  a very  general  accusation,  drawn  up  by  Stevens, 
and  seemed  most  likely  to  secure  the  necessary  two- 
thirds  for  conviction.  Fifty-four  members  would  vote. 
Twelve  of  them  were  Democrats  and  were  known  to  he 
for  acquittal.  The  majority  of  the  Republicans  were 
for  conviction.  A small  group  had  given  no  indication 
of  their  position,  and  their  votes  would  be  the  decisive 
ones.  As  the  roll  was  called  each  senator  replied' 
“Guilty”  or  “Not  guilty,”  while  floor  and  galleries 
counted  off  the  vote  as  the  knitting  women  clicked  off 
the  day’s  toll  of  heads  during  the  days  when  the  guillo- 
tine made  a reign  of  terror  in  France.  The  result  was 
thirty-five  votes  for  conviction  and  nineteen  for  ac- 
quittal. As  thirty-six  were  necessary,  Johnson  had 
escaped.  A recess  of  ten  days  was  taken  during  which 
the  prosecution  sought  some  shred  of  evidence  which 
might  prove  that  some  one  of  the  nineteen  had  ac- 
cepted a bribe  for  his  vote,  but  to  no  avail.  When  the 
Senate  convened  again  there  was  no  change  in  the 
vote  on  the  second  and  third  articles,  and  the  attempt 
to  convict  was  abandoned. 

For  the  first  time  in  many  months  Johnson  enjoyed 
a respite  from  the  attacks  of  his  foes.  Stanton  re- 
linquished his  office,  and  the  integrity  of  the  executive 
power  was  preserved.  The  race  of  the  dictator  of  the 
House  had  been  run,  for  Stevens  lived  less  than  three 
months  after  the  trial. 


RECONSTRUCTION 


21 


The  continuous  controversies  of  the  Johnson  admin- 
istration almost  completely  pressed  into  the  back- 
gTound  two  diplomatic  accomplishments  of  no  little 
importance.  The  more  dramatic  of  these  related  to  the 
French  invasion  of  Mexico.  During’  1861,  naval  ves- 
sels of  England,  France  and  Spain  had  entered  Mexi- 
can ports  in  order  to  compel  the  payment  of  debts 
said  to  be  due  those  countries,  but  England  and  Spain 
had  soon  v’ithdrawn  and  had  left  France  to  proceed 
alone.  French  troops  thereupon  had  invaded  the  coun- 
try, captured  Mexico  City  and  established  an  empire 
with  Archduke  Maximilian  of  Austria  as  its  head,  des- 
pite the  protests  and  opposition  of  the  Mexicans  nnder 
their  leader  Juarez.  The  United  States  had  expressed 
dissent  and  alarm,  meanwhile,  but  because  of  the  war 
was  in  no  position  to  take  action. 

As  soon  as  civil  strife  was  finished,  however,  John- 
son and  Seward  took  vigorous  steps.  An  army  under 
General  Sheridan  was  sent  to  the  border,  and  diplo- 
matic pressure  was  exerted  to  convince  France  of  the 
desirability  of  withdrawal.  The  occnpation  of  Mex- 
ico was,  apparently,  not  popular  in  France,  and  in  the 
face  of  American  opposition  the  French  government 
sought  a means  of  dropping  the  project.  Accordingly 
the  invading  forces  were  withdrawn  early  in  1867,  leav- 
ing the  hapless  Maximilian  to  the  Mexicans,  by  whom 
he  was  subsequently  seized  and  executed. 

IVhile  the  Mexican  difficulty  was  being  brought  to  a 
successful  outcome,  the  government  of  Russia  offered 
to  sell  to  the  United  States  her  immense  Alaskan  pos- 
sessions w’est  and  northwest  of  Canada.  Secretary 
Seward  was  enthusiastically  disposed  to  accept  the 
offer  and  a treaty  was  accordingly  dravm  up  on  March 
30,  1867,  providing  for  the  acquisition  of  the  territory 
for  $7,200,000.  The  Senate,  however,  was  far  less  in- 


22 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


cliued  to  seize  the  opportunity.  Little  was  known 
about  Alaska,  and  the  cost  seemed  almost  prohibitive 
in  view  of  the  financial  strains  caused  by  the  war. 
Nevertheless  the  inclination  to  acquire  territory  was 
strong  and  there  was  a widespread  desire  to  accede  to 
the  wishes  of  Russia  who  was  understood  to  have  been 
well-disposed  toward  the  United  States  during  the  war. 
Cnder  the  operation  of  these  forces  the  Senate  changed 
its  attitude  and  ratified  the  treaty  on  April  9,  1867. 
By  this  act  the  United  States  came  into  possession  of 
an  area  measuring  nearly  600,000  square  miles,  and 
stores  of  fish,  furs,  timber,  coal  and  precious  metals 
whose  size  is  even  yet  little  understood. 

It  was  not  long  before  it  became  apparent  that  radi- 
cal reconstruction  had  been  founded  too  little  upon  the 
hard  facts  of  social  and  political  conditions  in  the 
South,  and  too  much  upon  benevolent  but  mistaken 
theories,  and  upon  prejudices,  paidisanship  and  emo- 
tion. It  was  inevitable  that  there  should  be  an  after- 
math. 

At  the  close  of  reconstruction  in  1871,  the  southern 
negro  was  a citizen  of  civil  and  political  importance. 
As  a voter,  he  was  on  an  equality  with  the  whites; 
he  belonged  to  the  Republican  party  and  his  party  was 
a powerful  factor  in  the  politics  of  the  South;  his  posi- 
tion was  secured,  or  at  least  seemed  to  be  secured,  by 
amendments  to  the  federal  Constitution.  Legally  and 
constitutionally  his  position  appeared  to  be  impreg- 
nable. In  the  minds  of  the  southern  white,  however, 
the  amendments  vied  with  military  reconstruction  in 
their  injustice  and  unwisdom.  To  his  mind  they  con- 
stituted an  attempt  to  abolish  the  belief  of  the  white 
man  in  the  essential  inferiority  of  the  black,  to  make 
the  pyramid  of  government  stand  on  its  apex,  and  to 


RECONSTRUCTION 


23 


place  the  very  issues  of  existence  within  the  power  of 
the  congenitally  unfit.  To  the  discontent  aroused  by 
war  were  added  political  and  racial  antagonism,  which 
blazed  at  times  into  fury.  The  southern  whites  be- 
gan to  invent  methods  for  overcoming  the  power  of  the 
freedmen  in  politics  and  for  insuring  themselves 
against  possible  danger  of  violence  at  the  hands  of  the 
blacks. 

The  most  famous  device  was  the  Ku  Klux  Klan  or 
the  Invisible  Empire,  a somewhat  loosely  organized 
secret  society  which  originated  in  Tennessee  during  the 
turmoil  immediately  after  the  close  of  the  war.  In 
theory  and  practice  its  operations  were  simple  and 
effective.  Its  chief  officials  were  the  Grand  Wizard, 
the  Grand  Dragon,  the  Grand  Titan.  Local  branches 
were  Dens,  each  headed  by  a Grand  Cyclops.  The  Den 
worked  usually  at  night,  when  the  members  assembled 
clad  in  long  white  robes  and  white  masks  or  hoods,  dis- 
cussed cases  which  needed  attention,  and  then  rode 
forth  on  horses  whose  bodies  were  covered  and  whose 
feet  were  muffled.  The  exploits  of  the  Klan  expanded, 
in  the  exaggerated  stories  common  among  the  negroes, 
into  the  most  amazing  achievements.  The  members 
were  thought  to  be  able  to  take  themselves  to  pieces, 
drink  entire  pailfuls  of  water,  and  devour  “fried  nig- 
ger meat.”  Usually  the  person  about  to  be  “visited” 
received  a notice  that  the  dreaded  Klan  was  upon  him. 
He  was  warned  to  cease  his  political  activities  or  per- 
haps to  leave  the  neighborhood.  If  the  threat  proved 
ineffective,  whipping  or  some  worse  punishment  was 
likely  to  follow. 

In  1872  Congress  unintentionally  aided  in  the  process 
of  overcoming  negro  domination  by  the  passage  of  the 
Amnesty  Act,  which  restored  to  all  but  a few  hundreds 
of  the  former  Confederates  the  political  privileges 


24 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


which  had  been  taken  from  them  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Under  the  latter  the  great  majority  of 
former  southern  leaders  had  been  deprived  of  the  right 
to  hold  office.  On  the  restoration  of  this  right  such 
men  as  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  former  Vice-President 
of  the  Confederate  States,  and  Wade  Hampton,  one  of 
the  most  influential  South  Carolinians,  could  again  take 
an  active  part  in  politics.  With  their  return,  the 
canse  of  white  supremacy  received  a powerful  impetus. 

In  taking  this  step,  however.  Congress  did  not  in- 
tend to  allow  the  legal  and  constitutional  rights  of  the 
blacks  to  be  waived  wdthout  a contest.  Reports 
reached  the  North  concerning  the  activities  of  the 
southern  whites — reports  which  in  no  way  minimized 
the  amount  of  intimidation  and  violence  involved — 
and  in  response  to  this  information  Congress  passed 
the  enforcement  laws  of  1870-1871,  generally  kno-wn  as 
the  “Force  Acts.”^  These  laws  laid  heavy  penalties 
upon  individuals  who  should  prevent  citizens  from  ex- 
ercising their  constitutional  political  powers — primar- 
ily the  right  to  vote.  As  offences  under  these  acts 
were  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  federal  courts  and 
as  the  federal  officials  manifested  an  inclination  to 
carry  ont  the  law,  the  number  of  indictments  was  con- 
siderable. Convictions,  however,  were  infrequent. 
The  famous  Ku  Klux  Act  of  1871  amplified  the  law  of 
1870  and  was  aimed  at  combinations  or  conspiracies  of 
persons  who  resorted  to  intimidation.  It  authorized 
the  President  to  suspend  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  and  made  it  his  duty  to  employ  armed 
force  to  suppress  opposition. 

1 The  threats  used  to  keep  tlie  negroes  away  from  the  polls  are  typi- 
fied in  the  following,  whirdi  was  published  in  Mississippi: 

‘The  Terry  Terribles  will  be  here  Monday  to  see  there  is  a fair  elec- 
tion. 


RECONSTRUCTION 


25 


Additional  sting  was  given  the  enforcement  laws  by 
provision  for  the  superintendence  of  federal  elections, 
under  specified  conditions,  by  federal  officials  called 
“supervisors  of  election.”  The  supervisors  were 
given  large  powers  over  the  registration  of  voters  and 
the  casting  and  counting  of  ballots,  so  as  to  ensure  a 
fair  vote  and  an  honest  count.  Since  here,  again, 
federal  troops  stood  behind  the  law,  it  was  manifest 
that  the  central  government  would  show  some  degree 
of  determination  in  its  handling  of  the  southern  situa- 
tion. Nevertheless,  the  result  was  merely  to  delay  the 
gradual  elimination  of  the  blacks  from  political  ac- 
tivity, not  to  prevent  it.  In  practice  the  Republican 
state  governments  in  the  South  were  continued  in  the 
seats  of  authority  only  through  the  presence  of  the 
federal  soldiery.  In  one  way  or  another  the  whites 
gained  the  upper  hand,  so  that  by  1877  only  South 
Carolina  and  Louisiana  had  failed  to  achieve  self- 
government  unhampered  by  federal  force. 

In  the  meantime  the  enforcement  acts  were  being 
slowly  weakened  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  several  de- 
cisions bearing  upon  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
The  significant  portion  of  Section  I of  the  Amendment 
is  as  follows : 

No  State  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall  abridge 
the  privileges  or  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States; 
nor  shall  any  State  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or 
property,  without  due  process  of  law ; nor  deny  to  any  per- 
son within  its  jiirisdietion  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 

‘‘The  Byram  Bulldozers  will  be  here  Monday  to  see  there  is  a fair 
election. 

“The  Edwards  Dragoons  will  be  here  Monday  to  see  there  is  a fair 
election. 

“Who  cares  if  the  McGill  men  don’t  like  it? 

“The  whole  State  of  ^Mississippi  is  interested  in  the  election. 

“It  shall  be  a Democratic  victory.” 


26 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


In  several  cases  involving  the  enforcement  acts,  the 
Court  found  portions  of  the  laws  in  conflict  with  the 
Constitution  and  finally,  in  1883,  the  decision  in  United 
States  V.  Harris  completed  their  destruction.  Here 
the  court  met  a complaint  that  a group  of  white  men 
had  taken  some  negroes  away  from  the  officers  of  the 
law'  and  ill-treated  them.  Such  conduct  seemed  to  be 
contrary  to  that  part  of  the  Ku  Klux  Act  which  for- 
bade combinations  designed  to  deprive  citizens  of  their 
legal  rights.  The  Court,  however,  called  attention  to 
the  important  words,  “No  State  shall  make  or  en- 
force,” and  w^as  of  opinion  that  the  constitutional 
power  of  Congress  extends  only  to  cases  where  States 
have  acted  in  such  a manner  as  to  deprive  citizens  of 
their  rights.  If  individuals,  on  the  contrary,  conspire 
to  take  away  these  rights,  relief  must  be  sought  at  the 
hands  of  the  state  government.  As  the  great  purpose 
of  the  Ku  Klux  Act  had  been  to  combat  precisely  such 
individual  combinations,  it  appeared  that  the  Court 
had,  at  a blow,  demolished  the  law.  Not  long  after- 
w^ards  the  Court  declared  unconstitutional  the  Civil 
Rights  Act  of  1875,  which  had  been  designed  to  insure 
equal  rights  to  negroes  in  hotels,  conveyances  and 
theatres.  Here  again  the  Court  was  of  opinion  that 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  grants  no  power  to  the 
United  States  but  forbids  certain  activities  by  the 
states.^ 

Stuffing  the  ballot  box  was  common  in  South  Car- 
olina and  other  states.  In  one  election  in  this  state 
the  number  of  votes  cast  was  almost  double  the  num- 
ber the  names  on  the  polling  list.  In  some  places  the 
imposition  of  a poll  tax  peacefully  eliminated  the  im- 

1 In  regard  to  segregation  of  the  races  in  railroad  coaches,  the  Court 
decided,  1910,  that  constitutional  rights  are  not  interfered  with  when 
separate  accommodations  are  provided,  if  the  accommodations  be  equally 
good.  Chiles  v.  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Eailroad  Co.,  218  U.  S.,  71. 


RECONSTRUCTION 


27 


pecmiious  freedman.  In  Mississippi  the  state  legis- 
lature laid  out  the  “shoestring”  election  district,  300 
miles  long  and  about  20  miles  wide,  which  included 
many  of  the  sections  where  the  negroes  were  most 
numerous,  in  order  that  their  votes  might  have  as  little 
effect  as  possible.  By  hook  or  by  crook,  then,  in  simple 
and  devious  ways,  the  dangers  of  negro  domination 
were  averted.  Nevertheless  the  provisions  of  the  law 
for  federal  supervision  of  elections  remained,  becom- 
ing a bone  of  contention  during  a later  administration. 

About  1890  there  began  a new  era  in  the  elimination 
of  the  negro  from  politics  in  the  South.  The  people  of 
that  section  disliked  the  methods  which  they  felt  the 
necessity  of  using,  and  searched  about  for  a less  crude 
device.  Furthermore  the  rise  of  a new  political  move- 
ment in  some  parts  of  the  South  in  the  late  eighties 
and  early  nineties  was  making  divisions  among  the 
Democrats  and  was  encouraging  attempts  by  the  two 
factions  to  control  the  negro  vote.  Suddenly,  a rela- 
tively small  number  of  negro  voters  became  a powerful 
and  purchasable  make-weight.  Both  sides,  perhaps, 
were  a bit  disturbed  at  this  development.  At  any  rate, 
additional  impetus  was  given  to  the  movement  for  the 
suppression  of  the  negro.  Eventually  plans  were  orig- 
inated, some  of  which  were  clearly  constitutional  and 
all  of  which  carried  a certain  appearance  of  legality. 

The  first  steps  were  taken  by  Mississippi  in  1890. 
The  new  state  constitution  of  that  year  required  as  pre- 
requisite to  the  voting  privilege,  the  payment  of  all 
taxes  which  were  legally  demanded  of  the  citizen  dur- 
ing the  two  preceding  years — a provision  to  which  no 
constitutional  exception  could  be  taken,  and  which  ef- 
fectively debarred  large  numbers  of  colored  voters. 
Further,  it  provided  that  after  January  1,  1892,  every 
voter  must  be  able  to  read  any  section  of  the  state  con- 


28 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


stitution  or  be  able  to  give  an  interpretation  of  it  when 
read  to  him.  As  the  election  officials  who  would  judge 
the  ability  of  the  applicant  properly  to  interpret  the 
constitution  would  certainly  be  whites,  it  was  clear  that 
the  ignorant  black  would  have  scant  chance  of  passing 
the  educational  test.  Several  other  states  followed  in 
the  wake  of  Mississippi,  until  in  1898  Louisiana  dis- 
covered a new  barrier  through  which  only  whites  might 
make  their  way  to  the  voting  lists.  This  was  the 
famous  “grandfather  clause.”  In  brief,  it  allowed 
citizens  to  vote  who  had  that  right  before  January  1, 
1867,  together  with  the  descendants  of  such  citizens, 
regardless  of  their  educational  and  property  qualifica- 
tions. As  no  negroes  had  voted  in  the  state  before  that 
date,  they  were  effectively  debarred.  Under  the  influ- 
ence of  such  pressure,  the  negro  vote  promptly  dwin- 
dled away  to  negligible  proportions.  In  Louisiana,  to 
cite  one  case,  there  were  127,263  registered  colored 
voters  in  1896,  and  5,354  in  1900.  Between  these  two 
years  the  new  state  constitution  had  been  passed.  In 
1915  the  Supreme  Court  finally  declared  a grandfather 
clause  unconstitutional  on  the  ground  that  its  only  pos- 
sible intention  was  to  evade  that  provision  of  the  Fif- 
teenth Amendment  which  forbids  the  states  to  abridge, 
on  account  of  color,  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States  to  vote. 

The  history  of  the  effects  of  the  war  and  of  recon- 
struction on  the  political  status  of  the  negro  has  been 
concisely  summarized  as  falling  into  three  periods. 
Soon  after  the  close  of  the  war:  (1)  the  negroes  were 
more  powerful  in  politics  than  their  numbers,  intelli- 
gence and  property  seemed  to  justify;  (2)  the  Repub- 
lican party  was  a power  in  the  South;  and  (3)  the  ne- 
groes enjoyed  political  rights  on  a legal  and  constitu- 
tional equality  with  the  whites.  By  1877  the  first  of 


RECONSTRUCTION 


29 


these  generalizations  was  no  longer  a fact ; by  1890  the 
Republican  party  had  ceased  to  be  of  importance  in  the 
South;  and  by  the  opening  of  the  twentieth  century, 
the  negro  as  a possible  voter  was  not  on  a legal  and 
constitutional  equality  with  the  white. 

In  the  sphere  of  government  the  war  and  recon- 
struction were  of  lasting  importance.  Preeminently  it 
was  definitely  established  that  the  federal  government 
is  supreme  over  the  states.  Although  the  Constitution 
had  seemed  to  many  to  establish  that  supremacy  in 
no  uncertain  terms,  it  can  not  be  doubted  that  only  as 
a result  of  the  war  and  reconstruction  did  the  theory 
receive  a degree  of  popular  assent  that  approached 
unanimity.  Temporarily,  at  least,  reconstruction 
added  greatly  to  the  prestige  and  self-confidence  of 
Congress.  During  the  war  the  powers  of  the  Presi- 
dent had  necessarily  expanded.  The  reaction,  al- 
though hastened  by  the  character  and  disposition  of 
President  Johnson,  was  inevitable.  The  depression  of 
the  executive  elevated  the  legislature  and  not  until  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  did  the  scales  swing 
back  again  toward  their  former  position. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

General.  The  best  general  account  of  the  period  1865- 
1917  is  to  be  found  in  the  following  volumes  of  The  American 
Nation:  A History:  W.  A.  Dunning,  Reconstruction  Political 
and  Economic,  1865-1877  (1907)  ; E.  E.  Sparks,  National  De- 
velopment, 1877-1885  (1907)  ; D.  R.  Dewey,  National  Prob- 
lems, 1885-1897  (1907)  ; .1.  H.  Latane,  America  as  a World 
Power,  1897-1907  (1907)  ; F.  A.  Ogg,  National  Progress, 
1907—1917  (1918).  The  volumes  vary  in  excellence  and  in- 
terest, but  set  a high  standard,  especially  in  their  recognition 
of  the  importance  of  economic  facts,  and  contain  excellent 
bibliographical  material.  The  following  single  volumes  are 


30 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


useful:  E.  B.  Andrews,  United  States  in  Our  Own  Time, 
1870-1903  (1903)  ; C.  A.  Beard,  Contemporary  American  His- 
tory (1914)  ; P.  L.  Haworth,  Reconstruction  and  Union, 
1865-1912  (1912)  ; P.  L.  Haworth,  United  States  in  Our  Own 
Time,  1865-1920 ; E.  P.  Oberholtzer,  History  of  the  United 
States  since  the  Civil  War  (to  be  in  several  volumes,  of  which 
one  appeared  in  1917,  covering  1865-1868)  ; F.  L.  Paxson,  The 
Aew  Nation  (1915)  ; H.  T.  Peck,  Twenty  Years  of  the  Repub- 
lic, 1885-1905  (1907),  readable  and  especially  valuable  in  its 
interpretation  of  the  period  which  it  covers;  J.  F.  Rhodes,  His- 
tory of  the  United  States  from  Hayes  to  McKinley,  1877-1896 
(1919),  lacks  understanding  of  the  period  covered.  J.  S. 
Bassett,  Short  History  of  the  United  States  (1913),  has  ex- 
cellent chapters  on  the  years  1865-1912 ; F.  J.  Turner  in  the 
Encyclopaedia  Britannica  (11th  ed.),  article  “United  States, 
Hi.story  1865-1910,”  is  brief  but  inclusive;  the  later  chapters 
of  iMax- Farrand,  Development  of  the  United  States  (1918), 
present  a new  point  of  view.  The  Chronicles  of  America 
Series  (1919  and  later),  edited  by  Allen  Johnson,  contains 
valuable  volumes  on  especial  topics.  For  party  platforms 
and  election  statistics  consult  Edward  Stanwood,  A History 
of  the  Presidency  (2  vols.,  2nd  ed.,  1916). 

Reconstruction.  The  most  valuable  single  volume  on  the 
reconstruction  period  is  the  volume  by  Dunning  alreadj^  re- 
ferred to;  W.  L.  Fleming,  Sequel  of  Appomattox  (1919),  is 
also  excellent;  J.  F.  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States 
since  the  Compromise  of  1850,  vols.  VI,  (1906),  is  the 
best  detailed  account;  James  Schouler,  History  of  the  United 
States,  vol.  VII  (1913),  presents  a new  view  of  President 
Johnson.  Valuable  biographies  are  J.  A.  AVoodburn,  The 
Life  of  Thaddeus  Stevens  (1913)  ; G.  H.  Haynes,  Charles 
Sumner  (1909)  ; Horace  AVhite,  The  Life  of  Toyman  Trum- 
bull (1913).  On  impeachment,  D.  AV.  Dewitt,  The  Impeach- 
ment and  Trial  of  Andrew  Johnson  (1903),  is  best.  W.  A. 
Dunning,  Essays  on  Civil  War  and  Reconstruction  (ed.  1910), 
is  strong  on  the  constitutional  changes.  Studies  on  recon- 
struction in  the  several  states  have  been  published  by  W.  AA^. 
Davis  (Florida),  (1913)  ; AV.  L.  Fleming  (Alabama),  (1905)  ; 


RECOXSTEUCTION 


31 


J.  "W.  Garner  (Mississippi),  (1901)  ; J.  G.  deR.  Hamilton 
(North  Carolina),  (1914)  ; C.  W.  Ramsdell  (Texas),  (1910j  ; 
and  others.  For  documentary  material,  W.  L.  Fleming, 
Documentary  History  of  Beconstr action  (2  vols.,  1906-7),  is 
essential.  Edward  Channiug,  A.  B.  Hart  and  F.  J.  Turner, 
Guide  to  the  Study  and  Reading  of  American  History  (1912), 
provides  full  references  to  a wide  variety  of  works  covering 
1865-1911.  Consult  also  Appleton’s  Annual  Oyclopaedia, 
1861-1902.  On  foreign  relations  J.  B.  Moore,  Digest  of  In- 
ternational Laic,  8 vols.,  (1906). 

Periodical  literature.  The  most  useful  periodicals  are: 
American  Economic  Revieiv  (1911 — ) ; American  Historical 
Recieiv  (1895 — ) ; American  Political  Science  Review 
(1907 — ) ; Atlantic  Monthly  (1857 — ) ; Century  Magazine 
(1870 — ) ; Harper’s  'Weekly  (1857-1916)  ; Harvard  Law  Re- 
vieiv; History  Teachers’  Magazine,  continued  as  Historical 
Outlook  (1909 — ) ; Journal  of  Political  Economy  (1892 — ) ; 
Ration  (1865 — ) ; North  American  Revieiv  (1815 — ) ; Politi- 
cal Science  Quarterly  (1886 — ) ; Quarterly  Jaurnal  of  Eco- 
nomics (1886 — ) ; Scribner’s  Magazine  (1887 — ) ; Yale  Re- 
view (1892-1911,  new  series,  1912 — ). 


CHAPTER  II 

IN  PRESIDENT  GRANT ’s  TIME 


Aside  from  President  Lincoln,  the  most  promi- 
nent personality  on  the  northern  side  during  the 
latter  part  of  the  Civil  War  was  General  Ulysses  S. 
Grant.  His  successes  in  the  Mississippi  Valley  in  the 
early  days  of  the  war,  when  success  was  none  too  com- 
mon, his  capture  of  Vicksburg  at  the  turning  point  of 
the  conflict,  and  his  dogged  drive  toward  Richmond  had 
established  his  military  reputation.  When  the  drive 
toward  Richmond  resulted  at  last  in  the  capture  of 
Lee’s  army  and  its  surrender  at  Appomattox,  the  vic- 
torious North  turned  with  gratitude  to  Grant  and  made 
him  a popular  idol,  while  the  politicians  began  to  ques- 
tion whether  his  popularity  might  not  be  put  to  ac- 
count in  the  field  of  politics. 

Grant  himself  had  never  paid  any  attention  to  mat- 
ters of  government.  In  only  one  presidential  election 
had  he  so  much  as  voted  for  a candidate,  and  then  it 
was  for  a Democrat,  James  Buchanan.  In  1860  he 
was  prevented  from  voting  for  Senator  Stephen  A. 
Douglas  and  against  Abraham  Lincoln  only  by  the  fact 
that  he  had  not  fulfilled  the  residence  requirement  for 
suffrage  in  the  town  where  he  was  living.  Neverthe- 
less in  his  capacity  as  general  of  the  army  his  head- 
quarters after  the  war  were  in  Washington  and  his 
duties  brought  him  into  contact  with  the  politicians 
and  eventually  entangled  him  in  the  controversy  be- 
tween the  President  and  Congress.  Circumstances  at 

32 


IN  PRESIDENT.  GRANT’S  TIME 


33 


first  threw  liim  into  close  association  with  Johnson,  but 
at  the  time  of  the  Stanton  episode  late  in  1867  a mis- 
understanding arose  between  them  which  developed 
into  a question  of  veracity,  and  then  into  open  hostility. 
The  opponents  of  the  President  took  up  the  General’s 
case  with  alacrity  and  from  then  on  the  popular  hero 
was  looked  upon  as  the  inevitable  choice  for  the  next 
Republican  nomination. 

The  convention  of  the  National  Union  Republican 
Party,  as  it  was  called  at  that  time,  was  held  in  Chi- 
cago, May  20,  1868,  during  the  interval  between  the 
votes  on  the  eleventh  and  second  charges  of  the  im- 
peachment of  President  Johnson.  General  Grant  was 
unanimously  nominated  for  the  presidency  and  Schuy- 
ler Colfax,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
for  the  second  place  on  the  ticket.  The  platform  por- 
trayed the  benefits  of  radical  reconstruction  and  de- 
fended negro  suffrage  in  the  South.  In  the  North  at 
that  time  the  black  was  commonly  denied  the  vote — the 
Fifteenth  Amendment  having  not  yet  been  ratified — 
and  the  convention  accordingly  declared  that  the  ques- 
tion of  suffrage  in  all  the  “loyal”  states  properly  be- 
longed in  the  states  themselves.  Other  planks  as- 
serted that  the  public  debt  ought  to  be  paid  in  full,  that 
pensions  for  the  veterans  were  an  obligation  and  that 
immigration  ought  to  be  encouraged.  The  adminis- 
tration of  President  Johnson  was  denounced  and  the 
thirty-five  senators  who  voted  for  his  conviction  in  the 
impeachment  trial  were  commended. 

The  Democrats  met  at  Tammany  Hall  in  New  York 
on  July  4.  Their  platform  approved  the  pension  laws, 
advocated  the  sale  of  public  land  to  actual  occupants, 
praised  the  administration  of  President  Johnson,  ar- 
raigned .the  radicals  and  declared  the  reconstruction 
acts  “unconstitutional,  revolutionary,  and  void.”  If 


34 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


the  rjidical  party  should  win  in  the  election,  the  Demo- 
crats asserted,  the  result  would  be  “a  subjected  and 
conquered  people,  amid  the  ruins  of  liberty  and  the 
scattered  fragments  of  the  Constitution.”  The  regu- 
lation of  the  suffrage,  one  plank  declared,  had  always 
been  in  the  hands  of  the  individual  states.  The  most 
prominent  place  in  the  platform,  however,  was  given 
to  the  question  of  the  public  debt.  Part  of  the  bonds 
issued  during  the  war  had,  by  acts  of  Congress,  been 
made  payable  in  “dollars,”  a word  which  might  mean 
either  paper  dollars  or  gold  dollars.  Paper,  however, 
was  much  less  valuable  than  gold,  times  were  hard,  and 
many  people  held  the  opinion  that  the  debt  could  prop- 
erly be  paid  in  paper.  Such  was  the  “Ohio  idea,” 
which  was  made  part  of  the  Democratic  platform. 

The  choice  of  a candidate  required  twenty-two  bal- 
lots. Early  trials  indicated  the  strength  of  George  H. 
Pendleton,  popularly  known  as  “Gentleman  George” 
and  the  chief  exponent  of  the  “Ohio  idea.”  Johnson 
also  had  support.  Chief  Justice  Salmon  P.  Chase,  hav- 
ing failed  to  obtain  the  Republican  nomination,  allowed 
it  to  be  known  that  he  was  willing  to  become  the  Demo- 
cratic candidate.  At  length,  on  the  twenty-second  bal- 
lot, a few  votes  were  cast  for  Governor  Horatio  Sey- 
mour of  New  York,  the  chairman  of  the  convention. 
The  move  met  with  enthusiastic  approval,  despite  Sey- 
mour’s insistence  that  he  would  not  be  a candidate,  and 
he  was  unanimously  chosen. 

The  developments  of  the  campaign  depended  largely 
upon  occurrences  in  the  South.  Militarj^  reconstruc- 
tion had  not  been  wholly  completed  in  Virginia,  Mis- 
sissippi, Texas  and  Georgia.  The  last  of  these  states 
had  once  been  readmitted  to  the  Union,  but  had  im- 
mediately expelled  the  negro  members  of  its  legisla- 
ture, and  was  thereupon  placed  again  under  military 


IN  PKESIDENT  GRANT’S  TIME 


35 


rule.  The  Kii  Klux  Klan  was  meanwhile  in  general  op- 
eration throughout  the  South  and  its  activities,  both 
real  and  imaginary,  received  wide  advertisement  in 
the  North.  Public  interest,  therefore,  in  the  underly- 
ing issues  of  the  campaign  centered  upon  the  attitude 


^871  /SSO  ''888  '8f£  ''89^ 

of  the  candidates  toward  the  southern  question.  Gen- 
eral Grant  was  understood  to  be  with  the  radicals  and 
Seymour  with  the  conservatives.  The  result  of  the 
election  was  the  choice  of  the  Republican  leader  by  an 
apparently  large  majority.  He  carried  twenty-six  out 
of  thirty-four  states,  with  214  out  of  294  electoral  votes. 


36 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


but  he  received  a popular  majority  of  only  300,000. 
Examination  of  the  returns  indicated  a strong  con- 
servative minority  in  many  of  the  solid  Republican 
states.  The  strength  of  the  radicals  in  the  South, 
moreover,  was  due,  in  the  main,  to  negro-carpetbag 
domination,  and  when  these  states  should  become  con- 
servative, as  they  were  sure  to  do,  the  political  parties 
would  be  almost  evenly  divided.^ 

The  man  who  was  now  entering  upon  his  first  expe- 
rience as  the  holder  of  an  elective  office  had  risen  from 
obscuritj"  to  public  favor  in  the  space  of  a few  years. 
Although  a graduate  of  West  Point,  with  eleven  years 
of  military  experience  afterward,  his  career  before 
1861  had  been  hardly  more  than  a failure.  He  had 
left  the  army  in  1854  rather  than  stand  trial  on  a charge 
of  drunkenness;  had  grubbed  a scanty  living  out  of 
“Hard  Scrabble,’’  a farm  in  Missouri;  had  tried  his 
hand  at  real  estate,  acted  as  clerk  in  a custom-house 
and  worked  in  a leather  store  at  $800  a year.  Then 
came  the  war,  and  in  less  than  three  years  Grant  had 
received  the  title  of  Lieutenant-General,  which  only 
Washington  had  borne  before  him,  and  had  become 
General-in-Chief  of  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States. 
Always  an  uncommunicative  man,  he  kept  his  own 
counsel  during  the  interval  between  his  election  and 
his  inauguration.  He  saw  few  politicians,  asked  no 
advice  about  his  cabinet,  sought  no  assistance  in  pre- 
paring his  inaugural  address  and  made  no  suggestions 
to  the  leaders  of  his  party  concerning  legislation  that 
he  would  like  to  see  passed.  His  first  act,  the  appoint- 

1 The  closing  months  of  Johnson’s  administration  found  him  almost 
in  a state  of  isolation.  The  incoming  President  refused  to  have  any 
social  relations  with  him,  or  even  to  ride  with  him  from  the  White 
House  to  the  Capitol  on  inauguration  day.  After  the  installation'  of 
his  successor,  Johnson  returned  to  Tennessee  but  was  later  chosen  to 
the  Senate,  where  he  served  hut  a short  time  before  his  death. 


IN  PEESIDENT  GEANT’S  TIME 


37 


meiit  of  Ms  cabinet,  caused  a gasp  of  surprise  and  dis- 
may. Most  of  the  men  named  were  but  little  known 
and  some  of  them  were  not  aware  that  they  were  being 
chosen  until  the  list  was  made  public.  The  Secretary 
of  State,  Elihu  Washburne,  was  a close  personal  friend, 
and  was  appointed  merely  that  he  might  hold  the  posi- 
tion long  enough  to  enjoy  the  title  and  then  retire.  He 
was  succeeded  by  Hamilton  Fish,  of  New  York,  who 
proved  to  be  a wise  choice.  The  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  was  A.  T.  Stewart,  a rich  merchant  of  New 
York,  but  he  had  to  withdraw  immediately  on  account 
of  a law  forbidding  any  person  “interested  in  carrying 
on  the  business  of  trade  or  commerce”  to  hold  the  office. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  A.  E.  Borie,  was  a rich  in- 
valid of  Philadelphia,  who  had  almost  no  qualifications 
for  his  office  and  resigned  at  once.  Better  appoint- 
ments were  former  Governor  J.  D.  Cox,  of  Ohio,  as  Sec- 
retary of  the  Interior,  and  Judge  E.  E.  Hoar,  of  Mas- 
sachusetts, as  Attorney-General. 

When  the  Congress  elected  with  Grant  assembled  in 
1869  its  first  act  was  a measure  providing  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  public  debt  in  coin.  Part  of  the  Tenure  of 
Office  Act  was  repealed,  the  President  having  indicated 
his  opposition  to  it.  On  the  southern  question  General 
Grant  had  earlier  inclined  toward  moderation,  but  radi- 
cal counsels  and  the  logic  of  events  led  him  to  join 
Congress  in  the  passage  of  the  enforcement  act  and 
the  Ku  Klux  Act,  both  of  which  have  already  been 
mentioned. 

It  was  during  this,  the  first  year  of  Grant’s  admin- 
istration, that  there  occurred  the  famous  gold  con- 
spiracy of  1869.  Jay  Gould  and  James  Fisk,  Jr.,  two 
of  the  most  unscrupulous  stock  gamblers  of  the  time, 
determined  to  corner  the  supply  of  gold  and  then  run 
its  market  price  up  to  a high  level,  in  order  to  further 


38 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


certain  interests  which  they  had  recently  purchased. 
The  likelihood  that  the  conspirators  could  carry  out  the 
plan  depended  largely  on  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury, George  S.  Boutwell,  who  was  accustomed  to  sell 
several  millions  of  dollars’  worth  of  gold  each  month. 
If  the  sales  could  he  stopped  Gould  and  Fisk  might  be 
successful.  Accordingly,  they  got  on  friendly  terms 
with  the  President  through  cultivating  the  acquaint- 
ance of  his  brother-in-law,  were  seen  publicly  with  him 
at  the  theatre  and  other  places,  and  subsequently  he 
wrote  to  the  Secretary  expressing  his  opinion  that  the 
sales  had  better  stop.  Gould  apparently  was  informed 
of  this  decision  by  the  brother-in-law,  even  before  the 
message  reached  the  Secretary,  and  immediately 
bought  up  so  much  gold  as  to  run  the  price  to  an  un- 
paralleled figure.  This  was  on  “Black  Friday,”  Sep- 
tember 24.  The  Secretary  became  alarmed,  rumors 
were  abroad  that  the  administration  was  implicated  in 
the  conspiracy,  and  at  noon,  after  consultation  with  the 
President,  he  decided  to  place  four  millions  in  gold  on 
the  market.  At  once  the  price  dropped,  brokers  went 
bankrupt,  and  Gould  and  Fisk  had  to  take  refuge  be- 
hind armed  guards  to  save  their  lives.  The  President 
had  not  been  a party  to  the  plans  of  the  speculators, 
but  his  blindness  to  their  real  purposes  and  his  asso- 
ciation with  them  during  the  period  when  their  scheme 
was  being  perfected  made  him  a target  for  all  manner 
of  accusations. 

Further  astonishment  was  caused  by  the  attitude  of 
the  President  toward  two  of  the  three  really  able  men 
in  his  cabinet.  In  June,  1870,  he  suddenly  called  for 
the  resignation  of  Judge  Hoar.  It  appeared  that  he 
was  seeking  votes  in  the  Senate  for  a treaty  in  which 
he  was  interested  and  that  certain  southern  members 
demanded  the  post  of  attorney-general  for  a southern 


IN  PRESIDENT  GRANT’S  TIME 


39 


man  in  return  for  their  support.  Secretary  Cox’s  res- 
ignation came  soon  afterward.  He  had  taken  his  de- 
partment out  of  politics,  had  furthered  the  cause  of 
civil  service  reform  and  had  protected  his  employees 
from  political  party  assessments.  These  acts  brought 
him  into  collision  with  the  politicians,  who  had  the  ear 
of  the  President,  and  Cox  had  to  retire.  Both  Hoar 
and  Cox  were  succeeded  by  mediocre  men. 

The  treaty  which  caused  the  removal  of  Secretary 
Hoar  was  one  that  the  President  had  arranged  provid- 
ing for  the  annexation  of  San  Domingo.  The  Senate 
was  opposed  to  ratification,  but  General  Grant  was  ac- 
customed to  overcoming  difficulties  and  he  urged  his 
case  with  all  the  power  at  his  command.  One  result 
was  an  unseemly  wrangle  between  the  President  and 
Senator  Charles  Sumner  over  the  latter’s  refusal  to 
support  ratification.  General  Grant,  in  resentment, 
procured  the  withdrawal  of  the  Senator’s  friend,  John 
Lothrop  Motley  from  England,  Avhither  he  had  been 
sent  as  minister,  and  later  the  exclusion  of  Sumner 
from  the  chairmanship  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  a post  in  Avhich  he  had  displayed  great  abil- 
ity for  ten  years.  Eventually  the  President  had  to 
give  Avay  on  San  Domingo,  as  the  Senate  did  not  agree 
Avith  him  in  his  estimate  of  its  probable  Amine. 

In  its  conduct  of  our  relations  Avith  England,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  administration  met  Avith  success  and 
receiAmd  popular  approAml.  EAmr  since  the  Avar  the 
people  of  the  North  had  desired  an  opportunity  to 
make  Great  Britain  suffer  for  her  attitude  during  that 
struggle.  Senator  Sumner  struck  a popular  chord 
Avhen  he  suggested  that  England  should  pay  heavy 
damages  on  the  ground  that  her  encouragement  of  the 
South  had  prolonged  the  Avar.  Specifically,  hoAvever, 
the  United  States  demanded  reparation  for  destruction 


40 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


committed  by  the  Alabama  and  other  vessels  that  had 
been  built  in  Eng’lish  ports.  In  1870  Europe  was  in  a 
state  of  apprehension  on  account  of  the  Franco-Prus- 
sian  War,  and  Secretary  Fish  seized  the  opportunity  to 
press  our  claims  upon  England.  The  latter,  mean- 
while, had  abated  somewhat  her  earlier  attitude  of  un- 
willingness to  arbitrate,  and  Fish  placed  little  em- 
phasis on  Senator  Sumner’s  suggestions  of  a claim  for 
indirect  damages.  The  Treaty  of  Washington,  signed 
and  ratified  in  May,  1871,  provided  for  the  arbitration 
of  the  Alabama  claims  under  such  rules  that  a de- 
cision favorable  to  the  American  side  of  the  case  was 
made  exceedingly  probable.  Each  of  five  governments 
appointed  a representative — the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  Italy,  Switzerland  and  Brazil.  The  meeting 
took  place  in  Geneva  and  resulted  favorably  to  the 
American  demands.  England  was  declared  to  have 
failed  to  preserve  the  proper  attitude  for  a neutral 
during  the  war  and  was  ordered  in  1872  to  make  com- 
pensation in  the  amount  of  $15,500,000. 

The  United  States  had  need  of  any  feeling  of  national 
pride  that  might  come  as  the  result  of  the  Geneva 
award,  to  offset  the  shame  of  domestic  revelations,  for 
one  of  the  characteristics  of  the  decade  after  the  war 
was  the  wide-spread  corruption  in  political  and  com- 
mercial life.  One  of  the  most  flagrant  examples  was 
the  Tweed  Ring  in  New  York.  The  government  of  that 
city  was  in  the  hands  of  a band  of  highwaymen,  of 
whom  William  M.  Tweed,  the  leader  of  Tammany  Hall, 
was  chief.  Through  the  purchase  of  votes  and  the  skil- 
ful distribution  of  the  proceeds  of  their  control,  they 
managed  to  keep  in  power  despite  a growing  suspicion 
that  something  was  wrong.  A favorite  method  of  de- 
frauding the  city  was  to  raise  an  account.  One  who 
had  a bill  against  the  city  for  $5,000  would  be  asked 


IN  PEESIDENT  GEANT’S  TIME 


41 


to  present  one  for  $55,000.  Wlien  he  did  so,  he  would 
receive  his  $5,000  and  the  remainder  would  be  divided 
among  the  members  of  the  Eing.  The  plasterer,  for 
exam]  le,  who  worked  on  the  County  Court  House  pre- 
sented bills  for  nearly  $3,000,000  in  nine  months.  The 
New  York  Times  and  the  cartoons  of  Thomas  Nast  in 
Harper’s  Weekly  were  the  chief  agents  in  arousing  the 
people  of  the  city  to  their  situation.  The  former  ob- 
tained and  published  proofs  of  the  rascality  of  the 
Eing,  mass  meetings  were  held  and  an  election  in  No- 
vember, 1871,  overturned  Tweed  and  his  associates. 
Some  of  them  fled  from  the  country,  while  Tweed  him- 
self died  in  jail. 

More  important  both  because  of  its  effect  on  national 
politics  and  because  of  its  influence  on  railway  legis- 
lation for  many  years  afterward  was  the  Credit  Mo- 
bilier  scandal.  The  Credit  Mobilier  was  a construction 
company  composed  of  a selected  group  of  stockholders 
of  the  Union  Pacific  Eailroad,  the  transcontinental  line 
which  was  being  built  between  1865  and  1869.  In  their 
capacity  of  railroad  stockholders  they  awarded  them- 
selves as  stockholders  of  the  construction  company  the 
contract  to  build  and  equip  a large  part  of  the  railway. 
The  terms  which  they  gave  themselves  were  so  gener- 
ous as  to  insure  a handsome  profit.  Chief  among  the 
members  of  the  Credit  Mobilier  was  Oakes  Ames,  a 
member  of  Congress  from  Massachusetts.  Late  in 
1867  Ames  became  fearful  of  railroad  legislation  that 
was  being  introduced  in  "Washington  and  he  therefore 
decided  to  take  steps  to  protect  the  enterprise.  He 
was  given  343  shares  of  Credit  Mobilier  stock,  which 
he  placed  among  members  of  Congress  where,  as  he 
said,  they  would  ‘ ‘ do  most  good.  ’ ’ Eumors  concerning 
the  nature  of  the  transaction  resulted  finally  in  accusa- 
tions in  the  New  York  Sun  during  1872,  which  involved 


42 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


the  names  of  many  prominent  politicians.  Congres- 
sional committees  were  at  once  appointed  to  investi- 
gate the  charges,  and  their  reports  caused  genuine  sen- 
sations. Ames  was  found  guilty  of  selling  stock  at 
lower  than  face  value  in  order  to  influence  votes  in 
Congress  and  was  censured  by  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. The  Vice-President,  Schuyler  Colfax,  and 
several  others  were  so  entangled  in  the  affair  as  to 
lose  their  reputations  and  retire  from  public  life  for 
good.  Still  others  such  as  James  A.  Garfleld  were  sus- 
pected of  complicity  and  were  placed  for  many  years  on 
the  defensive. 

Fear  was  wide-spread  that  political  life  in  Wash- 
ington was  riddled  with  corruption.  Corporations 
wdiich  were  large  and  wealthy  for  that  day  were  al- 
ready getting  a controlling  grip  on  the  legislatures  of 
the  states,  and  if  the  Credit  Mobilier  scandal  were 
typical,  had  begun  to  reach  out  to  Congress.  Had  the 
charges  been  made  a little  earlier  they  might  have  in- 
fluenced the  election  of  1872,  which  turned  largely  on 
certain  omissions  and  failings  of  the  administration, 
and  especially  of  General  Grant  himself. 

There  is  something  intensely  pathetic  in  General 
Grant  as  President  of  the  United  States — this  short, 
slouchy,  taciturn,  unostentatious  man  who  was  more  at 
ease  with  men  who  talked  horses  than  with  men  who 
talked  government  or  literature;  this  President  who 
was  unacquainted  with  either  the  theory  or  the  prac- 
tice of  politics,  who  consulted  nobody  in  choosing  his 
cabinet  or  writing  his  inaugural  address,  who  had 
scarcely  visited  a state  capital  except  to  capture  it  and 
had  been  elected  to  the  executive  chair  in  times  that 
were  to  try  men’s  souls.  An  indolent  man,  he  called 
himself,  but  the  world  knew  that  he  was  tireless  and  ir- 
resistible on  the  field  when  necessity  demanded,  per- 


IN  PRESIDENT  GRANT’S  TIME 


43 


sisteiit,  imperturbable,  simple  and  direct  in  his  lan- 
guage, and  upright  in  his  character.  The  tragedy  of 
President  Grant’s  career  was  his  choice  of  friends  and 
advisors.  In  Congress  he  followed  the  counsels  of  sec- 
ond-rate men  who  gave  him  second-rate  advice;  out- 
side he  associated  too  frequently  with  questionable 
characters  who  cleverly  used  him  as  a mask  for  schemes 
that  were  an  insult  to  his  integrity,  but  which  his  lack 
of  experience  and  his  utter  inability  to  judge  char- 
acter kept  hidden  from  his  view.  Honorable  himself 
and  loyal  to  a fault  to  his  friends,  he  believed  in  the 
honesty  of  men  who  betrayed  him,  long  after  the  rest 
of  the  world  had  discovered  what  they  were.  He  could 
accept  costly  gifts  from  admirers  and  appoint  these 
same  men  to  offices,  without  dreaming  that  their  gen- 
erosity had  sprung  from  any  motive  except  gratitude 
for  his  services  during  the  war.^ 

It  was  inevitable,  in  view  of  these  facts,  that  the 
presidential  campaign  of  1872  should  be  essentially  an 
anti-Grant  movement,  but  its  particular  characteris- 
tics had  their  origin  before  the  General’s  first  election. 
In  1865  a constitutional  convention  in  Missouri  had 
deprived  southern  sympathizers  of  the  right  to  vote 
and  hold  office.  A wing  of  the  Republican  party,  led 
by  Colonel  B.  Gratz  Brown,  had  begun  a counter- 
movement, intended  to  remove  the  restrictions  on  the 
southerners,  and  also  to  reform  other  abuses  in  the 
state.  Colonel  Brown  had  early  received  the  assist- 
ance of  General  Carl  Schurz,  a man  of  ability  with  the 
temperament  of  a reformer.  The  Brown-Schurz  fac- 

1 In  1884,  a year  before  his  death,  the  dishonesty  of  a trusted  friend 
left  him  bankrupt,  while  a painful  and  malignant  disease  began  slowly 
to  eat  away  his  life.  Nevertheless,  with  characteristic  courage  he  set 
himself  to  the  task  of  dictating  his  Memoirs,  or  more  often  penciling 
sentences  when  he  was  unable  to  speak,  in  order  that  he  might  repay 
his  debts  with  the  proceeds. 


44 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


tion  had  quickly  increased  in  numbers,  had  become 
known  as  the  Liberal  Republican  party  and  had  at- 
tracted such  interest  throughout  the  country  that  a 
national  conference  was  called  for  May,  1872,  at  Cin- 
cinnati. In  adopting  a conciliatory  southern  policy, 
the  Liberal  Republicans  became  opposed  to  the  Presi- 
dent, who  had  by  this  time  become  thoroughly  com- 
mitted to  the  radical  program.  Other  critics  of  the 
administration,  mainly  Republicans,  became  interested 
in  the  Liberal  revolt — those  who  deprecated  the  Presi- 
dent’s choice  of  associates  and  advisors,  the  civil  serv- 
ice reformers  who  were  aroused  by  the  dismissal  of 
Secretaries  Hoar  and  Cox,  and  the  tariff  reformers 
who  had  vainly  attempted  to  arouse  enthusiasm  for 
th'eir  plans. 

On  account  of  the  varied  character  of  the  elements 
which  composed  it  and  the  independent  spirit  of  its 
members,  the  Cincinnati  assembly  resembled  a mass 
meeting  rather  than  a well-organized  political  confer- 
ence. It  numbered  among  its  members,  nevertheless, 
many  men  of  influence  and  repute.  Some  of  the  most 
powerful  newspaper  editors  of  the  country,  also,  were 
friendly  to  its  purpose,  so  that  it  seemed  likely  to  be 
a decisive  factor  in  the  coming  campaign.  In  most 
respects  the  platform  reflected  the  anti-Grant  character 
of  the  convention.  It  condemned  the  administration 
for  keeping  unworthy  men  in  power,  favored  the  re- 
moval of  all  disabilities  imposed  on  southerners  be- 
cause of  the  rebellion,  objected  to  interference  by  the 
federal  government  in  local  affairs — a reference  to  the 
use  of  troops  to  enforce  the  radical  reconstruction 
policy — and  advocated  civil  service  reform.  The  con- 
vention found  difficulty  in  stating  its  attitude  toward 
the  tariff  question.  It  was  deemed  necessary  to  get 
the  support  of  Horace  Greeley,  the  editor  of  the  New 


IN  PRESIDENT  GRANT’S  TIME 


45 


York  Tribune,  the  most  powerful  northern  newspaper 
of  Civil  War  times,  but  Greeley  was  an  avowed  pro- 
tectionist. The  platform,  therefore,  evaded  the  issue 
by  referring  it  to  the  people  in  their  congressional  dis- 
tricts, and  to  Congress.  But  the  rock  on  which  the 
movement  met  shipwreck  was  the  nomination  of  a 
candidate.  Many  able  men  were  available — Charles 
Francis  Adams,  who  had  been  minister  to  England, 
Senator  Lyman  Trumbull,  B.  Gratz  Brown  and  Judge 
David  Davis  of  the  Supreme  Court.  Any  one  of  them 
Avould  haA’e  made  a strong  candidate.  The  convention, 
however,  passed  oAmr  all  of  them  and  nominated 
Greeley,  long  known  as  being  against  tariff  reform, 
against  cml  service  reform  and  hostile  to  the  Demo- 
crats, Avhose  support  must  be  obtained  in  order  to 
achieve  success.  Although  a journalist  of  great  in- 
fluence and  capacity,  Greeley  was  an  erratic  individual, 
AAdiose  appearance  and  manner  were  the  joy  of  the 
cartoonist. 

The  Republican  convention  met  on  June  5,  and  unani- 
mously re-nominated  Grant.  The  platform  recited  the 
achievements  of  the  party  since  1861,  urged  the  reform 
of  the  civil  service,  advocated  import  duties  and  ap- 
proA’ed  of  the  enforcement  acts  and  amnesty. 

To  the  Democrats  the  greatest  likelihood  of  success 
seemed  to  lie  in  the  adoption  of  the  Liberal  Republican 
nominee  and  platform.  Such  a course,  to  be  sure, 
would  commit  them  to  a candidate  who  had  excoriated 
their  party  forVears  in  his  newspaper,  and  to  the  three 
war  amendments  to  the  Constitution,  which  the  Liberal 
Republicans  had  accepted.  Yet  it  promised  the  South 
relief  from  military  enforcement  of  obnoxious  laws,  and 
that  was  Avorth  much.  Both  Greeley  and  his  platform 
AA’ere  accordingly  accepted. 

The  enthusiasm  for  the  Liberal  movement  Avhich  was 


46 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


observable  at  the  opening  of  the  campaigni  rapidly 
dvdndled  as  the  significance  of  the  nomination  became 
more  clear.  Greeley  was  open  to  attack  from  too  many 
quarters.  The  cartoons  of  Nast  in  Harper’s  Weekly, 
especially,  held  him  np  to  merciless  ridicule.  In  the 
end  he  was  defeated  by  750,000  votes  in  a total  of  six 
and  a half  million,  a disaster  which,  together  with  the 
death  of  his  wife  and  the  overwork  of  the  campaign,  re- 
sulted in  his  death  shortly  after  the  election.  As  for 
the  Republicans  they  elected  not  only  their  candidate 
but  also  a sufficient  majority  in  Congress  to  carry  out 
any  program  that  the  party  might  desire. 

On  March  3,  1873,  as  Grant’s  first  term  was  drawing 
to  a close.  Congress  passed  a measure  increasing  the 
salary  of  public  officials  from  the  President  to  the  mem- 
bers of  the  House  of  Representatives.  The  increase 
for  Congressmen  was  made  retroactive,  so  that  each  of 
them  would  receive  $5,000  for  the  two  years  just  past. 
To  a country  whose  fears  and  suspicions  had  been 
aroused  by  the  Credit  Mobilier  scandal,  the  “salary 
grab”  and  the  “back  pay  steal”  were  fresh  indica- 
tions that  corruption  was  entrenched  in  Washington. 
Senators  and  Representatives  began  at  once  to  hear 
from  their  constituencies.  Many  of  them  returned  the 
increase  to  the  treasury  and  when  the  next  session 
opened,  the  law  was  repealed  except  so  far  as  it  applied 
to  the  president  and  the  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court. 

The  congressional  elections  of  1874  indicated  the  ex- 
tent of  the  popular  distrust  of  the  administration.  In 
New  York,  where  Samuel  J.  Tilden  was  chosen  gov- 
ernor, and  in  such  Republican  strongholds  as  Massa- 
chusetts and  Pennsylvania  the  Democrats  were  suc- 
cessful. In  the  House  of  Representatives  the  Repub- 
lican two-thirds  majority  was  wiped  out  and  the  Demo- 


IN  PRESIDENT  GRANT’S  TIME  47 

crats  given  complete  control.  Even  the  redoubtable 
Benjamin  F.  Butler  lost  bis  seat. 

Further  apprebensions  were  aroused  by  rumors  con- 
cerning the  operations  of  a “Whiskey  Ring.”  For 
some  years  it  bad  been  suspected  that  a ring  of  revenue 
officials  with  accomplices  in  Washington  were  in  collu- 
sion ’with  the  distillers  to  defraud  the  government  of 
the  lawful  tax  on  whiskey.  Part  of  the  illegal  gains 
were  said  to  have  gone  into  the  campaign  fund  for 
Grant’s  re-election,  although  he  was  ignorant  of  the 
source  of  the  revenue.  Benjamin  H.  Bristow,  who 
became  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in  1874,  began  the 
attempt  to  stop  the  frauds  and  capture  the  guilty 
parties.  This  was  no  simple  task,  because  informa- 
tion of  impending  action  was  surreptitiously  sent  out 
by  officials  in  Washington.  Finally  Secretarj^  Bristow 
got  the  information  which  he  sought,  and  then  moved 
to  capture  the  criminals.  One  of  the  most  prominent 
members  of  the  Ring  was  an  internal  revenue  official 
in  St.  Louis  who,  it  was  recollected,  had  entertained 
President  Grant,  had  presented  him  with  a pair  of 
horses  and  a wagon,  and  had  given  the  General’s  pri- 
vate secretary  a diamond  shirt-stud  valued  at  $2,400. 
Public  opinion  was  yet  further  shocked,  however,  when 
the  trail  of  indictments  led  to  the  President’s  private 
secretary.  General  Babcock.  On  first  receiving  the 
news  of  Bristow’s  discoveries.  Grant  had  written  “Let 
no  guilty  man  escape”;  but  later  he  became  secretly 
and  then  openly  hostile  to  the  investigation.  During 
the  trial  of  Babcock,  the  President  asked  to  be  a wit- 
ness in  his  behalf.  A verdict  of  acquittal  was  given, 
but  afterwards  the  two  men  had  a private  conference, 
and  when  “Grant  came  out,  his  face  was  set  in  silence.” 
Babcock  never  returned  to  the  White  House  as  Secre- 


48 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


tary,  but  was  given  the  post  of  Superintendent  of  Pub- 
lic Buildings  and  Grounds.  Several  of  the  members  of 
the  Ring  were  imprisoned  but  were  later  pardoned  by 
the  President.  In  the  meanwhile  Grant  seems  to  have 
been  brought  to  believe  that  Bristow  was  persecuting 
Babcock  with  a view  to  getting  the  favor  of  the  reform 
element  in  the  party  and  eventually  the  presidential 
nomination.  Relations  between  the  two  became 
strained  and  Bristow  resigned. 

The  last  year  of  Grant’s  second  administration  was 
blackened  by  the  case  of  W.  W.  Belknap,  who  was  then 
Secretary  of  War.  Investigation  by  a House  com- 
mittee uncovered  the  fact  that  since  1870  an  employee 
in  the  Indian  service  had  paid  $12,000  and  later  $6,000 
a year  for  the  privilege  of  retaining  his  office.  The 
money  had  been  paid  at  first  to  Mrs.  Belknap,  who 
had  made  the  arrangement,  and  after  her  death  to  the 
Secretary  himself.  The  House  unanimously  voted  to 
impeach  him,  but  on  the  day  when  the  vote  was  taken 
he  resigned  and  the  President  accepted  the  resignation. 
Only  the  fact  that  he  was  out  of  office  prevented  the 
Senate  from  declaring  him  guilty,  and  critics  of  the 
administration  noted  that  the  President  had  saved  an- 
other friend  from  deserved  punishment. 

It  would  be  easy  to  over-estimate  the  responsibility 
of  General  Grant  for  the  political  corruption  of  his 
administrations.  For  the  most  part  the  wrong-doing 
of  the  time  began  before  his  first  election.  Democrats 
as  well  as  Republicans  participated  in  many  of  the  scan- 
dals. Politicians  in  the  cities,  the  states  and  the  nation 
seemed  to  be  determined  to  have  a share  in  the  enor- 
mous wealth  that  was  being  created  in  America,  and 
they  got  it  by  means  that  varied  from  the  merely  un- 
ethical and  indiscreet,  to  the  openly  corrupt.  As  for 
the  President,  his  own  defence,  given  in  his  last  mes- 


IN  PRESIDENT  GRANT’S  TIME 


49 


sage  to  Congress,  may  be  taken  as  the  best  one: 
“Failures  have  been  errors  of  judgment,  not  of  intent.” 

Under  the  circumstances,  however,  it  was  natural 
that  the  presidential  campaign  of  1876  should  turn  upon 
the  failings  of  the  administration.  Popular  interest  in 
the  southern  issue  was  on  the  wane.  Early  in  the  elec- 
tion year,  nevertheless,  James  G.  Blaine,  Republican 
leader  in  the  House,  made  a forceful  attack  on  Jeffer- 
son Davis,  as  the  wilful  author  of  the  “gigantic  mur- 
ders and  crimes  at  Andersonville,”  the  southern  prison 
in  which  federal  captives  had  been  held.  Instantly  the 
sectional  hatred  flared  up  and  Blaine,  already  a well- 
known  leader,  became  a prominent  candidate  for  the 
nomination.  Republican  reformers  generally  favored 
Bristow.  A third-term  boom  for  Grant  was  effectively 
crushed  by  an  adverse  resolution  in  the  House. 

The  Republican  nominating  convention  met  on  June 
14.  The  virtues  of  Blaine  were  set  forth  in  a famous 
speech  by  Robert  G.  Ingersoll  in  which  he  referred  to 
the  attack  on  Davis:  “Like  an  armed  warrior,  like  a 
plumed  knight  James  G.  Blaine  marched  down  the  halls 
of  the  American  Congress  and  threw  his  shining  lance 
full  and  fair  against  the  brazen  forehead  of  every 
traitor  to  his  country.”  The  “plumed  knight,”  how- 
ever, was  Open  to  attack  concerning  a scandal  during 
the  Grant  regime,  and  the  convention  turned  to  Gov- 
ernor Rutherford  B.  Hayes,  of  Ohio,  a man  of  quiet 
ability  who  had  been  unconnected  with  Washington 
politics,  was  relatively  unknown  and,  therefore,  not 
handicapped  by  the  antagonisms  of  previous  opponents. 
The  platform  emphasized  the  services  of  the  party 
during  the  war,  touched  lightly  on  the  events  of  the 
preceding  eight  years,  advocated  payment  of  the  public 
debt,  and  favored  import  duties  and  the  reform  of  the 
civil  service. 


50 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


The  Democrats  met  on  June  27.  There  was  little 
opposition  to  the  nomination  of  Governor  Samuel  J. 
Tilden,  of  New  York,  a wealthy  lawyer  who  had  made 
a record  as  a reformer  in  opposition  to  “Boss”  Tweed 
and  a corrupt  canal  ring.  The  platform  was  distinctly 
a refoimi  document.  It  demanded  reform  in  the  gov- 
ernments of  states  and  nation,  in  the  currency  system, 
the  tariff,  the  scale  of  public  expense,  and  the  civil 
service.  An  eloquent  paragraph  exhibited  those  cor- 
ruptions of  the  administration  which  had  caused  such 
general  dismay. 

There  was  little  in  the  campaign  that  was  distinctive, 
and  on  November  8,  the  morning  after  the  election,  it 
seemed  clear  that  Tilden  had  been  successful.  He  had 
carried  the  doubtful  states  of  Connecticut,  New  York, 
New  Jersey  and  Indiana.  When  the  figures  were  all 
gathered,  it  was  found  that  his  popular  vote  exceeded 
that  of  his  rival  by  more  than  250,000.  But  there  were 
disputes  in  three  states,  Florida,  Louisiana  and  South 
Carolina.  Hayes  would  be  elected  only  if  the  electoral 
votes  of  all  these  states  could  be  obtained  for  him.  If, 
however,  Tilden  received  even  one  electoral  vote  from 
any  of  the  states,  the  victory  would  be  his.  Hayes  was 
conceded  166  electoral  votes;  Tilden  184.  Nineteen 
were  in  dispute.  The  Republican  leaders  at  once 
claimed  the  nineteen  disputed  votes,  and  asserted  that 
their  candidate  was  elected.  The  Democrats  had  no 
doubt  of  the  victory  of  Tilden.^  The  capitals  of  the 
three  doubtful  states  now  became  the  centers  of  obser- 
vation. Troops  had  long  been  stationed  in  South  Caro- 
lina and  Louisiana,  and  others  were  promptly  sent  to 
Florida.  Prominent  politicians  from  both  parties  also 
flocked  thither,  in  order  to  uphold  the  party  interests. 

1 There  was  also  a technical  question  concerning  one  elector  in  Oregon, 
which  was  easily  settled. 


IN  PE.ESIDENT  GEANT’S  TIME 


51 


In  South  Carolina  it  became  evident  that  a majority 
of  the  popular  vote  was  for  Hayes,  although  both  the 
Democratic  and  the  Eepublican  electors  sent  in  returns 
to  IVashington.  In  Florida  there  was  a board  of  can- 
vassers which  had  power  to  exclude  false  or  fraudulent 
votes.  It  was  composed  of  two  Eepublicans  and  one 
Democrat.  When  all  ballots  had  been  sent  in,  the 
Democrats  claimed  a majority  of  ninety;  the  Eepubli- 
cans a majority  of  forty-five.  The  board  went  over  the 
returns  and  by  a partisan  vote  threw  out  enough  to 
make  the  Eepublican  majority  924.  Eepublican  elec- 
toral votes  were  thereupon  sent  to  Washington,  but  so 
also  were  Democratic  votes.  The  situation  in  Louisi- 
ana was  still  more  complicated.  Political  corruption 
and  intimidation  had  been  commonplaces  in  that  state. 
On  the  face  of  the  returns,  Tilden’s  electors  had  re- 
ceived majorities  varying  from  6,000  to  9,000.  As  in 
Florida  there  was  a board  of  canvassers  which  was 
here  composed  of  four  Eepublicans,  three  of  whom  were 
men  of  low  character.  The  vote  of  the  state  was 
offered  to  the  Democrats,  once  for  $1,000,000  and  once 
for  $200,000,  but  the  offer  was  not  taken.  The  board 
then  threw  out  enough  ballots  to  choose  all  the  Hayes 
electors.  As  in  the  other  cases.  Democratic  electors 
also  sent  ballots  to  Washington. 

There  was  no  federal  agency  with  power  to  deter- 
mine which  sets  of  electors  were  to  be  counted,  and  the 
fact  that  the  federal  Senate  was  Eepublican  and  the 
House  Democratic  seemed  to  preclude  the  possibility 
of  legislation  on  the  subject.  No  such  critical  situa- 
tion had  ever  resulted  from  an  election,  and  a means  of 
settlement  must  quickly  be  discovered,  for  only  three 
months  would  elapse  after  the  electoral  votes  were  sent 
to  Washington,  before  the  term  of  General  Grant  would 
expire.  The  means  devised  was  the  Electoral  Com- 


52 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


mission.  This  body  was  to  be  composed  of  five  sena- 
tors, five  representatives,  and  five  justices  of  the  Su- 
preme Court.  The  Senate  and  the  House  were  each  to 
choose  their  five  members,  and  four  members  of  the 
Court  were  designated  by  tlie  Act  which  established 
the  Commission,  with  power  to  choose  a fifth.  It  was 
understood  that  seven  would  be  Republicans,  seven 
Democrats  and  that  the  fifteenth  member  would  be 
Justice  David  Davis,  an  Independent,  who  would  be 
selected  by  his  four  colleagues.  On  him  in  all  proba- 
bility, the  burden  of  the  decision  would  fall.  On  the 
day  when  the  Senate  agreed  to  the  plan,  however,  the 
Democrats  and  Independents  in  the  Illinois  legislature 
chose  Justice  Davis  as  United  States  Senator  and 
under  these  circumstances  he  refused  to  serve  on  the 
Commission.  It  was  too  late  to  ■withdraw,  and  since  all 
the  remaining  justices  from  whom  a commissioner 
must  be  chosen  were  Republicans,  the  Democrats  were 
compelled  to  accept  a body  on  which  they  were  outnum- 
bered eight  to  seven. 

The  Electoral  Commission  sat  all  through  the  month 
of  February,  1877.  Its  decisions  were  uniformly  in 
favor  of  Hayes  electors  by  a vote  of  eight  to  seven, 
always  along  party  lines,  and  on  March  2,  it  was 
formally  announced  that  Hayes  had  been  elected.  The 
disappointment  of  the  Democrats  was  bitter  and  last- 
ing, for  their  candidate  had  received  over  a quarter  of 
a million  popular  votes  more  than  his  opponent,  and 
yet  had  been  declared  defeated.  For  a time  there  was 
some  fear  of  civil  war.  Tilden,  however,  accepted  the 
decision  of  the  Commission  in  good  faith,  and  forbade 
his  friends  and  his  party  to  resist.  Moreover,  close 
friends  of  the  Republican  candidate  assured  southern 
Democratic  politicians  that  Hayes  if  elected  would 
adopt  a conciliatory  policy  toward  the  South,  and  would 


IN  PRESIDENT  GRANT’S  TIME 


53 


allow  tlie  southern  states  to  govern  themselves  unham- 
pered by  federal  interference.  Peaceful  counsels  pre- 
vailed, therefore,  and  the  closing  days  of  President 
Grant’s  administration  were  undisturbed  by  threats 
of  strife. 

The  question  whether  Hayes  was  fairly  elected  is  a 
fascinating  one.  There  is  no  doubt  that  there  was 
fraud  and  intimidation  on  both  sides,  in  the  disputed 
states.  In  Louisiana,  for  example,  the  Democrats  pre- 
vented many  negroes  from  voting  by  outrageous  in- 
timidation, while  the  Republicans  had  many  negroes 
fraudulently  registered.  Little  is  knovm,  also,  of  the 
activities  of  the  “visiting  statesmen,”  as  those  poli- 
ticians were  called  who  went  to  the  South  to  care  for 
their  party  interests.  It  is  known  that  they  were  well 
provided  "with  money  and  that  the  boards  of  canvassers 
contained  many  unscrupulous  men.  Nor  is  it  likely 
that  politicians  who  lived  in  the  days  of  the  Credit 
Mobilier  and  the  Whiskey  Ring  would  falter  at  a bar- 
gain which  would  affect  the  election  of  a president. 
Republicans  looked  upon  the  Democrats  as  being  so 
wicked  that  they  were  justified  in  “fighting  the  devil 
with  fire.”  Democrats  looked  upon  the  election  as  so 
clearly  theirs  that  no  objection  ought  to  be  made  to  their 
taking  what  belonged  to  them.  It  seems  certain,  how- 
ever, that  Hayes  had  no  hand  in  any  bargains  made  by 
his  supporters.  x\s  for  Tilden,  his  wealth  was  such 
that  he  could  have  purchased  votes  if  he  had  desired  to 
do  so,  and  the  fact  that  all  the  votes  went  to  his  rival 
indicates  that  he  did  not  yield  to  the  temptation. 
Moreover,  one  of  his  closest  associates,  Henry  Watter- 
son,  the  journalist,  tells  of  one  occasion  when  the 
presidency  was  offered  to  Tilden  and  refused  by  him. 
Perhaps  a definitive  statement  of  the  rights  and  wrongs 
of  this  famous  election  will  never  be  made;  for  one 


54 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


after  another  the  men  most  intimately  associated  with 
it  have  died  leaving-  some  account  of  their  activities, 
bnt  none  of  them  has  told  much  more  than  was  already 
known. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

Dunning,  Rhodes  and  Schouler,  together  with  most  of  the 
works  referred  to  at  the  close  of  Chapter  I,  continue  to  be 
useful.  L.  A.  Coolidge,  Ulysses  8.  Grant  (1917),  is  not  as 
partisan  as  most  of  the  biographies  of  the  time  and  is  valuable 
despite  a lack  of  a thorough  understanding  of  the  period.  The 
following  are  valuable  for  especial  topics:  11.  Adams,  His- 
torical Essays  (1891)  ; C.  P.  Adams,  Jr.,  and  H.  Adams,  Chap- 
ters of  Erie  (1886),  (gold  conspiracy)  ; C.  F.  Adams,  Jr., 
Charles  Francis  Adams  (Treaty  of  Washington)  ; C.  P. 
Adams,  Jr.,  “The  Treaty  of  Washington”  in  Lee  at  Appomat- 
tox, and  Other  Papers  (1902)  ; James  Bryce,  American  Com- 
monwealth (vol.  II,  various  editions  since  1888,  contains  fa- 
mous chapter  on  the  Tammany  Tweed  ring;  A.  B.  Paine, 
Thomas  Nast,  His  Period  and  His  Pictures  (1904),  (Tweed 
ring).  P.  L.  Haworth,  Hayes-Tilden  Disputed  Presidential 
Election  of  1876  (1906),  is  a thorough  study;  on  this  election, 
see  also  John  Bigelow,  The  Life  of  8.  J . Tilden  (2  vols.,  1895), 
and  C.  R.  Williams,  Life  of  Rutherford  B.  Hayes  (2  vols., 
1914). 


CHAPTER  III 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS  OF  THE.  NEW  EBA 

WITH  the  close  of  Grant’s  administration,  the 
main  immediate  problems  connected  with  po- 
litical reconstruction  came  to  an  end.  During  the  war, 
however,  important  economic  and  social  developments 
had  been  taking  place  throughout  the  United  States 
wliich  were  destined  to  take  on  greater  and  greater  sig- 
nificance. The  reconstruction  problem  looked  back- 
ward to  the  war;  the  new  developments  looked  forward 
to  a new  America.  Reconstruction  affected  fewer  and 
fewer  people  as  time  went  on;  the  later  changes  ulti- 
mately transformed  the  daily  life  of  every  individual 
in  the  nation.  Not  only  did  they  determine  the  means 
by  which  he  earned  his  livelihood,  but  the  comforts 
Avhich  he  enjoyed,  the  conditions  of  rural  or  urban  life 
which  surrounded  him,  the  ease  with  which  he  visited 
other  portions  of  the  country  or  obtained  information 
concerning  them,  the  number  and  variety  of  the  foreign 
products  that  could  be  brought  to  him,  the  political 
problems  upon  which  he  thought  and  voted,  and  the  at- 
titude of  the  government  toward  his  class  in  society. 
Most  of  these  changes  were  distinguishable  during  the 
twenty-five  years  following  the  war  and  could  be  stated 
in  brief  and  definite  terms. 

From  the  standpoint  of  population,  the  growth  of 
the  country  before  1890,  although  not  so  rapid  as  it 
had  been  before  the  war,  was  both  constant  and  im- 
portant. Between  1870  and  1890  the  numbers  of  people 

55 


56 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


increased  from  nearly  thirty-nine  millions  to  nearly 
sixty-three  millions,  the  rate  each  decade  being  not  far 
from  twenty-five  per  cent.  Six  states  added  more  than 
a million  each  to  their  population — New  York  and 
Pennsylvania  in  the  Northeast;  Ohio,  Illinois  and 
Kansas  in  the  Middle  West;  and  Texas  in  the  South. 
No  fewer  than  seventeen  others  expanded  by  half  a 
million  or  more— ten  of  the  seventeen  being  in  the  val- 
ley drained  by  the  Mississippi  River  system. 

Detailed  study  of  particular  sections  of  the  country 
discloses  a continuous  shifting  of  population  which  indi- 
cates changes  in  the  economic  life  of  the  people.  In 
northern  New  England,  the  numbers  increased  slowly. 
Both  Maine  and  New  Hampshire  lost  from  1860  to  1870 ; 
nearly  half  of  Maine’s  counties  and  nearly  two-thirds 
of  Vermont’s  lost  population  between  1880  and  1890; 
the  people  were  abandoning  the  rural  districts  to  flock 
to  the  cities  or  migrate  to  the  West.  Shipbuilding  fell 
off  in  Maine;  the  dairy  interests  languished  in  Ver- 
mont, less  wheat  was  being  planted  and  the  farmers,’ 
no  longer  growing  wool,  were  selling  their  flocks.  Most 
of  the  growth  was  to  be  found  in  the  industrial  counties. 
The  traditional  New  England  thrift,  however,  was  not 
lost  with  the  migration  of  the  people,  for  savings  bank 
deposits  were  increasing,  and  the  state  of  Vermont  was 
free  from  .debt  in  1880,  and  all  its  counties  in  1890. 
The  South,  between  1870  and  1890,  increased  in  num- 
bers a little  less  rapidly  than  the  country  as  a whole. 
On  the  Atlantic  Coast  the  greatest  relative  expansion 
was  in  Florida ; in  the  western  South,  in  Texas.  The 
increase  was  almost  wh'olly  native,  as  immigration  did 
not  flow  into  that  section. 

The  great  expansion  of  the  Middle  West,  from  Ohio 
to  Kansas,  was  based  upon  the  public  land  policy  of 
the  federal  government.  Substantially  all  this  region 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


57 


had  once  been  in  the  possession  of  the  United  States, 
which  had  early  adopted  the  system  of  laying  out  town- 
ships six  miles  on  a side,  with  subdivisions  one  mile 
square,  (containing  640  acres),  called  sections.  An 
important  feature  of  the  policy  had  been  the  encourage- 
ment of  education  and  of  transportation  through  the 
gift  of  large  grants  of  the  public  land.  Moreover,  set- 
tlement had  been  stimulated  by  the  disposal  of  land  to 
purchasers  at  extremely  liberal  fignires.  In  1862  the 
famous  Homestead  Act  had  inaugurated  a still  more 
generous  policy.  Under  this  law  the  citizen  might  set- 
tle upon  a quarter-section  and  receive  a title  after  five 
years  of  actual  occupation,  with  no  charge  other  than 
a slight  fee.  Millions  of  acres  were  taken  up  in  this 
wa}'  both  by  natives  and  by  immigrants.  1,300,000  peo- 
ple poured  into  Illinois  between  1870  and  1890;  over 
1,000,000  into  Kansas,  and  nearly  that  number  into 
Nebraska;  in  the  Dakotas  a young  man  of  college  age 
in  1890  might  have  remembered  almost  the  entire  sig- 
nificant portion  of  the  history  of  his  state  and  have 
been  one  of  the  oldest  inhabitants.  The  frontier  of 
settlement  advanced  from  the  western  edge  of  Missouri 
into  mid-Kansas,  and  almost  met  the  growing  popula- 
tion of  the  Far  West,  whose  economic  possibilities  had 
already  attracted  attention. 

The  discovery  of  gold-dust  in  a mill-race  in  Cali- 
fornia had  drawn  the  “Forty-niners”  to 

. . . lands  of  gold 

That  lay  toward  the  sun. 

For  a few  years  fabulous  sums  of  the  precious  metal 
had  been  extracted  from  the  ground  by  the  hordes  of 
treasure-seekers  who  had  come  from  all  over  the  world 
by  boat,  pack-animal  or  “prairie  schooner,”  around 
Cape  Horn,  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  or  over  the 


58 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


western  mountains.  When  the  yield  of  the  mines  had 
slackened,  some  of  the  poulation  had  filtered  off  to 
newer  fields,  but  more  had  settled  down  to  exploit  the 
agricultural  and  lumber  resources  of  California.  In 
Nevada  a rich  vein  of  silver  called  the  “Comstock 
Lode”  had  been  discovered;  in  1873  a group  operating 
the  “Virginia  Consolidated”  mine  struck  the  great 
‘ ‘ bonanza,  ’ ’ and  the  output  reached  unheard  of  propor- 
tions. The  success  of  the  mines,  however,  was  essen- 
tial to  Nevada,  which  had  few  other  resources  to  de- 
velop, and  when  the  yield  slowed  down  the  population 
growth  of  the  state  noticeably  slackened.  In  Colorado 
during  the  late  fifties  some  prospectors  had  struck  gold, 
and  another  rush  had  made  “Pike’s  Peak  or  Bust”  its 
slogan.  Some  had  returned,  “Busted  by  Thunder,” 
but  others  had  better  fortune,  discovered  gold,  silver 
or  lead,  and  helped  lay  the  foundations  of  Denver  and 
Leadville.  In  Idaho  and  Montana,  in  Wyoming  and 
South  Dakota  and  other  states,  prospectors  found  gold, 
silver,  copper  and  lead,  and  thus  attracted  much  of  the 
population  that  later  settled  down  to  occupations  which 
were  less  feverish  and  more  reliable  than  mining.  In 
general,  the  advance  of  population  into  the  Middle 
West  was  more  or  less  regular,  as  wave  on  wave  made 
its  way  into  the  Mississippi  Basin;  in  the  Far  West, 
however,  population  extended  in  long  arms  up  the  fer- 
tile valleys  of  Washington,  Oregon  and  California,  or 
was  found  in  scattered  islands  where  mineral  wealth 
had  been  discovered  in  the  Rocky  Mountain  region. 

From  the  standpoint  of  absolute  growth,  the  expan- 
sion of  most  of  the  far  western  states  was  not  impos- 
ing, but  the  relative  increase  was  suggestive  of  the 
future.  Colorado  nearly  quadrupled  in  a decade, 
(1870-1880),  and  Washington  equalled  the  record  in 
the  following  ten  years.  California  grew  faster  from 


north  iakota 


larQueU^ 


Cogebici 

Me 


south' 

LACK 

HILLS 


DAKOTA 


Y!  'V 


Omati^ 


Denv^ 


aAHOM^ 


EXPLANATION  OK  COLOKS 


ECONOMIC  INTERESTS -1890 


.100  fathoms 


SlOO  Million  Manufactures 
$50  Million  Farm  Products  ' 
$10  Million  Mining  Products 


.500  fathoms 


.1000  fathoms 


C.S.HAM  MONO  &-CO-->^NE\ 


Greenwich 


Lun^ritude 


r 

Vy-A 

1 

ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


59 


1870  to  1890  than  it  had  done  in  the  gold  days,  indicat- 
ing that  its  development  was  based  on  something  more 
lasting  than  a fickle  vein  of  ore.  Meanwhile  politicians 
were  fanning  the  desire  of  the  growing  territories  to  be- 
come states,  and  in  1889  Montana  and  Washington  were 
admitted,  and  in  the  following  year  Idaho  and  Wyo- 
ming. Of  these,  Washington  alone  had  a population 
equivalent  to  the  federal  ratio  for  representation  in 
the  House.^ 

Utah  was  kept  outside  for  a few  years  longer,  until 
the  Mormon  Church  gave  satisfactory  indication  that 
anti-polygamy  laws  were  being  enforced. 

The  migration  westward,  which  has  been  a constant 
factor  in  American  development  since  early  times,  con- 
tinued unabated  after  the  Civil  War;  indeed  the  rest- 
less spirit  aroused  by  the  four  years  of  conflict  un- 
doubtedly tended  to  increase  this  steady  shift  toward 
the  West.  By  1890  approximately  a fifth  of  the  native 
Americans  were  to  be  found  in  states  other  than  those 
in  which  they  had  been  born.  95,000  natives  of  Maine, 
for  example,  were  to  be  found  in  Massachusetts ; 17,000 
Avere  in  California ; and  considerable  numbers  in  every 
state  betAveen  the  tAA’o.  The  North  Carolinians  AA^ere 
equally  AA^ell  distributed.  43,000  AA^ere  in  South  Caro- 
lina, 18,000  in  Texas,  and  5,500  in  Washington.  EA^ery 
state  had  contributed  to  populate  eAmry  other,  although 
in  general  the  migration  tended  to  take  place  on  east 
and  AA'cst  lines,  and  predominantly  Avestward. 

Within  the  AvestAAmrd-moA’ing  tide  of  population  A\^ere 
sAAurling  eddies — cities — AA’hich  tended  to  attract  to 
themseUes  larger  and  larger  proportions  of  the  sur- 
rounding people.  In  1870  Iavo  men  in  eA^ery  ten  lived 

1 The  ratio  was  151,912  but,  by  a provision  of  the  Constitution,  states 
are  piven  a representative  even  if  they  do  not  contain  the  requisite 
number. 


60 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


in  cities  whose  population  was  8,000  or  more ; by  1890 
another  man  in  every  ten  had  forsaken  rural  life. 
Large  cities  like  Boston  and  New  York  sucked  in  sur- 
rounding districts,  and  so  constituted  metropolitan  cen- 
ters with  problems  new,  to  American  life.  Such  cities 
as  Birmingham,  Kansas  City,  and  Seattle  were  just 
appearing  in  1880,  but  their  growth  was  verj^  rapid; 
Los  Angeles  increased  ten  fold  and  Minneapolis  thir- 
teen, between  1870  and  1890;  Denver,  having  received 
ten  newcomers  between  1860  and  1870,  added  102,000 
in  the  following  twenty  years.  In  the  country  as  a 
whole  the  concentration  in  cities  was  most  marked  in 
the  area  north  of  the  Potomac  and  Ohio  rivers  and  east 
of  the  Mississippi ; the  South  remained  rural,  as  before 
the  war.  With  the  growth  of  urban  population  came 
questions  of  lighting  and  water  supply,  street  railway 
transportation  and  municipal  government,  industry, 
education,  health  and  morals.^ 

Immigration,  another  constant  factor  in  American 
development,  underwent  important  changes  during  the 
twenty-five  years  from  1865  to  1890.  Greater  in  pros- 
perous years  and  smaller  during  years  of  depression, 
the  inward  tide  reached  its  climax  in  1882-,  when  789,000 
aliens  reached  the  new  world.  That  year,  in  several 
respects,  was  a turning  point  in  the  history  of  immi- 
gration into  the  United  States.  It  was  in  this  year  that 
the  Chinese  were_^cluded ; that  immigration  from 
Italy,  Austria-Hungary,  and  Russia  became  of  suffi- 
cient size  to  be  impressive ; and  that  the  first  inclusive 
federal  immigration  act  was  passed.  The  immigration 

1 The  most  important  advances  in  municipal  street  railway  transpor- 
tation were  made  between  1875  and  1890.  In  1876  New  York  began 
the  construction  of  an  overhead  or  elevated  railway  on  which  trains 
were  drawn  by  small  locomotives.  The  first  electric  street  railways 
were  operated  in  Richmond.  Va.,  and  in  Baltimore.  Electric  street 
lighting  was  introduced  in  San  Francisco  in  1879. 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


61 


law  of  1882  defined,  in  general,  the  policy  which  the 
nation  has  pursued  ever  since.  It  placed  a tax  of  fifty 
cents  on  all  incomers  to  be  paid  by  the  ship  companies ; 
it  forbade  the  landing-  of  objectionable  persons,  such  as 
convicts  and  lunatics;  and  it  placed  on  the  owners  of 
vessels  the  expense  of  returning  immigrants  not  per- 
mitted to  land.  All  these  provisions  were  amended  or 
developed  in  later  laws,  like  that  of  1885  forbidding- 
persons  or  corporations  to  prepay  the  transportation 
of  laborers  or  to  encourage  immigration  under  contract 
to  perform  work.  The  greater  part  of  the  foreign 
population  settled  in  the  manufacturing-  and  urban 
North.  Put  into  simplest  terms,  the  census  of  1890 
showed  that  of  every  hundred  aliens  who  had  come  to 
the  United  States  between  1870  and  1890,  thirty-seven 
were  to  be  found  in  the  states  from  Maine  to  Pennsyl- 
vania, four  from  Delaware  to  Texas,  forty-seven  from 
Ohio  to  Kansas  and  twelve  in  the  Far  West  (for  the 
most  part  Chinese). 

Of  the  great  economic  interests  of  the  United  States, 
the  most  widespread  was  agriculture.  In  the  North- 
east, to  be  sure,  the  amount  of  improved  farm  land 
had  been  growing  steadily  less  since  1850  and  the  people 
had  been  turning  their  energies  into  other  activities. 
In  the  South,  on  the  other  hand,  agriculture  formed  the 
main  economic  resource  and  the  twenty-five  years  fol- 
lovung  the  war  were,  for  the  most  part,  consumed  in 
recovering-  from  that  struggle.  Although  conditions 
varied  from  place  to  place,  the  situation  in  many  por- 
tions of  the  South  was  little  short  of  pitiable.  Not  only 
were  factories,  public  buildings  and  railroads,  houses 
and  barns,  tools  and  seeds  destroyed,  capital  and  credit 
gone,  mining-  at  a standstill  and  banks  ruined,  but  bands 
of  thieves  infested  many  districts,  federal  officers  were 
frequently  dishonest  and  defrauded  the  people,  and  the 


62 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


entire  labor  system  was  wiped  out  at  a stroke.  The 
negroes  had  not  been  ideal  workmen  as  slaves ; now,  as 
freedmen,  they  found  difficulty  in  adjusting  themselves 
to  the  economic  obligations  of  their  new  status,  and 
evinced  a tendency  to  rove  about  restlessly,  instead  of 
settling  down  to  the  stern  task  of  helping  to  rebuild  the 
shattered  South. 

It  was  manifest  that  the  first  problem  was  to  revive 
the  agricultural  activities  of  the  old  days,  and  that  the 
main  resource  must  be  cotton,  the  demand  for  which 
in  the  markets  of  the  North  and  of  Europe  was  such 
as  to  make  it  the  best  “money  crop.”  A labor  system 
was  introduced  known  as  share-farming  or  cropping. 
Under  this  system  the  plantation  owner  who  had  more 
property  than  he  could  cultivate  under  the  new  condi- 
tions let  parts  of  his  land  to  tenants,  supplying  them 
with  buildings,  tools,  seed  and  perhaps  credit  at  the 
village  store  for  the  supplies  necessary  for  the  year. 
The  tenant,  who  had  neither  money  nor  credit  with 
which  to  buy  land,  furnished  the  labor,  and  at  the 
harvest  dach  received  a specified  share  of  the  product, 
commonly  a half.  The  system  had  its  disadvantages ; 
it  kept  the  farmer  always  in  debt,  and  since  the  only 
valuable  security  which  the  plantation  owner  had  was 
the  crop — the  land  being  almost  unsalable — he  insisted 
bn  the  cultivation  of  cotton,  which  was  a safe  crop,  and 
avoided  experimentation  and  diversification.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  system  enabled  the  land  owner  to  take 
advantage  of  the  labor  supply  and  to  supervise  the  un- 
tutored negro, — and  it  kept  the  South  alive.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  large  plantations,  cultivated  by  several 
tenant  farmers,  the  number  of  small  farms  tilled  by 
independent  owners  or  renters  increased.  Due  to  this 
tendency  and  to  the  opening  of  many  small  holdings  in 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


63 


the  Southwest,  the  size  of  the  average  farm  diminished, 
so  that  the  small  farmer  began  to  replace  the  plantation 
owner  as  the  typical  southerner. 

Owing  to  the  insistence  of  land  owners  upon  cotton 
culture,  the  South  first  caught  up  with  its  ante-helium 
production  in  the  cultivation  of  this  staple,  for  shortl)^ 
before  1880  the  crop  exceeded  that  of  1860.  The  pro- 
duction of  tobacco,  the  second  great  southern  crop, 
sharply  shifted  after  the  war  from  the  Atlantic  Coast 
states,  except  North  Carolina,  to  the  Mississippi  region, 
especially  to  Kentucky.  Maryland,  indeed,  never  again 
produced  much  more  than  half  as  great  a crop  as  she 
did  in  1860,  while  Virginia  did  not  equal  her  former 
record  until  the  opening  of  the  twentieth  century,  al- 
though the  South  as  a whole  recovered  in  the  late 
eighties.  Eice  culture,  likewise,  did  not  recover  read- 
ily for  South  Carolina  alone  produced  almost  as  much 
in  1860  as  the  entire  South  in  1890,  and  not  until  the 
development  of  production  in  Louisiana  after  1890  did 
the  crop  assume  its  former  importance.  The  produc- 
tion of  sugar  in  Louisiana  in  1890  was  but  little  greater 
than  it  had  been  in  1860,  and  in  the-  production  of 
cereals  the  South  did  not  keep  pace  with  the  upper 
Mississippi  Valley  before  1890.  On  the  other  hand  the 
rapid  growth  of  Texas  was  one  of  the  outstanding- 
features  of  southern  development  during  the  period, 
for  that  state  improved  an  amount  of  farm  land  be- 
tween 1870  and  1890,  roughly  equivalent  to  the  com- 
bined areas  of  New  Hampshire,  Vermont,  and  Massa- 
chusetts. There  was  observable,  moreover,  a certain 
hopefulness,  a certain  resiliency  of  purpose,  a pride  in 
the  achievements  of  the  past  and  in  the-  possibilities  of 
the  future.  In  these  respects  the  South  was  a new 
South  by  1890. 


64 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Greater  tlian  the  South  as  a food-producing  area, 
was  the  belt  of  states  from  Ohio  and  Michigan  to  Kan- 
sas and  the  Dakotas : 

Where  there’s  more  of  reaping  and  less  of  sowing, 

That’s  where  the  West  begins. 

The  increased  occupation  of  the  public  lands,  the 
growth  of  population,  improvements  in  transportation 
and  the  greater  use  of  agricultural  machinery,  which 
could  be  employed  to  advantage  on  the  large  and  rela- 
tively level  farms,  led  to  developments  that  were  des- 
tined to  have  an  important  effect  on  the  history  of  the 
nation.  Agricultural  machinery,  such  as  the  reaper, 
had  been  known  long  before  the  war,  but  the  reduction 
of  the  labor  supply  from  1861  to  1865  had  compelled 
farmers  to  replace  men  with  machines.  A reaper  that 
merely  cut  the  grain  and  tossed  it  aside,  gave  way  at 
last  to  one  which  not  only  cut  the  grain,  but  gathered  it 
into  sheaves  and  bound  the  sheaves  with  twine.  So 
great  was  the  effect  of  the  harvester  upon  western  agri- 
culture that  William  H.  -Seward  declared  that  it 
“pushed  th^  frontier  westward  at  the  rate  of  thirty 
miles  a year.” 

Due  to  the  facts  already  mentioned,  the  number  of 
mid-western  farms  increased  nearly  a million  from 
1870  to  1890,  and  the  acreage  in  improved  farm  land 
grew  by  an  amount  equivalent  to  the  combined  areas 
of  the  British  Isles,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  and  Den- 
mark, with  a generous  margin  to  spare.  The  produc- 
tion of  corn,  wheat,  oats  and  other  cereals  became  so 
great  as  to  demand  an  outlet  to  the  East  and  to  the 
markets  of  the  world.  Elevators  for  the  storage  of 
grain  were  constructed  with  a capacity  of  300,000  to 
1,000,000  bushels,  and  improvements  were  made  in  the 
methods  of  loading  and  unloading  the  product.  De- 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


65 


spite  the  growth  of  the  agricultural  interests  of  the 
Middle  West,  however,  the  farmer  did  not  reach  pros- 
perity. For  twenty  years  after  1873  prices  fell  stead- 
ily both  in  the  United  States  and  in  other  countries  of 
the  world,  and  the  agricultural  classes  found  themselves 
receiving  a smaller  and  smaller  return  for  their  prod- 
ucts. Unrest  grew  to  distress,  and  distress  to  acute 
depression,  while  the  demands  of  the  farmers  for  relief 
frequently  determined  the  trend  of  mid-western 
politics.^ 

Less  general  than  agriculture,  but  more  character- 
istic of  the  period  after  the  war,  was  the  development 
of  manufacturing.  The  census  of  1870  was  faulty  and 

200 


2SO 


200 


60 


J86S  JBJo  lays  J880  J6&S  1390 

inadequate,  but  it  was  sufficiently  accurate  to  indicate 
that  the  manufacturing  region  was  preeminently  that 
north  of  the  Potomac-Ohio  river  line  and  east  of  the 
Mississippi.  By  1890  it  was  apparent  that  the  indus- 
trial interests  were  shifting  slightly  toward  the  West ; 
nevertheless  the  leading  states  were  those  of  southern 

1 Hamlin  Garland,  Main  Trcuvelled  Roads,  portrays  the  hardships  of 
Western  farm  life. 


66 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


New  England,  and  New  York,  New  Jersey  and  Penn- 
sylvania. In  these  states  no  fewer  than  four  hundred 
and  forty-seven  industries  employed  more  than  a mil- 
lion dollars  of  capital  each.  The  manufacturing  of 
cotton,  woolen  and  silk  for  the  rest  of  the  country  was 
done  here;  foundry  products,  iron  and  steel  manufac- 
tures, silver  and  brass  goods,  refined  petroleum,  boots 
and  shoes,  paper  and  books,  with  a host  of  other 
articles,  were  sent  from  this  section  to  every  part  of 
the  world.  All  along  the  line,  from  Massachusetts  to 
Pennsylvania,  capital  engaged  in  manufacturing 
doubled  between  1880  and  1890,  and  the  number  of  em- 
ployees greatly  increased. 

Although  the  industrial  life  of  the  South  belongs,  for 
the  most  part,  to  the  years  since  1890,  the  coal  and  iron 
deposits  of  Alabama  were  known  and  utilized  before 
that  year,  the  number  of  cotton  mill  spindles  in  North 
Carolina  tripled  between  1880  and  1890,  and  cotton 
expositions  were  held  in  Atlanta  in  1881  and  New 
Orleans  in  1884.  It  was  in  the  eighties,  also,  that  the 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railroad  and  the  Norfolk  and 
Western  led  to  the  exploitation  of  the  coal  deposits  of 
Virginia  and  West  Virginia,  especially  the  famous 
Pocahontas  field. 

Some  aspects  of  the  growth  of  manufacturing  in  the 
North  are  well  illustrated  in  the  development  of  the 
mineral  resources  around  Lake  Superior.  The  pres- 
ence of  copper  and  iron  in  this  region  had  long  been 
known,  but  they  had  not  been  utilized  until  a decade 
before  the  Civil  War,  and  even  then  the  output  had 
been  greatly  restricted  by  insufficient  transportation 
facilities.  By  the  close  of  the  war,  however,  a canal 
had  been  constructed  which  allowed  the  passage  of 
barges  from  Lake  Superior  to  Lake  Huron,  and  rail- 
roads had  been  laid  to  a few  important  mining  centers. 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


67 


The  Marquette  iron  range  in  northern  Michigan,  the 
Gogebic  in  Wisconsin  and  Michigan,  the  Menominee 
near  Marquette,  the  Vermilion  Lake  and  Mesahec  ore- 
beds  near  Duluth, — all  these  combined  to  yield  millions 
of  tons  of  ore,  caused  the  development  of  numerous 
mining  towns  and  laid  the  foundations  of  a gigantic 
expansion  in  the  production  of  steel.  As  the  iron  and 
steel  industry  with  its  furnaces,  machinery  and  skilled 
labor  was  already  established  at  points  in  Illinois,  Ohio 
and  western  Pennsylvania,  it  was  cheaper  to  transport 
the  ore  to  these  places  than  to  transfer  the  industry  to 
the  mines.  Ore  vessels  were  constructed  capable  of 
carrying  mammoth  cargoes ; docks,  railroads  and  canals 
were  built ; and  the  products  of  the  mines  taken  to  lake 
and  inland  cities.  Improvements,  meanwhile,  were  be- 
ing continually  made  in  the  steel  industry,  such  as  the 
Bessemer  process,  by  which  the  impurities  were  burned 
out  of  the  iron  ore,  and  exactly  enough  carbon  intro- 
duced into  the  molten  metal  to  transform  it  into  steel. 

Although  the  steel  industry  was  established  in  many 
places,  its  most  dramatic  growth  occurred  in  those 
parts  of  eastern  Ohio  and  western  Pennsylvania  that 
center  about  the  city  of  Pittsburg.  Placed  strategi- 
cally at  the  point  where  the  Allegheny  and  Mononga- 
hela  rivers  join  to  form  the  Ohio,  in  the  midst  of  an 
area  rich  in  coal,  petroleum  and  natural  gas,  Pittsburg 
rapidly  became  the  center  of  a region  in  which  the  de- 
velopment of  manufacturing  and  the  construction  of 
railroads  dwarfed  other  interests.  A large  portion  of 
the  ore  mined  in  the  Lake  Superior  fields  was  carried 
to  the  Pittsburg  district  to  be  transformed  into  steel 
products  of  all  kinds.  Moreover,  the  fortunes  made  by 
private  individuals  in  the  region,  and  the  inflow  of 
alien  laborers  to  work  in  the  factories  and  on  the  rail- 
roads raised  weighty  social  and  industrial  problems. 


68 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Manifestly  the  extension  of  agriculture  and  industry 
in  so  large  a country  as  the  United  States  was  de- 
pendent upon  the  corresponding  growth  of  the  means 
of  transportation,  both  by  water  and  by  rail.  A de- 
tailed account  of  the  expansion  of  the  railway  net,  with 
the  accompanying  implications  in  the  fields  of  finance 
and  politics,  is  a matter  for  later  consideration.  Cer- 
tain of  its  general  features  may  be  mentioned,  however, 
because  they  are  intimately  interwoven  with  the  eco- 
nomic developments  which  have  just  been  explained. 
The  concentration  of  the  population  in  the  cities,  of 
which  New  York  and  Chicago  were  outstanding  exam- 
ples, was  one  of  these  features.  From  the  time  of  the 
first  census,  the  city  of  New  York  continued  to  main- 
tain its  position  as  the  most  populous  city  of  the  na- 
tion. Between  1850  and  1890  it  added  a round  million 
to  its  numbers,  containing  1,515,000  persons  at  the 
later  date.  Moreover  it  was  the  center  of  a thriving 
and  thickly  ^ttled  region  extending  from  New  Haven 
on  the  one  side  to  Philadelphia  on  the  other — the  most 
densely  populated  area  in  America.  The  uninter- 
rupted expansion  of  the  city  indicated  that  the  reasons 
for  its  growth  were  constant  in  their  operation.  And, 
in  fact,  the  reasons  were  not  difficult  to  find.  It  was 
blessed  with  one  of  the  world’s  finest  harbors  and  had 
access  to  the  interior  of  the  state  by  way  of  the  Hudson 
and  Mohawk  rivers.  These  natural  advantages  had 
long  since  been  recognized  and  had  been  increased  by 
the  construction  of  the  Erie  Canal  in  1825  which,  with 
the  Great  Lakes  and  the  several  canals  connecting  the 
Lakes  with  the  Ohio  Valley,  had  given  New  York  an 
early  hold  and  almost  a monopoly  on  the  trade  between 
the  upper  Mississippi,  the  Lakes  and  the  coast.  The 
city,  therefore,  became  an  importing  and  exporting 
center ; its  shipping  interests  grew,  immigration  flowed 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


69 


in,  and  its  manufacturing  establishments  soon  out- 
stripped those  of  any  other  industrial  center ; the  great 
printing  and  publishing,  banking  and  commercial  firms 
were  drawn  irresistibty  to  the  most  populous  city,  and 
Wall  Street  became  the  synonym  for  the  financial  cen- 
ter of  the  nation. 

In  1840  Chicago  had  been  an  unimportant  settlement 
of  4500  persons,  but  by  the  opening  of  the  war  it 
had  grown  to  twenty-five  times  that  size,  and  added 
800,000  between  1870  and  1890.  It  had  early  become 
evident  that  the  city  was  the  natural  outlet  toward  the 
East  for  the  grain  trade  and  the  slaughtering  and  meat- 
packing industry  of  the  ui^per  Mississippi  Valley.  Be- 
fore the  late  sixties,  however,  railway  connection  was 
defective,  being  composed  of  many  short  lines  rather 
than  of  one  continuous  road,  so  that  freight  had  to  be 
loaded  and  unloaded  many  times  during  its  passage  to 
the  seaboard.  This  situation,  which  had  been  merely 
inconvenient  before  the  war,  had  become  little  short 
of  intolerable  during  the  struggle,  because  the  closing 
of  the  Mississippi  had  cut  off  from  the  Middle  West  its 
water  outlet  toward  the  South  and  had  diverted  more 
freight  to  the  railroads.  After  the  war,  Cornelius 
Vanderbilt,  president  of  the  Hudson  Eiver  Railroad, 
combined  a number  of  the  shorter  roads  so  as  to  give 
uninterrupted  communication  between  Chicago  and 
New  York,  to  tap  the  trade  of  the  Mississippi  Valley, 
and  to  compete  with  water  traffic  by  way  of  the  Great 
Lakes  and  the  Erie  Canal.  Other  railroads  saw  the 
possibilities  in  the  western  trade,  and  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio,  the  Grand  Trunk,  and  the  Erie  followed  the 
lead  of  Vanderbilt.  A similar  development,  although 
on  a smaller  scale,  accompanied  the  growth  of  other 
northern  cities.  The  retroactive  effects  of  the  roads 
on  the  distribution  of  the  population  are  too  detailed 


70 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


for  discussion,  but  a single  example  may  typify  many. 
In  1870  the  Maine  farmer  supplied  much  of  the  meat 
consumed  in  Boston;  by  1895,  he  was  getting  his  own 
meat  from  the  West.  He  must,  therefore,  adapt  him- 
self to  the  new  conditions  if  he  could,  move  to  the  manu- 
facturing cities  as  so  many  of  his  neighbors  did,  or 
migrate  to  the  West. 

Like  the  growth  of  New  York  and  Chicago,  the  de- 
velopment of  California  had  an  important  effect  on 
the  history  of  American  railway  transportation.  Al- 
though it  had  been  agitated  for  many  years,  the  project 
for  a railroad  from  the  Mississippi  to  the  Pacific  Coast 
had  not  reached  the  construction  stage  until  the  con- 
gressional acts  of  1862  and  1864  provided  for  a line  to 
be  built  from  Omaha  to  San  Francisco.  The  Union 
Pacific  Railroad  had  been  incorporated  to  build  the 
eastern  end,  while  the  western  end  was  to  be  con- 
structed by  the  Central  Pacific  Railroad  Company,  a 
California  corporation.  The  latter  act,  that  of  1864, 
had  given  the  roads  substantial  financial  assistance  and 
half  the  public  land  on  a strip  forty  miles  wide  along 
the  line  of  the  track.  Many  difficulties  had  stood  in  the 
way — lack  of  funds,  problems  of  construction  and  in- 
adequate labor  supply.  Eventually  they  had  all  been 
overcome  by  the  energy  and  skill  of  such  men  as  Stan- 
ford, Crocker  and  Huntington.  Imported  Chinese 
coolies  had  met  the  labor  demand  and  construction  was 
speeded  up.  Actual  building  had  begam  in  1863  and 
six  years  later  the  two  roads  met  at  Promontory  Point 
near  Ogden  in  Utah,  where  the  last  spike  was  driven, 
the  engines 

Facing  on  the  single  track, 

Half  a world  behind  each  back. 

During  the  four  years  followfing  the  completion  of  the 


115°  Longitude 


West  110°  from 


Greenwich  105° 


,Seattl< 


Ft.Bentor^ 
O ^ 

Great  Falls/-/^ 


V A K' 

Rismarck 


‘Coma  \ 

Q>  I 


jMissoula 


Glendive, 


PACIFIC 


NORTV'^ 


Billing 


jh^^elQowstone 

NAriJONAu  PARK 


Pierre 

admitted 


Yanktoi 


Cj^shh 


Frfmont  f /y 


Shcahone  Falls 


admitted  189!! 


admitted 


Rawlins 


Ogden  I 


inemucca. 


lyaramie 


ovan; 


^ftlf  Lake' 


Kearney  Hastings 


Salt  I^ake 


A.tchison. 


eus 


Virginia  City 

Q Carson 

' V.,.  „ 

Len,„\  1864 

i--— ^ \ O 

iValleyr  \ 


)DeDver 


/ Q Colorado  Sp^ 
J ikes  Peak 


Leadville 


Sacram 

Stockton 


ADO 

voPueblo 


jSAST^ 


Wichita 


admitted  1876 


fTrirddad 


interey 


feeno 


^Albuquerque\ 


^^eeles 


ARIZONA 

admitted  1912  1”^ 


THE 

NEW  WEST 


Bernardino 


M X 

admitted  It 


Phoenix 


English  Statute  Miles. 

States  admitted  before  the  Civil  War: 

States  admitted  duriiig  and  after  the  Civil  War: 
Indian  Reservations  at  the  close  of  1909 


Tucson 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


71 


transcontinental  line,  21,000  miles  of  new  railroad  were 
constracted,  much  of  which  was  built  into  the  wilderness 
ahead  of  settlement.  So  great  an  expansion,  coming  at 
a time  when  immense  stretches  of  new  land  were  being 
opened  and  industry  being  developed  on  a large  scale, 
could  hardly  fail  to  result  in  over-speculation.  The 
results  appeared  in  1873.  Jay  Cooke  and  Company, 
the  most  important  financial  concern  in  the  country 
had  been  back  of  the  Northern  Pacific  Eailroad, 
marketing  large  quantities  of  its  bonds  and  so  provid- 
ing capital  for  construction,  the  purchase  of  equipment, 
the  payment  of  wages  and  so  on.  Obviously  a large 
amount  of  money  was  thus  being  put  into  an  enterprise 
from  which  returns  would  come  only  after  a consider- 
able period;  and  yet  construction  had  to  be  continued, 
or  what  was  already  invested  would  be  lost.  What 
Cooke  was  doing  for  the  Northern  Pacific  was  being 
done  for  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  by  Fisk  and  Hatch, 
and  by  other  firms  for  speculative  enterprises  in  eveiw' 
corner  of  the  land. 

The  process  of  putting  capital  into  fixed  form  could 
hardly  go  on  forever,  and  several  events  led  to  a final 
crash.  In  1871  and  1872  great  fires  in  Chicago  and 
Boston  destroyed  millions  of  dollars’  worth  of  prop- 
erty. Early  in  1873  the  government  investigation  of 
the  Credit  Mohilier  Company  led  to  widespread  dis- 
trust of  the  roads  and  made  investors  conservative 
about  buying  bonds.  On  September  18,  1873,  Jay 
Cooke  and  Company  found  itself  unable  to  continue 
business  and  closed  its  doors.  The  failure  was  a thun- 
derbolt to  the  financial  world.  Indeed,  so  unbelieve- 
able  was  the  news  that  an  energetic  policeman  arrested 
a small  newsboy  who  shouted  his  “Extra — All  about 
the  failure  of  Jay  Cooke.  ’ ’ 

If  Jay  Cooke  and  Compaiw  fell,  the  sky  might  fall. 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


72 

People  rushed  to  withdraw  their  funds  from  the  banks. 
Fisk  and  Hatch  opened  their  doors  for  fifteen  minutes 
and  received  calls  for  $1,500,000.  They  closed  at  once. 
The  smaller  financial  institutions  followed  the  bigger 
ones.  Stocks  fell,  the  Exchange  was  closed,  there  was 
a money  famine.  Industrial  concerns,  dependent  on 
the  banks,  failed  by  scores.  Industrial  paralysis,  with 
railroad  receiverships,  laborers  out  of  employment, 
riots  and  their  accompaniments,  showed  how  deep- 
seated  had  been  the  trouble.  Not  until  late  in  the 
decade  did  business  recover  its  former  prosperity. 

With  the  return  of  more  stable  conditions  the  con- 
struction ofi  railroads  continued  unabated.  The 
Northern  Pacific  ran  near  the  Canadian  line  and  con- 
nected the  upper  Mississippi  Valley  with  the  coast, 
carrying  in  its  trail  the  manners  and  customs  of  the 
East.  Two  lines  in  the  South  were  extended  to  the 
Pacific,  so  that  by  the  middle  eighties  four  great  main 
avenues  gave  passage  through  a region  over  which,  so 
recently,  the  miner  and  the  trapper  had  forced  a dan- 
gerous path. 

The  fact  that  it  was  often  necessary,  in  building  the 
railroads  across  the  plains,  to  detail  half  the  working 
force  to  protect  the  remainder  against  the  Indians,  calls 
attention  to  one  unmistakable  result  of  the  conquest 
of  the  Far  West.  The  construction  of  the  railroads 
spelled  the  doom  of  the  wild  Indian.  Far  back  in  1834 
the  government  had  adopted  the  policy  of  setting  aside 
large  tracts  of  land  west  of  the  Mississippi  for  the  use 
of  the  Indian  tribes.  Most  of  the  savages  had  been 
stationed  in  an  immense  area  between  southern  Minne- 
sota and  Texas,  while  other  smaller  reservations  had 
been  scattered  over  most  of  the  states  west  of  the  river. 
On  the  whole,  the  government  had  dealt  with  the  In- 
dians in  tribes,  not  as  individuals.  The  rapid  inflow 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


73 


of  population  to  the  fertile  lands,  together  with  the 
rush  of  prospectors  to  newly  discovered  supplies  of 
gold  and  silver,  caused  increasing  demands  from  the 
Indians  for  protection,  and  from  the  whites  for  the  ex- 
tinguishment of  Indian  land  titles. 

The  classical  illustration  of  this  tendency  is  found 
in  the  case  of  the  Sioux  Indians  in  South  Dakota.  The 
discovery  of  gold  in  the  region  of  the  Black  Hills,  on 
the  Sioux  reservation,  aroused  agitation  for  the  re- 
moval of  the  tribe  to  make  way  for  settlers  and  miners. 
But  the  execution  of  the  scheme  was  not  so  simple  as 
its  conception.  The  removal  of  the  Sioux  necessitated 
the  transfer  of  the  Poncas,  a peaceful  tribe  which  lay 
immediately  east.  The  latter,  not  unnaturally,  ob- 
jected, quarrels  arose  and  eventually  the  Poncas  were 
practically  broken  to  pieces.  The  Sioux,  not  satisfied, 
attempted  to  regain  the  Black  Hills,  fought  the  famous 
Sioux  War  of  1876,  led  by  Sitting  Bull,  but  were 
crushed  and  forced  to  give  up  the  unequal  contest. 

It  would  not  be  worth  while  to  enter  into  the  details 
of  the  numerous  Indian  conflicts  after  the  Civil  War. 
It  is  enough  to  notice  that  stirring  accounts  of  them 
may  be  read  in  the  memoirs  of  such  soldiers  as  Custer, 
Sheridan  and  Miles,  and  that  they  cost  millions  of  dol- 
lars and  hundreds  of  lives.  Finally  it  became  evident 
that  the  attempt  to  deal  with  the  Indians  in  tribes  was 
a failure  and  it  was  determined  to  break  up  the  tribal 
holdings  of  land  so  as  to  give  each  individual  a small 
piece  for  his  private  property,  and  to  open  the  re- 
mainder to  settlement  by  the  whites.  In  pursuance  of 
such  a policy,  the  Dawes  Act  of  1887  provided  for  the 
allotment  of  a quarter-sectien-to-nach  head  of  a family, 
vfith  the  proviso  that  the  owner  should  not  sell  the  land 
within  twenty-five  years.  This  was  intended  to  pro- 
tect the  Indian  from  shrewd  “land-sharks.”  Citizen- 


74 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ship  was  given  with  the  ownership  of  the  land,  in  the 
hope  that  a sort  of  assimilation  might  gradually  take 
place,  and  earnest  attempts  were  made  to  provide  edu- 
cation for  the  red-man.  Not  all  these  hopes  were  real- 
ized, however,  and  the  later  Burke  Act,  1906,  attempted 
further  protection. 

While  the  Indian  was  being  restricted  to  a small 
part  of  the  great  region  west  of  the  Mississippi,  there 
was  being  enacted  on  the  plains  one  of  the  most  pic- 
turesque of  all  American  dramas.  Beyond  the  settled 
parts  of  the  states  just  west  of  the  “Father  of 
Waters,”  bounded  north  and  south  by  Canada  and  the 
Rio  Grande,  and  extending  west  to  the  Rocky  Mountain 
foot-hills,  lay  a huge  empire  of  rolling  territory.  It 
was  grass-covered,  but  lacked  sufficient  rainfall  to  make 
it  fertile,  so  that  it  was  considered,  as  part  of  it  had 
early  been  called,  “the  great  American  desert.” 

Cattle  turned  loose  long  before  by  Spanish  ranchers 
down  in  the  Southwest  had  multiplied,  spread  out  over 
the  plains,  and  run  wild — wild  as  Texas  steers.  A 
combination  of  circumstances  disclosed  the  fact  that 
these  cattle  could  be  improved  by  breeding,  corraled 
and  driven  north  over  the  “Long  Trail,”  to  be  slaught- 
ered in  Omaha,  Kansas  City,  St.  Louis  and  Chicago  for 
the  people  of  eastern  cities.  The  round-up,  when  the 
cattle  were  collected ; the  drive,  under  command  of  the 
boss  and  his  cow-boys, 

loose  in  the  unfenced  blue  riding  the  sunset  rounds ; 

the  great  ranches  in  the  North,  where  the  herds  were 
fattened  for  the  market; — all  this  formed  the  back- 
ground of  an  attractive  romance.  Obviously,  however, 
the  drive  was  dependent  on  great  stretches  of  open 
country,  with  free  grazing  and  free  access  to  water,  and 
it  is  also  manifest  that  these  conditions  could  not  long 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


75 


endure  in  the  face  of  constant  westward  migration. 
Homesteaders  followed  the  railroads  out  across  the 
plains,  and  the  cheapening  of  wire  fence  led  to  the  en- 
closure of  great  farms  including  the  best  grazing  lands 
and  the  water  supply.  By  1890,  therefore,  the  great 
drives  were  a tale  that  is  told.  The  less  romantic  pack- 
ing business  remained,  however;  ranches  supplied  the 
cattle,  the  railroads  transported  them,  and  improve- 
ments in  refrigerating  and  canning  made  possible  an- 
other development  in  domestic  and  foreign  trade. 

In  addition  to  the  expansion  of  the.  several  economic 
interests  of  the  various  sections  of  the  country,  inven- 
tions and  improvements  were  taking  place  which  af- 
fected the  general  problems  of  production  and  distri- 
bution. Improvements  in  machinery  saved  forty  to 
eighty  per  cent,  of  the  time  and  labor  demanded  in  the 
production  of  important  manufactured  goods.  Cheap- 
ened steel  affected  all  kinds  of  industry.  The  develop- 
ment of  steam-power  and  the  beginnings  of  the  practi- 
cal use  of  electricity  for  power  and  light  multiplied  the 
effectiveness  of  human  hands  or  added  to  human  com- 
fort. Cheaper  and  quicker  transportation  almost  revo- 
lutionized the  distribution  of  economic  goods.  The  in- 
creased use  of  the  telegraph  and  cable  shortened  dis- 
tances and  brought  together  producers  and  consumers 
that  had  in  earlier  times  been  weeks  of  travel  apart. 

The  necessarily  statistical  character  of  an  account 
of  economic  development  should  not  obscure  the  mean- 
ing  of  its  details.  Increased  population,  with  its  horde 
of  incoming  aliens,  created  a demand  for  standing 
room,  necessitated  westward  expansion,  and  made  the^ 
West  more  than  ever  a new  country  with  new  problems'^ 
The  growth  of  agriculture  enlarged  a class  that  had  not 
hitherto  been  as  influential  as  it  was  destined  to  be,  and 
brought  into  politics  the  economic  needs  of  the  farmer. 


76 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Manufacturing  brought  great  wealth  into  the  hands  of 
a few,  created  an  increasing  demand  for  protective 
taritfs  and  gave  rise  to  strikes  and  other  .industrial 
problems.  The  concentration  of  especial  interests  in 
especial  sections  made  likely  the  emergence  of  sectional 
antagonisms.  Back  of  tariff  and  finance,  therefore, 
back  of  transportation  and  labor,  of  new  political 
parties  and  revolts  in  the  old  ones,  of  the  great  strikes 
and  the  increasing  importance  of  some  of  the  sections, 
lay  the  economic  foundations  of  the  new  era. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

No  thorough  study  of  the  economic  history  of  the  United 
States  after  the  Civil  War  has  yet  been  made.  E.  L.  Bogart, 
Economic  History  of  the  United  States  (1907),  and  various 
later  editions,  is  the  best  single  volume;  E.  E.  Sparks,  Na- 
tional Development  (1907),  is  useful.  On  the  South,  consult 
articles  by  St.  G.  L.  Sioussat,  in  History  Teachers’  Magazine 
(Sept.,  Oct.,  1916)  ; P.  A.  Bruce,  Rise  of  the  New  South 
(1905)  ; J.  C.  Ballagh  (ed.).  South  in  the  Building  of  the  Na- 
tioyi  (1909),  vol.  VI;  M.  B.  Hammond,  Cotton  Industry 
(1897).  R.  P.  Porter,  West  from  the  Census  of  1880  (1882), 
is  a useful  compendium.  The  Plains  in  the  day  of  the  cow- 
boy are  well  described  in  Emerson  Hough,  Passing  of  the 
Frontier  (1918)  ; Emerson  Hough,  Story  of  the  Cowboy 
(1898)  ; F.  L.  Paxson,  Lcbst  American  Frontier  (1910)  ; and 
F.  L.  Paxson,  “The  Cow  Country,”  in  American  Historical 
Review,  Oct.,  1916.  N.  A.  Miles,  Serving  the  Republic  (1911), 
contains  reminiscences  of  Indian  conflicts.  On  the  Par  West, 
in  addition  to  Porter,  Hough  and  Paxson,  Katharine  Coman, 
Economic  Beginnings  of  the  Far  West  (2  vols.,  1912)  ; H.  K. 
White,  Union  Pacific  Railway  (1898)  ; L.  H.  Haney,  Congres- 
sional History  of  Railways  (2  vols.,  1908-1910)  ; S.  E.  White, 
The  Forty-Niners  (1918). 

There  is  also  an  abundance  of  useful  illustrative  Action,  such 
as:  Bret  Harte,  Luck  of  Roaring  Camp,  and  other  stories 
(Par  West)  ; Edward  Eggleston,  Hoosier  Schoolmaster  (In- 


ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS 


77 


diana)  ; W.  D.  Howells,  Rise  of  Silas  Lapham  (New  Eng- 
land) ; G.  W.  Cable,  Old  Creole  Days  (New  Orleans)  ; C.  E. 
Craddock,  In  the  Tennessee  Mountains ; F.  H.  Smith,  Colonel 
Carter  (Virginia)  ; Hamlin  Garland,  MaAn  Travelled  Roads 
and  Son  of  the  Middle  Border  (Middle  West)  ; P.  L.  Ford, 
Hon.  Peter  Sterling  (New  York)  ; S.  E.  White,  Gold  (Califor- 
nia) ; and  Riverman  (Lake  Superior  lumber)  ; John  Hay, 
Breadwinners  ( industrial) . 

For  other  references  to  economic  aspects  of  the  period,  see 
chapters,  IX,  XI,  XIV. 


CHAPTER  IV 


POLITICAL  AND  INTELLECTUAL  BACKGROUND  OF  THE 
NEW  ISSUES 

POWERFUL  as  economic  forces  were  from  1865  to 
1890,  they  did  not  alone  determine  the  direction 
of  American  progress  during  those  years.  Different 
individuals  and  different  sections  of  the  country  reacted 
differently  to  the  same  economic  facts;  a formula  that 
explained  a phenomenon  satisfactorily  to  one  group, 
carried  no  conviction  to  another ; political  parties  built 
up  their  platforms  on  economic  self-interest,  and  yet 
they  sometimes  had  their  ideals;  theories  that  seemed 
to  explain  economic  development  were  found  to  be  in- 
adequate and  were  replaced  by  others;  and  practices 
that  had  earlier  been  regarded  with  indifference  began 
to  offend  the  public  sense  of  good  taste  or  morals  or 
justice,  and  gave  way  to  more  enlightened  standards. 
Some  understanding  is  necessary,  therefore,  of  the 
more  common  theories,  ideals,  creeds  and  practices,  be- 
cause they  supplemented  the  economic  foundations  that 
underlay  American  progress  for  a quarter  century 
after  the  war. 

Since  the  Republican  party  was  almost  continuously 
in  power  during  this  period,  its  composition,  spirit  and 
ideals  were  fundamental  in  political  history.  Through- 
out the  North,  and  especially  in  the  Northeast,  the  in- 
tellectual and  prosperous  classes,  the  capitalists  and 
manufacturers,  were  more  likely  to  be  found  in  the 
Republican  party  than  among  the  Democrats.  In  fact 

78 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  79 


such  party  leaders  as  Senator  George  F,  Hoar  went  so 
far  as  to  assert  that  the  organization  comprised  the 
manufacturers  and  skilled  laborers  of  the  East,  the 
soldiers,  the  church  members,  the  clergymen,  the  school- 
teachers, the  reformers  and  the  men  who  were  doing  the 
great  work  of  temperance,  education  and  philanthropy. 
The  history  of  the  party,  also,  was  no  small  factor  in 
its  successes.  Many  northerners  had  cast  their  first 
ballot  in  the  fifties,  with  all  the  zeal  of  crusaders ; they 
looked  back  upon  the  beginnings  of  Republicanism  as 
they  might  have  remembered  the  origin  of  a sacred 
faith;  they  thought  of  their  party  as  the  body  which 
had  abolished  slavery  and  restored  the  Union ; and  they 
treasured  the  names  of  its  Lincoln,  its  Seward,  its 
Sumner  and  Grant  and  Sherman.  The  Republican 
party,  wrote  Edward  MacPherson  in  1888,  in  a history 
of  the  organization,  is 

both  in  the  purity  of  its  doctrines,  the  beneficent  sweep  of  its 
measures,  in  its  courage,  its  steadfastness,  its  fidelity,  in  its 
achievements  and  in  its  example,  the  most  resplendent  politi- 
cal organization  the  world  has  ever  seen. 

Senator  Hoar  declared  that  no  party  in  history,  not 
even  that  which  inaugurated  the  Constitution,  had  ever 
accomplished  so  much  in  so  short  a time.  It  had  been 
formed,  he  said,  to  prevent  the  extension  of  slavery  into 
the  territories,  but  the  “providence  of  God  imposed 
upon  it  far  larger  duties.”  The  Republican  party 
gave  “honest,  wise,  safe,  liberal,  progressive  American 
counsel”  and  the  Democrats  “unwise,  unsafe,  illiberal, 
obstructive,  un-American  counsel.”  He  remembered 
the  Republican  nominating  convention  of  1880  as  a 
scene  of  “indescribable  sublimity,”  comparable  in 
“grandeur  and  impressiveness  to  the  mighty  torrent  of 
Niagara.  ” 


80 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


During  the  generation  after  the  war  the  recollection 
of  the  struggle  was  fresh  in  men’s  minds  and  its  in- 
fluence was  a force  in  party  councils.  The  Democrats 
were  looked  upon  as  having  sympathized  with  the  ‘ ‘ re- 
bellion” and  having  been  the  party  of  disunion.  In 
campaign  after  campaign  the  people  were  warned  not 
to  admit  to  power  the  party  which  had  been  “traitor” 
to  the  Union.  Roscoe  Conkling,  the  most  influential 
politician  in  New  York,  declared  in  1877  that  the  Demo- 
crats wished  to  regain  power  in  order  to  use  the  funds 
in  the  United  States  Treasury  to  repay  Confederate 
war  debts  and  to  provide  pensions  for  southern  sol- 
diers. As  late  even  as  1888  the  nation  was  urged  to 
recollect  that  the  Democratic  party  had  been  the  ‘ ‘ main- 
stay and  support  of  the  Rebellion,”  while  the  Repub- 
licans were  the  “party  that  served  the  Nation.” 

At  a later  time  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  party 
had  not  been  founded  solely  on  idealism;  that  the  ad- 
herence of  Pennsylvania  to  the  party,  for  example,  was 
due  at  least  in  a measure  to  Republican  advocacy  of  a 
protective  tariff;  that  Salmon  P.  Chase  and  Edwin  M. 
Stanton,  two  of  the  leading  members  of  Lincoln ’s  cabi- 
net had  been  Democrats;  and  that  Lincoln’s  second 
election  and  the  successful  outcome  of  the  war  had  been 
due  partly  to  the  support  of  his  political  opponents. 
As  time  went  on,  also,  some  of  the  leaders  of  the  Re- 
publican party  declared  that  its  original  ideals  had 
become  obscured  in  more  practical  considerations. 
They  felt  that  abuses  had  grown  up  which  had  been 
little  noticed  because  of  the  necessity  of  keeping  in 
power  that  party  which  they  regarded  as  the  only 
patriotic  one.  They  asserted  that  many  of  the  manag- 
ers had  become  arrogant  and  corrupt.  All  this  helped 
to  explain  the  strength  of  such  revolts  as  that  of  the 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  81 


Liberal  Republican  movement  of  1872.  Nevertheless, 
during-  the  greater  part  of  the  twenty-five  years  after 
the  war,  hosts  of  Republicans  cherished  such  a picture 
as  that  drawn  by  Senator  Hoar  and  Edward  MacPher- 
son,  and  it  was  that  picture  which  held  them  within  the 
party  and  made  patriotism  and  Republicanism  synony- 
mous tenns. 

These  Republicans,  however,  who  took  the  more  criti- 
cal attitude  toward  their  party  formed  the  core  of  the 
“ Mugwump  ” or  Independent  movement.  Their  phi- 
losophy was  simple.  They  believed  that  there  ought  to 
be  a political  element  which  was  not  rigidly  controlled 
by  the  discipline  of  party  organization,  which  would 
act  upon  its  ovni  judgment  for  the  public  interest,  and 
which  should  be  a reminder  to  both  parties  that  neither 
conld  venture  upon  mischievous  policies  without  en- 
dangering its  control  over  the  machinery  of  govern- 
ment. Theoretically,  at  least,  the  Independent  be- 
lieved that  it  was  more  important  that  government  be 
well  administered  than  that  it  be  administered  by  one 
set  of  men  or  another.  The  weakness  of  this  group, 
aside  from  its  sm.all  size,  was  its  impatience  and  im- 
practicability. By  nature  the  Independent  was  an  in- 
dividualist, forming  his  own  opinion  and  holding  it 
vfitli  tenacity.  In  such  a body  there  could  not  be  long- 
continued  cooperation  or  singleness  of  purpose;  each 
new  problem  caused  new  decisions  resulting  in  the 
break-up  of  the  group  and  the  formation  of  new  align- 
ments. The  Independent  group,  therefore,  varied  in 
strength  from  campaign  to  campaign.  To  the  typical 
party  worker,  who  looked  upon  politics  as  a warfare 
for  the  spoils  of  office,  the  Independent  was  variously 
denounced  as  a deserter,  a traitor,  an  apostate  and  a 
guerilla  deploying  between  the  lines  and  foraging  now 


82 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


on  one  side  and  now  on  the  other.  To  the  party  wheel- 
liorse,  independent  voting  seemed  impracticable,  and 
the  atmosphere  of  reform  too  “highly  scented.” 

The  Democrats,  laboring  under  the  disadvantage  of  a 
reputation  for  disloyalty  during  the  war,  and  kept  out 
of  power  for  most  of  the  time  during  the  period,  were 
forced  into  a defensive  position  where  they  could  com- 
plain or  criticize,  but  not  present  a program  of  con- 
structive achievement.  They  denounced  the  election 
of  1876  as  a great  “fraud”;  they  looked  upon  the  Re- 
publicans as  the  organ  of  those  who  demanded  class  ad- 
vantages; they  condemned  the  party  as  wasteful,  cor- 
rupt and  extravagant  in  administration,  careless  of  the 
distress  of  the  masses,  and  desirous  of  increasing  the 
authority  of  the  federal  government  at  the  expense  of 
the  powers  of  the  states.  Their  own  mission  they  felt 
to  be  the  constant  assertion  of  the  opposite  principles 
of  government  and  administration.  They  felt  that  they 
in  particular  represented  government  by  the  people  for 
the  equal  good  of  all  classes.  In  conformity  to  what 
they  believed  to  be  the  principles  of  Jefferson  and  Jack- 
son  they  professed  faith  in  the  capacity  of  the  plain 
people.  They  advocated  frugality  and  economy  in  gov- 
ernment expenditure  and  looked  with  alarm  on  any 
extension  of  federal  power  that  invaded  the  traditional 
domain  of  local  activity. 

The  intensification  of  party  spirit  and  party  loyalty, 
which  was  so  typical  of  the  times,  “delivered  the  citizen 
more  effectually,  bound  hand  and  foot,  into  the  power 
of  the  party  embodied  in  its  Organization.”  The  or- 
ganization, meanwhile,  was  being  improved  and 
strengthened.  Its  permanent  National  Committee 
which  had  existed  from  ante-helium  days,  was  supple- 
mented in  both  parties  immediately  after  the  war  by 
the  congressional  committee,  whose  mission  it  was  to 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  83 


carry  the  elections  for  the  House  of  Representatives. 
Increased  attention  was  paid  to  state  and  local  organ- 
izations. Party  conventions  in  states  and  counties 
chose  delegates  to  national  conventions  and  nominated 
candidates  for  office.  State,  county  and  town  commit- 
tees raised  money,  employed  speakers,  distributed 
literature,  formed  torch-light  companies  to  march  in 
party  processions  and,  most  important  of  all,  got  out 
the  voters  on  election  day.  By  such  means  the  Na- 
tional Committee  was  enabled  to  keep  in  close  touch 
with  the  rank  and  file  of  the  party,  and  so  complete  did 
the  organization  become  that  it  deserved  and  won  the 
name,  “the  machine.” 

The  master-spirit  of  the  machine  was  usually  the 
“Boss,”  a professional  politician  who  generally  did 
not  himself  hold  elective  office  or  show  concern  in  con- 
structive programs  of  legislation  or  in  the  public  wel- 
fare. Instead,  his  interests  lay  in  winning  elections; 
dividing  the  offices  among  the  party  workers ; distribut- 
ing profitable  contracts  for  public  work;  procuring  the 
passage  of  legislation  desired  by  industrial  or  railroad 
companies,  or  blocking  measures  objected  to  by  them. 
A vivid  picture  of  the  activities  of  the  boss  in  New 
York,  drawn  by  Elihu  Root,  will  serve  to  portray  con- 
ditions in  many  states  and  cities  from  1865  to  1890: 

From  the  days  of  Fenton,  and  Conkling,  and  Arthur,  and 
Cornell,  and  Platt,  from  the  days  of  David  B.  Hill,  down  to 
the  present  time,  the  government  of  the  state  has  presented 
two  different  lines  of  activity,  one  of  the  constitutional  and 
•Statutory  officers  of  the  state,  and  the  other  of  the  party 
leaders, — they  call  them  party  bosses.  They  call  the  system 
— I do  not  coin  the  phrase,  1 adopt  it  because  it  carries  its 
own  meaning — the  system  they  call  “invisible  government.” 
For  I do  not  remember  how  many  years,  Mr.  Conkling  was 
the  supreme  ruler  in  this  state ; the  governor  did  not  count. 


84 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


the  legislatures  did  not  count ; comptrollers  and  secretaries 
of  state  and  what  not,  did  not  count,  It  was  what  Mr.  Couk- 
ling  said ; and  in  a great  outburst  of  public  rage  he  was  pulled 
down, 

Then  Mr.  Platt  ruled  the  state;  for  nigh  upon  twenty  years 
he  ruled  it.  It  was  not  the  governor;  it  was  not  the  legisla- 
ture; it  was  not  any  elected  officers;  it  was  Mr.  Platt.  And 
the  capitol  was  not  here  (in  Albany)  ; it  was  at  49  Broadway; 
with  Mr.  Platt  and  his  lieutenants.  It  makes  no  ditference 
what  name  you  give,  whether  you  call  it  Fenton  or  Conkling 
or  Cornell  or  Arthur  or  Platt,  or  by  the  names  of  men  now 
living.  The  ruler  of  the  state  during  the  greater  part  of  the 
forty  years  of  my  acquaintance  with  the  state  government 
has  not  been  any  man  authorized  by  the  constitution  or  by 
the  law.^ 

Under  such  conditions,  corruption  was  naturally 
a commonplace  in  politics.  In  the  campaigns, 
the  party  managers  were  too  often  men  to  whom 
“nothing  was  dreadful  but  defeat.”  At  every  presi- 
dential election,  immense  sums  of  money  were  poured 
into  the  most  important  doubtful  states — Conuecticuty 
New  York,  New  Jersey  and  Indiana.  Twenty  to  sev- 
enty-five dollars  was  said  to  have  been  the  price  of  a 
vote  in  Indiana  in  1880 ; and  ten  to  fifteen  per  cent,  of 
the  vote  in  Connecticut  was  thought  to  be  purchasable. 
In  New  York  ballot-box  stuffing  and.  repeating  were  the 
rule  in  sections  of  the  city.  Employers  exerted  a less 
crude  but  equally  efficacious  pressure  upon  their  em- 
ployees to  vote  “right.”  Municipal  government  also 
was  often  characterized  by  that  extreme  of  corruption 
which  called  out  the  scorn  of  writers  on  public  affairs. 
The  New  York  Times  complained  in  1877  that  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  city  was  no  more  a popular  government 
than  Turkish  rule  in  Bulgaria,  and  that  if  the  Tam- 


1 Addresses  on  Government  and  Citizenship,  202. 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NEAV  ISSUES  85 


many  leaders  did  not  collect  revenue  with  the  horse- 
whip and  sabre,  it  was  because  the  forms  of  law  af- 
forded a means  that  was  pleasanter,  easier  and  quite 
as  effective. 

Federal  officials,  it  must  be  admitted,  did  not  set  a 
high  standard  for  local  officers  to  follow.  During 
Grant’s  administration  five  judges  of  a United  States 
Court  were  driven  from  office  by  threats  of  impeach- 
ment; members  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs 
in  the  House  of  Representatives  sold  their  privilege  of 
selecting  young  men  to  be  educated  at  West  Point; 
and  candidates  for  even  the  highest  offices  in  the  gift 
of  the  nation  were  sometimes  men  whose  political  past 
would  not  bear  the  light  of  day.  More  difficult  to  over- 
come was  the  lack  of  a decent  sense  of  propriet}^  among 
many  public  officers.  Members  of  the  Senate  practiced 
before  the  Supreme  Court,  the  justices  of  which  they 
had  an  important  share  in  appointing;  senators  and 
representatives  traded  in  the  securities  of  railroads 
which  were  seeking  favors  at  the  hands  of  Congress; 
and  even  in  the  most  critical  circles,  corrupt  practices 
were  condoned  on  the  ground  that  all  the  most 
reputable  people  were  more  or  less  engaged  in  similar 
activities.  Most  difficult  of  all  to  understand  was  the 
unfaltering  support  accorded  by  men  of  the  utmost 
integrity  to  iDarty  leaders  whose  evil  character  was 
known  on  all  sides.  Men  who  would  not  themselves 
be  guilty  of  dishonest  acts  and  who  vehemently  con- 
demned such  deeds  among  their  political  opponents, 
failed  to  make  any  energetic  protest  within  their  own 
ranks  for  fear  that  they  might  bring  about  a party 
split  and  thus  give  the  “enemy”  a victory. 

The  political  practices  which  prevailed  for  at  least 
a quarter  of  a century  after  1865  were  notoriously 
bad.  Yet  the  student  of  the  period  must  be  sensitive 


86 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


to  liiglier  aspirations  and  better  practices  among  many 
of  the  politicians,  and  among  the  rank  and  tile  of  the 
people.  George  E.  Hoar,  John  Sherman,  Rutherford 
B.  Hayes,  Grover  Cleveland  and  many  others  were 
incorruptible.  The  exposure  of  scandalous  actions  on 
the  part  of  certain  high  officials  blasted  their  careers, 
indicating  that  the  body  of  the  people  would  not  con- 
done dishonesty,  and  the  parties  found  it  advisable  to 
accept  the  resignations  of  some  of  their  more  notorious 
campaign  managers.  Moreover,  the  American  people 
of  all  classes  were  a political  people,  with  a capacity  for 
political  organization  and  activity,  and  with  a passion 
for  change.  The  cruder  forms  of  corruption  were 
successfully  combated,  and  the  popular,  as  well  as  the 
official  sense  of  good  taste  and  propriety  gradually 
reached  higher  levels. 

Another  fundamental  political  consideration  after 
the  Civil  War  was  the  gradual  reduction  of  the  power 
of  the  executive  department.  During  the  war  the  au- 
thority exercised  by  President  Lincoln  had  risen  to 
great  heights,  partly  because  of  his  personal  charac- 
teristics and  partly  because  the  exigencies  of  the  times 
demanded  quick  executive  action.  After  the  conflict 
was  past,  however,  the  legislative  body  naturally  reas- 
serted itself.  Moreover,  the  quarrel  between  Presi- 
dent Johnson  and  Congress,  as  has  been  shown,  took 
the  form  of  a contest  for  control  over  appointments 
to  office  and  especially  over  appointments  to  the  cabi- 
net. The  resulting  impeachment,  although  it  did  not 
result  in  conviction,  brought  about  a distinct  shrink- 
age in  executive  prestige.  Grant  was  so  inexperienced 
in  politics  and  so  naive  in  his  judgments  of  his  asso- 
ciates that  he  fell  completely  into  the  power  of  the 
machine  and  failed  to  revive  the  former  importance 
and  independence  of  his  office. 


•BACKGEOUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  87 


The  ascendancy  'which  thus  slipped  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  executive  'was  seized  by  the  Senate,  where  it  re- 
mained for  a long  period,  despite  efforts  on  the  part 
of  the  president  and  the  House  of  Representatives  to 
prevent  it.  So  remarkable  and  continuous  a domina- 
tion is  not  to  be  explained  by  a single  formula.  The 
long  term  of  the  members  of  the  Senate,  the  traditional 
high  reputation  of  the  body  and  the  undoubted  ability 
of  many  of-  its  members  assisted  in  upholding  its  pres- 
tige. Its  small  size  as  compared  with  the  House  of 
Representatives  gave  it  greater  flexibility.  Further- 
more, certain  Senate  practices  were  instrumental  in 
giving  that  body  its  primacy.  Under  the  provisions 
of  the  Constitution  the  Senate  has  power  to  ratify  or 
reject  the  nominations  of  the  executive  to  many  im- 
portant positions  within  his  gift,  and  by  the  close  of 
reconstruction  it  had  acquired  a firm  control  over  such 
appointments.  “Senatorial  courtesy”  bade  every 
member,  regardless  of  party,  to  concur  with  the  de- 
cision of  the  senators  from  any  state  with  regard  to 
the  appointments  in  which  they  were  interested. 
When,  therefore,  the  executive  wished  to  change  condi- 
tions in  a given  office  he  must  have  the  acquiescence  of 
the  senators  from  the  state  in  which  the  change  was  to 
occur.  If  he  did  not,  the  entire  body  would  rally  to  the 
support  of  their  colleagues  and  refuse  to  confirm  the 
objectionable  nominations.  With  such  a weapon  the 
Senate  was  usually  able  to  force  the  executive  into 
submission,  or  at  least  to  make  reforms  extremely  dif- 
cult.  In  Senator  Hoar’s  suggestive  words,  senators 
went  to  the  White  House  to  give  advice,  not  to  receive 
it. 

In  connection  Awth  revenue  legislation  the  Senate 
seized  the  leadership  by  means  of  an  evasion  of  the 
Constitution.  According  to  the  terms  of  that  docu- 


88 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ment,  all  bills  for  raising  revenue  must  originate  in 
the  House  of  Representatives,  but  the  Senate  may  pro- 
pose amendments.  Relying  upon  this  power  the  Sen- 
ate constantly  revised  measures  to  the  extent  of  chang- 
ing their  character  completely  and  even  of  grafting 
part  or  all  of  one  proposal  upon  the  title  of  another. 
In  one  case,  early  in  the  period,  the  Senate  “amended” 
a House  bill  of  four  lines  which  repealed  the  tariff  on 
tea  and  coffee;  the  “amendment”  consisted  of  twenty 
pages,  containing  a general  revision  of  customs  duties 
and  internal  revenue  taxes.  At  a later  time  the  Senate 
Finance  Committee  drew  up  a tariff  bill  even  before 
Congress  had  assembled. 

The  primacy  of  the  Senate  quickly  led  to  recogmition 
of  the  value  of  seats  in  it.  Influential  state  politicians 
sought  election  in  order  to  control  the  patronage. 
Competent  judges  in  the  early  nineties  declared,  for 
example,  that  the  senators  from  New  York,  Penn- 
sylvania and  Maryland  were  all  of  this  type.  An- 
other considerable  fraction  was  composed  of  powerful 
business  meii,  directors  in  large  corporations,  who 
found  it  to  their  advantage  to  be  in  this  most  influen- 
tial law-making  body  and  who  were  known  as  oil  or 
silver  or  lumber  senators.  So  was  laid  the  foundation 
of  the  complaint  that  the  Senate  was  a millionaires’ 
club.  And  so,  too,  it  came  about  that  much  of  state 
politics  revolved  about  the  choice  of  members  for  the 
upper  house,  for  senators  were  elected  by  the  state 
legislatures  until  long  after  1890.  The  power  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  in  contrast  with  the  Senate, 
was  relatively  small  except  during  the  single  session 
1889-1891,  when  Thomas  B.  Reed  was  in  control,  al- 
though individual  members  sometimes  wielded  consid- 
erable influence. 

Somewhat  comparable  to  the  shift  in  the  center  of 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  89 


power  from  one  federal  authority  to  another,  was  the 
change  which  took  place  in  the  relative  strength  of  the 
state  and  national  governments.  This  transfer  was 
most  clearly  seen  in  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  cases  involving  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 

Previous  to  1868,  when  the  Amendment  became  part 
of  the  Constitution,  comparatively  little  state  legisla- 
tion relating  to  private  property  had  been  reviewed  by 
the  Court.  Ever  since  the  establishment  of  the  federal 
government,  cases  involving  the  constitutionality  of 
state  legislation  had  been  appealed  to  United  States 
Courts  when  they  had  been  objected  to  as  running 
counter  to  the  clauses  of  the  Constitution  forbidding 
states  to  enact  bills  of  attainder,  ex  post  facto  laws,  or 
laws  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts.  Their 
number,  however,  had  been  relatively  small,  and  nor- 
mally the  acts  of  state  legislatures  had  not  been  re- 
viewed by  federal  courts ; or  in  other  words  the  tend- 
ency had  been  to  preserve  the  individuality  and 
strength  of  the  several  states.  After  the  war,  the 
Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth  Amendments  placed  addi- 
tional prohibitions  on  the  states,  and  the  decisions  of 
the  Supreme  Court  determined  the  meaning  and  ex- 
tent of  the  added  provisions.  The  interpretation  of 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  especially  important. 
Most  significant  was  the  interpretation  of  Section  1, 
which  reads  as  follows : 

All  persons  bom  or  naturalized  in  the  United  States,  and 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citizens  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  State  wherein  they  reside.  No  State  shall 
make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall  abridge  the  privileges 
and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States ; nor  shall  any 
State  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without 
due  process  of  law;  nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its  juris- 
diction the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 


90 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


So  vague  and  inclusive  were  these  phrases  that  many 
important  questions  immediately  sprang  from  them. 
What  were  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  the  citi- 
zen? Did  those  of  the  citizen  of  the  United  States 
differ  from  those  of  the  citizen  of  a state?  Was  a cor- 
poration a person?  What  was  liberty?  What  was 
due  process  of  law?  Hitherto  the  protection  of  life, 
liberty  and  property  had  rested,  in  the  main,  upon  the 
individual  states,  and  cases  involving  these  subjects 
had  been  decided  by  state  courts.  Were  the  state 
courts  to  be  superseded,  in  relation  to  these  vital  sub- 
jects, by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court? 

It  has  already  been  shown  that  the  purpose  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  was  the  protection  of  the 
recently  freed  negro.  The  Thirteenth  Amendment  had 
forbidden  slavery,  hut  the  southern  states  had  passed 
apprentice  and  vagrancy  laws  which  reduced  the  negro 
to  a condition  closely  resembling  slavery  in  certain  of 
its  aspects.  The  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  designed 
to  remedy  such  a condition  by  forbidding  the  states  to 
abridge  the  privileges  of  citizens,  or  to  deprive  persons 
of  life,  liberty  or  property.  Were  the  very  vague 
phrases  of  the  Amendment  merely  in  keeping  with  the 
vagueness  of  many  of  the  other  grants  of  power  in  the 
Constitution,  or  were  they  designedly  expressed  in 
such  a way  as  to  accomplish  something  more  than  the 
protection  of  the  freedman? 

The  first  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  involving 
the  Amendment  was  that  given  in  the  Slaughter  House 
Cases  in  1873,  which  did  not  concern  the  negro  in  any 
way.  In  1869  the  legislature  of  Louisiana  had  given 
a corporation  in  that  state  the  exclusive  right  to 
slaughter  cattle  within  a large  area,  and  had  forbidden 
other  persons  to  construct  slaughter-houses  within  the 
limits  of  this  region,  but  the  corporation  was  to  allow 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  91 


any  other  persons  to  use  its  buildings  and  equipment, 
charging  fixed  fees  for  the  privilege.  Cases  were 
brought  before  the  courts  to  determine  whether  the  law 
violated  that  part  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  which 
forbids  a state  to  pass  laws  abridging  the  privileges 
of  citizens  and  taking  away  their  property  without  due 
process  of  law.  By  a vote  of  five  to  four  the  Court 
upheld  the  constitutionality  of  the  statute. 

The  majority  held  that  the  purpose  of  the  Amend- 
ment was  primarily  the  protection  of  the  negro.  This 
purpose,  the  Court  thought,  lay  at  the  foundation  of  all 
three  of  the  war  amendments  and  without  it  no  one  of 
them  would  ever  have  been  suggested.  The  majority 
did  not  believe  that  the  Congress  which  passed  the 
amendments  or  the  state  legislatures  which  ratified 
them  intended  to  transfer  the  protection  of  the  great 
body  of  civil  rights  from  the  states  to  the  federal  gov- 
ernment. Neither  did  they  think  that  due  process  of 
law  had  been  interfered  with  by  the  Louisiana  legisla- 
tion. In  reply  to  the  objection  that  the  slaughter-house 
law  violated  the  clause,  “nor  shall  any  State  deny  to 
any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws,”  the  majority  declared: 

We  doubt  very  much  whether  any  action  of  a State  not  di- 
rected by  way  of  discrimination  against  the  negroes  as  a class, 
or  on  account  of  their  race,  will  ever  be  held  to  come  within 
the  purvdew  of  this  provision. 

In  brief,  then,  the  majority  was  inclined  to  preserve 
the  balance  between  the  states  and  the  national  govern- 
ment very  much  as  it  had  been.  It  believed  that  the 
amendments  should  be  applied  mainly  if  not  wholly  to 
the  fortunes  of  the  freedman  and  that  judicial  review 
of  such  legislation  as  that  in  Louisiana  concerning  the 
slaughter  of  cattle  should  end  in  the  state  courts. 


92 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


For  a time  the  interpretation  of  the  Court  remained 
that  given  by  the  majority  in  this  decision.  When 
western  state  legislatures  passed  laws  regulating  the 
rates  which  railroads  and  certain  other  corporations 
might  legally  charge  for  their  services,  the  Court  at 
first  showed  an  inclination  to  allow  the  states  a free 
hand.  Regulation  of  this  sort,  it  was  held,  did  not 
deprive  the  citizen  or  the  corporation  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law. 

There  were  indications,  nevertheless,  that  the 
opinion  of  the  Court  was  undergoing  a change  as  time 
elapsed.  An  interesting  prelude  to  the  change  was  an 
arg-ument  by  Roscoe  Conkliiig  in  San  Mateo  County  v. 
Southern  Pacific  Railroad  Company  in  1882.  Conkling 
was  acting  as  attorney  for  the  railroad  and  was  at- 
tempting to  show  that  the  roads  were  protected,  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  from  state  laws  which  taxed 
their  property  unduly.  Conkling  argued  that  the 
Amendment  had  not  been  designed  merely  for  the 
protection  of  the  freedman,  and  in  order  to  substan- 
tiate his  contention,  he  produced  a manuscript  copy 
of  the  journal  of  the  Congressional  committee  that  had 
drawn  up  the  proposals  which  later  became  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  He  had  himself  been  a member 
of  the  committee.  The  journal,  it  should  be  noticed, 
had  never  hitherto  been  utilized  in  public. 

Conkling  stated  that  at  the  time  when  the  Amend- 
ment was  being  drafted,  individuals  and  companies 
were  appealing  for  congressional  protection  against 
state  taxation  laws,  and  that  it  had  been  the  purpose  of 
the  committee  to  frame  an  amendment  which  should 
protect  whites  as  well  as  blacks  and  operate  in  behalf 
of  corporations  as  well  as  individuals.  In  other  words, 
Conkling  was  muking  the  interesting  contention  that 
his  committee  had  had  a far  wider  and  deeper  purpose 


BACKaROUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  93 


in  mind  in  phrasing  the  Amendment  than  had  been 
commonly  understood  and  that  the  demand  for  the 
protection  of  the  negro  from  harsh  southern  legisla- 
tion had  been  utilized  to  -answer  the  request  of  busi- 
ness for  federal  assistance.  The  safety  of  the  negro 
was  put  to  the  fore;  the  purpose  of  the  committee  to 
strengthen  the  legal  position  of  the  corporations  was 
kept  behind  the  doors  of  the  committee-room;  and  the 
phrases  of  the  Amendment  had  been  designedly  made 
general  in  order  to  accomplish  both  purposes.  The 
sequel  appeared  four  years  later,  in  1886,  when  the 
case  Santa  Clara  County  v.  Southern  Pacific  Railroad 
brought  the  question  before  the  Court.  At  this  time 
Mr.  Chief  Justice  Waite  announced  the  opinion  of  him- 
self and  his  colleagues  that  a corporation  was  a “per- 
son” within  the  meaning  of  the  Amendment  and  thus 
entitled  to  its  protection. 

Later  decisions,  such  as  that  of  1889  in  Chicago, 
Milwaukee  and  St.  Paul  Railway  Company  v.  Min- 
nesota, left  no  doubt  of  the  fact  that  the  Court  had 
come  to  look  upon  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  much 
more  than  a protective  device  for  the  negro.  The  full 
meaning  of  the  change,  however,  did  not  appear  until 
after  1890,  and  is  a matter  for  later  consideration.  In 
brief,  then,  before  1890,  the  Supreme  Court  was  con- 
tent in  the  main  to  avoid  the  review  of  state  legislation 
concerning  the  ownership  and  control  of  private  prop- 
erty, a practice  which  lodged  great  powers  in  the  state 
courts  and  legislatures.  By  that  year,  however,  it 
was  manifest  that  the  Court  had  undergone  a com- 
plete change  and  that  it  had  adopted  a theory  which 
would  greatly  enlarge  the  functions  of  the  federal 
courts,  at  the  expense  of  the  states.  The  medium 
through  which  the  change  had  come  was  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment. 


94 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


The  demand  on  the  part  of  business  men  for  pro- 
tection from  state  legislation,  which  Roscoe  Conkling- 
described  in  the  San  Mateo  case,  arose  from  their  be- 
lief in  the  economic  doctrine  of  laissez  faire.  Be- 
lievers in  this  theory  looked  upon  legislation  which 
regulated  business  as  a species  of  meddling  or  inter- 
ference. The  individual,  they  thought,  should  be  al- 
lowed to  do  very  much  as  he  pleased,  entering  into 
whatever  business  he  wished,  and  buying  and  selling 
where  and  how  and  at  what  prices  suited  his  interests, 
stimulated  and  controlled  by  competition,  but  without 
direction  or  restriction  by  the  government.  It  was 
believed  that  the  amazing  success  of  the  American 
business  pioneer  was  proof  of  the  wisdom  of  the  lais- 
sez  faire  philosophy.  The  economic  giant  and  hero 
was  the  self-made  man. 

Economic  abuses,  according  to  the  laissez  faire  phi- 
losophy, would  normally  be  corrected  by  economic  law, 
chiefly  through  competition.  If,  for  illustration,  any 
industry  demanded  greater  returns  for  its  products 
than  proved  to  be  just  in  the  long  run,  unattached  cap- 
ital would  be  attracted  into  that  line  of  production, 
competition  would  ensue,  prices  would  be  again  low- 
ered and  justice  would  result.  Every  business  man 
would  exert  himself  to  discover  that  employment 
which  would  bring  greatest  return  for  the  capital 
which  be  had  at  his  command.  He  would  therefore 
choose  such  an  industry  and  so  direct  it  as  to  make 
his  product  of  the  greatest  value  possible.  Hence 
although  he  sought  his  own  interests,  he  would  in  fact 
promote  the  interest  of  the  public. 

Indeed  the  philosopher  of  laissez  faire  was  sincerely 
~ convinced  that  his  system  ultimately  benefited  society 
as  a whole.  Andrew  Carnegie,  an  iron  and  steel  man- 
ufacturer, presented  this  thesis  in  an  article  in  the 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  95 


North  American  Revieiv  in  1889.  The  reign  of  indi- 
vidualism, he  held,  was  the  order  of  the  day,  was  in- 
evitable and  desirable.  Under  it  the  poorer  classes 
were  better  off  than  they  had  ever  been  in  the  world’s 
history.  “We  start  then,”  he  said,  “with  a condi- 
tion of  affairs  under  which  the  best  interests  of  the 
race  are  promoted,  but  which  inevitably  gives  wealth 
to  the  few.  Thus  far,  accepting  conditions  as  they  ex- 
ist, the  situation  can  be  surveyed  and  pronounced 
good.”  Let  the  man  of  ability,  he  advised,  accumu- 
late a large  fortune  and  then  discharge  his  duty  to  the 
public  through  philanthropic  enterprises,  such  as  the 
foundation  of  libraries.  Society  would  be  more  highly 
benefited  in  this  way  than  by  allowing  the  millions  to 
circulate  in  small  sums  through  the  hands  of  the 
masses.  Statistical  studies  of  the  distribution  of 
wealth  seemed  to  justify  Carnegie’s  judgment  that  the 
existing  tendency  was  for  wealth  to  settle  into  the 
hands  of  the  few.  In  1893  it  was  estimated  that  three 
one-hundredths  of  one  per  cent,  of  the  people  owned 
twenty  per  cent,  of  the  nation’s  wealth. 

Although  the  laissez  faire  theory  was  dominant  later 
even  than  1890,  it  was  apparent  before  that  time  that 
its  sway  was  being  challenged.  The  adherents  of  lais- 
sez  faire  themselves  did  not  desire  to  have  the  doctrine 
applied  fully  and  evenly.  They  demanded  govern- 
ment protection  for  their  enterprises  through  the 
medium  of  high  protective  import  tariffs,  and  they 
sought  subsidies  and  grants  of  public  land  for  the  rail- 
roads. Naturally  it  was  not  long  before  the  classes 
whose  desires  conflicted  with  the  manufacturing  and 
railroad  interests  began  in  their  turn  to  seek  aid  from 
the  government.  The  people  of  the  Middle  West,  for 
example,  were  not  content  to  allow  the  railroad  com- 
panies. to  control  their  affairs  and  establish  their  rates 


96  SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 

without  let  or  hindrance  from  the  state  legislatures. 
The  factory  system  in  the  Northeast,  likewise,  raised 
questions  which  were  directed  toward  the  foundations 
of  laissez  faire.  Under  the  factory  regime  employers 
found  it  advantageous  to  open  their  doors  to  women 
and  children  and  to  keep  them  at  machines  for  long, 
hard  days  which  unfitted  the  women  for  domestic 
duties  and  for  raising  families,  and  which  stunted  the 
children  in  body  and  mind.  Out  of  these  circum- 
stances arose  a demand  for  restrictions  on  the  free- 
dom of  employers  to  fix  the  conditions  under  which 
their  employees  worked. 

Opposition  to  an  industrial  system  based  upon 
laissez  faire  would  have  been  even  greater  during 
the  seventies  and  eighties  if  it  had  not  been  for 
two  sources  of  national  wealth — the  public  lands 
and  the  supplies  of  lumber,  ore,  coal  and  simi- 
lar gifts  of  nature.  When  the  supply  of  land  in  the 
West  was  substantially  unlimited,  a sufficient  part  of 
the  population  could  relieve  its  economic  distresses  by 
migrating,  as  multitudes  did.  Such  huge  stores  of 
natural  wealth  were  being  discovered  that  there 
seemed  to  be  no  end  to  them.  But  in  the  late  eighties 
when  the  best  public  lands  were  nearly  exhausted  and 
the  need  of  more  careful  husbanding  of  the  national 
resources  became  apparent  to  far-sighted  men,  ad- 
vanced thinkers  began  to  question  the  validity  of  an 
economic  theory  which  allowed  quite  so  much  free- 
dom to  individuals.  For  the  time,  however,  such  ques- 
tions did  not  arise  in  the  minds  of  the  masses. 

As  the  laissez  faire  doctrine  underlay  the  problem 
of  the  relation  between  government  and  industry,  so 
the  quantity  theory  of  money  was  fundamental  in  the 
monetar}^  question.  According  to  the  quantity  theory, 
money  is  like  any  other  commodity  in  that  its  value 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  97 


rises  and  falls  with  variations  in  the  supply  and  de- 
mand for  it.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  a given  com- 
munity is  entirely  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the  world. 
It  possesses  precisely  enough  pieces  of  money  to  sat- 
isfy the  needs  of  its  people.  Suddenly  the  number  of 
pieces  is  doubled.  The  supply  is  twice  as  great  as 
business  requires.  If  no  new  elements  enter  into  the 
situation,  the  value  of  each  piece  becomes  half  as  great 
as  before,  its  purchasing  power  is  cut  in  two  and  prices 
double.^  A bushel  of  potatoes  that  formerly  sold  for  a 
dollar  now  sells  at  two  dollars.  A farmer  who  has 
mortgaged  his  farm  for  $1,000  and  who  relies  upon  his 
sales  of  potatoes  to  pay  otf  his  debt  is  highly  benefited 
by  the  change,  while  the  creditor  is  correspondingly 
harmed.  The  debtor  is  obliged  to  raise  only  half  as 
many  potatoes ; the  creditor  receives  money  that  buys 
half  the  commodities  that  could  have  been  purchased 
with  his  money  at  the  time  of  the  loan. 

On  the  other  hand,  suppose  the  number  of  pieces  of 
money  is  instantly  halved  and  all  other  factors  con- 
tinue unchanged.  There  is  now  twice  as  great  a de- 
mand for  each  piece,  it  becomes  more  desirable  and 
will  purchase  more  goods.  Prices,  that  is  to  say,  go 
down.  Dollar  potatoes  now  sell  for  fifty  cents.  The 
debtor  farmer  must  grow  twice  as  many  potatoes  as 
he  had  contemplated;  the  creditor  finds  that  he  re- 
ceives money  that  has  doubled  in  purchasing  power. 

It  has  already  been  said  that  the  quarter  century 
after  the  war  was,  in  the  main,  a period  of  falling 
prices.  The  farmer  found  the  size  of  his  mortgage, 
as  measured  in  bushels  of  wheat  and  potatoes,  growing 
steadily  and  relentlessly  greater.  The  creditor  re- 

1 In  practice,  new  elements  do  enter  into  the  situation  so  that  the 
theory  requires  much  qualification.  Cf.  Taussig,  Principles  of  Eco- 
nomics (1915),  I,  ch.  18. 


98 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ceived  a return  which  purchased  larger  and  larger 
quantities  of  commodities.  The  debtor  class  was 
mainly  in  the  West ; the  creditors,  mainly  in  the  East. 
The  westerners  desired  a larger  quantity  of  money 
which  would,  as  they  believed,  send  prices  upward; 
the  East,  depending  upon  similar  reasoning,  desired 
a contraction  in  supply.  The  former  were  called  in- 
flationists; the  latter,  contractionists.  jMuch  of  the 
monetary  history  of  the  country  after  the  Civil  War 
was  concerned  with  the  attempt  of  the  inflationists  to 
expand  the  supply  of  currency,  and  the  contractionists 
to  prevent  inflation. 

The  intellectual  background  of  the  twenty-five  years 
after  the  war,  so  far  as  it  can  be  considered  at  this 
point,  was  to  be  found  mainly  in  the  development  of 
education  and  the  growth  of  the  newspaper  and  pe- 
riodical. Before  the  Civil  War,  except  in  the  South, 
the  old-time  district  school  had  given  way,  in  most 
states,  to  graded  elementary  schools,  supported  by 
taxation.  After  the  war  the  southern  states  made 
heroic  efforts  to  revive  education,  in  which  they  were 
aided  by  such  northern  benefactions  as  the  Peabody 
Educational  Fund  of  $2,000,000  established  in  1867. 
In  the  northern  states  the  schools  were  greatly  im- 
proved, free  text-books  became  the  rule,  the  free  public 
high-schools  replaced  the  former  private  academies, 
and  normal  schools  for  the  training  of  teachers  were 
established.  The  period  was  also  marked  by  the  foun- 
dation of  scores  of  colleges  and  especially  of  the  great 
state  universities.  The  Morrill  Act  of  July  2,  1862, 
had  provided  for  a grant  to  each  state  of  30,000  acres 
of  public  land  for  every  senator  and  representative  in 
Congress  to  which  the  state  was  entitled.  The  land 
was  to  be  used  to  promote  education  in  the  agricultural 
and  mechanic  arts,  and  in  the  natural  sciences.  The 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  99 

advaiitag-es  of  the  law  were  quickly  seen,  and  between 
1865  and  1890  seventeen  state  universities  were  started, 
most  of  them  in  the  Aliddle  and  Far  West.  Many  of 
these  underwent  a phenomenal  growth  and  had  a great 
influence  on  the  states  in  which  they  were  established. 

The  newspaper  press  was  also  undergoing  a trans- 
formation in  the  quarter  century  after  the  war.  The 
great  expansion  of  the  numbers  and  influence  of 
American  newspapers  before  and  during  that  struggle 
had  been  due  to  the  ability  of  individuals.  James 
Gordon  Bennett  had  founded  the  New  York  Herald,  for 
example,  in  1835,  and  from  then  on  the  Herald  had 
been  “Bennett’s  paper.”  Similarly  the  Tribune  had 
represented  Horace  Greeley  and  the  Times,  Henry  J. 
Raymond.  The  effect  of  the  war  was  to  develop  tech- 
nical resources  in  gathering  news,  to  necessitate  a 
larger  scale  of  expenditure  and  a wider  range  of  in- 
formation, and  to  make  a given  issue  the  work  of  many 
men  instead  of  one.  Raymond  died  in  1869,  Greeley 
and  Bennett  in  1872;  and  although  the  Sun  was  the 
embodiment  of  Charles  A.  Dana  until  his  death  in 
1897,  the  Nation  and  the  Evening  Post  of  Edwin  L. 
Godkin  until  1899,  nevertheless  the  tendency  was  away 
from  the  newspaper  which  reflected  an  individual  and 
toward  that  which  represented  a group;  away  from 
the  editorial  which  expressed  the  views  of  a well-known 
writer,  to  the  editorial  page  which  combined  the  labors 
of  many  anonymous  contributors.  The  financial  basis 
of  the  newspaper  also  underwent  a transition.  As 
advertising  became  more  and  more  general,  the  rev- 
enues of  newspapers  tended  to  depend  more  on  the 
favor  of  the  advertiser  than  upon  the  subscriber,  giv- 
ing the  former  a powerful  although  indirect  influence 
on  editorial  policies. 

The  influence  of  the  press  in  politics  was  rapidly 


100 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


growing.  A larger  number  of  newspapers  became  suf- 
ficiently independent  to  attack  abuses  in  both  parties. 
The  New  York  Times  and  Thomas  Nast’s  cartoons  in 
Harper’s  Weekly  were  most  important  factors  in  the 
overthrow  of  the  Tweed  Ring  in  New  York  City,  and 
in  the  elections  of  1884  and  later,  newspapers  exerted 
an  unusual  power.  Press  associations  in  New  York 
and  the  West  led  the  way  to  the  Associated  Press,  with 
its  wide-spread  cooperative  resources  for  gathering 
news. 

As  important  as  the  character  of  the  press,  was  the 
amount  and  distribution  of  its  circulation.  Between 
1870  and  1890  the  number  of  newspapers  published  and 
the  aggregate  circulation  increased  almost  exactly 
threefold — about  five  times  as  fast  as  the  population 
was  growing.  In  the  latter  year  the  entire  circulation 
for  the  country  was  over  four  and  a half  billion  copies, 
of  which  about  sixty  per  cent,  were  dailies.  So  great 
had  been  the  growth  of  the  press  during  the  seventies 
that  the  census  authorities  in  1880  made  a careful 
study  of  the  statistical  aspects  of  the  subject.  It  ap- 
peared from  this  search  that  newspapers  were  pub- 
lished in  2,073  of  the  2,605  counties  in  the  'Union. 
Without  some  such  means  of  spreading  information,  it 
would  have  been  impossible  to  conduct  the  great  presi- 
dential campaigns,  in  which  the  entire  country  was 
educated  in  the  tariff  and  other  important  issues. 

The  expansion  of  the  press  is  well  exemplified  by  the 
use  of  the  telegraph  in  the  spread  of  information. 
When  Lincoln  was  nominated  for  the  presidency  in 
1860,  a single  telegraph  operator  was  able  to  send  out 
all  the  press  matter  supplied  to  him.  In  1892  at  the 
Democratic  convention,  the  Western  Union  Telegraph 
Company  had  one  hundred  operators  in  the  hall. 
Mechanical  invention,  meanwhile,  was  able  to  keep  pace 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NEW  ISSUES  101 


with  the  demand  for  news.  The  first  Hoe  press  of 
1847  had  been*so  improved  by  1871  that  it  printed  ten 
to  twelve  thousand  eight-page  papers  in  an  hour,  and 
twenty-five  years  later  the  capacity  had  been  increased 
betAveen  six  and  sevenfold. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

Nearly  all  material  on  party  history  is  so  partisan  that  it 
should  be  read  with  critical  scepticism : Francis  Curtis,  The 
Repuhlican  Party,  1854-1904  (2  vols.,  1904)  ; J.  D.  Long, 
Republican  Party  0888)  ; for  the  Independent  attitude, 
consult  Harper's  Weekly  during  the  campaign  of  1884.  As 
the  Republicans  were  in  power  most  of  the  time  from 
1865-1913,  there  is  more  biographical  and  autobiographical 
material  about  Republicans  than  about  Democratic  lead- 
ers. Local  studies  of  political  conditions  and  the  social  struc- 
ture of  the  parties  are  almost  entirely  lacking.  On  the  per- 
sonal side,  the  following  are  essential:  G.  F.  Parker,  Writ- 
ings and  Speeches  of  Grover  Cleveland  (1892)  ; T.  E.  Burton, 
John  Sherman  (1906)  ; J.  B.  Foraker,  Notes  of  a Busy  Life  (2 
A'ols.,  1916),  throws  light  on  the  ideals  and  practices  of  a politi- 
cian ; G.  F.  Hoar,  Autobiography  of  Seventy  Years  (2  vols., 
1903),  gives  the  New  England  Republican  point  of  view;  Rollo 
Ogden,  Life  and  Letters  of  E.  L.  Godkin  (2  vols.  ,1907)  ; G.  F. 
Parker,  Recollections  of  Grover  Cleveland  (1909),  is  useful, 
but  sketchy,  there  being  as  yet  no  thorough  biography  of 
Cleveland;  T.  C.  Platt,  Autobiography  (1910),  interestingly 
portrays  the  philosophy  of  a machine  politician,  but  should 
be  read  with  care;  John  Sherman,  Recollections  of  Forty 
Years  in  House,  Senate  and  Cabinet  (2  vols.,  1895)  ; Edward 
Stauwood,  James  G.  Blaine  (1905),  is  highly  favorable  to 
Blaine;  W.  M.  Stewart,  Reminiscences  (1908),  is  interesting, 
partisan  and  unreliable.  For  a general  estimate  of  the  auto- 
biographical material  of  the  period,  consult  History  Teachers’ 
Magazine  (later  the  Historical  Outlook),  “Recent  American 
History  Through  the  Actors’  Eyes,’’  March,  1916. 

Jesse  Macy,  Party  Organization  and  Machinery  (1904)  ; M. 


102 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


G.  Ostrogorski,  Democracy  and  Political  Parties  (2  vols., 
1902;,  gives  a keen  and  pessinilstiu  account  of  American  po- 
litical practices  in  vol.  II ; J.  A.  Woodburn,  Political  Parties 
and  Party  Problems  in  the  United  States  (1903,  and  later  edi- 
tions) gives  a succinct  account  in  good  temper. 

For  the  Fourteenth  Amendment : C.  G.  Haines,  American 
Doctrine  of  Judicial  Supremacy  (1914)  ; C.  AV.  Collins,  The 
Fourteenth  Amendment  and  the  States  (1912),  is  a careful 
study,  which  is  critical  of  the  prevailing  later  interpretation 
of  the  Amendment.  The  Slaughter  House  ease,  giving  the 
earlier  interpretation  is  in  J.  W.  AVallace,  Cases  argued  and 
adjudged  in  the  Supreme  Court  (Supreme  Court  Reports), 
XVI,  36. 

L.  H.  Haney,  History  of  Economic  Thought  (1911),  on 
laissez  faire;  J.  L.  Laughlin,  Principles  of  Money  (1903)  ; and 
Irving  Fisher,  M'hy  is  the  Dollar  Shrinking  (1914),  present 
two  sides  of  the  quantity  theory  of  money. 

Most  useful  on  the  development  of  education  are  F.  P. 
Graves,  A History  of  Education  in  Modern  Times  (1913)  ; 
and  E.  G.  Dexter,  History  of  Education  in  the  United  States 
(1904). 

The  growth  of  newspapers  is  described  in  The  Bookman, 
XIV,  567-584,  XV,  26-44;  see  also  Rollo  Ogden,  Life  and 
Letters  of  Godkin,  already  mentioned ; G.  H.  Payne,  History 
of  J ournalism  in  the  United  States  (1920)  ; J.  AI.  Lee,  History 
of  American  Journalism  (1917).  The  effects  of  education 
and  the  press  on  American  social,  economic  and  political  lifa 
have  not  been  subjected  to  thorough  study. 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  NEW  ISSUES 

OUT  of  the  economic  and  political  circumstances 
which  haA’e  just  been  described,  there  were 
emerging  between  1865  and  1875  a wide  variety  of  na- 
tional problems.  Such  questions  were  those  concern- 
ing the  proper  relation  between  the  government  and 
the  railroads  and  industrial  enterprises ; the  welfare 
of  the  agricultural  and  wage-earning  classes;  the  as- 
similation of  the  hordes  of  immigrants ; the  conserva- 
tion of  the  resources  of  the  nation  in  lumber,  minerals 
and  oil ; the  tariff,  the  financial  obligations  of  the  gov- 
ernment, the  reform  of  the  civil  service,  and  a host  of 
lesser  matters.  The  animosities  aroused  by  the  war, 
however,  and  the  insistent  nature  of  the  reconstruction 
question  almost  completely  distracted  attention  from 
most  of  these  problems.  Only  upon  the  tariff,  finance 
and  the  civil  service  did  the  public  interest  focus  long 
enough  to  effect  results. 

The  tariff  problem  has  periodically  been  settled  and 
unsettled  since  the  establishment  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment. Just  previous  to  the  war  a low  protective  tariff 
had  been  adopted,  but  the  outbreak  of  the  conflict  had 
necessitated  a larger  income;  and  the  passage  of  an 
internal  revenue  act,  together  with  a higher  protective 
tariff,  had  been  the  chief  means  adopted  to  meet  the 
demand.  By  1864  the  country  had  found  itself  in  need 
of  still  greater  revenues,  and  again  the  internal  and 
tariff  taxes  had  been  increased.  These  acts  were  in 

103 


104 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


force  at  the  close  of  the  war.  The  internal  revenue 
act  levied  taxes  upon  products,  trades,  and  profes- 
sions, upon  liquors  and  tobacco,  upon  manufactures, 
auctions,  slaughtered  cattle,  railroads,  advertisements 
and  a large  number  of  smaller  sources  of  income. 

The  circumstances  that  had  surrounded  the  fram- 
ing and  passage  of  the  tariff  act  of  1864  had  been  some- 
what peculiar.  The  need  of  the  nation  for  revenue 
had  been  supreme  and  there  had  been  no  desire  to  stint 
the  administration  if  funds  could  bring  the  struggle 
to  a successful  conclusion.  Congress  had  been  willing 
to  levy  almost  any  rates  that  anybody  desired.  The 
combination  of  a willingness  among  the  legislators  to 
raise  rates  to  any  height  necessary  for  obtaining  rev- 
enue, and  a conviction  on  their  part  that  high  rates 
were  for  the  good  of  the  country  brought  about  a sit- 
uation eminently  satisfactory  to  the  protectionist  ele- 
ment. There  had  been  no  time  to  spend  in  long  dis- 
cussions of  the  wisdom  of  the  act  and  no  desire  to  do 
so ; and  moreover  the  act  had  been  looked  upon  as 
merely  a temporary  expedient.  It  is  not  possible  to 
describe  accurately  the  personal  influences  which  sur- 
rounded the  passage  of  the  law.  It  is  possible,  how- 
ever, to  note  that  many  industries  had  highly  pros- 
pered under  the  war  revenue  legislation.  Sugar  re- 
fining had  increased ; whiskey  distilling  had  fared  well 
under  the  operation  of  the  internal  revenue  laws;  the 
demands  of  the  army  had  given  stimulus  to  the  woolen 
mills,  which  had  worked  to  capacity  night  and  day ; and 
the  manufacture  and  use  of  sewing  machines,  agricul- 
tural implements  and  the  like  had  been  part  of  the  in- 
dustrial expansion  of  the  times.  Large  fortunes  had 
been  made  in  the  production  of  rifles,  woolen  clothing, 
cotton  cloth  and  other  commodities,  especially  when 
government  contracts  could  be  obtained.  Naturallv 


THE  NEW  ISSUES 


105 


the  tax-levviug  activities  of  Congress  had  tended  to 
draw  the  business  interests  together  to  oppose  or  in- 
fluence particular  rates.  The  brewers,  the  cap  and  hat 
manufacturers,  and  others  had  objected  to  the  taxes 
on  their  products;  the  National  Association  of  Wool 
Manufacturers  and  the  American  Iron  and  Steel  As- 
sociation had  been  formed  partly  with  the  idea  of  in- 
fluencing congressional  taritf  action. 

After  the  close  of  the  war,  the  tariff,  among  other 
things,  seemed  to  many  to  require  an  overhauling. 
Justin  S.  Morrill,  a member  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Ways  and  Means,  and  one  of  the  framers  of  the  act  of 
1864,  argued  in  favor  of  the  protective  system  al- 
though he  warned  his  colleagues: 

At  the  same  time  it  is  a mistake  of  the  friends  of  a sound 
tariff  to  insist  upon  the  extreme  rates  imposed  during  the 
war,  if  less  will  raise  the  necessary  revenue.  . . . Whatever 
percentage  of  duties  were  imposed  upon  foreign  goods  to 
cover  internal  taxes  upon  home  manufactures,  should  not  now 
be  claimed  as  the  lawful  prize  of  protection  where  such  taxes 
have  been  repealed.  . . . The  small  increase  of  the  tariff  for 
this  reason  on  iron,  salt,  woolen,  and  cottons  can  not  be  main- 
tained except  on  the  principle  of  obtaining  a proper  amount 
of  revenue. 

Sentiment  was  strong  against  the  tariff  in  the  agricul- 
tural parts  of  the  West  and  especially  in  those  sections 
not  committed  to  wool-gro-wing.  Great  personal  influ- 
ence was  exerted  on  the  side  of  “tariff-reform”  by 
David  A.  Wells,  a painstaking  and  able  student  of  eco- 
nomic~conditions  who  Avas  appointed  special  commis- 
sioner of  the  revenue  in  1866.  As  a result  of  his  in- 
A’estigations  he  became  converted  from  a believer  in 
protection  to  the  leader  of  the  opposition,  and  his  re- 
ports had  a considerable  influence  in  the  formation  of 


106 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


opinion  in  favor  of  revision.  The  American  Free 
Trade  League  was  formed  and  included  such  influen- 
tial figures  as  Carl  Schurz,  Jacob  D.  Cox,  Horace  ' 
White,  Edward  Atkinson,  E.  L.  Godkin,  editor  of  The 
Nation,  and  many  others.  William  B.  Allison  and 
James  A.  Garfield,  both  prominent  Republican  mem- 
bers of  the  House,  were  in  favor  of  downward  revision. 

In  1867  a bill  providing  for  many  reductions  passed 
the  Senate  as  an  amendment  to  a House  hill  which 
proposed  to  raise  rates.  Far  more  than  a majority  in 
the  House  were  ready  to  accept  the  Senate  measure, 
but  according  to  the  rules  it  was  necessary  to  obtain  a 
two-thirds  vote  in  order  to  get  the  amended  hill  before 
the  House  for  action.  This  it  was  impossible  to  do. 
Nevertheless,  the  wool  growers  and  manufacturers 
were  able  “through  their  large  influence,  persistent 
pressure  and  adroit  management”  to  procure  an  act 
in  the  same  session  which  increased  the  duties  on  wool 
and  woolens  far  above  the  war  rate.  In  1869  the 
duties  on  copper  were  raised,  as  were  those  on  steel  ^ 
rails,  marble,  flax  and  some  other  commodities  in 
1870. 

The  growth  of  the  Liberal  Republican  movement  in 
1872,  with  its  advocacy  of  downward  revision,  fright- 
ened somewhat  the  protectionist  leaders  of  the  Repub- 
lican organization.  It  was  believed  that  a slight  con-  — 
cession  might  prevent  a more  radical  action,  and  just 
before  the  campaign  a ten  per  cent,  reduction  was 
brought  about.  In  1873  the  industrial  depression  so 
lowered  the  revenues  as  to  present  a plausible  oppor- 
tunity for  restoring  duties  to  their  former  level  in 
1875,  where  they  remained  for  nearly  a decade. 

The  lack  of  effective  action  on  the  part  of  the  tariff 
reformers  of  both  parties  was  due  to  a variety  of 
causes.  In  the  years  immediately  following  the  war, 


THE  NEW  ISSUES 


107 


the  Eepublicans  in  Congress  were  more  interested  in 
their  quarrel  with  President  Johnson  than  in  tariff  re- 
form. Furthermore,  the  unpopular  internal  revenues 
were  being  quickly  reduced  between  1867  and  1872,  and 
it  was  argued  that  a simultaneous  reduction  of  im- 
port taxes  would  decrease  the  revenue  too  greatly. 
Moreover  there  was  no  solidarity  among  the  Demo- 
crats, the  South  was  discredited,  and  at  first  not  fully 
represented.  Wells  was  driven  out  of  office  in  1870, 
the  Liberal  Eepublican  movement  was  a failure,  the 
protected  manufacturers  knew  precisely  what  they 
wanted,  they  knew  how  to  achieve  results  and  some  of 
them  were  willing  to  employ  methods  that  the  reform- 
ers were  above  using.  As  time  went  on  and  the  coun- 
try was,  in  the  main,  rather  prosperous,  many  people 
and  esjjecially  the  business  men  made  up  their  minds 
that  the  war  tariffs  were  a positive  benefit  to  the  coun- 
try. For  these  reasons  a war  policy  which  had  gener- 
ally been  considered  a temporary  expedient  became  a 
permanent  political  issue  and  a national  problem. 

The  positions  of  the  two  political  parties  on  the  tar- 
iff were  not  sharply  defined  during  the  ten  years  im- 
mediately following  the  war.  The  Democrats  seemed 
naturally  destined  for  the  role  of  revisionists  because 
of  their  party  traditions,  their  support  in  the  South — 
ordinarily  a strong,  low-tariff  section — and  because 
they  were  out  of  power  when  high  tariffs  were  enacted. 
Yet  the  party  was  far  from  united  on  the  subject. 
Some  prominent  leaders  were  frankly  protectionists, 
such  as  Samuel  J.  Eandall  of  Pennsylvania,  who  was 
Speaker  of  the  House  for  two  terms  and  part  of  an- 
other. The  party  platform  ordinarily  was  silent  or 
non-committal.  In  1868,  for  example,  the  Democratic 
tariff  plank  was  wide  and  generous  enough  for  a com- 
plete platform.  The  party  stood  for 


108 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


a tariff  for  revenue  upon  foreign  imports,  and  such  equal  tax- 
ation under  the  internal  revenue  laws  as  will  afford  incidental 
protection  to  domestic  manufacturers,  and  as  will,  without 
impairing  the  revenue,  impose  the  least  burden  upon,  and  best 
promote  and  encourage,  the  great  industrial  interests  of  the 
country. 

In  1872  the  “straight”  Democrats,  that  is  those  who 
refused  to  support  Greeley,  were  for  a “judicious” 
revenue  tariff ; but  in  1876  the  party  denounced  the  ex- 
isting system  as  “a  masterpiece  of  injustice,  inequality 
and  false  pretence.”  Democratic  state  platforms 
were  even  less  firm ; in  fact,  the  eastern  states  seemed 
committed  to  protection.  In  Congress,  however,  most 
of  the  opposition  to  the  passage  of  tariff  acts  was 
supplied  by  the  Democrats. 

The  attitude  of  the  Eepublicans  was  more  important, 
because  theirs  was  the  party  in  power.  There  was,  as 
has  been  shown,  a strong  tariff-reform  element,  and  in 
some  of  the  conventions  care  seems  to  have  been  taken 
to  avoid  any  definite  statement  of  principles — doubt- 
less on  account  of  the  well-known  differences  in  the 
party — and  for  many  years  there  was  no  clearly  de- 
fined statement  of  the  attitude  of  the  organization. 
Yet  it  must  be  emphasized  that  Eepublicans  were 
usually  protectionists  in  the  practical  business  of  vot- 
ing in  Congress.  Skillful  Eepublican  leaders  gave  way 
a little  in  the  face  of  opposition  but  regained  the  lost 
ground  and  a little  more,  after  the  opposition  re- 
treated. Since  the  war-tariffs  had  been  passed  under 
Eepublican  rule,  it  was  easy  to  clothe  them  with  the 
sanctity  of  party  accomplishments. 

Fully  as  technical  as  the  tariff  problem,  and  pre- 
senting a wider  range  for  the  legislative  activities  of 
Congress,  was  the  financialsl^tion  in  which  the  coun- 


THE  NEW  ISSUES 


109 


try  found  itself  in  1865.  The  total  expenditures  from 
June  30, 1861  to  June  30, 1865  had  been  somewhat  more 
than  three  and  one-third  billions  of  dollars,  an  amount 
almost  double  the  aggregate  disbursements  from  1789 
to  1861.  Officers  accustomed  to  a modest  budget  and 
used  to  working  with  machinery  and  precedents  which 
were  adapted  to  the  day  of  small  things,  had  been  sud- 
denly called  upon  to  work  under  revolutionized  condi- 
tions. From  the  point  of  view  of  expense,  merely,  one 
year’s  operations  during  the  war  had  been  equivalent 
to  thirty-six  times  the  average  outlay  of  the  years 
hitherto.  As  has  been  shown,  the  major  part  of  the 
income  necessary  for  meeting  the  increased  expenses  • 
had  been  obtained  by  means  of  the  tariff  and  internal 
revenue  taxes. 

The  tariff  worked  to  the  advantage  of  many  people, 
and  its  retention  was  insistently  demanded  by  them; 
the  internal  revenue  taxes  were  disliked,  and  few 
things  were  more  popular  after  the  war  than  their  re- 
duction. In  1866  an  act  was  passed  which  lowered  the  — 
internal  revenue  by  an  amount  estimated  at  forty- 
five  to  sixty  millions  of  dollars.  In  succeeding  years 
further  reductions  were  made,  so  that  by  1870  the  scale 
was  low  enough  to  withstand  attacks  until  1883. 

The  national  debt  was  the  source  of  more  compli- 
cated questions.  It  was  composed,  on  June  30,  1866, 
of  a variety  of  loans  carrying  five  different  rates  of 
interest  and  maturing  in  nineteen  different  periods  of 
time.  Parts  of  it  had  been  borrowed  in  times  of  dis- 
tress at  high  rates;  but  after  the  struggle  was  suc- 
cessfully ended,  the  credit  of  the  government  was  good, 
and  enough  money  could  be  obtained  at  low  interest 
charges  to  cancel  the  old  debt  and  establish  a new  one 
with  the  interest  account  correspondingly  reduced. 
Hugh  McCulloch  and  John  Sherman  as  secretaries  of 


110 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


the  treasury  were  most  influential  in  accomplishing 
this  transition,  and  by  1879  the  process  was  completed 
and  a yearly  saving  of  fourteen  million  dollars  effected. 

Differences  of  opinion  concerning  the  kind  of  money  / 
with  which  the  principal  of  the  debt  should  be  paid  I 
brought  this  matter  into  the  field  of  politics.  When 
the  earliest  loans  had  been  contracted,  no  stipulation 
had  been  made  in  regard  to  the  medium  of  payment. 
Later  loans  had  been  made  redeemable  in  “coin,” 
without  specifying  either  gold  or  silver;  while  still 
later  bonds  had  been  sold  under  condition  that  the  iin- 
terest  be  paid  in  coin,  although  nothing  had  been  said 
about  the  principal.  There  was  considerable  demand 
for  redemption  of  the  bonds  in  paper  money,  except 
where  there  was  agreement  to  the  contrary,  although 
the  previous  custom  of  the  government  had  been  to  pay 
in  coin.  The  proposal  to  repay  the  debt  in  paper  cur- 
rency, the  “Ohio  idea,”  gained  considerable  ground  in  ^ 
the  Middle  West,  as  has  already  been  explained.  In 
the  campaign  of  1868  the  Democratic  platform  advo- 
cated the  Ohio  plan.  Some  of  the  Republicans,  like 
Thaddeus  Stevens,  agreed  with  this  policy ; some  of  • 
the  Democrats  opposed  it — Horatio  Seymour,  the  pres- 
idential candidate,  among  them.  Nevertheless  the 
Democratic  platform  committed  the  party  to  payments 
in  greenbacks  unless  express  contract  prevented,  while 
the  Republicans  denounced  this  policy  as  “repudia- 
tion” and  promised  the  payment  of  the  debt  in  “good 
faith”  according  to  the  “spirit”  and  “letter”  of  the 
laws.  The  credit  of  the  government  was  highly  bene^ 
fited  by  the  payment  of  the  debt  in  gold,  yet  the  bonds 
had  been  purchased  during  the  war  with  depreciated 
paper,  and  gold  redemj)tion  greatly  enriched  the  pur- 
chasers at  the  expense  of  the  remainder  of  the  popula- 
tion. It  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  debtor  classes 


THE  NEW  ISSUES 


111 


•were  not  enthusiastic  over  this  outcome.  The  Eepuhli- 
cans  on  being  successful  in  the  election  and  coining  into 
power,  carried  out  their  campaign  promises  and 
pledged  the  faith  of  the  country  to  the  payment  of  the 
debt  in  coin  or  its  equivalent. 

The  income  tax  was  a method  of  raising  revenue 
which  did  not  produce  any  considerable  returns  until 
after  the  war  was  over.  Acts  passed  during  the  wmr 
had  levied  a tax  on  all  incomes  over  six  hundred  dol- 
lars and  had  introduced  progressively  increasing  rates 
on  higher  amounts.  Incomes  above  $5,000,  for  exam- 
ple, were  taxed  ten  per  cent.  The  greatest  number  of 
people  were  reached  and  the  largest  returns  obtained 
in  1866  when  nearly  half  a million  persons  paid  an  ag- 
gregate of  about  seventy-three  million  dollars.  The 
entire  system  was  abolished  in  1872. 

Aside  from  the  tariff,  the  “legal-tender”  notes  gave 
rise  to  the  greatest  number  of  political  and  constitu- 
tional tangles.  By  acts  of  February  25, 1862  and  later. 
Congress  had  provided  for  the  issue  of  four  hundred 
and  fifty  million  dollars  of  United  States  paper  notes, 
which  were  commonly  known  as  greenbacks  or  legal- 
tenders.  The  latter  name  came  from  the  fact  that, 
under  the  law,  the  United  States  notes  were  legal  ten- 
der for  all  debts,  public  or  private,  except  customs 
duties  and  interest  on  the  public  debt.  In  other  words, 
the  law  compelled  creditors  to  receive  the  greenbacks 
in  payment  of  all  debts,  with  the  two  exceptions  men- 
tioned. Three  main  questions  arose  in  connection 
vdth  these  issues  of  paper:  whether  Congress  had 
power  under  the  Constitution  to  make  them  legal  ten- 
der; whether  their  volume  should  be  allowed  to  re- 
main at  war  magnitude,  be  somewhat  contracted  or  en- 
tirely done  away  vfith;  and  whether  the  government 
should  resume  specie  payments — that  is,  exchange  gold 


112 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAK 


for  paper  on  the  demand  of  holders  of  the  latter. 

The  hrst  of  these  questions  was  twice  decided  in  the 
Supreme  Court.  In  1870,  in  Hepburn  v.  Griswold,  the  ^ 
point  at  issue  was  whether  the  greenbacks  could  law- 
fully be  offered  to  satisfy  a debt  contracted  before  the 
legal-tender  act  had  been  passed.  As  it  happened, 
Salmon  P.  Chase,  who  had  been  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury during  the  war,  was  now  Chief  Justice  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  and  delivered  its  opinion.  By  a vote  of  t 
four  to  three  it  decided  that  the  greenbacks  were  not( 
legal  tender  for  contracts  made  previous  to  the  passage 
of  the  law.  At  the  time  when  tlie  case  was  decided/, 
however,  there  were  two  vacancies  on  the  bench  which 
were  immediately  tilled,  and  shortly  thereafter  two 
new  cases  involving  the  legal-tender  act  were  brought 
before  the  Court  (Knox  v.  Lee,  and  Parker  v.  Davis). 
The  decision,  which  was  announced  in  1871,  over-ruled  ' 
the  judgment  in  Hepburn  v.  Griswold  and  held  by  a 
vote  of  five  to  four  that  the  legal-tender  act  was  con- 
stitutional as  applied  to  contracts  made  either  before 
or  after  its  passage. 

The  second  question  relating  to  the  greenbacks  was  ~ 
that  in  regard  to  their  volume.  At  first  Congress 
adopted  the  policy  of  contraction  and  when  greenbacks 
came  into  the  treasury  they  were  destroyed.  As  con- 
tinued contraction  tended  to  make  the  Volume  of  cur- 
rency smaller  and  to  make  money  harder  to  get,  and 
therefore,  to  raise  its  value,  the  debtor  classes  began 
to  object.  As  early  as  1865  there  was  strong  sentiment 
against  contraction  and  in  favor  of  paying  the  public 
debt  in  paper.  Economic  distress  in  the  West  fur- 
thered the  movement  and  some  of  the  Republican  lead- 
ers were  doubtful  of  the  wisdom  of  reducing  the  out- 
standing stock  of  paper.  Contraction  was  stopped, 
therefore,  in  1868,  and  only  President  Grant’s  veto  in 


THE  NEW  ISSUES 


113 


1874  prevented  an  increase  in  the  amount.  Event- 
ually, in  1878,  the  amount  then  in  circulation — $346,- 
681,000 — was  fixed  by  a law  forbidding  further  con- 
traction.^ 

The  western  farmers,  meanwhile,  were  feeling  the 
pinch  of  falling  prices.  Believing  that  their  ills  were 
due  to  the  scarcity  of  money,  they  opposed  the  policy 
of  contraction  and  even  launched  the  Greenback  party 
to  carry  out  their  principles.  In  1876  it  polled  80,000 
votes,  and  in  1878  at  the  time  of  the  congressional  elec- 
tions over  1,000,000,  but  thereafter  its  strength  rapidly 
declined.  Neither  the  East  nor  the  West  understood 
the  motives  of  the  other  in  this  controversy.  Eastern 
congressmen  considered  western  insistence  upon  a 
a large  volume  of  currency  as  a dishonest  movement 
to  reduce  bond  values  by  legislation.  Such  an  action, 
they  asserted,  would  do  away  with  the  national  integ- 
rity. The  people  of  the  West  thought  of  the  eastern 
bondholders  as  “fat  bullionists”  who  dined  at  costly 
restaurants  on  terrapin  and  Burgundy  and  paid  for 
their  luxuries  with  bonds  whose  values  were  raised  by 
a contracted  currency. 

The  thiixl_cpiestion  relating  to  the  greenbacks  was 
that  of  the  resumption  of  specie  payments.  At  the 
close  of  the  war  practically  all  the  money  in  circula- 
tion was  paper,  which  passed  at  a depreciated  value 
because  it  was  not  redeemable  in  coin.  The  obvious  i 
thing  was  to  resume  the  exchange  of  specie  for  paper 
and  thus  restore  the  latter  to  par  value,  but  serious 
obstacles  stood  in  the  way.  A money  crisis  in  1873 
aroused  a clamor  for  larger  supplies  of  paper;  gold 
was  hard  to  procure,  as  France  and  Germany  were 
both  accumulating  a redemption  fund  and  specie  was 
actually  flowing  out  of  the  country.  Outside  of  the 

1 This  is  the  amount  still  outstanding. 


114 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


treasury  there  was  little  gold  in  the  United  States,  the 
amount  being  less  than  one  hundred  million  dollars  as 
late  as  1877.  The  friends  of  resumption  could  not  be 
sure  of  the  feasibility  of  their  project,  and  the  oppon- 
ents were  aggressive  and  numerous. 

In  the  elections  of  1874  the  Republicans  were  se- 
verely defeated,  and  it  was  seen  that  the  Democrats 
would  have  a clear  majority  in  the  next  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives. Hence  the  Republicans  hurried  through. 

a resumption  bill  on  January  14, 1875 — a sort  of  death- 
bed act.  It  authorized  the  secretary  of  the  treasury 
to  raise  gold  for  redemption  purposes,  and  set  January^ 
1,  1879,  as  the  date  when  resumption  should  take  place. 
As  in  the  case  of  the  taritf,  the  political  parties  found 
difficulty  in  determining  which  side  of  the  resumption 
question  they  desired  to  take.  Although  the  Demo- 
cratic platform  of  1868  contained  a greenback  plank,  ^ 
yet  some  of  its  leaders  opposed,  and  the  state  platforms 
of  1875  and  1876  demanded  resumption.  The  national 
platform  of  the  latter  year  both  denounced  the  Repub- 
licans for  not  making  progress  toward  resumption  and 
demanded  the  repeal  of  the  act  of  1875,  without  disclos- 
ing whether  the  party  was  prepared  to  offer  any  im- 
provements. In  November,  1877,  a bill  practically  re- 
pealing the  resumption  act  passed  the  House — the 
western  and  southern  Democrats  furnishing  most  of 
the  affirmative  votes,  assisted  by  twenty-seven  Repub- 
licans. A resolution  declaring  it  to  be  the  opinion  of 
Congress  that  United  States  bonds  were  payable  in 
silver  was  introduced  and  advocated  by  many  Repub- 
licans. On  the  other  hand,  eastern  state  Democratic 
and  Republican  platforms  were  much  alike.  Appar- 
ently, therefore,  differences  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the 
greenbacks  and  resumption  were  caused  as  much  by 
sectional  as  by  party  considerations.^ 

1 For  later  stages  of  resumption,  cf.  pp.  141-142. 


THE  NEW  ISSUES 


115 


More  lasting  than  finance  as  a political  issue  but  less 
enduring  than  the  tariff,  was  the  reform  of  the  civil 
service.  In  its  widest  sense,  the  term  civil  service 
included  all  non-military  government  officers  from 
cabinet  officials  and  supreme  court  judges  to  the  hum- 
blest emploj’ee  in  the  postal  or  naval  service.  The 
reform,  however,  was  directed  mainly  toward  the  ap- 
pointment and  tenure  of  the  lower  officers.  Before  the 
Civil  War  the  “spoils  system”  had  been  in  full  swing; 
appointments  to  positions  had  been  frankly  used  as 
rewards  for  party  activity;  office-holders  had  been 
openly  assessed  a fraction  of  their  salaries  in  order  to 
fill  the  treasure  chest  at  campaign  times;  rotation  in 
office  had  been  the  rule.  During  the  war.  President 
Lincoln  had  found  his  ante-room  filled  with  wrangling, 
importunate  office-seekers  who  consumed  time  which 
he  needed  for  the  problems  of  the  conflict.  As  he  him- 
self had  expressed  the  situation,  he  was  like  a man  Avho 
was  letting  offices  in  one  end  of  his  house  while  the 
other  end  was  burning  down.  During  the  war,  also, 
the  patronage  at  the  disposal  of  the  government  had 
vastly  increased.  Not  only  had  the  number  of  labor- 
ers, clerks  and  officials  become  greater,  but  numerous 
contracts  had  been  let  for  the  production  of  war  ma- 
terials, and  manufacturers  and  merchants  intrigued 
for  a share  of  federal  business.  “Influence”  and  posi- 
tion had  been  more  powerful  than  merit  in  procuring 
the  favor  of  government  officers. 

After  the  war  many  abuses  that  had  earlier  been 
overlooked  began  to  attract  the  attention  of  a few 
thoughtful  men.  It  was  estimated  that  not  more  than 
one-half  to  three-fourths  of  the  legitimate  internal 
revenue  was  collected  during  Johnson’s  presidency, 
so  corrupt  and  inefficient  were  the  revenue  collectors. 
Endless  Indian  troubles  and  countless  losses  of  money 


116 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


resulted  from  the  corruption  of  the  federal  Indian 
agents.  Conditions  were  even  worse  during  the  Grant 
regime.  The  President ’s  appointments  were  wretched ; 
he  placed  his  relatives  in  official  positions;  revenue 
frauds  amounting  to  $75,000,000  were  discovered  dur- 
ing his  second  administration.  In  certain  depart- 
ments, it  was  customary,  when  vacancies  occurred,  to 
allow  the  salaries  to  “lapse” — that  is,  accumulate — so 
as  to  provide  a fund  to  satisfy  patronage  seekers.  In 
one  case,  thirty-five  persons  were  put  on  the  “lapse 
fund”  for  eight  days  at  the  end  of  a fiscal  year,  in 
order  to  ‘ ‘ sop  up  ” a little  surplus  which  was  in  danger 
of  being  saved  and  returned  to  the  treasury.  One 
customs  collector  at  the  port  of  New  York  removed 
employees  at  an  average  rate  of  one  every  three  days ; 
another,  three  every  four  days;  and  another,  three 
every  five  days,  in  order  to  provide  places  for  party 
workers.  One  secretary  in  an  important  department 
of  the  government  had  seventeen  clerks  for  whom  he 
had  no  employment.  The  party  assessments  on  office- 
holders became  little  short  of  outrageous.  Two  or 
three  per  cent,  of  the  salary  of  the  lower  officers  was 
called  for,  while  the  more  important  officials  were  ex- 
pected to  contribute  much  larger  sums.  In  New  York 
— for  the  system  held  in  the  states  and  cities — candi- 
dates for  the  mayoralty  were  reputed  to  pay  $25,000  to 
$30,000 ; judges,  $10,000  to  $15,000 ; and  representatives 
in  Congress,  $10,000.  While  these  conditions  were  by 
no  means  wholly  due  to  the  spoils  system,  the  method 
of  appointment  in  the  civil  service  made  a bad  matter 
worse. 

Conditions  such  as  these  could  hardly  fail  to  produce 
a reform  movement.  In  fact,  as  far  back  as  1853  some 
elementary  and  ineffective  legislation  had  attempted  a 
partial  remedy.  The  war  gave  added  impetus  to  the 


THE  NEW  ISSUES 


117 


movement  and  attention  turned  to  the  reform  systems 
of  (Ireat  Britain  and  other  countries,  where  problems 
similar  to  ours  had  already  been  met  and  solved.  The 
first  American  who  really  grasped  civil  service  reform 
was  Thomas  A.  Jenckes,  a member  of  Congress  from 
Rhode  Island.  He  introduced  reform  bills  in  1865  and 
later,  based  on  studies  of  English  practice  and  on  cor- 
respondence with  the  leaders  of  reform  there;  but  no 
legislation  resulted.  In  brief,  his  plan  provided  for 
the  appointment  of  employees  in  the  public  service  on 
the  basis  of  ability,  determined  by  competitive  exam- 
inations. After  a time  Jenckes  and  his  associates 
achieved  considerable  success  and  finally  interested 
President  Grant  in  their  project.  In  1871  they  got  a 
rider  attached  to  an  appropriation  bill  which  author- 
ized the  chief  executive  to  prescribe  rules  for  the  ad- 
mission of  persons  into  the  civil  service  and  allowed 
him  to  appoint  a commission  to  put  the  act  into  effect. 
George  William  Curtis,  a well-known  reformer,  was 
made  chairman,  and  rules  were  formulated  which  were 
applied  to  the  departments  at  Washington  and  to 
federal  offices  in  New  York.  Grant,  although  favor- 
able to  the  reform,  was  not  enthusiastic  about  it,  and 
soon  made  an  appointment  which  was  so  offensive  that 
Curtis  resigned.  Congress,  nothing  loath,  refused  to 
continue  the  necessary  appropriations  and  the  reform 
project  continued  in  a state  of  suspended  animation 
until  the  inauguration  of  President  Hayes. 

The  human  elements  in  the  struggle  for  civil  service 
reform,  both  during  the  decade  after  the  war  and  for 
many  years  later,  are  necessary  for  an  understanding 
of  the  course  of  the  controversy  and  its  outcome. 
These  elements  included  the  advocates  of  the  patronage 
system,  the  reformers  and  the  president. 

Sometimes  the  advocates  of  the  patronage  system 


118 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


viewed  the  refoim  with  contempt.  Roscoe  Conkling, 
for  example,  expressed  his  sentiments  in  the  remark, 
“When  Dr.  Johnson  said  that  patriotism  was  the  last 
refuge  of  the  scoundrel  he  ignored  the  enormous  possi- 
bilities of  the  word  reform!”  Sometimes  they  at- 
tempted to  discredit  the  project  by  an  exaggeration  of 
its.  effects,  as  when  John  A.  Logan  declared  that  he 
saw  in  it  a life-tenure  and  an  aristocratic  caste.  “It 
will  not  be  apparent  how  great  is  its  enormity,”  he 
declared  in  Congress,  “how  vicious  are  its  practices 
and  how  poisonous  are  its  influences  until  we  are  too 
far  encircled  by  its  coils  to  shake  them  off.”  The 
strength  of  the  exponents  of  the  patronage  system, 
however,  lay  not  in  their  capacity  for  contempt  and 
ridicule,  but  in  a theory  of  government  that  was 
founded  upon  certain  very  definite  human  character- 
istics. The  theory  may  be  clearly  seen  in  the  Auto- 
hiograpliy  of  Thomas  C.  Platt,  a colleague  of  Conk- 
ling in  the  Senate  and  for  many  years  the  boss  of  N^w 
York  state.  It  may  be  expressed  somewhat  as  follows. 

In  the  field  of  actual  politics,  parties  are  a necessity 
and  organization  is  essential.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
citizen,  therefore,  to  support  the  party  that  stands  for 
right  policies  and  to  adhere  closely  to  its  official  organ- 
ization. Loyalty  should  be  rewarded  by  appointment 
to  positions  within  the  gift  of  the  party;  and  disloyalty 
should  be  looked  upon  as  political  treason.  One  who 
votes  for  anybody  except  the  organization  candidate 
feels  himself  superior  to  his  party,  is  faithless  to  the 
great  ideal  and  is  only  a little  less  despicable  than  he 
who,  having  been  elected  to  an  office  through  the  energy 
and  devotion  of  the  party  workers,  is  then  so  ungrate- 
ful as  to  refuse  to  appoint  the  workers  to  positions 
within  his  gift.  Positions  constitute  the  cohesive  force 
that  holds  the  organization  intact. 


THE  NEW  ISSUES 


119 


The  second  of  the  human  elements,  the  reform 
group,  was  led  by  such  men  as  George  William  Curtis, 
Dorman  B.  Eaton  and  Carl  Schurz,  with  the  support 
of  periodicals  like  Harper’s  Weekly  and  The  Nation. 
The  career  and  character  of  Curtis  is  typical  at  once 
of  the  strength  and  the  weakness  of  the  group.  As  a 
young  man  Curtis  had  intended  to  enter  a business 
career,  but  finding  it  unsuited  to  his  tastes  he  had  aban- 
doned his  ambition,  spent  some  years  in  European 
travel  and  then  devoted  himself  to  literary  work,  first 
on  Harper’s  Magazine  and  afterwards,  for  many  years, 
as  editor  of  Harper’s  Weekly.  He  had  early  inter- 
ested himself  in  politics,  had  been  in  the  convention 
which  nominated  Lincoln,  had  taken  part  in  numerous 
state  and  national  political  conferences  and  conven- 
tions, was  president  of  the  Metropolitan  Museum  of 
Art  in  New  York  and  chancellor  of  the  University  of 
the  State  of  New  York.  For  many  years,  during  the 
period  when  civil  service  reform  was  making  its  fight 
for  recognition,  Curtis  was  the  president  and  one  of 
the  moving  spirits  of  the  National  Civil  Service  Re- 
form League.  In  politics  he  was  an  independent  Re- 
publican. Although  of  the  intellectual  class,  like  the 
other  prominent  leaders  of  the  reform  movement,  he 
was  a man  of  practical  political  ability,  not  a mere 
obsemmr  of  politics,  so  that  he  and  his  associates  made 
up  in  capacity  and  influence  what  they  lacked  in 
breadth  of  appeal.  Some  of  the  leaders  were  patient 
men  who  expected  that  results  would  come  slowly  and 
who  were  ready  to  accept  half  a loaf  of  reform  rather 
than  no  loaf  at  all,  but  there  were  also  such  impatient 
critics  as  E.  L.  Godkin  who  put  so  much  emphasis  on 
the  failures  of  the  reformers  as  to  overshadow  their 
positive  achievements.  Moreover,  there  were  the  well- 
meaning  but  impracticable  people  who  constituted  what 


120 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Theodore  Roosevelt  -once  called  the  “lunatic  fringe” 
of  reform  movements. 

The  attitude  of  the  exponents  of  the  patronage  sys- 
tem toward  the  reformers  was  one  of  undisguised  con- 
tempt. In  a famous  speech  delivered  at  a New  York 
state  convention  in  Rochester  in  September,  1877, 
Conkling  poured  his  scorn  on  the  reform  element  in 
general  and  on  Curtis  in  particular,  as  “man-mil- 
liners,” “carpet-knights  of  politics,”  “grasshoppers 
in  the  corner  of  a fence,”  and  disciples  of  ladies’  maga- 
zines with  their  “rancid,  canting  self-righteousness.” 

The  third  personal  element  in  the  reform  contro- 
versy was  the  chief  executive.  Beginning  \vith  Grant, 
if  not  with  Lincoln,  the  presidents  were  favorable  to 
the  progress  of  reform,  but  they  were  surrounded  by 
circumstances  that  made  vigorous  action  a difficult  mat- 
ter. The  task  of  distributing  the  patronage  was  a 
burden  from  which  they  would  have  been  glad  to  be 
relieved,  yet  the  demands  of  the  party  organization 
were  insistent,  -and  to  turn  a constantly  deaf  ear  to 
them  would  have  been  to  court  political  disaster.  The 
executive  was  always  in  the  position  of  desiring  to 
further  an  ideal  and  being  obliged  to  face  the  hard 
facts  of  politics.  The  progress  which  he  made,  there- 
fore, depended  on  how  resolutelj^  he  could  press  for- 
ward his  ideal  in  the  face  of  continued  opposition.  A 
great  difficulty  lay  in  getting  subordinates — in  the  cabi- 
net, for  example — who  were  in  sympathy  with  prog- 
ress, and  sometimes  even  the  vice-presidential  nomina- 
tion was  given  to  the  patronage  element  in  the  party 
in  order  to  placate  that  faction,  while  the  presidential 
nominee  was  disposed  to  reform. 

Public  opinion  was  slow  in  forming  and  was  lacking 
in  the  means  of  definite  expression.  For  many  years 
after  the  war  there  was  widespread  fear  that  the  instal- 


THE  NEW  ISSUES 


121 


lation  of  a Democratic  president  would  result  in  the 
wholesale  debauch  of  the  offices,  and  sober  northerners 
believed,  or  thought  they  believed,  that  “rebels”  would 
again  be  in  power  if  a Democrat  were  elected.  Under 
such  conditions  and  because  the  offices  were  already 
filled  with  Eepublicans,  the  Eepublican  North  was  will- 
ing to  leave  things  as  they  w^ere. 

The  party  pronouncements  on  civil  service  reform 
were  as  evasive  as  they  were  on  finance  and  the  tariff. 
To  be  sure  the  Liberal  Eepublicans  in  1872  sincerely 
desired  reform  and  made  it  the  subject  of  a definite 
plank  in  their  platform,  but  the  wing  of  the  Democratic 
party  that  refused  to  ally  with  them  was  silent  on  the 
civil  service,  and  the  “straight”  Eepublicans  advo- 
cated reform  in  doubtful  and  unconvincing  terms.  In 
1876  both  party  platforms  were  even  more  vague,  al- 
though Hayes  himself  was  openly  committed  to  the 
improvement  of  the  service. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  best  work  on  the  tariff  is  F.  W.  Taussig,  Tariff  History 
of  the  United  States  (6th  ed.,  1914),  a scholarly  and  non- 
partisan account,  although  giving  slight  attention  to  legisla- 
tive history;  Ida  M.  Tarbell,  Tariff  in  Our  Times  (1911), 
emphasizes  the  personal  and  social  sides  of  tariff'  history  and 
is  hostile  to  protection ; Edward  Stanwood,  American  Tariff 
Controversies  (2  vols.,  190.3),  devotes  considerable  attention 
to  the  historical  setting  and  legislative  history  of  tariff  acts, 
and  is  distinctly  friendly  to  protection. 

The  most  useful  single  volume  on  financial  history  is  D.  R. 
Dewey,  Financial  History  of  the  United  States  (5th  ed.,  1915), 
which  is  concise,  accurate  and  equipped  with  full  bibliog- 
raphies; A.  B.  Hepburn,  History  of  Currency  in  the  United 
States  (1915),  is  by  an  expert;  A.  D.  Noyes,  Forty  Years  of 
American  Finance  (1909),  continues  the  same  author’s  Thirty 


122 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


Years  and  is  reliable;  T.  E.  Burton,  John  Sherman  (1906), 
is  useful  here.  The  legal-tender  decisions  are  in  J.  W.  Wal- 
lace, Cases  argued  and  adjudged  in  the  Supreme  Court,  VIII, 
603,  and  XII,  457. 

The  standard  work  on  the  civil  service  is  C.  R.  Fish,  The 
Civil  Service  and  the  Patronage  (1905)  ; the  reports  of  the 
Civil  Service  Commission,  especiallj^  the  Fourth  Report,  are 
essential;  the  articles  by  D.  B.  Eaton  in  J.  J.  Lalor,  Cyclo- 
paedia of  Political  Science  (3  vols.,  1893),  are  justly  well- 
known;  G.  W.  Curtis,  Orations  and  Addresses  (2  vols.,  1894), 
and  Edward  Cary,  George  William  Curtis  (1894),  are  excel- 
lent. The  politician’s  side  may  be  found  in  A.  R.  Conkling, 
Life  and  Letters  of  lioscoe  Conkling  (1889),  and  T.  C.  Platt, 
Autobiography  (1910). 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  RUTHERFORD  B.  HAYES 

The  conditions  which  confronted  President  Hayes 
when  the  tinal  decision  of  the  Electoral  Commis- 
sion placed  him  in  the  executive  chair  did  not  make  it 
probable  that  he  could  carry  out  a program  of  positive 
achievetnent.  The  withdrawal  of  troops  from  the 
South  had  been  almost  completed,  but  the  process  of 
reconstruction  had  been  so  dominated  by  suspicion, 
ignorance  and  vindictiveness  that  sectional  hostility 
was  still  acute.  As  has  been  seen,  the  economic  prob- 
lems which  faced  the  country  were  for  the  most  part 
unsolved;  on  the  subjects  of  tariff,  finance  and  the  civil 
service,  neither  party  was  prepared  to  present  a united 
front;  and  the  lack  of  foresight  and  statesmanlike 
leadership  in  the  parties  had  given  selfish  interests  an 
opportunity  to  seize  control.  Nor  did  the  circum- 
stances surrounding  the  election  of  Hayes  tend  to 
simplify  his  task,  for  the  disappointment  of  the  Demo- 
crats was  extreme,  and  they  found  a natural  difficulty 
in  adjusting  themselves  to  the  decision  against  Tilden. 
Democratic  newspapers  dubbed  Hayes  “His  Fraudu- 
lency”  and  “The  Boss  Thief,”  printed  his  picture  with 
“Fraud”  printed  across  his  brow  and  referred  to  his 
election  as  the  “steal”  and  a “political  crime.” 

The  man  who  was  to  essay  leadership  under  such 
conditions  had  back  of  him  a useful  even  if  not  bril- 
liant career.  He  had  been  born  in  Ohio  in  1822,  had 
graduated  from  Kenyon  College  as  valedictorian  of  his 
class,  attended  Harvard  Law  School  and  served  on  the 

123 


124 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Union  side  during  the  war,  retiring  with  the  rank  of  a 
brevet  Major  General.  He  had  been  twice  elected  to 
Congress,  but  had  resigned  after  his  second  election  to 
become  governor  of  his  native  state,  a position  which 
he  had  filled  for  three  terms. 

Hayes  was  a man  of  the  substantial,  conscientious 
and  hard-working  type.  He  was  not  brilliant  or  mag- 
netic, he  originated  no  innovations,  burst  into  no 
flights  of  imaginative  oratory.  His  state  papers  were 
planned  with  painstaking  care — first,  frequently,  jotted 
down  in  his  diary  and  then  elaborated,  revised,  recopied 
and  revised  again.  The  vivid  imagination  and  high- 
strung  emotions  that  made  Clay  and  Blaine  great  cam- 
paigners were  lacking  in  Hayes.  He  was  gentle,  dig- 
nified, simple,  systematic,  thoughtful,  serene,  correct. 
In  making  his  judgments  on  public  questions  he  was 
sensitive  to  moral  forces.  The  emancipation  of  the 
slaves  was  not  merely  wise  and  just  to  him — it  was 
‘‘Providential.”  He  favored  a single  six-year  term 
for  the  president  because  it  would  safeguard  him  from 
selfish  scheming  for  another  period  of  power.  Partly 
because  of  the  lack  of  dash  and  coimpelling  force  in 
Hayes,  but  more  because  of  the  low  standards  of  politi- 
cal action  which  were  common  at  the  time,  his  scruples 
seemed  puritanical  and  were  held  up  to  ridicule  as  the 
milk-and-water  and  “old- Woman”  policies  of  “Granny 
Hayes.”  His  public,  as  well  as  his  private  life,  was' 
unimpeached  in  a time  when  lofty  principles  were  not 
common  and  when  scandal  attached  itself  to  public  offi- 
cers of  every  grade.  To  his  probity  and  the  “safe” 
character  of  his  views,  as  well  as  to  his  record  as  gov- 
ernor of  an  important  state,  was  due  his  elevation  to 
the  presidency.^  In  his  habit  of  self-analysis,  Hayes 

1 For  a time  public  interest  was  absorbed  by  the  determination  of 
President  and  Mrs.  Hayes  to  serve  no  wines  of  any  kind  in  the  White 


THE  ADMINISTKATION  OF  HAYES  125 

was  reminiscent  of  John  Quincy  Adams.  Like  Adams 
lie  kept  a diary  from  iiis  early  youth,  the  serious  and 
mature  entries  in  which  cause  the  reader  to  wonder 
whether  Hayes  ever  had  a childhood.  When  he  had 
just  passed  his  twentieth  birthday  he  confided  to  his 
diary  that  he  found  himself  unsatisfied  with  his  prog- 
ress ill  Blackstone,  that  he  must  curb  his  “propensity” 
to  read  newspapers  to  the  exclusion  of  more  substan- 
tial matter,  and  in  general  that  he  was  “greatly  de- 
ficient in  many  particulars.”  Then  and  in  later  years 
he  noted  hostile  criticisms  of  himself  and  combated 
them,  recorded  remarks  that  he  had  heard,  propounded 
questions  for  future  thought,  expressed  a modest  am- 
bition or  admitted  a curbed  elation  over  success. 

In  the  field  of  politics  Hayes  was  looked  upon  as  a 
reliable  party  man,  a reputation  which  was  justified  by 
his  rigid  adherence  to  his  party  and  by  his  attitudi 
toward  the  opposition.  In  both  these  respects  he  was 
the  ordinary  partisan.  Nevertheless  he  thought  out 
his  views  i\ith  unusual  care,  made  them  a matter  of 
conscience  and  measured  policies  by  ethical  standards 
that  were  more  exacting  than  the  usual  politician  of  the 
time  was  accustomed  to  exercise.  The  only  remark 
of  his  that  gained  wide  circulation  reflects  his  type  of 
partisanship:  “he  serves  his  party  best  who  serves  his 
country  best.”  In  these  latter  respects — his  thought- 
fulness, conscientiousness,  exacting  standards  of  con- 
duct and  less  narrowly  partisan  spirit — he  formed  a 

House.  Finally  a delicious  frozen  punch  was  served  at  about  the  middle 
of  the  state  dinners,  known  to  the  thirsty  as  "the  Life-saving  Station.” 
It  was  popularly  understood  to  be  liberally  strengthened  with  old  Santa 
Croix  rum,  but  the  President  later  asserted  that  he  had  caused  the 
punch  to  be  sharpened  with  the  flavor  of  Jamaica  rum  and  that  no  drop 
of  spirits  was  inserted.  What  the  chef  really  did,  perhaps  nobody 
knows.  At  any  rate,  both  sides  were  satisfied.  Williams,  R.  B.  Bayes, 
II,  312  note. 


L26 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


contrast  to  the  most  influential  leaders  of  his  party 
organization.  Altogether  it  seemed  likely  at  the  start 
that  Hayes  might  have  friction  with  the  Republican 
chiefs. 

The  opening  of  the  administration  found  public  in- 
terest centered  on  the  inaugural  address  and  the  Cabi- 
net.^ The  inaugural  set  forth  with  clearness  and  dig- 
nity the  problems  which  the  administration  desired  to 
solve : the  removal  of  the  barriers  between  the  sections 
on  the  basis  of  the  acceptance  of  the  war  amendments, 
southern  self-government  and  the  material  develop- 
ment of  the  South ; reform  in  the  civil  service,  thorough, 
radical  and  complete;  and  the  resumption  of  specie 
payments.  To  the  choice  of  a cabinet,  Hayes  devoted 
much  painstaking  care.  For  Secretary  of  State,  he 
nominated  William  M.  Evarts  of  New  York,  an  emi- 
nent lawyer  who  had  aided  Charles  Francis  Adams  in 
his  diplomatic  battle  with  England  during  the  Civil 
War  and  later  in  the  Geneva  Arbitration,  had  shown 
wit  and  finesse  in  the  defence  of  Andrew  Johnson  in 
the  impeachment  trial,  and  had  valiantly  assisted  the 
Republican  cause  before  the  Electoral  Commission. 
In  addition,  Evarts  was  a man  of  the  world  who  knew 
how  to  make  the  most  of  social  occasions  and  was  an 
orator  of  reputation.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
was  John  Sherman  of  Ohio,  who  had  been  for  years 
chairman  of  the  finance  committee  of  the  Senate,  and 
was  an  example  of  the  more  statesmanlike  type  of 
senator  of  war  and  reconstruction  times. 

The  nomination  of  Carl  Schurz,  as  Secretary  of  the 
Interior,  and  David  M.  Key,  as  Postmaster-General, 
caused  an  uproar  among  the  party  leaders.  Schurz 

1 Because  March  4 fell  on  Sunday,  the  oath  of  office  was  privately 
administered  to  Hayes  on  Saturday  evening,  March  3.  Williams, 
Hayes,  II,  5, 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  HAYES  127 


was  a cosmopolitan,  a German- American,  a scholar, 
orator,  veteran  of  the  Civil  AVar,  friend  of  Lincoln,  and 
independent  thinker.  His  devotion  to  the  cause  of 
civil  service  reform  recommended  him  to  the  friendship 
of  the  President  and  to  the  enmity  of  the  political 
leaders.  The  politicians  scored  Schurz  as  not  a trust- 
worthy Republican — he  was  independent  by  nature  and 
had  been  a leader  in  the  Liberal  Republican  movement ; 
and  they  denounced  him  as  an  impractical  man,  whose 
head  was  full  of  transcendental  theories — which  was  a 
method  of  saying  that  he  was  a civil  service  reformer. 
No  little  excitement  was  occasioned  by  the  appointment 
of  Key.  The  President  had  desired  to  appoint  to  the 
cabinet  a southerner  of  influence,  and  had  thought  of 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  as  Secretary  of  War.  The  choice 
of  General  Johnston  would  have  been  an  act  of  great 
magnanimity,  but  since  General  Sherman,  to  whom 
Johnston  had  surrendered  only  twelve  years  before, 
was  commander  of  the  army,  it  would  have  placed 
Sherman  in  the  singular  position  of  taking  military 
orders  from  a former  leading  “rebel.”  AAJien  Hayes 
consulted  his  party  associates,  however,  he  found  their 
feelings  expressed  in  the  exclamation  of  one  of  them: 
“Great  God!  Governor,  I hope  you  are  not  thinking  of 
doing  anything  of  that  kind!”  He  thereupon  reluct- 
antly gave  way  and  turned  to  Key.  The  latter  was  less 
prominent  than  Johnston,  but  had  been  a Confederate 
leader,  was  a Democrat  and  a man  of  moderate  coun- 
sels. The  remaining  members  of  the  cabinet  were  men 
of  much  less  moment,  but  altogether  it  is  clear  that 
few  presidents  have  been  surrounded  by  so  able  a 
group  of  advisers.^ 

Seldom,  also,  has  a president’s  announcement  of  his 

1 George  W.  McCrary  was  Secretary  of  War;  Richard  W.  Thompson, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy;  Charles  Devens,  Attorney-General. 


128 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE, 


cabinet  caused  so  much  dissent  among  his  own  sup- 
porters. Senator  Cameron,  of  Pennsylvania,  had 
urged  a cabinet  appointment  for  liis  son,  and  on  being 
refused  became  hostile  to  Hayes.  Senator  Blaine,  of 
Maine,  was  piqued  because  Hayes  refused  to  offer  a 
place  to  a Maine  man;  the  friends  of  General  John  A. 
Logan,  of  Illinois,  were  dissatisfied  at  the  failure  of 
Hayes  to  understand  the  qualifications  of  their  favor- 
ite ; Conkling  disliked  Evarts  and  besides  desired  a 
place  for  his  associate  Thomas  C.  Platt;  and  the  latter 
considered  the  nomination  of  Evarts  a “straight-arm” 
blow  at  the  Republican  organization.  Departing, 
therefore,  from  the  custom  in  such  cases,  the  Senate 
withheld  confirmation  of  the  nominations  for  several 
days,  during  which  it  became  apparent  that  the  rest 
of  the  country  had  received  the  announcement  of  the 
cabinet  with  favor,  and  then  the  opposition  disap- 
peared. During  the  remainder  of  his  presidency, 
however,  Hayes  fared  badly  in  making  his  nominations 
to  office,  for  fifty-one  of  them  were  rejected  outright, 
a larger  number  than  had  ever  before  been  disagreed 
to  when  the  President  and  the  Senate  were  of  the  same 
party.  The  frequency  with  which  the  nominations 
were  rejected  and  the  combative  manner  in  which  the 
contests  were  carried  on  by  the  Senate  indicated  that 
it  was  determined  to  regain  and  hold  fast  the  influence 
in  federal  counsels  that  it  had  relinquished  to  the  execu- 
tive during  the  war. 

Aside  from  the  nomination  of  members  of  the  cabi- 
net, the  first  important  executive  action  that  tested  the 
attitude  of  the  Senate  toward  the  President  was  in  re- 
lation to  the  southern  problem.  By  March,  1877,  all 
the  former  Confederate  states  except  Louisiana  and 
South  Carolina  had  freed  themselves  from  Republican 
rule  by  the  methods  already  mentioned,  and  in  these 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  HAYES  129 


states  the  Republicans  were  kept  in  power  only  by  the 
presence  of  troops.  In  Louisiana,  both  Packard,  a 
Republican  carpet-bagger,  and  Nicholls,  a Louisiana 
Democrat,  claimed  to  be  the  rightful  governor.  In 
South  Carolina,  the  Republican  contestant  was  Cham- 
berlain, a native  of  Massachusetts;  the  Democrat  was 
IVade  Hampton,  a typical  old-time  southerner.  Hayes 
could  withdraw  the  troops,  in  pursuance  of  his  con- 
ciliatory policy,  but  if  he  did  the  Republican  govern- 
ments would  certainly  collapse  because  they  were  un- 
supported by  public  opinion.  Furthermore,  the  re- 
turning board  which  had  declared  Hayes  the  choice  of 
Louisiana  in  the  presidential  election  had  asserted  that 
the  Republican  Packard  was  elected.  Blaine,  in  the 
Senate,  championed  the  doctrine  that  Hayes  could  not 
forsake  the  southern  Republicans  without  invalidating 
his  own  title.  Speaking  in  a confident  and  aggressive 
manner,  he  held  that  the  honor,  faith  and  credit  of  the 
party  bound  it  to  uphold  the  Republican  claimants. 
Nevertheless,  the  President  investigated  conditions  in 
both  states,  satisfied  himself  that  public  opinion  was 
back  of  the  Democratic  governments  and  then  recalled 
the  troops,  hardly  more  than  a month  after  his  inaugu- 
ration. The  Republican  governments  in  the  two  states 
promptly  gave  way  to  the  Democrats,  and  the  storm 
was  on  in  the  Senate.^ 

The  Republican  politicians  believed  that  no  good 
thing  could  come  from  the  “rebels,”  that  the  President 
was  abandoning  the  negro,  and  that  he  was  surrender- 
ing the  principles  for  which  the  party  had  contended. 
“Stalwarts,”  was  the  name  applied  by  Blaine  to  these 

1 Chamberlain,  the  Republican  claimant  in  South  Carolina,  wrote  in 
1901  that  he  was  “quite  ready  now  to  say  that  he  feels  sure  that  there 
was  no  possibility  of  securing  permanent  good  government  in  South 
Carolina  through  Republican  influences.”  Atlantic  Monthly,  LXXXVIT, 
482. 


130 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


uncompromising  party  men  wlio  would  not  relinquish 
the  grip  of  the  organization  on  the  southern  states. 
Hayes  was  freely  charged  with,  having  promised  the 
removal  of  the  military  forces  in  return  for  the  elec- 
toral votes  of  the  two  states  concerned,  and  some  color 
seemed  to  be  lent  to  this  accusation  when  he  proceeded 
to  reward  the  Louisiana  and  Florida  returning  boards 
with  appointments  to  office.  Even  the  New  York 
Times,  which  usually  supported  Hayes  with  vigor, 
characterized  the  Louisiana  settlement  as  “a  surren- 
der.” AVilliam  E.  Chandler  who  had  assisted  Hayes 
as  counsel  in  the  disputed  election  attacked  him  in  a 
pamphlet,  “Can  such  Things  be  and  overcome  us  like  a 
Summer  Cloud  without  our  Special  Wonder?”  Most 
of  the  influential  leaders  in  both  houses  of  Congress 
scarcely  disguised  their  hostility.  Indeed  the  discon- 
tent went  back  into  the  states  where,  as  in  New  Hamp- 
shire, a contest  over  the  endorsement  of  Hayes  was  so 
bitter  that  the  newspaper  reporters  had  to  be  excluded 
from  the  state  convention  to  prevent  public  reports  of 
schism  in  the  party.  The  Democrats  could  not  come  to 
his  support  since  they  were  unable  to  forget  the  elec- 
tion of  1876  even  in  their  satisfaction  over  the  treat- 
ment accorded  the  South.  In  six  weeks  the  President 
was  without  the  backing  of  most  of  his  party  leaders. 
On  the  other  hand,  a few  men  of  the  type  represented 
by  Hoar  and  Sherman  commended  the  President’s 
policy.  Independent  publications  such  as  Harper’s 
Weeldy  did  likewise,  and  when  the  Republican  conven- 
tion of  1880  drew  up  the  party  platform  the  leaders 
made  a virtue  of  necessity  and  adopted  a plank  en- 
thusiastically supporting  the  Hayes  administration. 

After  he  had  finished  with  the  southern  problem, 
Hayes  confided  to  his  diary,  “Now  for  civil  service  re- 
form!” And  for  appointments  in  general  he  recorded 


THE  ADMINISTRATION"  OF  HAYES  131 


several  principles : no  sweeping  changes ; recommeiula 
lions  by  congressmen  to  be  investigated — not  merely 
accepted;  and  no  relatives  of  himself  or  his  wife  to  b 
appointed,  however  good  their  qualifications  might  be. 
In  the  meanwhile  Secretary  Schurz  set  to  \vork  to  put 
the  Department  of  the  Interior  on  a merit  basis.  The 
principles  that  Hayes  set  up  for  himself  and  the  steps 
that  Schurz  took  were  in  conformity  with  the  party 
platform  of  1876  and  with  the  President’s  inaugural 
address ; nevertheless  the  party  leaders  were  dis- 
pleased, if  not  surprised,  for  platform  promises  were 
lightly  regarded  and  inaugural  addresses  were  some- 
times not  to  be  taken  very  seriously. 

The  earliest  acts  of  Hayes  were  not  such  as  to  facili- 
tate the  further  progress  of  reform.  The  appointment 
of  the  members  of  the  Louisiana  Returning  Board  to 
federal  offices  gave  color  to  charges  that  they  were 
receiving  their  reward  for  assisting  the  President  into 
his  position.  Furthermore,  on  June  22,  1877,  he  is- 
sued an  executive  order  forbidding  any  United  States 
officials  to  take  part  in  the  management  of  politi- 
cal organizations  and  declaring  that  political  assess- 
ments on  federal  officers  would  not  be  allowed.  So 
drastic  an  order  brought  amazement  to  the  party 
leaders,  who  had  not  dreamed  of  anything  so  radical. 
Perhaps  the  order  was  too  sudden  and  sweeping,  con- 
sidering the  practices  of  the  time.  At  any  rate  it  was 
not  enforced  and  the  President  seemed  to  have  set  a 
standard  to  which  he  had  not  the  courage  to  adhere. 
Nevertheless,  reform  principles  were  successfully 
tested  in  the  New  York  Post  Office  by  Thomas  L.  James, 
a vigorous  exponent  of  the  merit  system  who  had  been 
appointed  by  President  Grant  and  was  now  re-ap- 
pointed and  upheld  by  President  Hayes. 

But  the  great  battle  for  the  new  idea  came  in  con- 


132 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


nectioii  with  the  New  York  Custom  House.  Through 
the  port  of  New  York  came  two-thirds  to  three-fourths 
of  the  goods  which  were  imported  ipto  this  country,  and 
the  necessity  for  a businesslike  conduct  of  the  custom 
house  seemed  obvious.  Yet  there  had  for  some  time 
been  complaints  concerning  the  service,  and  Sherman 
appointed  commissions,  with  the  approval  of  the  Presi- 
dent, to  investigate  conditions  in  New  York  and  else- 
where. The  commission  which  studied  the  situation  in 
New  York  reported  that  one-fifth  of  the  persons  em- 
ployed there  were  superfluous,  that  inefficiency  and 
neglect  of  duty  were  common,  and  that  the  positions 
at  the  disposal  of  the  collector  had  for  years  been  used 
for  the  reward  of  party  activity.  The  commission 
recommended  sweeping  changes  which  Secretary  Sher- 
man and  President  Hayes  approved.  It  then  appeared 
that  the  New  York  officials  were  not  favorable  to  the 
President’s  reform  plans.  Furthermore,  Chester  A. 
Arthur,  the  collector  of  the  port,  was  a close  friend  of 
Roscoe  Conkling,  the  head  of  the  state  machine;  and 
A.  B.  Cornell,  the  naval  officer,  was  chairman  of  the 
state  and  national  Republican  committees.  It  was  evi- 
dent that  an  attempt  to  change  conditions  in  New  York 
would  precipitate  a test  of  strength  between  the  ad- 
ministration and  the  New  York  organization. 

As  Arthur  and  Cornell  would  not  further  the  de- 
sired reforms  and  would  not  resign,  the  President  re- 
moved them.  AVhen  he  nominated  their  successors, 
however,  the  Senate,  led  by  Conkling,  refused  to  add  its 
confirmation  and  there  the  matter  rested  for  some 
months.  Eventually  the  President’s  nominations  were 
confirmed,  an  outcome  which  seems  to  have  been 
brought'  about  in  part  at  least  by  letters  from.  Secretary 
Sherman  to  personal  friends  in  the  Senate  in  which  he 
urgently  pressed  the  case  of  the  administration.  The 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  HAYES  133 


President’s  victory  emphasized  the  disagreement  of  the 
powerful  state  organization  with  the  reform  idea,  and 
while  the  reformers  rejoiced  that  the  warfare  had  been 
carried  into  the  enemy’s  country,  newspaper  opinion 
varied  between  the  view  that  the  President  was  playing- 
politics  and  that  he  was  actuated  by  the  highest  motives 
only.  Agitation  for  reform,  meanwhile,  continued  to 
increase.  The  literary  men  among  the  reformers, 
aided  by  scores  of  lesser  lights,  conducted  a campaign 
of  education;  the  New  York  Civil  Service  Reform  As- 
sociation, founded  in  1877,  and  the  National  Civil 
Service  Reform  League,  in  1881,  gave  evidence  of  an 
effort  towards  the  organization  of  reform  sentiment. 

While  the  attention  of  the  President  and  the  politi- 
cians was  directed  toward  the  reform  of  the  civil  serv- 
ice, there  occurred  an  event  for  which  none  of  them  was 
prepared.  Early  in  the  summer  of  1877  train  hands  on 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  struck  because  of  a 
reduction  in  wages,  the  fourth  cut  that  they  had  suf- 
fered in  seven  years.  The  strike  spread  with  the  speed 
of  a prairie  fire  over  most  of  the  northern  roads  be- 
tween New  England  and  the  Mississippi.  At  the 
height  of  the  controversy  at  least  100,000  strikers  and 
six  or  seven  thousand  miles  of  railway  were  involved, 
while  at  several  points  especially  Martinsburg,  West 
Virginia,  and  Pittsburg,  rioting  and  destruction  took 
place.  A considerable  number  of  people  were  killed 
or  wounded,  and  the  loss  of  property  in  Pittsburg- 
alone  was  estimated  at  five  to  ten  millions  of  dollars. 
Eventually,  when  the  state  militia  failed  to  check  the 
disorder,  the  President  was  called  upon  for  federal 
troops  and  these  proved  effectual.  That  even  so 
thoughtful  and  conscientious  a man  as  Hayes  was  far 
from  understanding  the  meaning  of  the  strike  was  indi- 
cated in  his  message  to  Congress  in  which  he  merely 


134 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


expressed  his  gratification  that  the  troops  had  been 
able  to  repress  the  disorder.  Repression,  that  is  to 
say,  was  the  one  resource  that  occurred  to  the  mind  of 
the  chief  executive  and  to  the  majority  of  the  men  of 
liis  day.  That  repression  alone  could  not  remedj^  evils 
permanently,  that  salutary  force  ought  to  be  immedi- 
ately supplemented  by  a study  of  the  rights  and  wrongs  ■ 
of  the  two  sides  and  by  a dispassionate  correction  of  | 
abuses, — all  this  did  not  even  remotely  occur  to  the  j 
thoughts  of  the  political  leaders  of  the  time. 

The  breach  in  the  ranks  of  the  Republicans  which  I 
was  made  by  the  events  of  the  early  days  of  the  Hayes 
administration  was  closed  in  the  face  of  an  attack  by  j 
the  common  enemy — the  Democrats.  The  latter,  being  I 
in  control  of  the  House,  appointed  the  “Potter  Com-  | 
mittee”  to  investigate  the  title  of  Hayes  to  the  Presi- 
dency, hoping  to  discredit  him  and  thereby  turn  tbe 
tables  in  the  election  of  1880.  The  committee  exam- 
ined witnesses  and  reported,  the  Democrats  asserting 
that  Tilden  had  been  elected  and  the  Republicans  that 
Hayes  had  been.  The  Republican  Senate,  meanwhile, 
had  prepared  a counterblast.  , By  legal  proceedings  a 
committee  had  obtained  from  the  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Company  over  thirty  thousand  of  the  telegrams 
sent  by  both  parties  during  the  campaign.  The  Re- 
publicans declared  that  the  “cipher  despatches”  among 
these  messages  showed  that  the  Democrats  had  offered 
a substantial  bribe  for  the  vote  of  an  Oregon  Repub- 
lican elector.  Before  the  dispatches  were  returned  to 
the  telegraph  company,  somebody  took  the  precaution 
to  destroy  those  that  concerned  Republican  camjoaign 
methods  and  to  retain  those  relating  to  the  Democrats. 
The  latter  were  published  by  the  New  York  Trihune 
and  revealed  attempts  to  bribe  the  Florida  and  South 
Carolina  Returning  Boards.  Most  of  them  had  been 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  HAYES  135 


sent  by  Tildeii’s  nephew  or  received  by  him,  so  that 
the  corrupt  trail  seemed  to  lead  straight  to  the  caiuii- 
date  himself,  but  the  evidence  was  inconclusive.  The 
Potter  Committee  then  investigated  the  telegrams,  to- 
gether with  a great  number  of  witnesses,  and  another 
partisan  report  resulted.  It  thus  appeared  that  both 
j)ot  and  kettle  were  black  and  there  the  matter  rested. 
The  Democrats  had  done  themselves  no  good  and  had 
done  the  Republicans  no  harm.^ 

The  Democrats  also  attacked  the  election  laws,  under 
which  federal  officials  supervised  elections,  and  federal 
judges  and  marshals  had  jurisdiction  over  cases  con- 
cerning the  suffrage.  Under  these  laws,  also,  troops 
could  be  used  to  enforce  the  judgments  of  the  Courts. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  intimidation,  unfair  practices 
and  bribery  were  all  too  common  in  the  North  as  well 
as  in  the  South.  The  lack  of  official  ballots  and  secret 
voting  made  abuses  inevitable.  In  New  York,  Cincin- 
nati and  other  northern  cities,  and  on  a smaller  scale  in 
the  rural  districts,  abuses  of  one  sort  or  another  were 
normal  accompaniments  of  elections.  Intimidation  in 
the  South  was  notorious  and  not  denied.  The  existing 
election  laws  gave  the  dominant  party  an  opportunity 
to  appoint  large  numbers  of  deputy-marshals — largely 
party  workers,  of  course — paying  them  from  the  na- 

1 ^lany  of  the  dispatches  were  in  a complicated  cipher  which  resisted 
all  attempts  at  solution.  The  Tribune  published  samples  from  time  to 
time,  keeping  interest  alive  in  the  hope  that  somebody  might  solve  the 
riddle.  Finally  two  members  of  the  Tribune  staff  were  successful  in 
discovering  the  key  to  the  cipher  in  a way  that  recalls  the  paper-covered 
detective  story.  The  newspaper  aroused  and  excited  public  interest  by 
publishing  specimens  and  eventually  achieved  a sensation  by  putting 
the  most  damaging  material  into  print  on  October  16,  1878.  One  of  the 
telegrams,  with  its  translation,  ran  as  follows: 

“Absolutely  Petersburg  can  procured  by  Copenhagen  may  Thomas 
prompt  Edinburgh  must  if  river  take  be  you  less  London  Thames  will.” 

Translation:  If  Returning  Board  can  be  procured  absolutely,  will 
you  deposit  30,000  dollars?  May  take  less.  Must  be  prompt.  Thomas. 


136 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


tional  treasury  and  so  solidifying  the  party  organiza- 
tion. In  the  election  of  1876  about  $275,000  had  been 
spent  in  this  way.  Some  of  the  federal  supervisors 
had  been  extremely  energetic — so  much  so  that  in  one 
case  in  Louisiana  their  registration  lists  showed  8,000 
more  colored  voters  in  1876  than  were  discovered  by 
the  census  enumerators  four  years  later. 

If  the  Republicans  saw  involved  in  the  laws  both  a 
principle  and  a party  weapon,  the  Democrats  saw  both 
a principle  and  an  opportunity.  They  attached  a 
“rider”  to  an  army  appropriation  bill,  which  made  it 
unlawful  to  use  any  part  of  the  army  for  any  other  than 
the  purposes  expressly  authorized  by  the  Constitution 
or  by  act  of  Congress.  Since  the  Constitution  allowed 
the  use  of  troops  only  to  “execute  the  laws  of  the 
Union,  to  suppress  Insurrections  and  repel  Invasions,” 
the  new  law  would  prevent  the  employment  of  armed 
forces  for  civil  purposes  at  the  polling  places.  The 
President  was  compelled  to  yield  to  save  the  appro- 
priation bill. 

In  the  next  Congress  the  Democrats  controlled  both 
House  and  Senate  and  they  advanced  to  the  attack  on 
the  remainder  of  the  election  laws.  Attempts  were 
made  to  prevent  the  appointment  of  special  deputy- 
marshals  by  forbidding  the  payment  of  any  compensa- 
tion to  them  or  to  the  regular  marshals  when  used  in 
elections.  Each  time  that  Congress  passed  such  a law 
the  President  vetoed  it,  even  though  special  sessions 
had  to  be  called  to  make  up  for  lost  time.  He  saw  in 
the  use  of  the  rider  a dangerous  assertion  of  coercive 
power  on  the  part  of  Congress.  By  means  of  it.  Con- 
gress was  withholding  funds  essential  for  military  and 
civil  purposes  until  the  President  should  assent  to 
legislation  totally  unconnected  with  the  appropriations. 
He  felt  himself  being  threatened  and  driven  by  a hostile 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  HAYES  137 


legislature.  For  the  President  to  give  way  before  such 
constraint  would  be  to  lose  the  veto  power  and  to 
destroy  the  independence  of  the  executive  as  a branch 
of  the  government.  The  Democrats  were  unable  to 
muster  force  enough  to  overrule  the  veto,  and  here  the 
matter  rested  while  other  forces,  which  have  already 
been  described,  were  sapping  the  strength  of  the  elec- 
tion laws.  On  the  whole,  the  result  was  probably  to 
bring  the  Republican  factions  together  and  so  to 
strengthen  the  party  for  the  election  of  1880.  The 
Democrats,  on  the  other  hand,  probably  lost  ground. 

In  the  meanwhile  a difficult  and  technical  problem — 
the  monetary  question — was  forcing  itself  upon  the  at- 
tention of  Congress  and  of  the  country.  The  rapid 
development  of  the  economic  life  of  the  United  States 
was  demanding  an  increased  volume  of  currency  with 
which  to  perform  the  multitude  of  exchanges  which 
constantly  take  place  in  the  life  of  an  industrial  people. 
Unless  the  volume  of  the  currency  expanded  propor- 
tionately with  the  increase  of  business,  or  there  was  a 
corresponding  increase  in  the  use  of  bank  checks,  the 
demand  for  money  would  cause  its  value  to  go  up — 
that  is,  prices  to  go  down.  If  the  volume  expanded 
more  rapidly  than  was  necessitated  by  business,  the 
valu'e  of  money  would  fall  and  prices  wmuld  go  up.  A 
change  in  the  price  level  in  either  direction,  as  has  been 
seen,  would  harm  important  groups  of  people.  The 
exact  amount,  however,  by  which  the  volume  should  be 
increased  was  not  easy  to  determine.  Furthermore, 
assuming  that  both  gold  and  silver  should  be  coined, 
what  amount  of  each  would  constitute  the  most  desir- 
able combination  % What  ought  to  be  the  weight  of  the 
coins?  If  paper  currency  was  to  supplement  the  pre- 
cious metals,  what  amount  of  it  should  be  in  circula- 
tion? These  are  difficult  questions  under  any  circum- 


138 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


stances.  They  did  not  become  less  so  when  answered 
by  a bulky  and  uninformed  Congress  acting  under  the 
influence  of  definite  personal,  sectional  and  property 
interests. 

Several  facts  tended  to  restrict  the  kind  of  money 
whose  volume  could  be  greatly  increased.  It  was  not 
advisable  to  expand  the  greenbacks  because  legislation 
had  already  limited  their  amount  and  because  such  ac- 
tion would  unfavorably  affect  the  approaching  resump- 
tion of  specie  payments.  Tile  quantity  of  national 
bank  notes,  another  common  form  of  paper  money,  was 
somewhat  rigidly  determined  by  the  amount  of  federal 
bonds  outstanding,  for  the  national  bank  notes  were 
issued  upon  the  federal  bonds  as  security.  Moreover, 
the  bonds  were  being  rapidly  paid  off  during  the  seven- 
ties and  it  was,  therefore,  impossible  to  expect  any 
increase  of  the  currency  from  this  source.  Normally 
the  supply  of  gold  available  for  coinage  did  not  vary 
greatly  from  year  to  year  and  certainly  did  not  respond 
with  exactness  to  the  demand  of  industry  for  a greater 
or  smaller  volume  of  circulating  medium.  It  seemed 
to  remain  for  silver  to  supply  any  needed  increase. 

But  silver  was  not  in  common  use  except  as  a subsid- 
iary coin.  For  many  years  the  value  of  the  bullion 
necessary  for  coining  a silver  dollar  had  been  greater 
than  the  value  of  the  coin.  Nobody  therefore  brought 
his  silver  to  the  mint  but  sold  it  instead  in  the  commer- 
cial markets.  Indeed  so  insignificant  was  the  amount 
of  silver  usually  coined  into  dollars  that  an  act  of  1873 
systematizing  the  coinage  laws  had  omitted  the  silver 
dollar  completely  from  the  list  of  coins.  The  omission 
was  later  referred  to  by  the  friends  of  silver  currency 
as  the  “Crime  of  1873.”  At  the  same  time  a remark- 
able coincidence  was  providing  the  motive  power  for 
the  demand  that  silver  be  more  largely  used  as  cur- 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  HAYES  139 


rency.  Early  in  the  seventies  Germany  and  the  Latin 
Monetary  Union,  (France,  Switzerland,  Belgium,  Italy 
and  Greece),  had  reduced  the  amount  of  their  silver 
coinage,  thus  throwing  a large  supply  of  bullion  on 
the  market.  Simultaneously,  enlarged  supplies  of  sil- 
ver were  being  found  in  western  United  States.  A 
Nevada  mine,  for  example,  which  had  produced  six  hun- 
dred and  forty-five  thousand  dollars’  worth  of  ore  in 
1873  had  turned  out  nearly  twenty-five  times  that 
amount  two  years  later.  Naturally  the  market  price  of 
silver  fell  and  the  mine  owners  began  to  seek  an  outlet 
for  their  product.  Thus  the  people  who  were  convinced 
that  the  volume  of  the  currency  was  insufficient  for  the 
industrial  demands  of  the  nation  received  a new  and 
powerful  reenforcement  from  the  producers  of  silver 
ore.  There  arose  what  the  New  York  Tribune  referred 
to  as  “The  Cloud  in  the  West.” 

Inevitably  the  cloud  in  the  West  threw  its  shadow 
into  Congress  where  the  demand  was  insistent  that  the 
government  “do  something  for  silver.”  A commis- 
sion had  been  appointed  in  1876  to  study  the  currency 
problem  and  make  recommendations.  When  the  report 
was  made  it  appeared  that  the  opinions  of  the  members 
were  so  divergent  that  little  was  gained  from  the  in- 
vestigation. While  the  commission  was  deliberating, 
Richard  P.  Bland  of  Missouri  introduced  a bill  pro- 
viding for  the  free  and  unlimited  coinage  of  silver. 
Under  its  provisions  the  owner  of  silver  bullion  could 
present  any  quantity  of  his  commodity  to  the  govern- 
ment to  be  coined  under  the  conditions  which  controlled 
the  coinage  of  gold.  The  House  responded  readily 
to  Bland’s  proposal.  In  the  Senate,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  William  B.  Allison,  the  free  and  unlimited 
feature  of  the  bill  was  dropped  and  a provision  adopted 
limiting  the  purchase  of  bullion  to  an  amount  not 


140 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


greater  than  four  million  dollars’  worth  per  month  and 
not  less  than  two  million  dollars’  worth.  The  bullion 
so  obtained  was  to  be  coined  into  silver  dollars,  which 
were  to  be  legal  tender  for  all  debts  public  and  private. 
Bland  was  ready  to  accept  the  compromise  because  he 
hoped  to  be  able  to  increase  the  use  of  silver  by  subse- 
quent legislation.  “If  we  cannot  do  that,”  he  said, 
“I  am  in  favor  of  issuing  paper  money  enough  to  stuff 
down  the  bond-holders  until  they  are  sick.”  The  re- 
mark was  typical  of  the  sectional  and  class  hatreds  and 
misunderstandings  which  this  debate  aroused,  and  of 
the  maze  of  ignorance  in  which  both  sides  were  grop- 
ing. To  the  silver  faction,  their  opponents  were  “men- 
dacious hirelings”  and  “Gilded  Shylocks.”  God,  in 
His  infinite  wisdom  had  imbedded  silver  in  the  western 
mountains  for  a beneficent  purpose.  “The  country,” 
said  one  speaker,  “is  in  an  agony  of  business  distress 
and  looks  for  some  relief  by  a gradual  increase  of  the 
currency.”  On  the  other  hand,  the  opponents  of  silver 
scorned  the  “delusion”  of  a “clipped”  coin  and  the 
dishonest  proposition  to  make  ninety  cents’  worth  of 
silver  pass  as  a dollar.  The  “storm-driven,  buffeted, 
and  scarred”  ship  of  industrial  peace,  an  easterner  de- 
clared, “deeply  laden  with  all  precious  and  golden 
treasure  is  sighted  in  the  offing ! . . . shall  we  put  out 
the  lights?  . . . Dare  we  remove  the  ship’s  helm,  leav- 
ing her  crippled  and  helpless?” 

Sherman  believed  that  this  limited  amount  of  silver 
could  be  taken  into  the  currency  system  without  diffi- 
culty, but  President  Hayes  thought  that  harm  would 
result  from  making  the  silver  dollar  a legal  tender 
when  the  market  value  of  the  bullion  in  the  coin  was 
not  equal  in  value  to  that  of  the  gold  dollar.  He  there- 
fore vetoed  the  bill  on  February  28,  1878.  He  could 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  HAYES  141 


not  carry  Congress  with  him,  however,  and  the  measure 
was  passed  over  the  veto  on  the  same  day. 

Party  lines  had  disappeared  during  the  debates  over 
the  passage  of  the  act.  Eastern  members  of  both 
houses  and  of  both  parties  had  been  opposed,  with  few 
exceptions,  to  the  increased  use  of  silver;  the  western- 
ers had  been  equally  united  in  its  favor.  The  East, 
the  creditor  section  and  the  holder  of  most  of  the  Civil 
IVar  bonds,  had  no  desire  to  try  an  experiment  with 
the  currency  which  would,  in  their  opinion,  reduce  the 
purchasing  power  of  their  income.  The  debtor  West 
looked  with  disfavor  upon  an  increase  in  the  real 
amount  of  their  debts  which  was  brought  about  by  an 
inadequate  supply  of  currency.  Since  prices  continued 
to  decline  they  believed  that  the  remedy  was  a greater 
quantity  of  money.  Evidently  the  greenback  contro- 
versy was  reviving  in  a new  garb. 

The  approach  of  the  resumption  of  specie  payments 
which  had  been  set,  it  will  be  remembered,  for  January 
1,  1879,  increased  the  burden  under  which  the  western- 
ers and  the  debtor  classes  in  general  were  working. 
Favorable  commercial  conditions  and  Sherman’s  fore- 
sight, tact  and  intelligence  made  it  possible  to  overcome 
the  various  difficulties  in  the  way  of  accumulating  a 
sufficient  reserve  of  gold,  and  on  December  31,  1878, 
the  Treasury  had  on  hand  about  $140,000,000  of  the 
precious  metal,  an  amount  nearly  equal  to  forty  per 
cent,  of  the  paper  in  circulation.  Despite  the  desira- 
bility of  resumption,  the  first  effects  of  preparations 
for  it  were  harmful  to  considerable  bodies  of  people. 
As  January  1 approached,  the  greenbacks,  which  had 
been  circulating  at  a depreciated  value,  rose  nearer 
and  nearer  to  par.  Debts  which  had  been  incurred 
when  paper  dollars  were  worth  sixty  cents  in  gold,  had 


142 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


to  be  paid  in  dollars  worth  eighty,  ninety  or  a hundred 
cents,  according  to  the  date  when  the  debt  fell  due. 
Business  men  who  were  heavily  in  debt  and  farmers 
whose  property  was  mortgaged  found  their  burden 
daily  growing  in  size. 

Notwithstanding  the  steady  advance  of  paper  toward 
par  value,  Sherman  nervously  awaited  business  hours 
on  January  2,  1879,  (since  the  first  fell  on  Sunday)  to 
see  whether  there  would  be  such  a rush  of  holders  of 
paper  who  would  wish  gold  that  his  slender  stock  would 
be  wiped  out.  New  York,  the  financial  center,  was 
watched  with  especial  anxiety.  To  Sherman’s  sur- 
prise, only  $135,000  of  paper  was  presented  for  redemp- 
tion in  gold;  to  his  amazement  and  relief,  $400,000  in 
gold  was  presented  in  exchange  for  paper.  Evidently, 
now  that  paper  and  metal  were  interchangeable,  people 
preferred  the  lighter  and  more  convenient  medium. 
Favorable  business  conditions  enabled  the  government 
to  continue  specie  payments ; a huge  grain  crop  in  1879, 
coupled  with  crop  failures  in  England,  caused  unprece- 
dented exports  of  wheat,  corn  and  other  products,  and 
a corresponding  importation  of  gold.  The  damage  re- 
sulting from  the  appreciation  of  paper  was  temporary 
in  character;  the  public  credit  was  vastly  benefited; 
and  the  greater  amount  of  stability  in  the  value  of 
paper  proved  invaluable  to  industry. 

Happily  Hayes’s  stormy  political  relations  were  bal- 
anced by  comparative  quiet  in  foreign  affairs.  Only 
Mexico  caused  trouble,  and  that  was  of  negligible  im- 
portance. A few  raiders  made  sporadic  excursions 
into  Texas,  which  necessitated  an  expedition  for  the 
punishment  of  the  marauders.  General  Ord  was  di- 
rected to  cross  the  border  if  necessary,  but  General 
Diaz,  at  the  head  of  the  Mexican  government,  concluded 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  HAYES  143 


an  agreement  for  cooperation  with  the  United  States 
in  the  protection  of  the  boundary.  The  agreement  was 
only  partly  successful,  however,  and  on  several  occa- 
sions troops  crossed  the  Rio  Grande  and  fought  with 
bandits. 

On  the  Pacific  Coast,  meanwhile,  the  Chinese  ques- 
tion was  becoming  a political  issue.  In  earlier  times 
the  immigration  of  the  Chinese  had  been  encouraged 
because  of  the  need  of  a cheap  labor  supply  when  the 
transcontinental  railroads  were  being  built.  As  the 
coast  filled  up,  however,  with  native  population,  and 
the  demand  for  laborers  fell  off,  there  arose  numerous 
objections  to  the  oriental.  It  was  seen  that  since  he 
was  willing  to  work  for  extremely  low  wages  he  could 
drive  American  laborers  out  of  their  places.  Labor 
leaders  such  as  Dennis  Kearney  held  meetings  on  the 
“sand  lots”  in  San  Francisco  and  aroused  anti-Chinese 
feeling.  Riots  and  violence,  even,  were  not  unknown. 

Just  before  the  inauguration  of  President  Hayes  a 
commission  of  inquiry  had  visited  the  coast  and  ex- 
amined many  witnesses.  The  commission  reported 
that  the  resources  of  the  Pacific  states  had  been  more 
rapidly  developed  vnth  coolie  labor  than  they  would 
otherwise  have  been,  but  that  the  Chinese  lived  under 
filthy  conditions,  formed  an  inferior  foreign  element 
and  were,  on  the  whole,  undesirable.  It  recommended 
that  the  executive  take  steps  in  the  direction  of  a modi- 
fication of  the  existing  treaty  with  China,  for  fear  that 
the  problem  might  spread  eastward  with  increasing 
immigration.  The  electioneering  possibilities  of  the 
subject  had  appealed  to  both  parties  and  they  had 
earnestly  demanded  action  in  their  platforms  of  1876. 
Opinion  was  forming  throughout  the  country,  aided 
by  Bret  Harte’s  famous  lines; 


144 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Which  I wish  to  remark 
And  my  language  is  plain, 

That  for  ways  that  are  dark 
And  tricks  that  are  vain, 

The  heathen  Chinee  is  peculiar 
Which  the  same  I would  rise  to  explain. 

Action  by  Congress  was  hindered  by  the  Burlingame 
treaty  of  1868  with  China,  which  covered  the  subject 
of  immigration  in  unmistakable  language.  By  its  pro- 
visions citizens  of  China  were  to  have  the  same  rights 
of  travel  and  residence  in  America  as  the  subjects  of 
the  most  favored  nation.  Reciprocally,  China  was  to 
grant  equal  privileges  to  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
The  process  of  modifying  a treatj^  through  the  ordi- 
nary diplomatic  channels  was  so  slow  that  Congress 
sought  to  avoid  delay  by  passing  a law  forbidding 
shipmasters  to  bring  in  more  than  fifteen  Chinese  at 
one  time,  and  calling  upon  the  President  to  notify 
China  that  the  terms  of  the  Burlingame  treaty,  in  so 
far  as  they  related  to  immigration,  would  not  hold 
after  July  1,  1879,  when  the  proposed  legislation  would 
take  effect.  President  Hayes  sympathized  with  the 
purpose  of  the  bill  but  felt  obliged  to  veto  it  because 
of  the  Burlingame  treaty.  The  veto  message  recalled 
that  the  treaty  had  been  of  American  seeking  and  that 
its  ratification  had  been  applauded  all  over  the  coun- 
try. The  abrogation  of  part  of  the  agreement  would 
be  equivalent  to  abrogation  of  the  whole,  leaving 
American  citizens  in  China  without  adequate  treaty 
protection.  Furthermore  Hayes  felt  that  treaties 
could  not  rightfully  be  violated  by  legislation,  but  ad- 
vocated other  measures  for  the  relief  of  the  people  of 
the  Pacific  Coast.  He  thereupon  sent  to  China  a com- 
mission, headed  by  James  B.  Angell  of  Michigan,  which 
succeeded  in  liberally  modifying  the  existing  treaty. 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  HAYES  145 

Under  the  new  arrangement  the  United  States  might 
“regulate,  limit,  or  suspend”  the  immigration  of  Chi- 
nese laborers ; and  as  the  treaty  was  promptly  ratified, 
it  redounded  somewhat  to  the  credit  of  the  Republi- 
cans in  the  election  of  1880. 

The  administration  of  Hayes  was,  on  the  whole,  an 
admirable  one.  The  problems  which  he  faced  were 
varied  and  difficult,  but  most  of  them  were  met  sensibly 
and  with  success.  To  be  sure,  he  did  not  grasp  the 
social  and  economic  forces  behind  the  monetary  agita- 
tion ; nor  did  he  have  the  insight  and  originality  neces- 
sary for  attacking  the  problem  of  industrial  unrest  as 
it  appeared  in  the  strike  of  1877.  But  neither  did  his 
associates,  nor  his  successors  in  the  presidency  for 
many  years  to  come.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ethical 
standards  of  the  administration  were  high  and  the 
atmosphere  of  the  White  House  sane  and  wholesome. 
The  home  life  of  the  President  was  exceptionally  at- 
tractive, for  Mrs.  Hayes  was  a woman  of  unusual 
charm  and  social  capacity.  The  attitude  of  Hayes  on 
the  southern  question  and  on  civil  service  reform  was 
courageous  and  progressive.  And  most  of  all,  his 
ideas  on  public  questions  were  stated  ^\fith  unmistak- 
able clearness  in  a day  when  old  issues  were  sinking 
into  the  background  and  both  parties  were  reluctant  to 
define  their  position  on  the  new  ones. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

A great  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  Hayes’s  ad- 
ministration was  made  by  the  publication  of  C.  R.  Williams, 
Life  of  Biitherford  B.  Hayes  (2  vols.,  1914).  It  is  complete 
and  contains  copious  extracts  from  Hayes’s  diary,  but  is  writ- 
ten with  less  of  the  critical  spirit  than  is  desirable ; J.  F. 
Rhodes  has  a valuable  chapter  in  his  Historical  Essays 


UG 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


(1909)  ; J.  W.  Burgess,  Admimstration  of  R.  B.  Hayes  (1916), 
is  a eulogy ; V.  L.  Shores,  Hayes-Conhling  Controversy  (1919), 
describes  the  civil  service  quarrel ; J.  R.  Commons  and  others. 
History  of  Labor  in  the  United  States  (2  vols.,  1918),  de- 
scribes the  strike  of  1877 ; so  also  does  J.  F.  Rhodes,  History 
of  the  United  States  from  Hayes  to  McKinley  (1919),  with 
full  references.  On  the  Chinese  affair,  consult  Mrs.  IM.  E. 
B.  S.  Coolidge,  Chinese  Immigration  (1909).  Most  of  the 
general  histories  already  mentioned  dwell  at  length  on  the 
Hayes  administration. 

For  the  official  messages  of  this  and  succeeding  administra- 
tions, the  most  convenient  source  is  J.  D.  Richardson,  Mes- 
sages and  Papers  of  the  Presidents  (10  vols.,  1903). 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE  POLITICS  OF  THE  EARLY  EIGHTIES 

The  Haj^es  administration  was  scarcely  half  over 
when  the  politicians  began  to  look  forward  to  the 
election  of  1880.  At  the  outset  of  his  campaigTi,  Hayes 
had  advocated  a single  term  for  the  executive  and 
there  was  no  widespread  movement  among  the  politi- 
cians to  influence  him  to  change  his  attitude.  His  ene- 
mies, indeed,  had  already  turned  to  General  Grant. 
There  had  been  a third-term  boom  for  the  General  dur- 
ing his  second  administration  and  he  had  indicated  that 
he  was  not  formidably  opposed  to  further  continuance 
in  office.  Suddenly,  however,  the  anti-third-term  feel- 
ing had  risen  to  impressive  proportions,  whereupon  the 
House  of  Representatives  had  adopted  a resolution 
which  characterized  any  departure  from  the  two-term 
precedent  as  ‘‘unwise,  unpatriotic,  and  fraught  with 
peril  to  our  free  institutions.”  As  the  resolution 
passed  by  an  overwhelming  vote — 233-18 — nothing 
further  was  heard  of  a third-term  boom. 

The  Hayes  administration  put  a different  complexion 
on  the  matter.  The  wheel-horses  of  the  party  were  not 
enthusiastic  over  the  President  or  his  policies,  and  in 
their  extremity  they  looked  to  Grant.  The  New  York 
State  Republican  Convention,  under  control  of  Roscoe 
Conkling  and  his  forces,  instructed  delegates  to  sup- 
port the  General  as  a candidate  for  the  nomination  and 
endeavored  to  forestall  opposition  to  a third  term.  It 

declared  that  the  objection  to  a third  presidential  term 

147 


148 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


applied  only  to  a third  consecutive  term  and  hence  was 
inapplicable  to  the  re-election  of  Grant.  Grant,  mean- 
while, presented  a spectacle  that  was  at  once  humorous 
and  pathetic.  He  had  not  expected,  on  leaving  the 
presidency,  to  return  to  power  again,  had  dropped  con- 
sideration of  the  political  future  and  had  given  himself 
up  to  the  enjoyment  of  foreign  travel.  The  royal 
reception  accorded  him  wherever  he  went  suggested 
to  his  political  supporters  that  they  utilize  his  popu- 
larity. It  was  foreseen  that  when  he  returned  to 
America  he  would  receive  a tremendous  ovation,  on  the 
wave  of  which  he  might  be  carried  into  office.  He  was 
flooded  with  advice  and  entreaties  that  he  act  in  ac- 
cordance with  this  plan.  His  family  was  eager  to  re- 
turn to  the  position  of  social  eminence  which  they  had 
occupied,  and  pressure  from  them  was  incessant.  At 
first  he  did  nothing  either  to  aid  or  to  hinder  the  boom, 
then  gave  way  to  the  pressure  and  at  last  became  ex- 
tremely anxious  to  obtain  the  coveted  prize. 

If  the  politicians  did,  in  truth,  desire  a relaxation 
from  the  patronage  standards  of  the  Hayes  regime, 
they  did  not  make  that  the  ostensible  purpose  of  their 
campaign.  They  argued  that  the  times  demanded  a 
strong  man;  that  foreign  travel  had  greatly  broadened 
the  General  and  given  him  a knowledge  of  other  forms 
of  government ; that  he  had  been  great  as  a commander 
of  armies,  greater  as  a President,  and  that  as  a citizen 
of  the  Republic  he  ‘ ‘ shone  with  a luster  that  challenged 
the  admiration  of  the  world.”  Behind  him  were  Conk- 
ling  and  Platt,  with  the  New  York  state  organization 
under  their  control,  Don  Cameron  who  held  Pennsyl- 
vania in  his  hand.  General  Logan,  strong  in  Illinois, 
and  lesser  leaders  who  wielded  much  power  in  smaller 
states.  Many  business  men  were  ready  to  lend  their 
aid;  the  powerful  Methodist  Church,  to  which  he  be- 


POLITICS  OF  THE  EARLY  EIGHTIES  Uy 


longed,  Avas  favorable  to  him;  and,  of  course,  his  popu- 
larity as  a military  leader  was  unbounded.  His  re- 
turn to  the  Linited  States  while  the  enthusiasm  was  at 
its  height  was  the  signal  for  an  unprecedented  ovation. 
The  opponents  of  a third  term  painted  in  high  colors 
the  danger  of  a revival  of  the  scandals  of  Grant’s  days 
in  the  presidential  chair,  formed  “No  Third  Term” 
leagues,  called  an  “Anti-Third-Term”  convention  and 
decried  the  danger  of  continuing  a military  man  in  civil 
office.  The  Nation  scoffed  at  the  educational  effect  of 
foreign  travel  on  a man  who  was  fifty-seven  years  of 
age  and  could  understand  the  language  in  only  one  of 
the  countries  in  which  he  travelled.  A large  fraction 
of  the  Eepnblican  press,  in  fact,  was  in  opposition. 
“Anything  to  beat  Grant”  and  “No  third  term”  were 
their  war-cries.  Nor  was  there  any  lack  of  Republican 
candidates  to  oppose  the  Grant  movement  and  to  give 
promise  of  a lively  nominating  convention.  Blaine’s 
popularity  was  as  widespread  as  ever.  Those  who 
feared  the  nomination  of  either  Grant  or  Blaine  favored 
Senator  George  F.  Edmunds  of  Vermont  or  Secretary 
Sherman.  Both  of  these  men  were  of  statesmanlike 
proportions,  but  Edmunds  was  never  widely  popular 
and  Sherman  was  lacking  in  the  arts  of  the  politician — 
“the  human  icicle,”  T.  C.  Platt  called  him. 

The  Republican  nominating  convention  of  1880  met 
in  Chicago  in  a-  building  described  as  “one  of  the  most 
splendid  barns”  ever  built.  This  convention  is  unusu- 
ally worthy  of  study  because  it  involved  most  of  the 
elements  which  entered  into  American  politics  in  the 
early  eighties.  It  was  long  memorable  as  making  a 
record  for  that  form  of  enthusiasm  which  bursts  into 
demonstrations.  ‘ ‘ Great  applause,  ” “ loud  laughter,  ’ ’ 
“cheers”  and  “hisses  long  and  furious”  dot  the  news- 
paper accounts  of  its  deliberations.  The  members 


150 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


“acted  like  so  many  Bedlamites,”  one  of  the  delegates 
said.  On  one  day  the  opening  prayer  was  so  unex- 
pectedly short  that  there  was  applause  and  laughter. 
The  keen  contest  for  the  nomination  resulted  in  gal- 
leries packed  with  supporters  of  the  several  candidates, 
who  cheered  furiously  as  their  favorite  delegates  ap- 
peared. As  the  galleries  came  down  nearly  to  the  level 
of  the  floor,  the  spectators  were  almost  as  much  mem- 
bers of  the  convention  as  the  delegates  themselves. 
It  was  under  such  conditions,  then,  that  the  convention 
proceeded  to  the  serious  business  of  adopting  prin- 
ciples and  choosing  a leader. 

Three  hundred  and  six  of  the  757  delegates  were 
sworn  supporters  of  Grant — pledged  to  die,  if  they 
died  at  all,  “with  their  boots  on,”  one  of  their  leaders 
said.  In  each  of  the  big  delegations — those  from  New 
York,  Pennsylvania  and  Illinois — a minority  ^yas  un- 
favorable to  Grant.  This  minority  could  be  counted 
in  the  General’s  column  if  the  convention  could  be 
forced  to  adopt  the  so-called  “unit-rule,”  under  which 
the  delegation  from  a state  casts  all  its  votes  for  the 
candidate  favored  by  the  majority.  In  this  particular 
case,  the  minorities  in  New  York,  Pennsylvania  and 
Illinois  numbered  more  than  sixty  delegates,  so  that  the 
adoption  of  the  rule  was  a stake  worth  playing  for. 
The  plan  formulated  by  the  Grant  leaders  was  worthy 
of  the  time. 

Donald  Cameron  of  Pennsylvania  was  chairman  of 
the  National  Republican  Committee.  Following  the 
usual  custom,  Cameron  was  to  call  the  convention  to 
order  and  present  the  temporary  chairman  who  had 
been  chosen  by  the  Committee.  As  the  Grant  support- 
ers were  in  a minority  even  on  the  Committee,  provi- 
sion was  made  to  meet  the  emergency  in  case  the  ma- 
jority insisted  on  the  appointment  of  an  anti-Grant 


POLITICS  OF  THE  EARLY  EIGHTIES  15 


chairman.  Cameron  was  to  announce  the  name,  a 
Grant  delegate  was  to  move  to  substitute  a Grant  man 
instead,  and  C’ameron  would  enforce  the  unit-rule  in 
the  resulting  ballot.  This  would  ensure  control  of 
the  organization  of  the  convention  and,  doubtless,  of 
the  nomination  of  the  candidate. 

Unhappily  for  this  well-laid  plan,  rumor  of  it  leaked 
out,  and  the  majority  of  the  National  Committee — op- 
posed to  Grant — conveyed  information  to  Cameron 
that  he  must  agree  to  give  up  such  a scheme  or  be 
ousted  from  his  position.  Cameron,  convinced  that  his 
enemies  were  determined,  gave  up  his  project,  and 
Senator  George  F.  Hoar,  who  favored  neither  Grant 
nor  Blaine,  was  made  temporary  and  later  permanent 
chairman. 

Although  defeated  in  the  first  skirmish,  the  Grant 
forces  pressed  forward  for  renewed  conflict.  Conkling 
presented  a resolution  that  every  member  of  the  con- 
vention be  bound  in  honor  to  support  the  eventual 
candidate,  whoever  he  might  be.  The  resolution  passed 
716  to  three ; and  he  then  moved  that  the  three  who  had 
voted  in  the  negative  had  thereby  forfeited  their  votes 
in  the  convention.  James  A.  Garfield  of  Ohio  led  the 
opposition  to  such  rough-shod  action  and  Conkling 
angrily  withdrew  his  resolution  amid  hisses.  When 
Garfield  reported  from  the  Committee  on  Rules  in  re- 
gard to  the  regulations  under  which  the  convention 
should  deliberate,  he  moved  that  the  unit  rule  be  not 
adopted  and  the  convention  upheld  him.  It  was  mani- 
fest that  the  delegates  were  not  in  a mood  to  surrender 
to  a junto  of  powerful  machine  politicians. 

The  way  having  been  now  cleared  for  action,  the 
convention  adopted  a platform.  This  was  composed 
largely  of  a summary  of  the  achievements  of  the  party 
and  denunciation  of  the  opposition.  Most  of  the 


152 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


planks  were  abstract  or  perfunctory,  or  expressed  in 
such  a way  as  not  to  commit  the  party  seriously. 
Harper’s  Weekly,  a Republican  periodical,  regretted 
the  character  of  the  platform  and  remarked  that  such 
documents  are  expected  to  say 

An  undisputed  thing 

In  such  a solemn  way. 

Judged  by  this  criterion,  the  platform  was  ideal.  The 
obligations  of  the  country  to  the  veterans  were  empha- 
sized and  the  restriction  of  Chinese  immigration  called 
for.  On  the  tariff,  the  only  utterance  was  an  avowal 
that  duties  levied  for  the  purposes  of  revenue  should 
discriminate  in  favor  of  labor.  After  this  declaration 
of  faith  had  been  unanimously  adopted,  a Massachu- 
setts delegate  presented  an  additional  plank  advocating 
civil  service  reform. 

The  convention  was  now  badly  put  to  it.  To  reject 
a plank  which  had  been  accepted  both  in  1872  and  in 
1876  would  discredit  the  party,  particularly  as  the  plat- 
form just  adopted  had  accused  the  opposition  of  sacri- 
ficing patriotism  “to  a supreme  and  insatiable  lust  for 
office.”  Nevertheless  the  opposition  to  its  adoption 
was  formidable,  and  it  had  already  been  twice  rejected 
in  the  Committee  on  Resolutions,  which  drew  up  the 
platform.  There  seemed  no  way  of  avoiding  the  issue, 
however,  and  the  plank  was  thereupon  adopted,  though 
not  before  Webster  Flanagan  of  Texas  had  blurted  out, 
‘ ‘ After  we  have  won  the  race,  ...  we  will  give  those 
who  are  entitled  to  positions  office.  What  are  we  up 
here  for?” 

With  the  speeches  presenting  candidates  to  the  con- 
vention, the  real  business  of  the  week  began.  Senator 
Conkling  aroused  a tempest  of  enthusiasm  for  General 
Grant  in  a famous  speech  which  began  with  the  lines. 


POLITICS  OF  THE  EAELY  EIGHTIES  153 


When  asked  what  state  he  hails  from, 

Our  sole  reply  shall  be, 

He  comes  from  Appomattox 
And  its  famous  apple  tree. 

Garfield  presented  Sherman’s  name.  At  the  outset 
General  Grant  led,  Blaine  was  a close  second  and  Sher- 
man third.  This  order  continued  for  thirty-five  bal- 
lots. By  that  time  Blaine  and  Grant  had  fought  each 
other  to  a standstill.  The  General’s  three  hundred  and 
six  held  together  without  a break,  and  Blaine’s  forces 
were  equally  determined.^  There  was  little  chance  of 
compromise,  as  Grant  and  Blaine  were  not  on  speaking 
terms,  and  Conkling  and  Blaine  looked  upon  each  other 
with  unconcealed  hatred.  Since  Sherman  was  handi- 
capped by  lack  of  united  support  in  his  own  state,  the 
natural  solution  of  the  problem  seemed  to  be  the  choice 
of  some  other  leader  who  might  harmonize  the  con- 
tending factions.  On  the  thirty-fourth  ballot,  seven- 
teen votes  were  given  to  Garfield;  on  the  next,  fifty; 
then  a stampede  began,  in  spite  of  a protest  by  Gar- 
field, and  on  the  thirty-sixth  ballot  a union  of  the 
Blaine  and  Sherman  forces  made  him  the  choice  of  the 
convention.  The  nominee  for  the  vice-presidency  was 
Chester  A.  Arthur,  who  was  one  of  the  leading  sup- 
porters of  Grant  and  a member  of  the  Conkling  group. 

The  choice  of  Garfield  was  well  received  by  the  coun- 
try, perhaps  the  more  so  as  a relief  from  the  danger  of 
a third  term.  The  nominee  was  a man  of  great  indus- 
try, possessed  of  a store  of  information,  tactful,  mod- 
est, popular,  an  effective  orator,  and  a veteran  of  the 
war.  His  rise  from  canal  boy  to  candidate  for  the 
presidency  exemplified  the  possibilities  before  indus- 
trious youth  and  gave  rise  to  many  a homily  on  demo- 

1 For  Platt’s  account  of  tlje  annual  reunion  and  banquet  of  the  three 
hundred  and  six — ’‘The  Old  Guard” — see  Autobiography,  115. 


154 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


cratic  America.  Yet  liis  friends  had  to  defend  his  re- 
lation to  a paving  scandal  in  the  District  of  Columbia 
and  an  unwise  connection  with  the  Credit  Mobilier  of 
1873.  In  neither  of  these  cases  does  Garfield  seem  to 
have  been  corrupt,  but  in  neither  does  he  appear  in  a 
highly  favorable  light.^ 

As  the  Republicans  were  dispersing,  the  Greenback 
convention  was  assembling.  Their  strength  in  the 
campaign  was  almost  negligible  but  their  platform 
presaged  the  future.  Money  to  be  issued  only  by  the 
government,  the  volume  of  money  increased,  ameliora- 
tive labor  legislation,  restriction  of  Chinese  immigra- 
tion, regulation  of  interstate  commerce,  an  income  tax, 
government  for  the  people  rather  than  for  classes, 
wider  suffrage, — all  these  were  advocated  in  concise 
and  unmistakable  terms.  James  B.  Weaver  was  the 
presidential  candidate. 

Among  the  Democrats,  the  all  important  question 
was  whether  Tilden  would  be  a candidate  again.  He 
naturally  wished  for  a renomination  and  an  oppor- 
tunity to  prove  by  an  election  that  he  had  been  “fraud- 
ulently” deprived  of  the  presidency  in  1876.  The 
party,  likewise,  seemed  to  need  his  services,  as  no  other 
leader  of  equal  prominence  had  appeared.  On  the 
other  hand,  his  health  had  rapidly  failed  since  1876  and 
it  was  apparent  that  he  was  unequal  to  the  exacting 
labors  of  the  presidency.  Not  until  just  before  the 
meeting  of  the  convention,  however,  did  he  make  known 
his  wishes  and  then  he  declared  that  he  desired  nothing 
so  much  as  an  honorable  discharge  from  public  serv- 

1 Garfield’s  early  career  as  a canal  boy  led  to  such  campaign  songs 
as  the  following: 

He  early  learned  to  paddle  well  his  own  forlorn  canoe, 

Upon  Ohio's  grand  canal  he  held  the  helium  true. 

And  now  the  people  shout  to  him:  “Lo!  ’t  is  for  you  we  wait. 

We  want  to  see  Jim  Garfield  guide  our  glorious  ship  of  state.” 


POLITICS  OF  THE  EARLY  EIGHTIES  155 


ice  and  that  he  “renounced”  the  renomination.  The 
party  took  him  at  his  word  and  turned  to  the  adoption 
of  a platform  and  the  choice  of  another  leader. 

The  platform  reflected  the  bitterness  of  the  party 
over  the  “great  fraud”  of  1876-1877  and  advocated 
tariff  for  reveiiue  only,  civil  service  reform  and  the 
restriction  of  Chinese  immigration.  In  other  words, 
except  for  the  usual  self-congratulation  and  the  de- 
nunciation of  the  opposition,  the  Democratic  platform 
closely  resembled  that  of  the  Republicans.  The  con- 
vention then  nominated  for  the  presidency  General 
Winfleld  S.  Hancock,  a modest,  brave  Union  soldier,  of 
whom  Grant  once  said,  “his  name  was  never  mentioned 
as  having  committed  in  battle  a blunder  for  which  he 
was  responsible.”  He  was  not  an  experienced  poli- 
tician, but  was  popular  even  in  the  South. 

On  the  whole  the  Democratic  convention  Avas  much 
less  interesting  than  its  Republican  predecessor. 
There  were  no  fierce  factional  quarrels  to  arouse  the 
emotions  to  concert  pitch.  The  applause  spurted  out 
here  and  there  like  the  “jets  from  a splitting  hose”  in 
the  “Ki  yi  yi  yi”  Avhich  characterized  the  cheers  of 
the  loAver  wards  of  New  York,  in  contrast  to  the  roll- 
ing billows  of  applause  Avhich  formed  so  memorable  an 
element  in  the  opposition  gathering.  The  New  York 
Tribune,  although  hostile  to  everything  Democratic, 
perhaps  stated  the  fact  when  it  commented  on  the  lack 
of  enthusiasm.  The  convention,  the  Tribune  noted, 
Avas  Avell-behaved,  but  a mob  Avithout  leaders;  there 
Avere  no  Conklings  or  Garfields  or  Logans,  only  John 
Kelleys  and  Wade  Hamptons. 

The  campaign  of  1880  reflected  the  lack  of  definite 
utterances  in  the  party  platforms.  Since  each  side 
Avas  loath  to  press  forAAmrd  to  the  solution  of  any  real 
problem  facing  the  nation,  the  campaign  Avas  confined, 


156 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


for  the  most  part,  to  petty  or  even  corrupt  partisan- 
ship. The  career  of  General  Garfield  was  carefully 
overhauled  for  evidences  of  scandal.  Arthur’s  fail- 
ings as  a public  officer  were  duly  paraded.  General 
Hancock  was  ridiculed  as  “a  good  man  weighing  two 
hundred  and  forty  pounds.”  Some  attempt  was  made 
by  the  Republicans  to  make  an  issue  of  the  tariff,  and 
a remark  of  Hancock  to  the  effect  that  the  tariff  was 
a “local  issue”  was  jeered  at  as  proving  an  ignorance 
of  public  questions.  There  was  little  response  to  the 
“bloody  shirt”  and  little  interest  in  “the  great  fraud.” 

A modicum  of  enthusiasm  was  injected  into  the  can- 
vass by  the  participation  of  Conkling  and  General 
Grant.  The  former  was  not  happily  disposed  toward 
the  Republican  candidate  and  Grant  had  always  re- 
fused to  make  campaign  speeches,  but  as  the  autumn 
came  on  and  defeat  seemed  imminent,  these  two  leaders 
were  prevailed  upon  to  lend  their  assistance.  Near 
the  end  of  the  campaign  a letter  was  circulated  in  the 
Pacific  states,  purporting  to  have  been  written  by  Gar- 
field to  a Mr.  Morey,  and  expressing  opposition  to  the 
restriction  of  Chinese  immigration.  The  signature 
was  a forgery,  but  complete  exposure  in  the  short  time 
before  election  day  was  impossible  and  the  letter  per- 
haps injured  Garfield  on  the  coast.  Nevertheless  Gar- 
field and  Arthur  won,  although  their  popular  plurality 
was  only  9,500  in  a total  of  about  nine  millions.  The 
electoral  vote  was  214  to  155  and  showed  that  the  di- 
vision among  the  states  was  sectional,  for  in  the  North 
Hancock  carried  only  New  Jersey,  together  with 
Nevada  and  five  electoral  votes  in  California,  the  result 
probably  of  the  Morey  letter. 

Two  aspects  of  the  campaign  had  especial  signifi- 
cance. The  attempt  by  Conkling  and  his  associates — - 
to  choose  the  Republican  nominee  through  the  shrewd 


POLITICS  OF  THE  EARLY  EIGHTIES  157 


manipulation  of  political  machinery,  and  against  the 
Avishes  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  party,  Avas  a move 
on  the  part  of  the  greater  state  bosses  to  get  control 
of  the  national  organization,  so  that  they  might  man- 
age it  as  they  managed  their  local  committees  and  con- 
A'entions.  The  second  notable  circumstance  concerned 
the  collection  and  expenditure  of  the  campaign  funds. 

Even  before  the  convention  met,  the  Republican 
Congressional  Committee,  pursuing  the  common  prac- 
tice of  the  time,  addressed  a letter  to  all  federal  em- 
ployees, except  heads  of  departments,  in  AAdiich  the 
suggestion  AAms  made  that  the  office  holders  AAmuld 
doubtless  consider  it  a “priAulege  and  a pleasure”  to 
contribute  to  the  campaign  funds  an  amount  equal  to 
tAA’o  per  cent,  of  their  salaries.  The  Republican  Na- 
tional Committee  also  made  its  demands  on  office  hold- 
ers— usually  five  per  cent,  of  a year’s  salary.  The 
Democrats,  having  no  hold  on  the  federal  offices,  had 
to  content  themselves  AAuth  the  cultivation  of  the  pos- 
sibilities in  states  Avhich  they  controlled.  In  NeAA^ 
York,  Senator  Platt  Avas  chairman  of  the  executHe 
committee  and  he  sent  a similar  communication  to  fed- 
eral employees  in  the  state.  EAmn  the  office  boy  in  a 
rural  post  office  AAms  not  overlooked,  and  Avhen  contri- 
butions AAmre  not  forthcoming,  the  names  of  delinquents 
AA-ere  sent  to  their  superiors.  Other  developments  ap- 
peared after  the  election  w^as  over.  In  February,  1881, 
a dinner  aa’us  given  in  honor  of  Senator  S.  W.  Dorsey, 
secretary  of  the  Republican  National  Committee,  to 
whom  credit  A\"as  given  for  carrying  the  state  of 
Indiana.  General  Grant  presided  and  grace  A\"as  asked 
by  Reverend  Henry  AVard  Beecher.  Dorsey  Avas  an 
Arkansas  carpet-bagger,  AAffio  had  been  connected  AAuth 
a railroad  SAAundle  and  AA^as  soon,  as  it  turned  out,  to  be 
indicted  for  complication  in  other  frauds.  The  sub- 


158 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


stance  of  the  speeches  was  that  the  prospect  of  suc- 
cess in  the  camiDaig'ii  seemed  waning,  that  Indiana  was 
essential  to  success  and  that  Dorsey  was  the  agent  who 
accomplished  the  task.  Arthur,  who  was  one  of  the  , 
speakers,  explained  the  modus  operandi:  “Indiana  was  : 
really,  I suppose,  a Democratic  State.  It  had  been 
put  down  on  the  books  always  as  a State  that  might 
be  carried  by  close  and  perfect  organization  and  a 
great  deal  of — (laughter).  I see  the  reporters  are 
present,  therefore  I will  simply  say  that  everybody 
showed  a great  deal  of  interest  in  the  occasion  and  dis- 
tributed tracts  and  political  documents  all  through  the 
State.” 

IVith  the  victory  accomplished,  the  politicians  turned 
from  the  contest  with  the  common  enemy  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  division  of  the  spoils;  from  the  ostensible 
issue  of  platforms,  to  the  real  issue  that  Flanagan 
had  personified.  Although  the  Republicans  had  pre-' 
seated  a united  front  to  their  opponents,  there  were 
factional  troubles  Avithin  the  party  that  all  but  dwarfed 
the  larger  contest.  The  “Stalwarts”  Avere  composed 
of  the  thorough  “organization  men”  like  Conkling, 
Platt  and  Arthur;  the  “ Half-breeds ” were  anti-or-  ^ 
ganization  men  and  more  sympathetic  with  the  ad-  :: 
ministration.  The  commander  of  the  Stahvarts  and  ;; 
one  of  the  most  influential  leaders  in  the  country  Avas 
Roscoe  Conkling,  Senator  from  New  York.  In  per- 
son Conkling  Avas  a tall,  handsome,  imperious  man,  i 
Avith  something  of  the  theatrical  in  his  appearance  and 
manner.  As  a politician  he  was  aggressive,  fearless,  ; 
scornful,  shreAvd  and  adroit  AAdien  he  chose  to  be,  and  I 
masterful,  alAA^ays.  As  an  orator  he  kneAv  hoAV  to  play  ' 
on  the  feelings  of  the  croAvd:  his  Amcabulary,  AAdien  he  ; 
turned  upon  one  AAdiom  he  disliked,  Avas  memorable  for  ' 
its  Avealth  of  invective  and  ridicule,  and  especially  he  ' 


POLITICS  OF  THE  EARLY  EIGHTIES  159 


uncorked  the  vials  of  his  wrath  on  any  who  were  not 
strictly  organization  men.  Although  an  able  man  and 
a successful  lawyer,  Conkling  seems  to  have  had  less 
interest  in  the  public  welfare  than  in  conventions, 
elections  and  patronage. 

The  announcement  of  Garfield’s  choice  of  a Cabinet 
was  the  signal  for  a fierce  patronage  fight.  James  G. 

/ Blaine,  the  choice  for  Secretary  of  State,  was  distaste- 
ful in  the  extreme  to  Conkling.  Many  years  before, 
during  a debate  in  the  House,  Blaine  had  compared 
Conkling  to  Henry  Winter  Davis  as 

Hyperion  to  a satyr,  Thersites  to  Hercules,  mud  to  marble, 
dunghill  to  diamond,  a singed  eat  to  a Bengal  tiger,  a whin- 
ing puppy  to  a roaring  lion. 

He  had  contemptuously  referred  to  Conkling ’s 
“haughty  disdain,  his  grandiloquent  swell,  his  maj- 
estic, supereminent,  overpowering,  turkey-gobbler 
strut.”  Accordingly  when  Garfield  disregarded  Conk- 
ling’s  wishes  in  regard  to  the  representation  which 
New  York  should  have  in  the  cabinet,  Conkling  laid 
the  blame  upon  his  old  enemy. ^ 

As  soon  as  the  administration  was  in  office,  the] 
Senate  met  in  executive  session  to  act  on  appoint- 
ments, and  it  appeared  that  the  parties  were  evenly 
divided,  the  balance  of  power  lying  in  the  hands  of  two 
Independents.  President  Garfield  sent  in  his  list  of 
nominees  for  office  without  consulting  Conkling  in  re- 
gard to  New  York  appointments.  Among  them  was 
William  H.  Robertson  for  the  coveted  position  of  col- 
lector for  the  port  of  New  York.  As  Robertson  had 

1 William  Windom,  of  Minn.,  was  Secretary  of  the  Treasury;  E.  T. 
Lincoln,  of  111.,  Secretary  of  War;  Wayne  iMaeVeagh,  of  Pa.,  Attorney- 
General;  T.  L.  James,  of  X.  Y.,  Postmaster-General;  W.  H.  Hunt,  of 
La.,  Secretary  of  the  Xavy;  S.  J.  Kirkwood,  of  la.,  Secretary  of  the 
Interior. 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAK 


1C) 

been  opposed  to  Crant  and  to  the  unit  rule  in  the  Re- 
publican convention,  Conkling’s  rage  reached  a fever 
pitch.  In  an  attempt  to  discredit  the  President  before 
the  country,  he  made  public  a letter  from  Garfield  giv- 
ing countenance  to  the  practice  of  levying  campaign  ■ 
assessments  on  federal  employees.  Conkling’s  point 
of  view  is  not  difficult  to  understand.  Consulta-  |i 
tion  with  the  senators  from  a state  with  regard  to  j 
nominations  to  offices  within  its  boundaries  was  the  ’ 
common  custom;  Conkling  had  sunk  hi’s  dislike  of  Gar-  1 
field  during  the  campaign  in  order  to  assist  in  a party  | 
victory;  moreover,  he  and  Platt,  the  other  New  York  ] 
senator,  understood  that  Garfield  had  agreed  to  dis-  i 
pense  New  York  patronage  in  conformity  to  the  wishes  i 
of  the  Stalwarts,  in  case  Conkling  took  the  stump.  He 
had  carried  out  his  part  of  the  bargain  and  now  desired  I 
his  quid  pro  quo. 

Meanwhile  the  Senate  was  trying  to  organize  and  , 
having  failed  because  of  the  even  division  of  the  par-  | 
ties,  stopped  the  attempt  long  enough  to  act  on  the  : 
nominations.  The  President  then  withdrew  all  except  ' 
that  of  Robertson,  thus  indicating  that  offices  in  which  i 
other  senators  were  concerned  would  not  be  filled  until  j 
the  New  York  case  was  settled.  Foreseeing  that  the  | 
members  would  wish  to  clear  the  way  for  their  own  in- 
terests and  that  Robertson’s  nomination  was  likely  to  ; 
be  agreed  to,  Conkling  and  Platt  resigned  their  posts 
and  appealed  to  the  New  York  legislature  for  a re- 
election  as  a vindication  of  the  stand  they  had  taken. 
As  the  legislature  was  Republican  and  as  Vice-Presi-  ; 
dent  Arthur  went  to  Albany  to  urge  their  case,  they  ; 
seemed  likely  to  succeed;  but  to  their  mortification  I 
they  were  both  defeated  after  an  extended  contest,  and 
Conkling  retired  permanently  to  private  life.  Platt, 
who  was  promptly  dubbed  “Me  Too,”  also  relin-  j 


POLITICS  OF  THE  EARLY  EIGHTIES  161 

quished  public  office,  but  only  for  a time.  In  the  mean- 
while, as  soon  as  Conkling  and  Platt  had  left  the  Sen- 
ate, the  nomination  of  Robertson  had  been  approved, 
and  Garfield  was  triumphant. 

Further  light  was  throvui  upon  political  conditions 
by  the  investigations  of  the  “star  routes.”  These 
were  routes  in  the  South  and  West  where  mails  had  to 
be  carried  by  stage  lines,  and  were  under  the  control  of 
the  Second  Assistant  Postmaster-General,  Thomas  J. 
Brady.  Rumors  had  been  common  for  some  years  that 
they  were  a source  of  corruption.  Garfield’s  Post- 
master-General, Thomas  L.  James,  had  already  made  a 
reputation  as  the  reform  postmaster  of  New  York, 
and  he  set  himself  to  investigate  the  reports.  Among 
other  things  it  was  discovered  that  a combination  of 
public  men  and  contractors  had  succeeded  in  raising 
the  compensation  on  134  star  routes  from  $143,169  to 
$622,808,  dividing  the  extra  profits  among  themselves. 
Brady  and  Senator  Dorsey,  the  active  agent  in  the  cam- 
paign in  Indiana,  were  accused  of  being  in  the  “ring” 
and  were  indicted  on  the  ground  of  conspiracy  to  de- 
fraud the  government.  Brady  attempted  to  block  the 
investigation  by  threatening  Garfield  with  an  exposure 
of  the  campaign  methods,  and  when  the  threat  failed 
he  made  public  a letter  from  the  President  to  “My  dear 
Hubbell,”  chairman  of  the  Congressional  Committee, 
similar  to  that  which  Conkling  had  earlier  published. 
The  trials  of  the  conspirators  dragged  on  until  1883 
and  resulted  in  the  acquittal  of  all  the  accused  except 
one  of  the  least  important.  Yet  some  good  was  ac- 
complished, for  the  ring  was  broken  up.  Dorsey  re- 
tired from  public  life,  and  renewed  attention  was 
drawn  to  the  need  of  better  federal  officials. 

During  tbe  course  of  the  trials,  the  country  was 
shocked  by  the  assassination  of  the  President  on  July 


162 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


2,  1881,  at  the  hands  of  a disappointed  office  seeker 
named  Gniteau.  Despite  a strong  constitution  Gar- 
field grew  slowly  weaker  and  died  on  September  19. 
The  catastrophe  affected  the  country  the  more  pro- 
foundly because  of  its  connection  with  the  factional 
quarrel  in  the  Republican  party  and  because,  follow- 
ing the  recent  murder  of  the  Russian  Czar,  it  seemed  to 
show  that  democratic  government  was  no  guarantee 
against  violence.^ 

The  consternation  with  Avhich  the  elevation  of  Ches- 
ter A.  Arthur  to  the  presidency  was  received  was  not 
confined  to  the  Democrats.  An  oft-repeated  remark 
made  at  the  time  was  expressive  of  the  opinion  of  those 
best  acquainted  with  the  new  executive:  “ ‘Chet’  Ar- 
thur President  of  the  United  States!  Good  God!” 
In  truth  Arthur’s  previous  career  hardly  justified  any- 
thing except  consternation.  He  had  been  identified  al- 
ways with  machine  politics  and  particularly  with  the 
Conkling  group;  he  had  been  a prominent  figure  in 
the  opposition  to  Hayes  when  the  latter  attempted  to 
improve  conditions  in  the  New  York  Customs  House; 
and  had  taken  an  active  and  undignified  share  in  the 
quarrel  between  Garfield  and  Conkling.  Chester  A. 
Arthur,  however,  was  a combination  of  characteristics 
such  as  enlist  the  interest  of  the  student  of  human  na- 
ture. Of  Vermont  birth,  educated  at  Union  College 
where  he  had  taken  high  rank,  he  had  taught  school 

1 The  death  of  the  President  empliasized  tlie  need  of  a presidential 
succession  law.  Under  an  act  of  1792,  the  president  and  vice-president 
were  succeeded  by  the  president  of  the  Senate  and  the  speaker  of  the 
House.  When  Garfield  died,  the  Senate  had  not  yet  elected  a presiding 
officer  and  the  House  had  not  met.  The  death  of  Arthur  would  have 
left  the  country  without  a legal  head.  The  Presidential  Succession  Act 
of  1886  remedied  the  fault  by  providing  for  the  succession  of  the  cabinet 
in  order,  beginning  with  the  Secretary  of  State.  The  presiding  officers 
of  the  Senate  and  House  were  omitted,  because  they  might  not  be  of  the 
dominant  party. 


POLITICS  OF  THE  EARLY  EIGHTIES  163 


for  a time,  had  entered  the  practice  of  law  in  New 
York,  had  made  a good  war  record,  and  had  been  a 
member  of  the  Republican  party  from  its  beginning. 
In  many  ways  Arthur  was  made  for  politics.  He  was 
the  “man  of  the  world”  in  appearance,  polished,  re- 
fined, well-groomed,  scrupulously  careful  about  his  at- 
tire, a bon-vivant.  Yet  he  was  equally  at  home  in  the 
atmosphere  of  politics  in  the  early  eighties;  a leader 
of  the  “Johnnies”  and  “Jakes,”  the  “Barneys”  and 
“Mikes”  of  New  York  City.  Dignity  characterized 
him,  whether  in  the  “knock-do'svn”  and  “drag-out” 
caucus  or  at  an  exclusive  White  House  reception.  He 
possessed  a refinement,  especially  in  his  home  life, 
that  is  not  usually  associated  with  ward  politics  but 
which  forms  an  element  of  the  “gentleman”  in  the  best 
sense  of  that  abused  word. 

Yet  they  who  feared  that  President  Arthur  would  be 
like  Chester  A.  Arthur,  the  collector  of  the  port,  were 
treated  to  a revelation.  The  suddenness  with  which 
the  elevation  to  the  responsibility  of  the  executive’s 
position  broadened  the  view  of  the  President  proved 
that  he  possessed  qualities  which  had  been  merely  hid- 
den in  the  pursuit  of  ordinary  partisan  politics.  Platt, 
expectant  of  the  dismissal  of  Robertson,  now  that  a 
Stalwart  was  in  power,  fell  back  in  disgust  and  dis- 
owned his  former  associate,  for  it  appeared  that  Ar- 
thur intended  to  further  the  principles  of  reform.  His 
first  annual  message  to  Congress  contained  a sane  dis- 
cussion of  the  civil  service  and  the  needed  remedies, 
which  committed  him  whole-heartedly  to  the  competi- 
tive system.  Although  he  did  not  go  as  far  as  some 
reformers  would  have  had  him,  he  went  so  much  far- 
ther than  was  expected  that  commendation  was  en- 
thusiastic, even  on  the  part  of  the  most  prominent 
leaders  in  the  reform  element.  In  the  same  message 


164 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


lie  urged  the  repeal  of  the  Bland- Allison  silver-coin- 
age act,  the  reduction  of  the  internal  revenue,  revision 
of  the  tariff,  a better  navy,  post-office  savings  banks, 
and  enlightened  Indian  legislation.  Altogether  it  was 
clear  that  he  had  laid  aside  much  of  the  partisan  in 
succeeding  to  his  high  office.^ 

The  Chinese  problem  soon  provided  him  with  an 
opportunity  to  show  an  independence  of  judgment,  to- 
gether with  an  indifference  to  mere  popularity,  which 
were  in  keeping  with  the  new  Arthur,  but  which  were 
a surprise  to  his  former  associates.  As  a result  of  the 
changes  in  the  Burlingame  treaty,  which  gave  the 
United  States  authority  to  suspend  the  immigration 
of  Chinese  laborers.  Congress  passed  a bill  in  1882 
to  prohibit  the  incoming  of  laborers  for  twenty  years, 
western  Republicans  joining  with  the  Democrats  in  its 
passage.^  Arthur  vetoed  the  measure  on  the  ground 
that  a stoppage  for  so  great  a period  as  twenty  years 
violated  those  provisions  of  the  treaty  which  allowed 
us  merely  to  suspend  immigration,  not  to  prohibit  it. 
An  attempt  to  overcome  the  veto  failed  for  lack  of  the 
necessary  two-thirds  majority.  Congress  did,  how- 
ever, pass  legislation  suspending  the  immigration  of 
laborers  for  ten  years,  and  this  bill  the  President 
signed.  Later  acts  have  merely  .extended  this  law  or 
made  it  more  effective. 

Arthur  also  exercised  the  veto  upon  a rivers  and 
harbors  bill.  It  had,  of  course,  long  been  the  custom 
for  the  federal  government  to  aid  in  the  improvement 
of  the  harbors  and  internal  water-ways  of  the  coun- 

1 The  cabinet  was  composed  of  F.  T.  Frelinghuysen,  N.  J.,  Secretary 
of  State;  C.  J.  Folger,  N.  Y.,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury;  R.  T.  Lincoln, 
111.,  Secretary  of  War;  B.  H.  Brewster,  Pa.,  Attorney-General;  T.  0. 
Howe,  Wis.,  Postmaster-General;  W.  E.  Chandler,  N.  H.,  Secretary  of 
the  Navy;  H.  M.  Teller,  Colo.,  Secretary  of  the  Interior. 

2 Above,  p.  145. 


POLITICS  OP  THE  EAPLY  EIGHTIES  165 


try.  But  the  modest  sums  of  ante-helium  days  grew 
rapidly  after  the  war,  stimulated  by  immense  federal 
revenues,  until  the  suggested  legislation  of  1882  ap- 
propriated nearly  nineteen  million  dollars.  It  pro- 
vided not  merely  for  the  dredging  of  great  rivers  like 
the  Mississippi  and  Ohio,  but  also  for  the  Lamprey 
Kiver  in  New  Hampshire,  the  Waccemaw  in  North 
C’arolina,  together  with  Goose  Rapids  and  Cheese- 
quake  Creek.  Some  of  these,  the  opposition  declared, 
might  better  be  paved  than  dredged.^  It  might  seem 
that  a bill  against  which  such  obvious  objections  could 
be  raised  would  be  doomed  to  failure.  But  the  argu- 
ment of  Ransom  of  North  Carolina,  who  had  charge  of 
the  bill  in  its  later  stages  in  the  Senate,  seems  to  have 
been  a decisive  one.  Somebody  had  objected  that  the 
members  of  the  committee  had  cared  for  the  interests 
of  their  own  states,  merely.  Ransom  repelled  the 
charge.  He  showed  that  the  New  England  states  had 
been  looked  out  for;  “Look  next  to  New  York,  that 
great,  grand,  magnificent  State  . . . that  empire  in  it- 
self ...  Go  to  Delaware,  little,  glorious  Delaware.” 
The  committee  had  retained  $20,000  for  Delaware. 
“Go  next  ...  to  great,  grand  old  Virginia.”  Vir- 
ginia had  received  something.  “Go  to  Missouri,  the 
young,  beautiful,  growing,  powerful  State  of  my  friend 
over  the  way.  ’ ’ And  so  on — all  had  been  treated  with 
thoughtful  care.  Ransom  was  wise  in  his  day  and  gen- 
eration. Although  Arthur  objected  to  the  bill  on  the 
grounds  of  extravagance  and  of  the  official  demoraliza- 
tion which  accompanied  it,  nevertheless  Republicans 
and  Democrats  alike  joined  in  passing  over  the  veto 
an  act  which  would  get  money  into  their  home  states. 

1 Some  thorouglily  unselfish  members  of  Congress  like  Senator  Hoar, 
however,  believed  the  bill  a justifiable  one  and  voted  for  it.  See  Hoar, 
Autobiography,  II,  chapter  VIII. 


166 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


The  congressional  elections  in  the  fall  of  1882  indi- 
cated that  the  factional  disputes  among  the  Republi- 
cans, and  their  failure  to  reform  conditions  in  the 
civil  service  had  presented  the  opposition  with  an  op- 
portunity. In  the  House  of  Representatives,  Republi- 
can control  was  replaced  by  a Democratic  majority  of 
sixty-nine;  the  state  legislatures  chosen  were  Demo- 
cratic in  such  numbers  as  to  make  sure  the  even  di- 
vision of  the  Senate  when  new  members  were  elected ; 
in  Pennsylvania,  a Democratic  reformer,  Robert  E. 
Pattison,  was  elected  governor,  and  in  New  York  an- 
other, Grover  Cleveland,  was  successful  by  the  unprece- 
dented majority  of  190,000. 

The  results  of  the  campaigTi  added  interest  to  a civil 
service  reform  bill  which  had  been  drafted  by  some  re- 
formers led  by  Dorman  B.  Eaton,  and  which  had  been 
presented  to  the  Senate  by  George  F.  Pendleton,  of 
Ohio.  The  debate  elicited  several  points  of  view. 
Pendleton  set  forth  the  evils  of  the  existing  system  of 
appointments,  and  emphasized  the  superior  advant- 
ages of  appointment  after  competitive  examination. 
The  Democrats  were  in  distress.  Although  Pendle- 
ton was  himself  a Democrat  and  the  party  platforms 
had  been  advocating  reform,  nevertheless  the  election 
of  1884  Avas  not  far  ahead.  Democratic  success  seemed 
likely,  and  the  party  leaders  desired  an  unrestrained 
opportunity  to  till  the  offices  with  their  followers. 
Senator  Williams  expressed  a conviction  that  the 
publican  party  was  a party  of  corruption  and^wff- 
tinued : 

The  only  way  to  reform  is  to  put  a good  honest  Democratic 
president  in  in  1884;  then  turn  on  the  hose  and  give  him  a 
good  hickory  broom  and  tell  him  to  sweep  the  dirt  away. 

The  Republicans,  on  their  side,  were  fearful  of  the 


POLITICS  OF  THE  EAELY  EIGHTIES  167 


same  clean  sweep  that  Williams  hoped  for,  and  they 
therefore  looked  with  greater  equanimity  upon  a bill 
which  might  retain  in  office  the  existing  office-holders, 
most  of  whom  belonged  to  their  party.  This  aspect  of 
the  situation  was  not  lost  upon  such  Democrats  as 
Senator  Bro\^m  who  moved  that  the  measure  be  en- 
titled “a  bill  to  perpetuate  in  office  the  Republicans 
who  now  hold  the  patronage  of  the  government.  ’ ’ In 
the  Senate  only  five  members  voted  against  its  passage, 
but  thirty-three  absented  themselves ; and  in  the  House 
forty-seven  opposed,  while  eighty-seven  were  absent. 
A little  study  of  the  debate  makes  it  clear  that  the 
passage  of  the  act  was  due  to  conviction  in  favor  of  re- 
form on  the  part  of  a few  and  to  fear  of  public  opinion 
on  the  part  of  many  others.  Undoubtedly  many  of 
the  absentees  were  members  who  would  not  vote  for 
the  measure  and  were  fearful  of  the  results  of  voting 
against  it.  The  President  signed  the  bill  January  16, 
1883. 

The  Pendleton  act  left  large  discretion  in  the  hands 
of  the  President.  It  authorized  the  appointment  of  a 
commission  of  three  who  should  prepare  and  put  into 
effect  suitable  rules  for  carrying  out  the  law.  The 
act  also  provided  that  government  offices  should  be 
arranged  in  classes  and  that  entrance  to  any  class 
should  be  obtained  by  competitive  examination;  that 
no  person  should  be  removed  from  the  service  for  re- 
I'using  to  contribute  to  political  funds;  and  that  ex- 
aminations should  be  held  in  one  or  more  places  in  each 
state  and  territory  where  candidates  appeared.  The 
system  was  to  be  inaugurated  in  customs  districts  and 
post  offices  where  the  number  of  employees  was  as 
many  as  fifty,  but  could  be  extended  later  under  direc- 
tion of  the  President.  The  soliciting  or  receiving  of 
contributions  by  federal  officials  of  all  grades,  for  po- 


168 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


litical  pui’poses,  was  forbidden.  With  the  exceptions 
just  mentioned,  officers  could  be  removed  from  office  as 
before,  but  the  purpose  of  removal  was  now  gone. 
Since  the  appointee  to  the  vacancy  must  be  the  suc- 
cessful competitor  in  an  examination,  the  chief  who 
removed  an  officer  could  not  replace  him  with  a per- 
sonal friend  or  party  worker. 

The  first  commission  was  headed  by  Dorman  B. 
Eaton.  The  work  of  grading  officials  and  placing  them 
within  the  protection  of  the  law  began  at  once,  and  by 
the  close  of  President  Arthur’s  term  nearly  16,000 
were  classified.  Fortunately,  the  work  of  the  commis- 
sion was  carried  on  sensibly  and  slowly,  and  no  back- 
ward steps  had  to  be  taken. 

The  attitude  of  Congress  toward  tariff  revision  illus- 
trates many  of  the  characteristics  of  congressional  ac- 
tion during  the  early  eighties.  In  his  first  message  to 
Congress,  Arthur  said  that  the  surplus  for  the  year 
was  $100,000,000,  and  therefore  urged  the  reduction  of 
the  internal  revenue  taxes  and  the  revision  of  the  tariff. 
In  May,  1882,  Congress  authorized  a tariff  commission 
to  investigate  and  report,  and  in  conformity  with  the 
law  Arthur  appointed  its  nine  members.  All  of  them 
were  protectionists  and  the  chairman,  John  L.  Hayes, 
was  secretary  of  the  Wool  Manufacturers’  Association. 
After  holding  hearings  in  more  than  a score  of  cities 
and  examining  some  hundreds  of  witnesses,  the  com- 
mission recommended  reductions  varying  from  nothing 
in  some  cases  to  forty  or  fifty  per  cent,  in  others.  The 
average  reduction  was  twenty  to  twenty-five  per  cent. 

Using  the  report  as  a foundation,  the  Senate  drew 
up  a tariff  measure,  added  it  to  a House  bill  which 
provided  for  a reduction  of  the  internal  revenues,  and 
passed  the  combination.  Meanwhile,  lobbyists  poured 


POLITICS  OF  THE  EAKLY  EIGHTIES  169 


into  Washington  to  guard  the  interests  of  the  pro- 
ducers of  lumber,  pig-iron,  sugar  and  other  materials 
upon  which  the  tariff  might  be  reduced.  When  the 
Senate  bill  reached  the  House  it  contained  lower  duties 
than  the  protectionist  members  desired.  The  latter, 
although  in  possession  of  the  organization  of  the  House, 
were  not  strong  enough  to  restore  higher  rates,  but 
under  the  shrewd  management  of  Thomas  B.  Reed, 
one  of  their  number,  they  were  able  to  refer  the  bill  to 
a conference  committee  of  the  two  houses  which  con- 
tained seven  strong  protectionists  out  of  ten  members. 
Reed  admitted  that  the  proceedings  were  “unusual  in 
their  nature  and  very  forcible  in  their  character”  but 
he  felt  that  a change  in  the  tariff  had  been  promised 
and  that  the  only  way  to  bring  it  about  in  the  face  of 
Democratic  opposition  was  to  settle  the  details  “in 
the  quiet  of  a conference  committee.”  A “great  emer- 
gency” having  arisen,  he  would  take  extraordinary 
measures.  The  bill  produced  under  these  circum- 
stances reduced  the  internal  revenue  taxes,  lowered 
some  of  the  tariff  duties  and  raised  others,  but  left 
the  general  level  at  the  point  where  it  had  been  at  the 
close  of  the  war.  The  Nation,  favorable  to  reform, 
scornfully  characterized  the'  act  as  “taking  a shaving 
off  the  duty  on  iron  wire,  and  adding  it  to  the  duty  on 
glue!”  Senator  Sherman,  a protectionist  member  of 
the  conference  committee,  wrote  an  account  of  the 
whole  procedure  many  years  afterward.  After  com- 
mending the  spirit  and  proposals  of  the  tariff  commis- 
sion and  mentioning  the  successful  efforts  of  many  per- 
sons to  have  their  individual  interests  looked  out  for, 
he  expressed  a regret  that  he  did  not  defeat  the  bill,  as 
he  could  have  done  in  view  of  the  evenly  balanced 
party  situation  in  the  Senate  at  that  time. 


170 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  election  of  1880  is  well  treated  by  Sparks,  Stanwood, 
Andrews,  and  Rhodes.  Senator  G.  F.  Hoar,  the  chairman  of 
the  Republican  nominating  convention,  has  a valuable  chapter 
in  his  Autobiography  of  Seventy  Years.  Such  newspapers  as 
the  New  York  Times  and  Tribune  are  invaluable  for  a discus- 
sion of  the  conventions. 

The  events  of  the  administration,  such  as  the  tariff  debates, 
the  passage  of  the  civil  service  law  and  others  are  discussed 
in  the  special  works  mentioned  in  Chapter  V.  Consult  also: 
Edward  Stanwood,  J.  G.  Blaine;  T.  C.  Platt,  Autobiography ; 
and  A.  R.  Conkling,  Life  and  Letters  of  Roscoe  Conkling. 
The  Annual  Cyclopaedia  contains  several  excellent  articles  on 
1he  tariff  (1882,  1883),  civil  service  reform  (1883),  star  route 
trials  (1882,  1883).  H.  C.  Thomas,  The  Return  of  the  Demo- 
cratic Party  to  Power  in  1884  (1919),  contains  useful  chapters 
on  Garfield  and  Arthur. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  OVEETUBN  OF  1884 


The  election  of  1880  was  memorable  only  for  the 
type  of  politics  with  which  that  contest  was  so 
inextricably  involved.  The  party  leaders  were  sec- 
ond-rate men;  the  platforms,  except  for  that  of  the 
Greenback  party,  were  as  lacking  in  definiteness  as 
the  most  timid  office-seeker  could  desire;  in  brief,  it 
Avas  a cross-section  of  American  professional  politics 
at  its  worst.  The  election  of  1884  was  a distinct,  al- 
though not  a complete  contrast.  It  was  not  a cam- 
paign of  platforms,  but  like  the  election  of  1824  it  was 
a battle  ot,Haen.  Tavo  genuine  leaders,  each  repre- 
senting a distinct  type  of  politics,  contended  for  an 
opportunity  to  try  out  a philosophy  of  government  in 
the  executive  chair.  In  1880  the  conAmntions  Avere  the 
chief  interest — the  campaign  AAms  dull.  The  campaign 
of  1884,  on  the  other  hand,  Avas  one  of  the  most  re- 
markable in  our  history. 

It  AA’iH  be  remembered  that  the  year  1882  had  been 
characterized  by  political  upheavals.  In  Pennsyl- 
vania the  Greenbackers  had  demanded  that  currency 
be  issued  only  by  the  central  government — not  by  the 
national  banks — and  that  measures  be  taken  to  curb 
monopolies ; the  independent  Republicans  had  revolted 
against  Cameron,  and  demanded  civil  serAuce  reform 
and  the  overthroAV  of  bossism ; and  the  Democrats  had 
elected  a goAmrnor  of  the  reformer  type,  Robert  E. 
Pattison.  Massachusetts  Republicans  had  gasped  the 
day  after  the  election  to  find  that  “Ben”  Butler,  who 

171 


172 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


bore  a questionable  reputation  as  a politician,  as  a sol- 
dier and  as  a man,  had  been  elected  by  a combination 
of  Greenbackers  and  Democrats  on  a reform  program. 
In  New  York  the  Democrats  had  taken  advantage  of  a 
factional  quarrel  among  their  opponents  to  elect  as 
governor  a man  who  had  achieved  a reputation  as  a 
reformer — Grover  Cleveland.  That  some  of  the  states 
which  had  been  Democratic  in  1882,  had  become  Repub- 
lican again  in  1883  illustrates  the  unstable  character  of 
the  politics  of  the  time. 

The  beginning  of  the  convention  season  of  1884  gave 
hint  of  the  vigorous  campaign  ahead.  An  Anti-Mo- 
nopoly party  nominated  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  who  was 
also  supported  by  the  Greenbackers.  The  Prohibition- 
ists presented  a ticket  headed  by  John  P.  St.  John. 
The  action  of  the  Republican  convention,  which  met  at 
Chicago  on  June  3,  proved  to  be  the  turning  point  in 
the  campaign.  President  Arthur  was  frankly  a candi- 
date for  another  term,  but  he  did  not  have  the  united 
support  of  the  professional  politicians  and  was  dis- 
trusted by  most  of  the  reform  element.  Nor  had  his 
veto  of  the  Chinese  immigration  bill  and  the  rivers  and 
harbors  act  tended  to  increase  his  popularity.  Most 
enthusiastic,  confident  and  vociferous  were  the  sup- 
porters of  James  G.  Blaine,  of  Maine.  The  independ- 
ent element  hoped  to  nominate  Senator  Edmunds,  of 
Vermont,  and  was  particularly  disturbed  at  the  char- 
acter of  the  workers  for  the  “Man  from  Maine.”  His 
campaign  manager,  Stephen  B.  Elkins,  had  been 
charged  with  a discreditable  connection  with  the  star- 
route  scandals;  men  of  the  Platt  type  were  urging 
that  it  was  now  Blaine’s  “turn”;  and  Powell  Clayton, 
an  Arkansas  carpet-bagger  of  ill-repute,  was  the  Blaine 
candidate  for  the  position  of  temporary  chairman  of 
the  convention. 


THE  OVERTURN  OF  1884 


173 


Before  a candidate  was  chosen  the  delegates  turned 
to  the  adoption  of  the  platform.  This  was  of  the  usual 
type  but  was  an  advance  over  that  of  1880  in  several 
respects.  It  committed  the  party  to  a protective  tariff 
and  advocated  an  interstate  commerce  law  and  the  ex- 
tension of  civil  service  reform. 

The  balloting  for  candidates  proved  that  Blaine  was 
clearly  the  choice  of  the  convention.  The  mere  men- 
tion of  his  name  threw  the  delegates  into  storms  of 
applause  and  even  on  the  first  ballot  he  received  votes 
from  every  state  in  the  union  save  five.  On  the  fourth 
ballot  he  received  an  overwhelming  majority  and  be- 
came the  nominee.  John  A.  Logan  of  Illinois,  a promi- 
nent politician  and  soldier,  was  nominated  for  the 
Vice-Presidency — a tail  to  the  ticket,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  Democrats,  which  was  designed  to  ‘‘Wag  Invita- 
tion to  the  Soldier  Vote.”  The  choice  of  Blaine  was 
variously  received  by  the  different  factions  in  the  con- 
vention. The  Pacific  coast  delegates,  in  a special  train, 
went  from  Chicago  to  Augusta,  Maine,  before  starting 
for  home,  in  order  personally  to  pledge  their  support 
to  the  candidate.  On  the  other  hand,  Theodore  Roose- 
velt disgustedly  remarked  that  he  was  going  to  a cattle- 
ranch  in  the  West  to  stay  he  knew  not  how  long. 
George  William  Curtis  sadly  declared  that  he  had  been 
present  at  the  birth  of  the  Republican  party  and  feared 
that  he  was  to  be  a witness  of  its  death.  Other  re- 
formers were  no  less  disaffected. 

The  outspoken  Republican  opposition  to  Blaine  gave 
infinite  aid  and  comfort  to  the  Democrats  whose  con- 
vention, coming  a month  later,  could  take  advantage  of 
the  growing  schism  in  the  opposition.  During  the  in- 
terval between  the  two  conventions  the  growing  senti- 
ment in  favor  of  the  nomination  of  Grover  Cleveland 
received  the  additional  impetus  of  independent  Repub- 


174 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


I. 


lican  support.  The  Democratic  party  was  still  an  oh-  ' 
ject  of  suspicion  to  them,  but  they  were  ready  to  run  ' 
the  risks  of  even  a Democratic  administration,  if  a j 
leader  of  proved  integrity  should  be  nominated,  and  '' 
Cleveland  seemed  to  them  to  meet  the  demands  of  the 
times.  The  first  work  of  the  convention,  which  met  in 
Chicago  on  July  8,  was  the  adoption  of  a reform  plat- 
form. Characterizing  the  opposition  party  as  a “rem- 
iniscence,” it  condemned  Republican  misrule,  and 
promised  reform;  it  proposed  a revision  of  the  tariff 
that  would  be  fair  to  all  interests,  and  reductions  which 
would  promote  industry,  do  no  harm  to  labor  and  raise 
sufficient  revenue;  and  it  briefly  advocated  “honest” 
civil  service  reform. 

The  enthusiasm  which  the  independent  Republicans 
were  manifesting  for  Cleveland  was  balanced  by  the  ! 
hostility  of  elements  within  his  party.  As  Governor 
he  had  exercised  his  veto  power  with  complete  disre- 
gard for  the  effect  on  his  own  political  future.  He 
had,  for  example,  vetoed  a popular  measure  reducing 
fares  on  the  New  York  City  elevated  railroad,  basing 
his  objections  on  the  ground  that  the  bill  violated  the 
provisions  of  the  fundamental  railroad  law  of  the  ' 
state.  He  was  opposed  by  Tammany  Hall,  led  by  John 
Kelley,  who  declared  that  the  labor  element  disliked 
him.  Kelley’s  reputation,  however,  was  such  that  his 
hostility  seemed  like  a compliment  and  gave  force  to 
General  Bragg’s  assertion,  in  seconding  the  nomina- 
tion of  Cleveland,  that  his  friends  “love  him  most  for 
the  enemies  he  has  made.”  The  first  ballot  proved  that 
the  Governor  was  stronger  than  his  competitors.  Sena- 
tor Bayard,  Allen  G.  Thurman,  Samuel  J.  Randall  and 
several  men  of  lesser  importance,  and  on  the  second 
ballot  he  received  the  nomination.  i 

The  choice  of  Cleveland  gave  the  independent  move-  I 


THE  OVERTURN  OF  1884 


175 


iiieiit  more  than  the  expected  impetus.  The  New  York 
Times  at  once  crossed  the  line  into  the  Cleveland  camp 
and  Harper’s  WeeMy,  long  a supporter  of  the  Republi- 
cans, the  Boston  Herald,  Springfield  Republican,  New 
York  Evening  Post,  The  Nation,  the  Chicago  Times 
and  a host  of  less  important  ones  followed.  A confer- 
ence of  Independents  in  New  York  City,  which  was 
composed  of  five  hundred  delegates  and  which  enlisted 
the  support  of  such  men  as  Carl  Schurz,  George  Wil- 
liam Curtis,  Henry  C.  Lea,  Charles  J.  Bonaparte, 
Moorfield  Storey  and  President  Seelye  of  Amherst 
College,  gave  striking  evidence  of  the  revolt  which 
Blaine’s  nomination  had  aroused.  Curtis  said  in  the 
conference,  that  the  chief  issue  of  the  campaign  was 
moral  rather  than  political.  The  New  York  Times  de- 
clared that  the  issue  was  a personal  one.  Some  of  the 
better  element,  however,  like  Senator  Hoar,  earnestly 
urged  the  election  of  Blaine,  while  Senator  Edmunds 
refused  either  to  aid  or  oppose  his  party.  Others,  like 
Roosevelt,  were  unable  to  give  ungrudging  support, 
but  felt  that  reform  would  be  better  promoted  by  work- 
ing within  the  party  than  by  withdrawing.  It  is  ob- 
vious that  Blaine  and  Cleveland,  not  the  platforms  of 
the  parties,  had  become  the  issue  of  the  campaign. 

James  G.  Blaine  was  born  in  Pennsylvania  in  1830, 
was  educated  at  Washington  College  in  his  native  state, 
later  moved  to  Augusta,  Maine,  and  purchased  an  in- 
terest in  the  Kennebec  Journal.  On  assuming  his  jour- 
nalistic duties  he  familiarized  himself  with  the  politics 
of  the  state  and  became  powerful  in  local,  and  later  in 
federal  affairs.  He  was  a member  of  the  first  Republi- 
can convention  and  was  chairman  of  the  state  Republi- 
can committee  for  more  than  twenty  years,  from  which 
point  of  vantage  he  had  a prevailing  influence  in  Maine 
politics.  He  served  in  the  state  and  federal  legisla- 


176 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  AVAE 


tures  as  well  as  in  Garfield’s  cabinet  and  was  a promi- 
nent candidate  for  the  presidential  nomination  in  1876 
and  in  1880. 

Grover  Cleveland,  altbougli  only  seven  years 
younger  than  Blaine,  was  relatively  inexperienced  on 
the  stage  of  national  affairs.  He  was  born  in  New 
Jersey,  the  son  of  a Presbyterian  minister,  grew  up 
with  little  education,  was  salesman  in  a village  store 
and  later  clerk  in  a law  office,  at  the  age  of  eighteen. 
Although  he  had  been  sheritf  of  Erie  County,  it  was 
not  until  1881,  when  he  became  mayor  of  Buffalo,  that 
he  took  an  important  part  in  politics,  and  here  his  rec- 
ord as  the  business-like  “veto  mayor”  was  such  as  to 
carry  him  into  the  governor’s  chair  a year  later.  The 
huge  majority  which  he  received  in  the  gubernatorial 
contest  was  not  wholly  due  to  his  own  strength — doubt- 
less factional  quarrels  among  the  Republicans  assisted 
him — but  the  prominence  which  this  election  gave  him 
and  his  conduct  as  Governor  made  inevitable  his  candi- 
dacy for  higher  office. 

Few  men  could  have  been  nominated  who  would  have 
presented  a more  complete  contrast  than  Blaine  and 
Cleveland.  In  personality  Blaine  was  magnetic,  ap- 
proachable, high-strung,  possessed  of  a vivid  imagina- 
tion and  of  a marvellous  memory  for  facts,  names  and 
faces.  Over  him  men  went  “insane  in  pairs,”  either 
devotedly  admiring  or  completely  distrusting  him. 
Cleveland  was  almost  devoid  of  personal  charm  except 
to  his  most  intimate  associates.  He  was  brusque  and 
tactless,  unimaginative,  plodding,  commonplace  in  his 
tastes  and  in  the  elements  of  his  character.  Men  threw 
their  hats  in  the  air  and  cheered  themselves  hoarse  at 
the  name  of  Blaine;  to  Cleveland’s  courage,  earnest- 
ness and  honesty,  they  gave  a tribute  of  admiration, 
When  the  campaign  was  at  fever  heat,  Blaine  was  lift- 


THE  OVERTURN  OP  1884 


177 


iug  crowds  of  eager  UsLi-iiers  to  ilie  mountain  peaks  of 
enthusiasm;  Cleveland  was  in  the  governor’s  room  in 
Albany,  phlegmatically  plodding  away  at  the  business 
of  his  office.  He  was  too  heavy,  unimaginative,  direct, 
to  indulge  in  flights  of  oratory.  Yet  scarcely  anything 
that  Blaine  said  still  lives,  while  some  of  Cleveland’s 
phrases  have  passed  into  the  language  of  every- 
day. 

No  less  a contrast  existed  between  Blaine  and  Cleve- 
land as  political  characters.  The  former’s  experience 
in  the  machinery  of  politics,  in  the  disposal  of  its 
loaves  and  fishes,  has  already  been  mentioned.  Of 
that  part  of  politics,  Cleveland  had  had  no  experience. 
It  is  said  that  he  never  was  in  Washington,  except  for 
a single  day,  until  he  went  there  to  become  President. 
Both  were  bold  and  active  fighters,  but  Blaine  was  a 
strategist,  a manager  and  a diplomat,  while  Cleveland 
could  merely  state  the  policy  which  he  desired  to  see 
put  into  effect,  and  then  crash  ahead.  Blaine  had  the 
instinct  for  the  popular  thing,  was  never  ahead  of  his 
party,  was  surrounded  by  his  followers ; Cleveland  saw 
the  thing  which  he  felt  a moral  imperative  to  accom- 
plish and  was  far  in  advance  of  his  fellows.  The  Re- 
publican was  popular  among  the  professional  political 
element  in  his  party  and  was  supported  by  it;  the 
Democrat  never  was.  Cleveland  openly  declared  his 
attitude  on  controverted  issues,  in  words  that  ad- 
mitted of  no  ambiguity  and  at  times  when  only  silence 
or  soft  words  would  save  him  from  defeat.  Blaine 
lacked  the  moral  courage  and  the  indifference  to  im- 
mediate results  which  were  necessary  for  so  exalted 
an  action.  Cleveland  had  more  of  the  reformer  in  his 
nature,  and  had  so  keen  a sense  of  responsibility  and 
duty  that  his  political  career  was  a succession  of  bat- 
tles against  things  that  seemed  wrong  to  him.  Blaine 


178 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


accepted  the  party  standards  as  they  were;  he  be- 
longed to  the  past,  to  the  policies  and  political  morality 
of  war  and  reconstruction ; Cleveland  belonged  to  the 
transition  from  reconstruction  to  the  twentieth  century. 

The  particular  thing,  however,  that  came  out  of 
Blaine’s  past  to  dog  his  foot-steps,  give  him  the  enmity 
of  the  Independents — better  known  as  the  “Mug- 
wumps”— and,  doubtless,  to  defeat  him,  was  a series 
of  transactions  exposed  in  the  Mulligan  letters.  In 
order  to  understand  these,  it  is  necessary  to  inquire 
into  events  that  occurred  fifteen  years  before  the  over- 
turn of  1884.  In  April,  1869,  a bill  favorable  to  the 
Little  Rock  and  Fort  Smith  Railroad — an  Arkansas 
land-grant  enterprise — was  before  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives. Blaine  was  Speaker.  As  the  session 
was  near  its  close  and  the  bill  seemed  likely  to  be  lost, 
its  friends  bespoke  Blaine’s  assistance.  He  suggested 
that  a certain  point  of  order  be  raised,  which  would 
facilitate  the  passage  of  the  measure,  and  also  asked 
General  John  A.  Logan  to  raise  the  point.  Logan  did 
so,  Blaine  sustained  him  and  the  act  was  passed. 
Nearly  three  months  later,  Warren  Fisher,  Jr.,  a Bos- 
ton business  man,  asked  Blaine  to  participate  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Little  Rock  Railroad.  Blaine  signified 
his  readiness,  closing  his  letter  with  the  words,  “I  do 
not  feel  that  I shall  prove  a dead-head  in  the  enterprise 
if  I once  embark  in  it.  I see  various  channels  in  which 
I know  I can  be  useful.”  When  Blaine’s  enemies  got 
hold  of  this,  they  declared  that  he  intended  to  use  his 
position  as  Speaker  to  further  the  interests  of  the 
road,  as  he  had  done  at  the  time  of  the  famous  point 
of  order ; his  friends  asserted  that  he  intended  merely 
to  sell  the  securities  of  the  road  to  investors.  Whether 
one  of  these  contentions  is  true,  or  both,  he  did  sell  con- 
siderable amounts  of  the  securities  of  the  road  to 


THE  OVERTURN  OF  1884 


179 


Maine  friends,  getting  a “handsome  commission.” 
Considerable  correspondence  passed  between  Blaine 
and  Fisher  from  1869  to  1872  when  their  relations 
ended.  Blaine  understood  that  all  their  correspond- 
ence was  mutually  surrendered. 

In  the  spring'  of  1876,  the  presidential  campaign  was 
on  the  horizon  and  Blaine  was  a prominent  candidate 
for  the  Republican  nomination.  Meanwhile  ugly 
rumors  were  flying  about  concerning  the  connection 
of  certain  members  of  Congress,  Blaine  among  them, 
with  questionable  railroad  transactions,  and  he  arose 
in  the  House  to  deny  the  charges.  He  did  not  discuss 
the  matter  fully,  as  he  did  not  wish  his  Maine  con- 
stituents to  know  that  he  had  received  a large  commis- 
sion for  selling  Little  Rock  securities.  Gossip  grew, 
however,  and  a congressional  investigation  resulted  in 
ilay,  1876.  Blaine  was  one  of  the  witnesses,  but  was 
doubtless  anxious  to  bring  the  investigation  to  an  end, 
since  it  clearly  reduced  his  chances  of  receiving  the 
nomination.  Presently  gossip  said  that  'Warren 
Fisher  and  James  Mulligan  were  going  to  testify. 
Mulligan  had  been  confidential  clerk  to  one  of  Mrs. 
Blaine’s  brothers  and  later  to  Fisher.  When  Mulligan 
began  his  testimony  it  appeared  that  he  intended  to 
lay  before  the  committee  a package  of  letters  that  had 
passed  between  Blaine  and  Fisher,  and  thereupon,  at 
Blaine’s  whispered  request,  one  of  the  members  of  the 
committee  procured  an  adjournment  for  the  day. 
That  evening  Blaine  found  Mulligan  at  the  latter’s  ho- 
tel and  prevailed  on  him  to  surrender  the  letters  tem- 
porarily, in  order  that  Blaine  might  read  and  then  re- 
turn them.  Blaine  thereupon  consulted  two  lavwers 
and  on  their  ad\dce  he  refused  to  restore  the  package 
to  Mulligan.  Merely  to  keep  silence,  however,  was  to 
admit  guilt.  Blaine,  therefore,  arose  one  day  in  the 


180 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


House  of  Eepresentatives  and  holding-  the  letters  in 
his  hand  read  selections  and  defended  himself  in  a re- 
markable burst  of  emotional  oratory.  At  the  climax  of 
this  defence  he  elicited  from  the  chairman  of  the  com- 
mittee of  investigation  an  unwilling  admission  that  the 
committee  had  suppressed  a dispatch  which  Blaine 
declared  would  exonerate  him.  Blaine  was  triumph- 
ant, his  friends  sure  that  he  had  cleared  himself  and 
the  matter  dropped  for  the  time.  Further  investiga- 
tion was  prevented  by  Blaine’s  refusal  to  produce  the 
letters  even  before  the  committee  and  by  his  sudden 
illness  shortly  afterward.  His  election  to  the  Senate 
soon  took  him  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  House 
committee  and  no  action  resulted. 

The  nomination  of  Blaine  in  1884  was  a fresh  breeze 
on  the  half-dead  embers  of  the  Mulligan  letters.  Har- 
per’s Weekly  and  other  periodicals  published  them 
with  damaging  explanatory  remarks.  Campaign  com- 
mittees spread  them  abroad  in  pamphlet  form.  At- 
tention was  directed  to  such  jDhrases  as  “I  do  not  feel 
that  I shall  prove  a dead-head”  and  “I  see  various 
channels  in  which  I know  I can  be  useful.”  Hostile 
cartoonists  used  the  phrases  with  an  infinite  variety 
of  innuendo.  But  the  most  powerful  evidence  was 
still  to  come.  On  September  15,  1884,  Fisher  and  Mul- 
ligan made  public  additional  letters  which  Blaine  had 
not  possessed  at  the  time  of  his  defence  in  1876.  The 
most  damaging  of  these  was  one  in  which  Blaine  had 
drawn  up  a letter  completely  exonerating  himself, 
which  he  asked  Fisher  to  sign  and  make  public  as  his 
own.  Blaine  had  marked  his  request  “confidential” 
and  had  written  at  the  bottom  “Burn  this  letter.” 
Fisher  had  neither  written  the  letter  which  was  re- 
quested nor  burned  Blaine’s.  Meanwhile  it  was  re- 
called that  Blaine  had  earlier  characterized  the  reform- 


THE  OVERTURN  OF  1884 


181 


ers  as  “upstarts,  conceited,  foolish,  vain”  and  as 
“noisy  bnt  not  nnmerons,  pharisaical  bnt  not  practi- 
cal, ambitions  bnt  not  wise,”  and  the  already  intem- 
perate campaign  became  more  personal  than  ever. 

Thomas  Nast’s  able  pencil  caricatured  Blaine  in 
Harper’s  Weekly  as  a magnetic  candidate  too  heavy 
for  the  party  elephant  to  carry;  Puck  portrayed  him 
as  the  “tattooed  man”  covered  all  over  with  “Little 
Rock,”  “Mulligan  Letters”  and  the  like.  Life  de- 
scribed him  as  a 

Take  all  I can  gettery, 

Mulligan  letteiy, 

Solid  for  Blaine  old  man. 

Nor  was  the  contest  of  scurrility  entirely  one-sided. 
Judge  caricatured  Cleveland  in  hideous  cartoons.  The 
New  York  Tribune  described  him  as  a small  man  “ev- 
erywhere except  on  the  hay-scales.”  Beginning  in 
Buffalo  rumors  spread  all  over  the  country  that  Cleve- 
land was  an  habitual  drunkard  and  libertine.  As  is 
the  way  of  such  gossip,  its  magnitude  grew  until  the 
Governor  appeared  in  the  guise  of  a monster  of  im- 
morality. The  editor  of  the  Independent  went  himself 
to  Buffalo  and  ran  the  rumors  to  their  sources.  He 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  -Cleveland  as  a young  man 
had  been  gmilty  of  an  illicit  connection,  that  he  had 
made  amends  for  the  wrong  which  he  had  done  and  had 
since  lived  a blameless  life.  Such  religious  periodi- 
cals as  the  Unitarian  Review,  however,  continued  to 
describe  him  as  a “debauchee”  and  “roue.”  Nearly 
a thousand  clergymen  gathered  in  New  York  de- 
clared him  a synonym  of  “incapacity  and  incon- 
tinency.”  Much  was  made,  also,  of  the  fact  that  Cleve- 
land had  not  served  in  the  war,  and  John  Sherman  de- 
nounced him  as  having  no  sympathy  for  the  Union 


182 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

cause.  It  did  little  good  in  the  heated  condition  of 
partisan  discussion  to  point  out  that  young  Cleveland 
had  two  brothers  in  the  service,  that  he  was  urgently 
needed  to  support  .his  widowed  mother  and  her  six 
other  children,  and  that  he  borrowed  money  to  obtain 
a substitute  to  take  the  field.  On  the  other  side,  Har- 
per’s Weekly  dwelt  upon  the  Mulligan  scandal;  The 
Nation,  while  deploring  the  incident  in  Cleveland’s 
past,  considered  even  so  grave  a mistake  as  less  im- 
portant than  Blaine’s,  since  the  latter’s  vices  were 
those  by  which  “governments  are  overthrown,  states 
brought  to  naught,  and  the  haunts  of  commerce  turned 
into  dens  of  thieves.” 

As  the  campaign  neared  an  end  it  appeared  that  the 
result  would  turn  upon  New  York,  Connecticut,  New 
Jersey,  and  Indiana,  and  especially  upon  the  first  of 
these.  In  New  York  several  elements  combined  to 
make  the  situation  doubtful  and  interesting.  Tam- 
many’s dislike  of  Cleveland  was  well-known,  but  open 
opposition,  at  least,  was  quelled  before  election  day. 
Roscoe  Conkling,  still  influential  despite  his  retirement, 
refused  to  take  the  stump  in  behalf  of  Blaine,  declaring 
that  he  did  not  engage  in  “criminal  practice.”  The 
Republicans  also  feared  the  competition  of  the  Prohi- 
bitionists, because  they  attracted  some  Republicans 
who  refused  to  vote  for  Blaine  and  could  not  bring 
themselves  to  support  a Democrat.  On  the  eve  of  the 
election  an  incident  occurred  which  would  have  been 
of  no  importance  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  closeness 
of  the  contest.  As  Blaine  was  returning  from  a speak- 
ing tour  in  the  West,  he  was  given  a reception  in  New 
York  by  a delegation  of  clergymen.  The  spokesman 
of  the  group,  the  Reverend  Dr.  Burchard,  referred  to 
the  Democrats  as  the  party  of  “Rum,  Romanism  and 
Rebellion.”  Blaine,  weary  from  his  tour,  failed  to 


THE  OVERTURN  OF  1884 


183 


notice  the  indiscreet  remark,  but  the  opposition  seized 
upon  it  and  used  it  to  discredit  him  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Irish.  On  the  same  evening  a dinner  at  Delmonico’s 
at  wliicli  many  wealthy  men  were  present,  provided 
material  for  the  charge  that  the  Republican  candidate 
was  the  choice  of  the  rich  classes. 

Early  returns  on  election  night  indicated  that  the 
Democrats  had  carried  the  South  and  all  the  doubtful 
states,  vdth  the  possible  exception  of  New  York. 
There  the  result  was  so  close  that  some  days  elapsed 
before  a final  decision  could  be  made.  Excitement  was 
intense ; and  business  almost  stopped,  so  absorbed  were 
people  in  the  returns.  At  length  it  was  officially  de- 
cided that  Cleveland  had  received  1,149  more  votes  than 
Blaine  and  by  this  narrow  margin  the  Democrats  car- 
ried New  York, -and  with  it  the  election. 

Contemjjorary  explanations  of  Blaine’s  defeat  were 
indicated  by  a transparency  carried  in  a Democratic 
procession  which  celebrated  the  victory : 

The  World  Says  the  Independents  Did  It 
The  Tribune  Says  the  Stalwarts  Did  It 
The  Sun  Says  Burchard  Did  It 
Blaine  Says  St.  John  Did  It 

Theodore  Roosevelt  Says  It  Was  the  Soft  Soap  Dinner  ^ 
We  Say  Blaine’s  Character  Did  It 
But  AYe  Don’t  Care  What  Did  It 
It’s  Done. 

None  of  these  explanations  took  into  account  the 
strength  of  Cleveland,  but  the  closeness  of  the  result 
made  all  of  them  important.  From  the  vantage  ground 
of  later  times,  however,  it  could  be  seen  that  greater 
forces  were  at  work.  By  1884  the  day  had  passed 
when  political  contests  could  be  won  on  Civil  AA’ar 

1 A reference  to  the  Dorsey  dinner  at  which  Arthur  told  how  Indiana 
was  carried. 


184 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


issues.  The  younger  voters  had  no  recollections  of 
Gettysburg  and  felt  no  animosity  toward  the  Demo- 
cratic South.  Moreover,  Cleveland’s  success  was  the 
culmination  of  a long-continued  demand  for  reform, 
which  he  satisfied  better  than  Blaine. 

The  opening  of  the  first  Democratic  administration 
since  Buchanan’s  time  excited  great  interest  in  every 
detail  of  Cleveland’s  activities  and  characteristics.^ 
Moreover,  many  who  had  voted  for  him  distrusted  his 
party  and  were  apprehensive  lest  it  turn  out  that  a 
mistake  had  been  made  in  placing  such  great  confidence 
in  one  man.  The  more  stiffly  partisan  Republicans 
firmly  believed  that  Democratic  success  meant  a trium- 
phant South,  with  the  “rebels”  again  in  the  saddle. 
Sherman  declared  that  Cleveland’s  choice  of  southern 
advisors  was  a “reproach  to  the  civilization  of  the 
age,”  and  Joseph  B.  Foraker,  speaking  in  an  Ohio  cam- 
paign, found  that  the  people  wished  to  hear  Cleveland 
“flayed”  and  wanted  plenty  of  “hot  stuff.” 

The  President’s  early  acts  indicated  that  the  parti- 
sans were  unduly  disturbed.  His  inaugural  address 
was  characterized  by  straightforward  earnestness. 
The  exploitation  of  western  lands  by  fraudulent  claim- 
ants was  sharply  halted.  The  cabinet,  while  inex- 
perienced, contained  several  able  men,  of  whom  Thomas 
F.  Bayard,  Secretary  of  State,  William  C.  Whitney, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  L.  Q.  C.  Lamar,  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Interior,  were  best  known.^ 

The  first  great  obstacle  that  Cleveland  faced  was 
well  portrayed  by  one  of  Nast’s  cartoons,  in  which  the 

iHis  marriage  to  Miss  Frances  Folsom,  which  occurred  in  1886,  occa- 
sioned lively  interest. 

2 Other  members  were;  Daniel  Manning,  N.  Y.,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury;  William  C.  Endicott,  Mass.,  Secretary  of  War;  A.  H.  Gar- 
land, Ark.,  Attorney-General;  William  F.  Vilas,  Wis.,  Postmaster- 
General. 


THE  OVERTURN  OF  1884 


185 


President,  with  an  ‘ ‘ Independent  ’ ’ club  in  his  hand,  was 
approaching  a snarling,  open-jawed  tiger,  which  repre- 
sented the  office-seeking  classes.  The  drawing  was  en- 
titled “Beware!  For  He  is  Very  Hungry  and  Very 
Thirsty.”  It  was  not  difficult  to  foresee  grave  trouble 
ahead  in  connection  with  the  civil  service.  The  Demo- 
crats had  been  out  of  power  for  twenty-four  years,  the 
offices  were  full  of  Republicans,  about  100,000  positions 
were  at  the  disposal  of  the  administration,  and  current 
political  practice  looked  with  indifference  upon  the  use 
of  these  places  as  rewards  for  party  work.  Hordes  of 
office-seekers  descended  upon  congressmen,  in  order  to 
get  introductions  to  department  chiefs;  they  filled  the 
waiting  rooms  of  cabinet  officers ; they  besieged  Cleve- 
land. Disappointed  applicants  and  displaced  officers 
added  to  the  clamor  and  confusion. 

The  President ’s  policj^,  as  it  worked  out  in  practice, 
was  a compromise  between  his  ideals  and  the  Avishes  of 
the  party  leaders.  He  earnestly  approved  the  Pendle- 
ton act  and  desired  to  carry  out  both  its  letter  and  its 
spirit.  He  remoAmd  office  holders  who  Avere  offensively 
partisan  and  AAffio  used  their  positions  for  political  pur- 
poses. He  gaA’e  the  South  a larger  share  in  the  activi- 
ties of  the  goA^ernment,  both  in  the  cabinet  and  in  the 
diplomatic  and  other  branches  of  the  serAuce.  When 
the  term  of  a Republican  office  holder  expired  he  filled 
the  place  AAuth  a fit  Democrat,  if  one  could  be  found, 
in  order  to  equalize  the  share  of  the  tAAm  parties  in  the 
patronage.  Nearly  half  of  the  diplomatic  and  consular 
appointments  Avent  to  southerners,  and  eA^entually  most 
of  the  Republicans  AA^ere  supplanted. 

The  displacement  of  so  many  officials  gaAm  the  Re- 
publicans an  opportunity  to  attempt  to  discredit  the 
President  in  the  eyes  of  his  mugAvump  supporters.  An 
amended  law  of  1869  gave  the  Senate  a certain  control 


186 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


over  removals,  although  the  constant  practice  of  early 
times  had  been  to  give  the  executive  a free  hand. 
Moreover  the  law  had  fallen  into  disuse — or,  as  the 
President  put  it — into  “innocuous  desuetude.”  Tlie 
case  on  which  the  Senate  chose  to  force  the  issue  was 
the  removal  of  George  M.  Duskin,  United  States  Dis- 
trict Attorney  in  Alabama,  and  the  nomination  of 
John  D.  Burnett  in  his  place.  The  Senate  called  upon 
the  Attorney-General  to  transmit  all  papers  relating  to 
the  removal;  the  President  directed  him  to  refuse,  on 
the  ground  that  papers  of  such  a sort  were  not  official 
papers,  to  which  the  Senate  had  a right,  and  also  on  the 
ground  that  the  power  of  removal  was  vested,  by  the 
Constitution,  in  the  president  alone.  In  the  meantime 
it  had  been  hinted  to  Cleveland  that  his  nominations 
would  be  confirmed  without  difficulty  if  it  were  ac- 
knowledged that  the  suspensions  were  the  usual  parti- 
san removals.  To  do  this  would,  of  course,  make  his 
reform  utterances  look  hypocritical  and  he  refused  to 
comply : 

I . . . dispute  the  right  of  the  Senate  ...  in  any  way  save 
through  the  judicial  process  of  trial  on  impeachment,  to  re- 
view or  reverse  the  acts  of  the  Executive  in  the  suspension, 
during  the  recess  of  the  Senate,  of  Federal  officials. 

As  he  was  immovable  and  was  taking  precisely  the 
position  that  such  Republican  leaders  as  President 
Grant  had  previously  taken,  the  Senate  was  obliged  to 
give  way.  Although  it  relieved  its  feelings  by  censur- 
ing the  Attorney-General,  it  later  repealed  the  re- 
mains of  the  Tenure  of  Office  act  of  1869,  leaving  vic- 
tory with  the  President. 

In  connection  with  the  less  important  offices  Cleve- 
land was  forced  to  compromise  between  the  desirable 
and  the  practicable.  Most  of  the  postmasters  were 


THE  OVERTURN  OF  1884 


187 


changed,  although  in  New  York  City  an  efficient  officer 
was  retained  who  had  originally  been  appointed  by 
Garfield.  All  the  internal  revenue  collectors  and 
nearly  all  the  collectors  of  customs  were  replaced.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  classified  service  was  somewhat  ex- 
tended by  the  inclusion  of  the  railway  mail  service,  a 
change  which,  with  other  increases,  enlarged  the  classi- 
fied lists  by  12,000  offices. 

It  seems  evident  that  Cleveland  pressed  reform  far 
enough  to  alienate  the  politicians  but  not  so  far  as  to 
satisfy  the  reformers.  When  he  withstood  Democratic 
clamor  for  office,  the  Independents  applauded,  and  the 
spoilsmen  in  his  own  party  accused  him  of  treason. 
When  he  listened  to  the  demands  of  the  partisans,  the 
reformers  became  disgusted  and  many  of  them  re- 
turned to  their  former  party  allegiance.  Eugene  Field 
expressed  Republican  exultation  at  the  dissension  in 
the  enemy ’s  ranks : 

. . . the  Mugwump  scorned  the  Democrat’s  wail. 

And  flirting  its  false  fantastic  tail, 

It  spread  its  wings  and  it  soared  away, 

And  left  the  Democrat  in  dismay, 

Too  hoo ! 

Aside  from  the  President,  official  Washington  seems  to 
have  had  but  little  real  interest  in  reform.  The  Vice- 
President,  Hendricks,  was  a partisan  of  the  old  school, 
and  so  many  members  of  Congress  were  out  of  sympa- 
thy wfith  the  system  that  they  attempted  to  annul  the 
la^v  by  refusing  appropriations  for  its  continuance. 
On  the  whole  a fair  judgment  was  that  of  Charles 
Francis  Adams,  a Republican,  who  thought  that  Cleve- 
land showed  himself  as  much  in  advance  of  both  parties 
as  it  was  wise  for  a leader  of  one  of  them  to  be. 

In  addition  to  further  improvements  in  the  civil  serv- 


188 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ice  laws,  Cleveland  was  interested  in  a long  list  of 
reforms  which  he  placed  before  Congress  in  his  first 
message : the  improvement  of  the  diplomatic  and  consu- 
lar service ; the  reduction  of  the  taritf ; the  repeal  of 
the  Bland- Allison  silver-coinage  act;  the  development 
of  the  navy,  which  he  characterized  as  a “shabby  orna- 
ment” and  a naval  reminder  “of  the  days  that  are 
past”;  better  care  of  the  Indians;  and  a means  of  pre- 
venting individuals  from  acquiring  large  areas  of  the 
public  lands.  The  fact  that  Hayes  and  Arthur  had 
urged  similar  reforms  showed  how  little  Cleveland  dif- 
fered from  his  Republican  predecessors.  It  was  not 
likely,  however,  that  the  program  would  be  carried  out, 
for  Congress  was  not  in  a reforming  mood  and  the 
Republicans  controlled  the  upper  house  so  that  they 
could  block  any  attempt  at  constructive  policies. 

The  latent  hostility  which  many  of  the  Civil  War 
veterans  felt  toward  the  Democratic  party  was  fanned 
into  flame  by  Cleveland’s  attitude  toward  pension 
legislation.  The  sympathy  of  the  country  for  its  dis- 
abled soldiers  had  early  resulted  in  a system  of  pen- 
sions for  disability  if  due  either  to  wounds  or  to  dis- 
ease contracted  in  the  service.  Early  in  the  seventies 
the  number  of  pensioners  had  seemed  to  have  reached 
a maximum.  Two  new  centers  of  agitation,  however, 
had  appeared,  the  Grand  Army  of  the  Republic  and  the 
pension  agent.  The  former  was  originally  a social  or- 
ganization but  later  it  took  a hand  in  the  campaign  for 
new  pension  legislation.  The  agents  were  persons 
familiar  with  the  laws,  who  busied  themselves  in  find- 
ing possible  pensioners  and  getting  their  claims  estab- 
lished. The  agitation  of  the  subject  had  resulted  in 
the  arrears  act  of  1879,  which  gave  the  claimant  back- 
pensions  from  the  day  of  his  discharge  from  the  army 
to  the  date  of  filing  his  claim,  regardless  of  the  time 


THE  OVERTURN  OF  1884 


189 


when  his  disability  began.  As  the  average  first  pay- 
ment to  the  pensioner  under  this  act  was  about  $1,000, 
the  number  of  claims  filed  had  grown  enormously  and 
the  pension  agents  had  enjoyed  a rich  harvest.  The 
next  step  was  the  dependent  pensions  bill,  which 
granted  a pension  to  all  who  had  served  three  months, 
were  dependent  on  their  daily  toil,  and  were  incapable 
of  earning  their  livelihood,  whether  the  incapacity  was 
due  to  wounds  and  disease  or  not.  President  Cleve- 
land’s veto  of  the  measure  aroused  a hostility  which 
was  deepened  by  his  attitude  toward  private  pension 
acts. 

F or  some  time  it  had  been  customary  to  pass  special 
acts  providing  pensions  for  persons  whose  claims  had 
already  been  rejected  by  the  pension  bureau  as  de- 
fective or  fraudulent.  So  little  attention  was  paid  to 
private  bills  in  Congress  that  1454  of  them  passed 
between  1885  and  1889,  generally  without  debate  and 
often  even  without  the  presence  of  a quorum  of  mem- 
bers. Two  hours  on  a day  in  April,  1886,  sufficed  for 
the  passage  of  five  hundred  such  bills.  Nobody  would 
now  deny  that  many  were  frauds,  pure  and  simple. 
Cleveland  was  too  frugal  and  conscientious  to  pass 
such  bills  without  examination  and  he  began  to  veto 
some  of  the  worst  of  them.  Each  veto  message  ex- 
plained the  grounds  for  his  dissent,  sometimes  pa- 
tiently, sometimes  with  a sharp  sarcasm  that  must  have 
made  the  victim  writhe.  In  one  case  where  a widow 
sought  a pension  because  of  the  death  of  her  soldier 
husband  it  was  discover-ed  that  he  had  been  accidentally 
shot  by  a neighbor  wliile  hunting.  Another  claimant 
was  one  who  had  enlisted  at  the  close  of  the  war,  served 
nine^q^^s,  had  been  admitted  to  the  hospital  with 
measles  and  then  mustered  out.  Fifteen  years  later 
he  claimed  a pension.  The  President  vetoed  the  bill, 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


EO 

scoffing  at  the  applicant’s  “valiant  service’’  and  “ter- 
rific encounter  with  the  measles.’’  iVltogether  he 
vetoed  about  two  hundred  and  thirty  private  bills. 
Time  after  time  he  expressed  his  sympathy  with  the 
deserving  pensioner  and  his  desire  to  purge  the  list 
of  dishonorable  names,  and  many  applauded  his  cour- 
ageous efforts.  Nevertheless,  his  pension  policy  pre- 
sented an  opportunity  for  hostile  criticism  which  his 
Republican  opponents  were  not  slow  to  embrace.  II is 
efforts  in  behalf  of  pension  reform  were  said  to  origi- 
nate in  hostility  to  the  old  soldiers  and  in  lack  of 
sympathy  with  the  northern  cause.  In  1887  it  even 
became  necessary  for  him  to  withdraw  his  acceptance 
of  an  invitation  to  attend  a meeting  of  the  Grand  Army 
in  St.  Louis,  because  of  danger  that  he  might  be  sub- 
jected to  downright  insult.^ 

Before  the  hostility  due  to  the  pension  vetoes  had 
subsided,  Adjutant-General  Drum  called  the  attention 
of  the  President  to  the  fact  that  flags  taken  from  Con- 
federate regiments  by  Union  soldiers  during  the  war 
and  also  certain  flags  formerly  belonging  to  northern 
troops  had  for  many  years  lain  packed  in  boxes  in  the 
attic  and  cellar  of  the  War  Department.  At  his  sug- 
gestion Cleveland  ordered  the  return  of  these  trophies 
to  the  states  which  the  regiments  had  represented. 
Although  recommended  by  Drum  as  a “graceful  act,” 
it  was  looked  upon  by  the  old  soldiers  with  the  utmost 
wrath.  The  commander  of  the  Grand  Army  called 
upon  Heaven  to  avenge  so  wicked  an  order  and  such 
politicians  as  Governor  Foraker  of  Ohio  gained  tempo- 
rary prominence  by  their  bitter  condemnation  of  it. 
Eventually  the  clamor  was  so  great  that  the  President 

1 President  Cleveland  also  ffcquently  used  his  veto  power  to  prevent 
the  passage  of  appropriations  for  federal  buildings  which  he  deemed 
unnecessary. 


THE  OVERTURN  OF  1884 


191 


rescinded  the  order  on  the  ground  that  the  final  dis- 
position of  the  flags  was  within  the  sphere  of  action  of 
Congress  only.  In  February,  1905,  however,  Congress 
passed  a resolution  providing  for  the  return  of  the 
flags  and  the  exchange  was  effected  without  excitement. 

For  the  reasons  already  mentioned,  little  legislation 
was  passed  during  President  Cleveland’s  administra- 
tion that  was  of  permanent  importance.  An  exception 
Avas  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  which  is  a subject 
for  later  discussion.  A Presidential  Succession  Act, 
Avhich  has  earlier  been  described,  provided  for  the  suc- 
cession of  the  members  of  the  cabinet  in  case  of  the 
remoAml  or  death  of  the  president  and  vice-president. 
The  Electoral  Count  Act  placed  on  the  states  the  bur- 
den of  deciding  contests  arising  from  the  choice  of 
presidential  electors.  When  more  than  one  set  of  elec- 
toral returns  come  from  a state,  each  purporting  to  be 
legal,  Congress  must  decide  Avhich  shall  be  counted. 
Of  some  importance,  too,  A\ms  the  establishment  of  the 
Department  of  Agriculture  in  1889  and  the  inclusion 
of  its  secretary  in  the  cabinet.  The  admission  of  the 
Dakotas,  Montana  and  Washington  as  states  took  place 
in  the  same  year.  The  improA’ement  of  the  nar^y,  be- 
gun so  auspiciously  by  Secretary  Chandler  under  Presi- 
dent Arthur,  Avas  continued  Avith  enthusiasm  and  Augor, 
and  the  vessels  constructed  formed  an  important  part 
of  our  naAW. 

Of  less  popular  interest  than  many  of  the  political 
cjuestions,  but  of  more  lasting  importance,  AAms  the 
rapid  reduction  of  the  public  land  supply.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  Homestead  laAV  of  1862  had  been  to  supply 
land  at  Ioav  rates  and  in  small  amounts  to  hona  fide 
■■ettlers,  but  the  beneficent  design  of  the  nation  had 
’ mn  someAA-hat  nullified  by  the  constant  evasion  of  tlm 

irit  of  the  laAvs.  Squatters  had  occupied  land  A\dth- 


192 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


out  reference  to  legal  forms;  cattlemen  had  fenced  in 
large  tracts  for  their  own  use  and  forcibly  resisted  at- 
tempts to  oust  them ; by  hook  and  by  crook  individuals 
and  companies  had  got  large  areas  into  their  possession 
and  held  them  for  speculative  returns.  Western  pub- 
lic opinion  looked  upon  many  such  violations  with 
equanimity  until  the  supply  of  land  began  to  grow 
small.  Then  came  the  demand  for  the  opening  of  the 
Indian  reservations,  which  comprised  250,000  square 
miles  in  1885.  The  Dawes  act  of  1887  provided  for  in- 
dividual ownership  of  small  amounts  of  land  by  the 
Indians  instead  of  tribal  ownership  in  large  reserva- 
tions. By  this  means  a considerable  amount  of  good 
land  was  made  available  for  settlement  by  whites.  The 
dwindling  supply  of  western  land  also  called  attention 
to  certain  delinquencies  on  the  part  of  the  railway 
companies.  Many  of  them  had  been  granted  enormous 
amounts  of  land  on  certain  conditions,  such  as  that 
specified  parts  of  the  roads  be  constructed  within  a 
given  time.  This  agreement,  with  others,  was  fre- 
quently broken,  and  question  arose  as  to  whether  the 
companies  should  be  forced  to  forfeit  their  claims. 
Cleveland  turned  to  the  problem  with  energy  and 
forced  the  return  of  some  millions  of  acres.  Neverthe- 
less, the  fact  that  it  was  becoming  necessary  to  be  less 
prodigal  with  the  public  land  indicated  that  the  supply 
was  no  longer  inexhaustible,  and  led  the  President  in 
his  last  annual  message  to  urge  that  the  remaining 
supply  be  husbanded  with  great  care.  Congress  was 
not  alert  to  the  demands  of  the  time,  however,  and  no 
effective  steps  were  taken  for  many  years. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

H.  C.  Thomas,  The  Bettirn  of  the  Democratic  Party  to  Power 
in  1884  (1919),  is  most  complete  and  scholarly  on  the  subject; 


THE  OVERTURN  OF  1884 


193 


Sparks,  Curtis,  Dewey,  and  Stanwood  continue  useful;  H.  T. 
Peek,  Twenty  Years  of  the  Republic,  1885-1905  (1907),  is 
illuminating  and  interesting;  H.  J.  Ford,  Cleveland  Era 
(1919),  is  brief;  the  files  of  The  Nation  and  Harper’s  Weekly 
are  essential,  while  those  of  the  New  York  Sun,  Evening  Post 
and  Tribune  add  a few  points.  The  Mulligan  letters  are  re- 
printed in  Harper’s  Weekly  (1884,  643-646). 

On  the  administration,  consult  the  general  texts  and  the 
special  volumes  mentioned  in  chapter  V ; G.  F.  Parker,  Recol- 
lections of  Grover  Cleveland  (1909)  ; and  Political  Science 
Quarterly  (June,  1918),  “Official  Characteristics  of  President 
Cleveland,’’  give  something  on  the  personal  side;  J.  L.  Whit- 
tle, Grover  Cleveland  (1896),  is  by  an  English  admirer; 
Cleveland’s  own  side  of  one  of  his  controversies  is  in  Grover 
Cleveland,  Presidential  Problems  (1904)  ; on  Blaine,  Edward 
Stanwood,  James  G.  Blaine  (1905).  The  Annual  Cyclopaedia 
has  useful  biographical  articles. 


CHAPTER  IX 


TRANSPORTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL 

HE  most  significant  legislative  act  of  President 


Cleveland’s  administration  was  due  primarily 


neither  to  him  nor  to  the  great  political  parties.  Jt 
concerned  the  relation  between  the  government  and  the 
railroads,  and  the  force  which  led  to  its  passage  origi- 
nated outside  of  Congress.  The  growth  of  the  trans- 
portation system,  therefore,  the  economic  benetits 
which  resulted,  the  complaints  wliich  arose  and  the 
means  through  which  the  complaints  found  voice  were 
subjects  of  primary  importance. 

Beginning  with  the  construction  of  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad  about  183U,  the  extension  of  the  railways 
went  forward  with  increasing  rapidity  so  that  they 
soon  formed  a veritable  network:  between  1830  and 
1850  over  7,000  miles  were  laid;  by  1860  the  total  was 
30,000  miles ; the  Civil  War  and  the  financial  depression 
of  1873  retarded  progress  somewhat,  but  such  delays 
were  temporary,  and  by  1890  the  total  exceeded  160,000 
miles.  In  the  earlier  decades  most  constructidhHook 
place  in  the  Northeast,  where  capital  was  most  plenti- 
ful and  population  most  dense.  Later  activity  in  the 
Northeast  was  devoted  to  building  “feeders”  or  branch 
lines.  In  the  South,  the  relatively  smaller  progress 
which  had  been  made  before  the  war  had  been  undone 
for  the  most  part  by  the  wear  and  tear  of  the  conflict, 
but  the  twenty-five  years  afterward  saw  greatly  re- 
newed construction.  The  most  surprising  expansion 
took  place  in  Texas  where  the  711  miles  of  1870  were 


TRANSPORTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL  195 


increased  to  8,754  by  1890.  In  the  Middle  West,  roads 
were  rapidly  built  just  before  the  war  and  immediately 
after  it,  and  the  first  connection  with  the  Pacific  Coast, 
as  has  been  shown,  was  made  in  1869. 

Many  of  the  circumstances  accompanying  this  rapid 
expansion  were  novel  and  important.  Beginning  with 
a federal  grant  to  the  Illinois  Central,  for  example,  in 
the  middle  of  the  century,  both  the  nation  and  the 


states  assisted  the  roads  by  gifts  of  millions  of  acres 
of  land.  It  was  to  the  advantage  of  the  companies  to 
procure  the  grants  on  the  best  possible  terms,  and  they 
exerted  constant  pressure  upon  congressmen  whose 
votes  and  influence  they  desired.  Frequently  the 
agents  of  the  roads  were  thoroughly  unscrupulous,  and 
such  scandals  as  that  connected  with  the  Credit  Mo- 
bilier  were  the  result.  More  important  still,  the  fact 
that  the  federal  and  state  governments  had  aided  the 
railroads  so  greatly  gave  them  a strong  justification  for 
investigating  and  regulating  the  activities  of  the  com- 
panies. 


196 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Meclianical  inventions  and  improvements  had  no 
small  part  in  the  development  of  the  transportation 
system.  The  early  tracks,  constructed  of  wood  beams 
on  which  were  fastened  iron  strips,  and  sometimes  de- 
scribed as  barrel-hoops  tacked  to  laths,  were  replaced 
by  iron,  and  still  later  by  heavy  steel  rails.  By  1890 
about  eighty  per  cent,  of  the  mileage  was  composed  of 
steel.  Heavy  rails  were  accompanied  by  improved 
roadbeds,  heavier  equipment  and  greater  speed.  A 
simple  improvement  was  the  gradual  adoption  of  a 
standard  gauge — four  feet  eight  and  a half  inches — 
which  replaced  the  earlier  lack  of  uniformity.  The 
process  was  substantially  completed  by  the  middle 
eighties,  when  many  thousands  of  miles  in  the  South 
were  standardized.  On  the  Louisville  and  Nashville, 
for  example,  a force  of  8,763  men  made  the  change  on 
1,806  miles  of  track  in  a single  day.  The  inauguration 
of  “standard”  time  also  took  place  during  the  eighties. 
Hitherto  there  had  been  a wide  variety  of  time  stand- 
ards and  different  roads  even  in  the  same  city  des- 
patched their  trains  on  different  systems.  In  1883  the 
country  was  divided  into  five  vertical  zones  each  ap- 
proximately fifteen  degrees  or,  in  sun-time,  an  hour 
wide.  Both  the  roads  and  the  public  then  conformed 
to  the  standard  time  of  the  zone  in  which  they  were. 

Of  greater  importance  was  the  consolidation  of  large 
numbers  of  small  lines  into  the  extensive  systems  which 
are  now  familiar.  The  first  roads  covered  such  short 
distances  that  numerous  bothersome  transfers  of  pas- 
sengers, freight  and  baggage  from  the  end  of  one  line 
to  the  beginning  of  the  next  were  necessary  on  every 
considerable  journey.  No  fewer  than  five  companies, 
for  example,  divided  the  three  hundred  miles  between 
Albany  and  Buffalo,  no  one  of  them  operating  more 
than  seventy-six  miles.  In  1853,  these  five  with  five 


197 


IN  1870.  c \ ? cyii' 


198 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


others  were  consolidated  into  the  New  York  Central 
Railroad.  Sixteen  years  later,  in  1869,  the  Centi’al 
combined  with  the  Hudson  River,  and  soon  aftei'wards 
procured  substantial  control  of  the  Lake  Shore  and 
Michigan  Southern,  the  Rock  Island,  and  the  Chicago 
and  Northwestern.  As  the  result  of  this  process  a 
single  group  of  men  directed  the  interests  of  a system 
of  railroads  from  New  York  through  Chicago  to 
Omaha.  The  Pennsylvania  Railroad  began  with  a 
short  line  from  Philadelphia  to  the  Susquehanna  River, 
picked  up  smaller  roads  here  and  there — eventually  one 
hundred  and  thirty-eight  of  them,  representing  two 
hundred  and  fifty-six  separate  corporations — reached 
out  through  the  Middle  West  to  Cincinnati,  Chicago 
and  St.  Louis,  and  in  1871  controlled  over  three  thou- 
sand miles  of  track,  with  an  annual  income  of  over 
forty  million  dollars.  In  the  eighties  a railroad  war  in 
northern  New  England  started  the  consolidation  of  the 
Boston  and  Maine  systeW 

The  beneficial  results  -of  the  growth  of  the  transpor- 
tation facilities  of  the  nation  were  immediate  and  revo- 
lutionary. The  fact  that  average  freight  rates  were 
cut  in  halves  between  1867  and  1890  helped  make  pos- 
sible the  economic  readjustments  after  the  Civil  War 
to  a degree  that  is  not  likely  to  be  overestimated.  Not 
only  did  railway  construction  supply  work  for  large 
numbers  of  laborers  and  help  bring  about  an  ever 
greater  westward  migration,  but  it  opened  a market 
for  the  huge  agricultural  surplus  of  the  Middle  West. 
Without  the  market  in  the  cities  of  the  pojDulous  At- 
lantic Coast  and  Europe,  the  expansion  of  the  West 
would  have  been  impossible.  Moreover,  the  railways 
brought  coal,  ore,  cotton,  wool  and  other  raw  materials 
to  the  Northeast,  and  thns  enabled  that  section  to  de- 
velop its  manufacturing  interests. 


199 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  AVAR 


200 

Despite  the  admittedly  great  benefits  resulting  from 
the  railroad  system,  there  was  a rising  tide  of  complaint 
on  the  part  of  the  public  in  regard  to  some  aspects  of 
its  construction  and  management.  It  was  objected,  for 
example,  that  many  of  the  western  roads  especially 
were  purely  speculative  undertakings.  Lines  were 
sometimes  built  into  new  territory  where  competition 
did  not  exist  and  where,  consequently,  the  rates  could 
be  kept  at  a high  point.  The  Chicago,  Burlington  and 
Quincy  presented  such  a case  in  1856.  Profits  were  so 
great  as  to  embarrass  the  company,  since  the  payment 
of  large  dividends  was  sure  to  arouse  the  hostility  of 
the  farmers  who  paid  the  freight  rates.  ‘‘This,  in- 
deed,’^ declared  the  biographer  of  one  of  the  presidents 
of  the  road,  “was  the  time  of  glad,  confident  morning, 
never  again  to  occur  in  the  history  of  railroad-building 
in  the  Lhiited  States.”  Sometimes  lines  were  driven 
into  territory  which  was  already  sufficiently  supplied 
with  transportation  facilities,  in  order  to  compel  the 
company  already  on  the  ground  to  buy  out  the  new 
road.  If,  as  time  went  on,  traffic  enough  for  both  roads 
did  not  appear,  they  had  to  be  kept  alive  through  the 
imposition  of  high  rates ; otherwise,  one  of  them  failed 
and  the  investors  suffered  a loss.  The  opportunities 
for  profit,  however,  were  so  numerous  that  the  amount 
of  capital  reported  invested  in  railways  increased  by 
$3,200,000,000  during  the  five  years  preceding  ] 885. 

/ A practice  which  was  productive  of  much  wrong- 
doing and  which  was  suggestive  of  more  dishonesty 
than  could  be  proved,  related  to  the  letting  of  contracts 
for  the  construction  of  new  lines.  The  directors  of  a 
road  frequently  formed  part  or  all  of  the  board  of 
directors  of  a construction  company.  In  their  capacity 
as  railroad  directors  they  voted  advantageous  con- 
tracts to  themselves  in  their  other  capacity,  giving  no 


TEAXSPOBTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL  201 


opportunity  to  independent  construction  companies 
who  might  agree  to  build  at  a lower  cost.  As  the  cost 
of  construction  was  part  of  the  debt  of  the  road,  the 
directors  were  adding  generously  to  their  own  wealth, 
while  the  company  was  being  saddled  with  an  increased 
burden.  It  cost  only  $58,000,000,  for  example,  to  build 
the  Central  Pacific,  but  a construction  company  was 
paid  $120,000,000  for  its  services.  When  John  Murray 
Forbes  was  investigating  the  Chicago,  Burlington  and 
Quincy  he  found  that  the  president  of  the  road  was 
paying  himself  a salary  as  president  of  a construction 
company,  out  of  the  railroad ’s  funds,  without  the  super- 
vision of  the  treasurer  or  any  one  else,  and  without  any 
auditing  of  his  accounts.  Moreover,  six  of  the  twelve 
members  of  the  board  of  directors  were  also  members 
of  the  construction  company.  Such  an  attempt  to 
“run  with  the  hare  and  hunt  with  the  hounds”  was 
suggestive,  to  say  the  least,  of  great  possibilities  of 
profit  to  the  directors  and  a constant  invitation  to  un- 
cessary  construction. 


^ Another  grievance  against  the  railways  was  the  reck- 
less, irresponsible  and  arrogant  management  under 
which  some  of  them  operated.  An  eminent  expert 
testified  before  an  investigating  commission  in  1885 
that  Jay  Gould  once  sold  $40,000,000  of  Erie  Railway 
stock  and  pocketed  the  proceeds  himself.  Most  of  the 
energy  of  the  officers  of  some  roads  was  expended  in 
deceiving  and  cheating  competitors.  “Railroad  finan- 
ciering” became  a “by-word  for  whatever  is  financially 
loose,  corrupt  and  dishonest.”  If  certain  roads 
demonstrated  by  successful  operation  that  honest 
methods  were  better  in  the  long  run,  their  probity  re- 
ceived scant  advertisement  in  comparison  with  the  un- 
scrupulous practices  of  their  less  respectable  neigh- 
bors. It  is  to  be  remembered,  also,  that  the  growth 


202 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


of  the  railway  system  had  been  so  rapid  and  so  huge 
that  it  was  impossible  to  meet  the  demand  for  trained 
administrators.  Naturally,  men  possessed  of  little  or 
no  technical  understanding  of  transportation  problems 
could  not  provide  highly  responsible  management. 

The  dishonest  manipulation  of  the  issues  and  sales 
of  railroad  stocks  is  a practice  that  was  not  confined 
solely  to  the  twenty-five  years  after  the  Civil  War,  but 
the  numerous  examples  of  it  which  occurred  during  that 
period  aggravated  the  exasperation  which  has  already 
been  mentioned.  Daniel  Drew,  the  treasurer  of  the 
Erie  Railway  in  1866,  furnished  an  excellent  illustra- 
tion of  this  type  of  activity.  Drew  had  in  his  posses- 
sion a large  amount  of  Erie  stock  which  had  been 
secretly  issued  to  him  in  return  for  a loan  to  the  com- 
pany. The  stock  in  the  market  was  selling  near  par 
and  still  rising.  Drew  instructed  his  agents  to  make 
contracts  for  the  future  delivery  of  stock  at  prices  cur- 
rent at  the  time  when  the  contracts  were  made.  When 
the  time  came  for  fulfilling  his  contracts.  Drew  sud- 
denly threw  the  secret  stock  on  the  market,  drove  gen- 
eral market  prices  on  Erie  stock  down  from  ninety-five 
to  fifty,  bought  at  the  low  figure,  and  sold  at  the  high 
price  which  was  called  for  in  the  contracts  made  by  his 
agents.  The  effect  of  such  sharp  dealing  on  investors, 
the  railroad  or  the  public  seems  not  to  have  entered 
into  the  calculation.  Indeed,  the  Erie  and  many  an- 
other road  was  looked  upon  by  its  owners  merely  as  a 
convenient  piece  of  machinery  for  producing  fortunes. 

Gould,  Drew  and  other  railroad  men  of  their  time 
were  also  expert  in  the  practice  of  ‘‘stock-watering.” 
This  consists  in  expanding  the  nominal  capitalization 
of  an  enterprise  without  an  equivalent  addition  to  the 
actual  capital.  The  rates  which  the  railway  has  to 
charge  the  public  tend  to  increase  by  approximately 


TRANSPORTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL  203 


whatever  dividends  are  paid  on  the  waterd  Then,  as 
later,  when  a road  was  prospering  greatly  it  would 
sometimes  declare  a “stock  dividend,”  that  is,  give 
its  stockholders  additional  stock  in  proportion  to  what 
they  already  owned.  The  addition  would  frequently 
be  water.  Its  purpose  might  be  to  cover  up  the  great 
profits  made  by  the  company.  If,  oil  a million  dollars’ 
worth  of  stock,  it  was  paying  ten  per  cent,  dividends, 
the  public  might  demand  lower  freight  and  passenger 
rates ; but  if  the  stock  were  doubled  and  earnings  re- 
mained stationary,  then  the  dividends  would  appear  as 
five  per  cent. — an  amount  to  which  there  could  be  no 
objection.  H.  V.  Poor,  the  railroad  expert,  declared 
before  a commission  of  investigation  in  1885  that  the 
New  York  Central  Railroad  was  carrying  $48,000,000 
of  wat-er,  on  which  it  had  paid  eight  per  cent,  dividends 
for  fifteen  years.  He  also  estimated  that  of  the  seven 
and  a half  billions  of  indebtedness  wdiich  the  roads  of 
the  country  were  carrying  in  1883,  two  billions  repre- 
sented water.  Others  thought  that  the  proportion  of 
water  wms  greater.  In  any  case  the  unnecessary  bur- 
den upon  business  to  provide  dividends  for  the  watered 
stock  was  an  item  of  some  magnitude.  The  investor, 
ho^vever,  looked  upon  stock-watering  with  other  eyes. 
The  building  of  a new  road  was  a speculation;  the 
profits  might  be  large,  to  be  sure,  but  there  might  in 
many  cases  be  a loss.  In  order  to  tempt  money  into 
railroad  enterprises,  therefore,  inducements  in  the 
form  of  generous  stock  bonuses  were  necessary. 

1 For  example,  an  investor  might  contribute  $100  in  cash  to  an  enter- 
prise. The  “paid  in  capital”  or  “actual”  capital  would  then  be  $100. 
He  might  receive  in  return  $100  in  stock  and  $100  in  bonds,  in  which 
case  the  “nominal  capital”  would  be  $200;  the  additional  $100  would 
be  “water.”  If  the  enterprise  paid  interest  on  the  bonds,  and  dividends 
on  the  stock,  it  would,  of  course,  be  paying  a return  on  the  water.  The 
practice  of  stock-watering  did  not  end  with  the  days  of  Gould  and  Drew. 


204 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


The  rate  wars  of  the  seventies  gave  wide  advertise- 
ment to  another  aspect  of  railroad  history.  The  most 
famous  of  these  contests  had  their  origin  in  the  grain- 
carrying  trade  from  the  Lakes  to  the  sea-board.  The 
entry  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  and  the  Grand  Trunk 
into  Chicago  in  1874,  stimulated  a four-cornered  com- 
petition among  these  roads  and  the  Pennsylvania  and 
New  York  Central  for  the  traffic  between  the  upper 
Mississippi  Valley  and  the  coast.  Rates  on  grain  and 
other  products  were  cut,  and  cut  again ; freight  charges 
dropped  to  a figure  which  wiped  out  profits ; yet  it  was 
impossible  for  any  line  to  drop  out  of  the  competition 
until  exhaustion  forced  all  to  do  so.  A railroad  can 
not  suspend  business  when  profits  disappear,  for  fixed 
expenses  continue  and  the  depreciation  of  the  value  of 
the  property,  especially  of  the  stations,  tracks  and 
rolling  stock,  is  extreme.  Since  the  rate  wars  were 
clearly  bringing  ruin  in  their  train,  rate  agreements 
and  pooling  arrangements  were  devised.  The  latter 
took  several  forms.  Sometimes  a group  of  competing 
roads  agreed  to  divide  the  business  among  the  com- 
petitors on  the  basis  of  an  agreed-upon  percentage. 
Another  plan  was  to  pool  earnings  at  the  close  of  a 
period  and  divide  according  to  a prearranged  ratio. 
Sometimes  destructive  competition  was  prevented  by 
a division  of  the  territory,  each  company  being  allowed 
a free  hand  in  its  own  field.  In  general,  pooling  agree- 
ments were  likely  to  break  down,  although  a southern 
pool  organized  by  Albert  Fink  on  a very  extensive 
scale  lasted  for  many  years  and  was  thought  to  have 
had  a vital  influence  in  eliminating  rate-wars.  Their 
efficacy  depended  mainly  on  good  faith,  and  good  faith 
was  a rarity  among  railroad  officials  in  the  seventies 
and  eighties.  In  the  eyes  of  the  public,  rate  agree- 
ments and  pools  were  vicious  conspiracies  which  left 


TEANSPOKTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL  205 


the  rights  and  well-being  of  the  private  shipper  com- 
pletely out  of  the  calculation. 

Still  another  indictment  of  the  railways  resulted 
from  their  participation  in  politics.  It  was  inevitable, 
of  course,  that  the  roads  should  be  drawn  into  the  field 
of  legislation — the  grants  of  public  land,  for  example, 
helped  bring  about  the  result.  It  early  seemed  advan- 
tageous to  attempt  to  influence  state  legislatures  to 
pass  favorable  laws,  and  it  seemed  a necessity  to  bring 
pressure  to  bear  in  order  to  protect  the  roads  from 
hostile  acts.  The  methods  used  by  the  railway  agents 
in  their  political  activity  naturallj^  varied  all  the  way 
from  legitimate  agitation  to  crude  and  subtle  forms  of 
bribery.  An  insidious  method  of  influencing  both  law- 
making and  litigation  was  the  pass  system.  Under  it 
the  roads  were  accustomed  to  give  free  transportation 
to  a long  list  of  federal  and  state  judges,  legislators  and 
politicians.  For  a judge  to  accept  such  favors  from  a 
corporation  which  might  at  any  time  be  haled  before 
his  court,  and  for  a legislator  to  receive  a gift  from  a 
body  that  was  constantly  in  need  of  legislative  atten- 
tion is  now  held  to  be  improper  in  the  extreme.  But 
in  those  days  a less  sensitive  public  opinion  felt  hardly 
a qualm.  That  the  practice  was  likely  to  arouse  an 
unconscious  bias  in  the  minds  of  public  officials  is 
hardly  debatable.  The  more  crude  forms  of  bribery, 
too,  were  not  uncommon.  It  was  testified  before  a 
committee  of  investigation  that  the  Erie  Railway  Com- 
pany in  one  year  expended  $700,000  as  a corruption 
fund  and  for  legal  expenses,  carrying  the  amount  on 
the  books  in  the  “India-rubber  account.”  The  manip- 
ulation of  the  courts  of  New  York  by  the  Erie  and  the 
New  York  Central  during  the  late  sixties  was  nothing 
short  of  a scandal.  Alliances  between  political  rings 
and  railroad  officials  for  the  purpose  of  caring  for 


206 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


their  mutual  interests  were  so  common  that  reformers 
questioned  whether  the  American  people  could  be  said 
to  possess  self-government  in  actuality.  Immediately 
after  the  Civil  War,  Charles  Francis  Adams,  Jr.,  an 
acute  student  of  transportation,  declared  that  it  was 
scarcely  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  state  legisla- 
tures were  becoming  a species  of  irreg-ular  boards  of 
railroad  direction.  The  evils  of  the  alliance  between 
the  roads  and  politics  were  not,  of  course,  due  entirely 
to  the  former.  The  receiver  of  a pass  shared  with  the 
giver  the  evil  of  the  system.  Many  a legislator  was 
corrupt ; more  shared  in  practices  which  v/ere  little  re- 
moved from  dishonorable.  Adams,  for  example,  gives 
an  account  of  his  experiences,  as  a director  of  the  Union 
Pacific,  in  dealing  with  a United  States  senator  in 
1884.  The  congressman  was  ready  to  take  excellent 
care  of  railroad  corporations  which  retained  him  as 
counsel,  but  was  a corrupt  and  ill-mannered  bully  to- 
ward the  Union  Pacific,  which  had  not  employed  him.^ 

The  most  constant  grievance  was  discrimination — 
that  the  roads  varied  their  rates  for  the  benefit  or 
detriment  of  especial  types  of  freight,  of  individuals 
and  of  entire  localities.  Through  business  between 
competing  points  was  carried  at  a low  figure,  while  the 
roads  recouped  themselves  by  charging  heavily  in 
towns  where  competition  was  absent.  Shippers  com- 
plained that  rates  between  St.  Paul  and  Chicago,  for 
example,  where  competition  existed  were  hardly  more 
than  half  the  charges  to  places  at  a similar  distance 
where  a single  road  was  in  a position  to  demand  what 
it  pleased.  Manufacturers  in  Rochester  could  send 
goods  to  New  York  City  and  reship  them  to  Cincinnati, 

1 In  this  connection  Professor  Farrand  mentions  the  statement  of  a 
railroad  magnate  that  “in  Eepuhlican  counties  he  was  a Republican,  and 
in  Democratic  counties  he  was  a Democrat,  hut  that  everywhere  he  was 
for  the  railroad.”  Development  of  the  United  States,  p.  290. 


TRANSPORTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL  207 


back  tlirougli  Rocliester,  for  less  than  the  rate  direct 
to  their  destination,  let  tlie  direct  haul  was  seven 
hundred  miles  shorter  than  the  indirect.  Secret  ar- 
rangements were  commonly  made  with  favored  sliij)- 
pers  by  which  they  secured  lower  rates  than  their  com- 
petitors. When  it  became  evident  that  transportation 
cost  entered  into  the  price  of  substantially  everything 
which  the  ordinary  citizen  consumed,  and  when  it  was 
considered  that  a slight  rise  in  railroad  rates  might 
easily  amount  to  a heavy  tax  on  a shipper  or  an  entire 
region,  it  was  seen  that  uniformity  of  rates  was  a mat- 
ter of  the  utmost  concern. 

In  brief,  then,  it  was  complained  that  the  growth  of 
the  transportation  system  had  placed  enormous  power 
in  the  hands  of  a small  group  of  men,  many  of  whom 
had  indicated  by  their  selfishness,  arrogance  and  ques- 
tionable practices  that  they  ought  not  to  be  entrusted 
wfith  so  great  a measure  of  authority. 


N^TE:  > 

The  best  example  of  the  American  railroad  presi-^U4|»iXl 
dent  after  the  war  was  Commodore  Cornelius  Vander-Bu^ 
bilt.  Vanderbilt  began  his  carper  by  foriyiiig 
gers  and  frpjp-hf  hpfwppn  Sfflfpn  TsIanH  anri  Npir 
City.  Later  he  turned  his  attention  to  shipping,  in 
which  he  made  a fortune,  and  planned  ' 


steamships  on  a large  scale-  Becoming  interested  in^.tu; 
railroading,  he  clearly  perceived  the  importance  of  tin 
western  trade  and  the  necessity  of  consolidation.  Van- 
derbilt was  a man  of  vision,  a man  who  combined  mag- 
nitude of  plan  with  the  vigorous  grasp  of  the  practical 
details  necessary  for  the  realization  of  his  ambitions. 

He  was  buoyant,  energetic,  confident,  ambitious,  deter- 
mined, despotic.  Unhampered  by  modem  conceptions 
of  public  duty,  undeterred  by  the  hostility  of  powerful 
opponents,  with  eyes  fixed  upon  the  combination  and 
control  of  a great  transportation  system,  Vanderbilt 


208 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


entered  courageously  upon  bitter  struggles  for  suprem- 
acy which  involved  the  misuse  of  the  courts,  the  control 
of  the  New  York  state  legislature  and  a thousand 
charges  of  corrupt  influence  and  bribery,  but  he  welded 
railroads  together,  replaced  wood  and  iron  with  steel, 
and  constructed  tracks  and  terminals.  At  his  death  in 
1877  he  left  a huge  fortune  and  bequeathed  to  his  suc- 
cessors a great,  consolidated  railroad  enterprise,  skill- 
fully and  successfully  administered.  The  great  weak- 
ness of  Commodore  Vanderbilt  and  his  associates,  and 
of  those  who  later  imitated  his  work  was  their  funda- 
mental conception  of  the  railroad  as  a private  venture. 
Success  consisted  in  bigness,  great  profits,  crushing  or 
buying  out  competitors,  and  administering  the  business 
for  the  best  good  of  the  few  owners,  regardless  of  the 
interests  of  the  region  through  which  the  railway 
passed.  Vanderbilt  and  many  of  his  contemporaries 
were  men  of  business  sagacity  and  foresight,  but  their 
etliical  outlook  was  restricted  and  their  sense  of  public 
responsibility  not  well  developed. 

So  considerable  a list  of  grievances  naturally  be- 
stirred the  people  to  seek  relief  at  the  hands  of  their 
legislators.  Two  lines  of  action  Avere  folloAved.  In 
Massachusetts,  as  early  as  1869,  a state  commission 
was  formed  with  purely  advisory  powers.  Under  the 
able  leadership  of  Charles  Francis  Adams,  Jr.,  it  at- 
tained great  influence  and  worked  effectively  for  the 
elimination  of  railroad  abuses  through  conference  and 
the  Aveight  of  public  opinion.  In  Illinois,  on  the  other 
hand,  reliance  Avas  placed  upon  compulsory  action. 
The  state  constitution  of  1870  declared  the  railroads  to 
be  public  higliAvays  and  required  the  legislature  to  fix 
rates  for  the  carriage  of  freight  and  passengers,  and  to 
pass  laAvs  to  correct  abuses  connected  AAuth  the  raihvays 
and  grain  AAmrehouses.  In  compliance  Avith  the  consti- 


TBANSPORTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL  2U9 


tiitiou  the  state  passed  the  necessary  legislation  and 
placed  their  execution  in  the  hands  of  a commission 
with  considerable  power.  Other  western  states  fol- 
lowed the  Illinois  model. 

On  the  national  scale  the  agitation  for  government 
action  began  with  the  minor  parties.  In  1872  the 
Labo-i* -Reformers  demanded  fair  rates  and  no  dis- 
crimination; in  1876  the  Prohibitionists  called  for 
lower  rates ; in  1880  the  Greenbackers  stood  for  fair  and 
uniform  rates ; four  years  later  they  urged  laws  which 
would  put  an  end  to  pooling,  stock-watering  and  dis- 
crimination, and  in  the  same  year  the  Republicans 
promised  an  act  to  regulate  commerce  if  they  were 
elected.  The  most  effective  force  behind  the  demand 
for  railroad  regulation  was  the  Patrons  of  Husbandry, 
better  known  as  the  “Grange.”  This  society  was 
founded  by  0.  H.  Kelley,  a government  clerk  in  Wash- 
ington, in  1867;  Its  initial  purpose  was  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  agricultural  classes  for  social  and  intellec- 
tual improvement,  but  later  it  engaged  in  the  effort  to 
correct  transportation  abuses  and  to  arouse  coopera- 
tion among  the  farmers  in  other  ways.  The  movement 
grew  astonishingly,  especially  in  the  Middle  West, 
where  its  membership  reached  nearly  759,000  in  1875. 

Transportation  conditions  in  the  West  had  not 
reached  the  relatively  stable  situation  which  charac- 
terized those  of  the  East.  In  the  West  much  new  work 
was  being  done,  with  the  attendant  evils  of  construc- 
tion companies  and  unnecessary  and  speculative  under- 
takings. Much  of  the  railroad  stock  was  in  the  hands 
of  eastern  investors  whom  the  western  farmers  pic- 
tured as  living  in  idle  ease  on  swollen  incomes,  careless 
of  the  high  rates  and  unfair  discriminations  under 
which  the  farmer  groaned.  The  constantly  falling 
prices,  which  influenced  the  West  in  so  many  other 


210 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ways,  served  to  heighten  the  discontent  with  any  abuse 
which  increased  the  farmer’s  burden.  Moreover,  the 
western  states  had  contributed  huge  amounts  of  land  to 
help  build  the  railways  and  they  were  not  minded  to 
give  up  the  hold  which  their  generosity  had  justified. 

Impelled,  then,  by  such  force  as  the  Grange  and  simi- 
lar organizations  supplied,  the  western  states  pro- 
ceeded to  the  adoption  of  laws  whose  purposes  ordinar- 
ily included  railroad  rate-making  by  the  legislature  or 
by  a commission,  the  doing  away  with  such  abuses  as 
discrimination,  and  the  prohibition  of  free  passes. 
The  railroads  promptly  opposed  the  laws  and  carried 
the  battle  to  the  courts.  The  so-called  “Granger 
Cases”  resulted.  Three  of  these  were  representative 
of  the  general  trend  of  the  decisions. 

The  famous  case  Munn  v.  Illinois,  which  was  decided 
by  the  Supreme  Court  in  1876  was  possibly  the  most 
vital  case  in  the  history  of  the  regulation  of  public 
service  corporations  after  the  Civil  War.  The  legis- 
lature of  Illinois,  in  conformity  with  the  state  constitu- 
tion of  1870,  had  passed  a law  fixing  maximum  charges 
for  the  storage  of  grain  in  warehouses.  The  owners 
of  a certain  warehouse  refused  compliance  with  the 
law  on  the  ground  that  it  was  contrary  to  the  Constitu- 
tion and  hence  null  and  void.  They  argued  that  when 
the  state  fixed  rates  it  deprived  the  owners  of  the  right 
to  set  higher  charges  and  so,  in  effect,  deprived  them 
of  their  property,  in  defiance  of  that  portion  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  forbidding  a state  to  “deprive 
any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due 
process  of  law.” 

On  examination  of  the  history  of  the  control  of  such 
enterprises,  the  Court  found  that  it  had  been  customarj 
in  England  for  many  centuries  and  in  this  country  from 
the  beginning,  to  regulate  rates  on  ferries,  charges  at 


TRANSPORTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL  211 


inns,  and  similar  public  enterprises,  and  that  it  had 
never  been  thought  that  such  action  deprived  persons 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law.  In  other 
words,  the  established  common  law,  at  the  time  of  the 
passage  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  did  not  look 
upon  rate  regulation  as  a dejirivation  of  property. 
The  Court,  therefore,  declared  the  Illinois  warehouse 
law  constitutional,  and  in  doing  so  made  the  following 
statement : 

Property  does  become  clothed  with  a public  interest  when 
used  in  a manner  to  make  it  of  public  consequence,  and  affect 
the  community  at  large.  When,  therefore,  one  devotes  his 
property  to  a use  in  which  the  public  has  an  interest,  he,  in 
effect,  grants  to  the  public  an  interest  in  that  use,  and  must 
submit  to  be  controlled  by  the  public  for  the  common  good, 
to  the  extent  of  the  interest  he  has  thus  created. 

While  the  Munn  case  was  before  the  Court,  the  case 
Peik  V.  the  Chicago  and  Northw’estern  Raihvay  Com- 
pany was  raising  a question  which  struck  at  the  heart 
of  the  chief  practical  impediment  in  the  way  of  state 
control  of  transportation.  The  central  question  in  the 
litigation  was  whether  the  legislature  of  Wisconsin 
could  lawfully  regulate  rates  on  railroads  inside  the 
state.  Since  the  bulk  of  the  traffic  on  most  roads 
crosses  state  borders  at  one  time  or  another  in  its 
transit,  the  regulation  of  rates  within  a state  normally 
affects  interstate  commerce.  But  the  regulation  of 
interstate  commerce  is  vested  in  Congress  by  the  terms 
of  the  Constitution.  The  railroad  was  quick  to  take 
advantage  of  the  division  of  power  between  the  states 
and  the  nation.  Indeed,  when  fighting  state  legislation, 
the  roads  earnestly  emphasized  the  exclusive  power  of 
Congress  over  interstate  commerce;  but  when  fighting- 
national  regulation,  they  equally  deprecated  any  inter- 


212 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ference  with  the  reserved  rights  of  the  states.  Acting 
in  accordance  with  its  established  practice,  the  Court 
decided  that  the  state  was  authorized  to  regulate  rates 
within  its  borders,  even  though  such  regulation  indi- 
rectly affected  persons  outside,  until  Congress  passed 
legislation  concerning  interstate  commerce.  Obviously 
this  decision  allowed  the  states  to  work  out  their  rail- 
road problems  unhampered,  and  constituted  one  of  the 
chief  victories  for  the  Grangers.  , . ' 

In  1886,  however,  the  Court  overturned  some  of  the 
principles  which  had  been  established  in  the  Munn  and 
Peik  cases.  The  new  development  came  about  in  con- 
nection with  the  Wabash  railroad.  It  appeared  that 
the  road  had  been  carrying  freight  from  Peoria,  Illin- 
ois, to  New  York  for  smaller  rates  than  were  charged 
from  Gilman  to  New  York,  despite  the  fact  that  Peoria 
was  eighty-six  miles  farther  away.  Since  Illinois  law 
forbade  a road  to  levy  a greater  charge  for  a short  haul 
than  for  a long  one,  a suit  was  instituted  and  carried 
to  the  Supreme  Court.  The  company  held  that  the 
Illinois  legislation  affected  interstate  commerce  and 
hence  trenched  upon  the  constitutional  power  of  Con- 
gress. This  time  the  Court  upheld  the  road.  It  de- 
cided that  the  transportation  of  goods  from  Illinois  to 
New  York  was  commerce  among  the  states,  that  such 
commerce  was  subject  to  regulation  by  Congress  ex- 
clusively, and  that  the  Illinois  statute  was  void.  It 
seemed,  then,  that  state  regulation  was  a broken  reed 
on  which  nobody  could  safely  lean,  and  attention  there- 
upon turned  to  the  federal  government. 

Congress  had  already  been  discussing  federal  regula- 
tion intermittently  for  some  years.  The  so-called 
“Windom  Report”  of  1874  had  advised  federal  con- 
struction and  improvement  of  transportation  facilities 
in  order  to  lower  rates  through  competition,  but  no 


TRANSPORTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL  v 


action  had  resulted.  In  1878  the  “Reagan  bill”  had 
proposed  government  regulation,  and  from  that  time 
the  subject  had  been  almost  continuously  before  Con- 
gress. In  1885  the  Senate  had  appointed  a select  com- 
mittee of  five  to  investigate  and  report  upon  the  regu- 
lation of  freight  and  passenger  transportation.  The 
committee  was  headed  by  Shelby  M.  Cullom,  who  had 
been  a member  of  the  legislature  of  Illinois  and  later 
governor,  in  the  years  when  the  railroad  and  ware- 
house laws  were  being  put  into  effect.  It  endeavored 
to  discover  all  shades  of  opinion  by  visiting  the  leading 
commercial  centers,  and  by  consulting  business  men, 
state  commissioners  of  railroads.  Granger  officials  and 
others.  After  a somewhat  thorough  investigation,  the 
committee  expressed  its  conviction  that  no  general 
question  of  governmental  policy  occupied  so  prominent 
a place  in  the  attention  of  the  public  as  that  of  con- 
trolling the  growth  and  influence  of  corporations.  The 
neednd  relief  might  be  obtained,  the  committee  thought, 
throu^  any  one  of  four  methods : private  ownership 
and  management,  with  a greater  or  less  degree  of  gov- 
ernment oversight;  government  ownership  and  man- 
agement ; government  ownership  with  private  manage- 
ment under  public  regulations ; partial  state  ownership 
and  management  in  competition  with  private  com- 
panies. The  widespread  opposition  to  state  ownership 
of  railroads,  the  commission  thought,  seemed  to  point 
to  some  form  of  government  regulation  and  control  of 
the  existing  situation. 

Impressed  with  the  magnitude  of  the  abuses  in- 
volved, and  the  hopelessness  of  regulation  through 
state  laws,  the  committee  presented  a bill  designed  to 
bring  about  regulation  on  a national  scale  through  a 
federal  agency.  The  resulting  law  was  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  of  February  4,  1887.  It  provided  that 


214 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


all  railway  charges  should  he  reasonable  and  just ; for- 
bade the  roads  to  grant  rebates,  or  to  give  preferences 
to  any  person,  locality  or  class  of  freight,  or  to  charge 
more  for  a short  haul  than  for  a long  one  except  with 
the  consent  of  the  proper  authorities;  it  made  pooling 
unlawful;  and  it  ordered  the  companies  to  pos’t  printed 
copies  of  their  rates,  which  were  not  to  be  altered  ex- 
cept after  ten  days  ’ public  notice.  The  act  also  created 
an  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  of  five  members 
to  serve  six-year  terms,  into  whose  hands  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  measure  was  placed.  Persons  who 
claimed  that  the  railways  were  violating  the  provisions 
of  the  law  could  make  complaint  to  the  Commission,  or 
bring  suit  in  a United  States  Court.  In  order  that  the 
Commission  might  know  the  condition  of  the  roads,  it 
was  given  power  to  call  upon  the  carriers  for  informa- 
tion, to  demand  annual  reports  from  them,  and  to  re- 
quire the  attendance  of  witnesses.  If  the  railroads 
refused  to  carry  out  the  orders  of  the  Commission,  they 
could  be  brought  before  a United  States  district  court. 

In  forbidding  pools,  the  Act  committed  the  railroads 
to  the  policy  of  enforced  competition,  a policy  which 
was  commonly  accepted  at  the  time  as  the  best  one  for 
the  public  interest.  Such  experts,  however,  as  Pro- 
fessor A.  T.  Hadley  and  Charles  Francis  Adams,  Jr., 
raised  important  objections.  They  cited  the  rate  wars 
to  indicate  the  results  of  competition  and  declared  that 
railroads  ought  to  be  monopolies.  If  two  grocery 
stores  are  established  where  trade  enough  exists  for 
only  one,  they  asserted,  the  weaker  competitor  can 
close  his  doors  and  the  public  loss  is  not  heavy;  but  in 
the  case  of  the  railways  a weak  competitor  must  con- 
tinue business  even  at  disastrously  low  rates  because 
all  his  interest  charges  continue  and  the  depreciation 
on  his  property  is  extreme.  The  construction  of  an 


TEANSPORTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL  215 


unnecessary  road  and  its  subsequent  operation  at  a 
loss,  its  failure  or  its  abandonment,  constitute  a great 
drain  upon  the  public.  Such  objectors  contended  that 
pooling  combinations  did  away  with  many  of  the  evils 
of  cut-throat  competition,  and  they  accordingly  urged 
that  the  carriers  be  permitted  to  make  such  arrange- 
ments, under  whatever  government  regulation  might  be 
needed  to  prevent  unreasonable  charges.  By  such 
means  the  available  business  of  a region  might  be 
fairly  divided  among  the  roads  entering  it,  without  re- 
sort to  competitive  rate-cutting  and  its  consequent 
evils. 

The  passage  of  the  law  was  looked  upon  with  much 
hostility  on  the  part  of  the  railroad  interests.  James 
J.  Hill  thought  that  the  railroads  might  survive,  al- 
though the  country  would  be  ruined,  and  he  predicted 
that  Congress  would  shortly  be  called  in  special  session 
to  repeal  the  act.  More  important  than  mere  hostility 
was  the  constant  opposition  and  evasion  which  charac- 
terized the  attitude  of  the  carriers  toward  the  opera- 
tion of  the  law.  Discriminations  were  commonly  prac- 
ticed and  hidden  away  in  accounts  under  false  or  mis- 
leading headings.  Rebates  were  given  and  received,  a 
fact  which  was  due  in  no  small  degree  to  the  shippers 
themselves.  A large  shipper  might  demand  advan- 
tageous rates  and  threaten  to  turn  his  trade  over  to  a 
rival  road.  As  the  arrangement  would  be  secret,  and 
the  likelihood  of  discovery  small,  the  temptation  to 
break  the  law  was  correspondingly  great. 

The  good  results  of  the  passage  of  the  law  were  dis- 
appointingly slight.  To  be  sure,  the  Commission  was 
gaining  experience,  administrative  precedents  were  be- 
ing established  and  injustice  was  somewhat  less  com- 
mon than  before.  The  first  chairman  was  Judge  T.  M. 
Cooley,  a noted  lawyer  whose  appointment  was  con- 


216 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


sidered  an  admirable  one.  Most  important  of  all,  the 
principle  of  government  regulation  was  established. 
Nevertheless,  progress  was  so  slow  as  to  be  almost  in- 
visible. The  courts  hampered  the  activities  of  the 
Commission.  When  cases  arose  involving  its  de- 
cisions, they  allowed  a retrial  of  the  entire  case  from 
the  beginning,  permitting  the  introduction  of  facts 
which  had  been  designedly  withheld  by  the  carriers  in 
order  to  undermine  the  influence  of  the  Commission, 
and  sometimes  they  reversed  its  findings  and  so 
dulled  the  effectiveness  of  its  labors.  Eleven  years 
after  the  Act  was  passed  the  Commission  declared  that 
abuses  were  so  constant  that  the  situation  was  in- 
tolerable; a prominent  railroad  president  made  the 
charge  that  “good  faith  had  departed  from  the  rail- 
way world”;  and  an  important  authority  on  railroad 
affairs  declared  that  the  Commission  had  become  an 
impotent  bureau  of  statistics. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

More  study  has  been  made  of  railroad  regulation  and  the 
technical  side  of  railroading  than  of  the  history  of  transpor- 
tation and  the  effects  of  the  roads  on  the  political  and  economic 
life  of  the  people.  An  excellent  single  volume  is  John  IMoody, 
The  Railroad  Builders  (1919),  which  devotes  attention  to  the 
important  personages  of  railroad  history,  discusses  the  growth 
of  large  systems  and  contains  valuable  maps;  the  best  concise 
account  of  the  history  of  the  railways  is  W.  Z.  Ripley,  Rail- 
roads: Rates  and  Regulation  (1912),  Chap.  I;  W.  Z.  Ripley, 
Railway  Problems  (rev.  ed.,  1913),  is  reliable;  E.  R.  Johnson 
and  T.  W.  Van  iMetre,  Principles  of  Railroad  Transportation 
(1916),  has  some  excellent  chapters  and  several  informing 
maps;  C.  F.  Carter,  When  Railroads  were  New  (1909),  is  a 
popular  account;  C.  P.  Adams,  Chapters  of  Erie  (1886),  ex- 
poses early  railroad  practices;  H.  G.  Pearson,  An  American 


TRANSPORTATION  AND  ITS  CONTROL  217 


Railroad  Builder  (1911),  presents  the  career  of  J.  M.  Forbes 
as  a railroad  president;  A.  T.  Hadley,  Railroad  Transporta- 
tion  (1886),  is  a classic,  early  account.  Consult  also  E.  R. 
Johnson,  America ti  Railway  Transportation  (1903)  ; Frank 
Parsons,  Heart  of  the  Railroad  Problem  (1906)  ; C.  F.  Adams, 
Jr.,  Railroads:  Their  Origin  and  Problems  (1878,  rev.  ed., 
1893)  ; “A  Decade  of  Federal  Railway  Reflation,”  in  At- 
lantic Monthly  (Apr.,  1898).  On  the  personal  side,  the  fol- 
lowing are  valuable : E.  P.  Oberholtzer,  Jay  Cooke,  Financier 
of  the  Civil  IPar  (2  vols.,  1907)  ; J.  G.  Pyle,  Life  of  J.  J.  Hill 
(2  vols.,  1917);  Memoirs  of  Henry  Villard  (1909).  On  the 
subject  of  land  grants  and  regulation : L.  H.  Haney,  Con- 
gressional History  of  Railways  (2  vols.,  1910)  ; S.  J.  Buck, 
The  Granger  Movement  (1913),  and  the  same  author’s  The 
Agrarian  Crusade  (1920),  are  best  on  the  relation  of  unrest 
among  the  agricultural  classes  to  the  railroad  problem.  The 
■’Cullom  Report”  is  in  Senate  Reports,  49th  Congress,  1st 
session  (Serial  Number  2356),  in  2 vols.,  and  is  a mine  of 
•'.iformation  on  early  -abuses.  The  most  important  Granger 
•ases  are  in  United  States  Reports,  vol.  94,  p.  113  (Munn  v. 
ill.),  and  vol.  118,  p.  557  (Wabash  case). 


CHAPTEE  X 


EXTREME  EEPUBLICANISM 

That  the  election  of  1888  differed  from  its  prede- 
cessors since  1865  was  due  chiefly  to  the  inde- 
pendence, courage  and  political  insight  of  President 
Cleveland.  Hitherto  campaigns  had  been  contested 
with  as  little  reference  to  real  issues  as  conditions  ren- 
dered possible.  Neither  party  had  possessed  leaders 
with  sufficient  understanding  of  the  needs  of  the  nation 
to  force  a genuine  settlement  of  an  important  issue. 
That  1888  saw  a clear  contest  made  it  a memorable  year 
in  recent  politics. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  tariff  act  of  1883  had 
been  satisfactory  only  to  a minority  in  Congress,  be- 
cause it  retained  the  high  level  of  customs  duties  that 
had  been  established  during  the  Civil  AVar.  The  con- 
gressional election  of  1882  had  resulted  in  the  choice  of 
a Democratic  House  of  Representatives  and  had  offered 
another  opportunity  for  downward  revision.  Early  in 
1884,  therefore,  AA^illiam  E.  Morrison  presented  a bill 
making  considerable  additions  to  the  free  list  and  pro- 
viding for  a “horizontal”  reduction  of  about  twenty 
per  cent,  on  all  other  duties  as  levied  under  the  act  of 
1883.  The  measure  was  defeated  by  four  votes.  Op- 
posed to  it  were  substantially  all  the  Republicans  and 
forty-one  Democrats,  most  of  them  from  the  industrial 
states  of  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania  and 
Ohio.  The  Democratic  tariff  plank  of  1884,  as  has 

been  seen,  was  practicallv  meaningless,  but  the  election 

■'  218 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM 


219 


of  Cleveland,  and  the  choice  of  a Democratic  House 
gave  another  opportunity  for  revision.  Again  Morri- 
son attempted  a reduction,  and  again  he  was  defeated 
by  Samuel  J.  Randall  and  the  other  protectionist 
Democrats. 

The  entire  matter,  however,  was  about  to  receive  a 
new  and  important  development  at  the  hands  of  Presi- 
dent Cleveland  and  John  G.  Carlisle,  who  was  the 
Speaker  of  the  House  during  the  four  years  from  1885 
to  1889.  Carlisle  was  a Kentuckian,  a man  of  grave 
bearing,  undagging  industry  and  substantial  attain- 
ments. His  taritf  principles  were  in  accord  with  those 
of  the  President,  and  his  position  as  Speaker  enabled 
him  to  determine  the  make-up  of  the  Committee  on 
Ways  and  Means,  which  would  frame  any  taritf  legis- 
lation. Cleveland  had  expressed  his  belief  in  the  de- 
sirability of  tariff  reduction  in  his  messages  to  Con- 
gress of  1885  and  1886,  basing  his  recommendations  on 
the  same  facts  that  had  earlier  actuated  President 
Arthur  in  making  similar  suggestions.  His  recom- 
mendations, however,  had  received  the  same  slight 
consideration  that  had  been  accorded  those  of  his  Re- 
publican predecessor.  He  therefore  determined  to 
challenge  the  attention  of  the  country  and  of  Congress 
by  means  of  a novel  expedient. 

Previous  presidential  messages  had  covered  a wide 
variety  of  subjects — foreign  'relations,  domestic  af- 
fairs, and  recommendations  of  all  kinds.  Departing 
from  this  custom,  the  President  made  up  his  mind  to 
devote  an  entire  message  to  tariff  reform.  His  project 
was  startling  from  the  political  point  of  view,  for  his 
party  was  far  from  being  a unit  in  its  attitude  toward 
reduction,  a presidential  campaign  was  at  hand,  and 
the  Independents,  who  had  had  a strong  influence  in 
bringing  about  his  success  in  1884,  sent  word  to  him 


220 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  AVAR 


that  a reform  message  would  imperil  his  chances  of  re- 
election.  This  type  of  argument  had  little  weight  with 
Cleveland,  however,  and  his  reply  was  brief : “Do  you 
not  think  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  en- 
titled to  some  instruction  on  this  subject?” 

On  December  6,  1887,  therefore,  he  sent  to  Congress 
his  famous  message  urging  the  downward  revision  of 
the  tariff.  The  immediate  occasion  of  his  recommen- 
dation, he  declared,  was  the  surplus  of  income  over  ex- 
penditure, which  was  piling  up  in  the  treasury  at  a 
rapid  rate  and  which  was  a constant  invitation  to  reck- 
less appropriations.  The  portion  of  the  public  debt 
which  was  payable  had  already  been  redeemed,  so  that 
whatever  surplus  was  not  expended  would  be  stored  in 
the  vaults,  thus  reducing  the  amount  of  currency  in 
circulation,  and  making  likely  a financial  crisis.  The 
simplest  remedy  for  the  situation  seemed  to  Cleveland 
to  lie  in  a reduction  of  the  income,  and  the  most  de- 
sirable means  of  reduction  seemed  to  be  the  downward 
revision  of  the  tariff,  a system  of  “unnecessary  taxa- 
tion” which  he  denominated  “vicious,  inequitable,  and 
illogical.”  Disclaiming  any  wish  to  advocate  free 
trade,  he  expressed  the  hope  that  Congress  would  turn 
its  attention  to  the  practical  problem  before  it: 

Our  progress  toward  a wise  conclusion  will  not  be  improved 
by  dwelling  upon  the  theories  of  protection  and  free  trade. 
This  savors  too  much  of  bandying  epithets.  It  is  a condition 
which  confronts  us,  not  a theory. 

The  effect  of  the  message  was  immediate.  Men  be- 
gan at  once  to  take  sides  as  if  everybody  had  been  wait- 
ing for  a leader  to  speak  his  mind;  and  the  parties 
adopted  the  definite  principles  to  which  they  adhered 
for  many  years  afterwards.  The  Democrats  very  gen- 
erally rallied  to  the  support  of  their  champion;  gaps  in 


EXTE^ME  REPUBLICANISM 


221 


the  ranks  were  closed  up ; and  doubtless  the  usual  pres- 
sure was  applied  to  obstinate  members  who  were  disin- 
clined to  follow  the  leader.  The  Republican  attitude 
was  well  expressed  in  the  phrase  of  one  of  the  poli- 
ticians: “It  is  free-trade,  and  we  have  ’em!”  The 
most  prominent  Republican,  James  G.  Blaine,  was  in 
Paris,  but  true  to  his  instinctive  recognition  of  a good 
political  opportunity  he  gave  an  interview  which  was 
immediately  cabled  to  America.  In  it  Blaine  main- 
tained that  tariff  reduction  would  harm  the  entire 
countr}",  and  especially  the  South  and  the  farmers,  and 
urged  the  reduction  of  the  surplus  by  the  abolition  of 
the  tax  on  tobacco,  which  he  termed  the  poor  man’s 
luxury.  The  “Paris  Message”  was  generally  looked 
upon  as  the  Republican  answer  to  Cleveland,  and  as 
pointing  to  Blaine  as  the  inevitable  candidate  for  the 
ensuing  campaign.  On  one  point,  most  men  of  both 
parties  were  agreed — that  the  President  had  displayed 
great  courage.  “The  presidential  chair,”'  declared 
Janres  Russell  Lowell,  “has  a man  in  it,  and  this  means 
that  every  word  he  says  is  weighted  with  what  he  is.” 

The  chairman  of  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee  in 
the  House  of  Representatives,  Roger  Q.  Mills, 
promptly  presented  a bill  which  conformed  to  the  prin- 
ciples for  which  the  President  had  argued.  The  dis- 
cussion of  the  Mills  bill  was  long  known  as  the  “Great 
Tariff  Debate  of  1888.”  The  House  seethed  with  it 
for  more  than  a month.  Mills  and  Carlisle  on  one  side 
and  William  McKinley  and  Thomas  B.  Reed  on  the 
other  typified  the  n'ew  leadership  and  the  new  positions 
which  the  parties  were  taking.  Senator  Morrill’s  idea 
that  the  war  tariff  was  a temporary  one,  President  Ar- 
thur’s advice  that  the  tariff  be  revised,  the  recommen- 
dations of  the  Tariff  Commission  of  1882  that  reduc- 
tions were  necessary, — all  these  were  no  longer  heard. 


222 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Instead,  the  Republicans  upheld  the  protective  sys- 
tem as  the  cause  of  the  unexampled  prosperity  of  the 
nation.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  protectionist  or 
reductionist  converts  were  made  by  the  endless  dis- 
cussion, but  the  initial  prejudices  of  each  side  were 
undoubtedly  deepened.  Each  telling  blow  on  either 
side  was  applauded  by  the  partisans  of  each  particular 
speaker,  so  that  “applause”  fairly  dots  the  dull  pages 
of  the  Congressional  Record.  McKinley  enlivened  his 
colleagues  by  pulling  from  his  desk  and  exhibiting  a 
suit  of  clothes  which  he  had  purchased  for  $10.U0,  a 
figure,  he  asserted,  which  proved  that  the  tariff  did  not 
raise  prices  beyond  the  reach  of  the  laboring  man. 
Mills  tracked  down  the  cost  of  the  suit  and  the  tariff 
on  the  materials  composing  it,  and  further  entertained 
the  House  by  an  exhibit  showing  that  it  cost  $4.98  to 
manufacture  the  suit  and  that  the  remainder  of  the 
price  which  the  laborer  paid  was  due  to  the  tariff.  In 
the  end,  the  Mills  bill  passed  the  House  with  but  four 
Democrats  voting  against  it.  Randall  was  so  ill  that 
he  was  unable  to  be  present  when  the  final  vote  was 
taken,  but  a letter  from  him  declaring  his  opposition 
to  the  bill  was  greeted  with  great  applause  on  the  Re- 
publican side.  RandaH’s  day  was  past,  however,  and 
leadership  was  passing  to  new  men. 

Meanwhile  the  Republicans  in  the  Senate,  where  they 
were  in  control,  had  prepared  a tariff  bill  which  was 
designed  to  give  evidence  of  the  sort  of  act  which 
would  be  passed  if  they  were  successful  in  the  cam- 
paign. Senator  Allison  and  Senator  Aldrich  were  in- 
fluential in  this  connection.  The  passage  of  leader- 
ship in  tariff  matters  to  Senator  Aldrich  and  men  of 
his  type  was  as  significant  as  the  transition  in  the 
House.  Aldrich  was  from  Rhode  Island,  an  able  man 
who  had  had  experience  in  state  affairs,  had  served 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM 


223 


in  the  federal  House  of  Representatives  and  had  been 
in  the  Senate  since  1881.  He  had  already  laid  the 
foundations  of  the  great  financial  and  industrial  con- 
nections which  gave  him  an  intimate,  personal  interest 
in  protection  and  which  later  made  him  an  important 
figure  in  American  industry  and  politics.  Since 
neither  party  controlled  both  branches  of  Congress,  it 
was  impossible  to  pass  either  the  Mills  bill  or  the  Sen- 
ate measure;  but  the  proposed  legislation  indicated 
what  might  be  expected  to  result  from  the  election. 
Each  side  had  thoroughly  committed  itself  on  the 
tariff  question. 

In  the  meanwhile,  great  interest  attached  to  the  ques- 
tion of  leaders  for  the  campaign.  Opposition  to 
Cleveland  was  not  lacking.  His  efforts  in  behalf  of 
civil  service  reform  had  not  endeared  him  to  the  office- 
seekers,  and  the  hostility  of  the  Democrats  in  the  Sen- 
ate was  shovm  by  their  feeble  support  of  him.  The 
West  did  not  relish  his  opposition  to  silver  coinage, 
while  his  vetoes  of  pension  legislation  were  produc- 
tive of  some  hostility,  even  in  his  own  party.  Nor 
was  the  personality  of  the  President  such  as  to  allay 
ill-feeling.  Indeed,  Cleveland  was  in  a position  com- 
parable to  that  of  Hayes  eight  years  before.  He  was 
the  titular  party  leader,  but  the  most  prominent  Demo- 
cratic politicians  were  not  in  agreement  with  his  prin- 
ciples, and  any  step  taken  by  him  was  likely  to  arouse 
as  much  hostility  in  some  Democratic  quarters  as 
among  the  Republicans.  Opposition  to  his  nomina- 
tion focused  upon  David  B.  Hill,  Governor  of  New 
York,  a man  Avho  was  looked  upon  as  better  disposed 
towards  the  claims  of  party  workers  for  office.  Other 
leaders  like  Bayard,  Thurman  and  Carlisle  aroused 
little  enthusiasm,  and  the  gradual  drift  of  sentiment 
toward  Cleveland  became  unmistakable.  If  the  poll- 


224 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ticiaiis  did  not  accept  him  with  joy,  they  at  least  ac- 
cepted him;  for  he  was  master  of  the  party  for  the 
moment  at  least,  and  his  hold  on  a large  body  of  the 
rank  and  file  was  not  to  be  doubted.  When  the  Demo- 
cratic convention  met  in  St.  Louis  in  June,  1888,  his 
nomination  was  made  without  the  formality  of  a 
ballot.^ 

The  platform  was  devoted,  for  the  most  part,  to  the 
question  of  revenue  reform,  indorsing  the  President’s 
tariff  message  and  urging  that  the  party  be  given  con- 
trol of  Congress  in  order  that  Democratic  principles 
might  he  put  into  effect.  Resolutions  Avere  also 
adopted  recommending  the  passage  of  the  Mills  bill, 
Avhich  was  still  under  discussion  when  the  convention 
met. 

Among  the  Republicans  the  choice  of  a candidate 
Avas  a far  more  difficult  matter.  The  probable  choice 
of  the  party  AA^as  Blaine,  but  his  letter  from  Italy, 
Avhere  he  AA-as  travelling  early  in  the  convention  year, 
forbade  the  use  of  his  name  and  opened  the  contest 
to  a great  number  of  less  Avell-knoAAm  leaders.  Pub- 
licly it  Avas  stated  that  Blaine  refused  for  reasons 
Avhich  AA^ere  “entirely  personal,”  but  intimate  friends 
kneAA^  that  he  AAmuld  accept  a nomination  if  it  came 
Avithout  solicitation  and  as  the  result  of  a unanimous 
party  call.  Although  the  demand  for  him  still  con- 
tinued, there  AA^ere  smaller  “booms”  for  Amrious  fav- 
orite sons,  and  as  his  ill  health  continued  he  made 
known  his  irreAmcable  decision  to  AvithdraAV.  Except 
for  Blaine,  the  most  prominent  contender  AAms  Sena- 
tor Sherman,  AAdiose  candidacy  reached  larger  propor- 
tions than  eA'er  before.  The  Ohio  delegation  Avas 

1 The  vice-presidential  candidate  was  Allan  G.  Thurman  of  Ohio, 
affectionately  known  as  the  “nohle  old  Roman,”  one  of  whose  titles  to 
fame  was  the  ownership  of  a large  red  bandanna  handkerchief  which 
he  flourished  on  all  occasions. 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM 


225 


unitedly  in  liis  favor  and  considerable  numbers  of 
southern  delegates  were  expected  to  vote  for  him.  On 
the  other  hand,  his  lack  of  personal  magnetism  was 
against  him  and  his  career  had  been  connected  with 
technical  matters  which  did  not  make  a popular  ap- 
peal. On  the  first  ballot  in  the  nominating  convention 
his  lead  was  considerable,  although  not  decisive,  but 
no  fewer  than  thirteen  other  leaders  also  received 
votes.  One  of  these  was  Senator  Benjamin  Harrison 
of  Indiana  whom  Blaine  had  suggested  as  an  available 
man  and  whom  the  New  York  delegation  considered  a 
strong  candidate  because  he  was  poor,  a reputable  sen- 
ator, a distinguished  volunteer  officer  in  the  war  and  a 
grandson  of  William  H.  Harrison  of  Tippecanoe  fame. 
Further  voting  only  emphasized  the  lack  of  unanimity 
until  the  eighth  ballot,  when  the  delegates  suddenly 
turned  to  Harrison  and  nominated  him. 

The  platform  was  long  and  verbose.  It  devoted  much 
attention  to  the  protective  tariff  which,  in  imitation 
of  Henry  Clay,  it  entitled  the  “American  system”;  it 
advocated  the  reduction  of  internal  revenue  duties,  if 
necessary  to  cut  down  the  surplus ; and  it  urged  civil 
service  reform,  liberal  pensions  and  laws  to  control 
oppressive  corporations. 

Two  factions  of  the  Labor  party,  as  well  as  the  Pro- 
hibitionists, nominated  candidates  and  urged  pro- 
grams to  which  no  attention  was  paid,  but  which  were 
later  taken  up  by  both  the  great  parties,  such  as  arbi- 
tration in  labor  disputes,  an  income  tax,  the  popular 
election  of  senators,  woman  suffrage  and  the  prohibi- 
tion of  the  manufacture  of  alcoholic  beverages. 

The  campaign  deserves  attention  because  of  the  un- 
usual elements  that  entered  into  it.  A spectacular  fea- 
ture which,  although  not  new,  was  developed  on  a large 
scale,  was  the  formation  of  thousands  of  political 


226 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


clubs,  which  paraded  evenings  with  flaming  torches. 
In  this  type  of  organization  the  Republicans  were  more 
successful  than  the  Democrats  and  thus  steered  many 
young  men  into  the  party  at  a time  when  they  were 
looking  forward  to  casting  their  first  ballot.  The  most 
unwholesome  feature  was,  as  before,  the  methods  used 
to  finance  the  campaign.  In  this  connection  both  par- 
ties were  guilty,  but  the  Republicans  were  able  to  tap 
a new  source  of  supply.  The  campaign  was  in  the 
hands  of  Matthew  S.  Quay,  a Pennsylvania  senator 
whose  career  as  a public  official  left  much  to  be  de- 
sired. Quay’s  political  methods  were  vividly  de- 
scribed at  a later  time  by  his  friend  and  admirer 
Thomas  C.  Platt,  whose  account  lost  none  of  its  de- 
lightfulness in  view  of  the  fact  that  Platt  obviously 
felt  that  he  was  complimenting  his  friend  in  telling 
the  story.  Believing  in  the  “rights”  of  business  men 
in  politics,  Platt  declared.  Quay  was  always  able  to 
raise  any  amount  of  money  needed,  although  when 
funds  were  raised  by  business  interests  against  him, 
he  lifted  the  “fiery  cross”  and  virtuously  exposed  his 
opponents  before  the  people.  Having  calculated  with 
skill  the  number  of  votes  needed  for  victoiw,  he 
found  out  Avhere  he  could  get  them — ^“and  then  he  got 
them.  ’ ’ 

That  Quay  was  able  to  tap  a new  source  of  supply 
was  due  to  a combination  of  circumstances.  It  will 
be  remembered  that  the  Pendleton  civil  service  act  of 
1883  had  forbidden  the  assessment  of  office-holders  in 
political  campaigns,  and  had  made  it  necessary  to  pro- 
cure funds  elsewhere.  In  the  campaign  of  1888,  busi- 
ness men  who  believed  that  the  success  of  Cleveland 
would  hurt  their  interests,  and  manufacturers  who 
profited  directly  by  the  protective  tariff  rallied  to  the 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM  227 

defence  of  Harrison  and  contributed  heavily  to  his 
campaign  fundd 

The  use  to  which  the  funds  thus  contributed  were 
put  was  revealed  in  a letter  written  apparently  by  W. 
\V.  Dudley,  treasurer  of  the  National  Republican  Com- 
mittee, and  sent  to  party  leaders  in  Indiana.  The  lat- 
ter were  directed  to  find  out  who  had  the  “Democratic 
boodle”  and  force  them,  presumably  by  competition,  to 
pay  big  prices  for  their  own  men.  The  leaders  were 
also  instructed  to  “divide  the  floaters  into  blocks  of 
five  and  put  a trusted  man  with  the  necessary  funds  in 
charge  of  these  five,  and  make  him  responsible  that 
none  get  away,  and  that  all  vote  our  ticket.” 

On  the  other  hand  the  most  wholesome  feature  of  the' 
campaign  was  its  educational  aspect.  Hundreds  of  so- 
cieties, tons  of  “literature,”  thousands  of  stump 
speeches  attacked  and  defended  the  tariff.  School- 
boys glibly  retailed  the  standard  arguments  on  one 
side  or  the  other.  Attention  was  centered,  as  it  had 
not  been  since  the  war,  on  an  important  issue. 

At  the  close  of  the  campaign  the  Republicans  played 
a trick  which  was  reminiscent  of  the  Morey  letter  of 
Garfield’s  day.  A letter  purporting  to  be  from  a 
Charles  F.  iMurchison,  a naturalized  American  of  Eng- 
lish birth,  was  sent  to  the  British  minister  in  'Wash- 
ington, Lord  Sackville-West.  Murchison  requested  the 
minister’s  opinion 'as  to  whether  President  Cleveland’s 
hostile  policy  in  a recent  controversy  with  Canada  had 
been  adopted  for  campaign  purposes  and  whether  after 
election  the  President  would  be  more  friendly  toward 

1 A party  worker  who  realized  the  opportunity  which  this  fact  pre- 
sented complained  that  Pennsylyania  manufacturers  who  made  fortunes 
under  protection  did  not  contribute  to  the  Republican  campaign  fund, 
and  remarked:  "Tf  I had  my  way  about  it  I would  put  the  manufac- 
turers of  Pennsylvania  under  the  fire  and  fry  all  the  fat  out  of  them.’' 


228 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


England.  Lord  Sackville  indiscreetly  replied  that  he 
believed  President  Cleveland  would  show  a concilia- 
tory spirit  toward  Great  Britain.  The  correspondence 
was  held  back  until  shortly  before  the  election  and  was 
then  published  in  the  newspapers  and  on  hand  bills. 
Republicans  triumphantly  declared  that  Cleveland  was 
the  “British  candidate.”  The  President  was  at  first 
inclined  to  overlook  the  incident  hut  eventually  gave 
way  to  pressure  and  dismissed  the  minister,  where- 
upon the  English  government  refused  to  fill  the  va- 
cancy until  there  was  a change  of  administration. 

In  the  ensuing  election  the  vote  cast  was  unusually 
heavy;  the  protectionists  felt  that  a supreme  effort 
must  be  made  to  preserve  the  tariff  system,  and  the 
Democrats,  having  experienced  the  joys  of  power,  were 
determined  not  to  loosen  their  grip  on  authority;  the 
Prohibitionists  increased  their  vote  over  that  of  1884 
by  100,000,  while  the  Labor  party  cast  147,000,  almost 
as  many  ballots  as  the  Prohibitionists  had  numbered 
in  the  earlier  year.  Cleveland  rppmt/oH  gnmpwhflt  over 
100,000  more  votes  than  HavHsmij  hnt  hi.d  support  was 
sn  nlaperl  thnf  his  plpatnral  vntp  was  siYtv-fivp  Ipss  thaji 


From  the  standpoint  of  poli  Fical  history  the  result 
was  unfortunate.  The  tariff  question  had  been  sadly 
in  need  of  a definite  answer,  the  people  had  been  edu- 
cated upon  it  and  had  given  a decision,  but  the  elec- 
toral system  placed  in  power  the  party  pledged  to  the 
theories  of  the  minority.  Aside  from  the  unusual  ef- 
fect of  our  machinery  of  election,  many  small  ele- 
ments entered  into  the  Republican  victory.  Some  of 
the  Independents  had  become  disaffected  since  1884 
and  had  returned  to  the  Republican  fold.  Disgruntled 
office-seekers  opposed  a President  who  did  not  reward 
his  workers.  In  New  York,  which  was  the  decisive 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM 


229 


factor,  Hill  was  a candidate  for  re-election  as  governor 
and  was  elected  by  a small  majority,  while  Cleveland 
lost  the  state  by  7,000  votes.  This  gave  color  to 
charges  that  the  enemies  of  the  President  had  made  a 
bargain  with  the  Republicans  by  which  the  latter  voted 
for  Hill  as  governor  and  the  Democrats  for  Harrison 
as  President. 

Benjamin  Harrison,  veteran  of  the  Civil  War  in 
which  he  had  attained  the  rank  of  brevet  brigadier- 
general,  and  senator  from  Indiana  for  a single  term, 
was  hardly  a party  leader  when  he  was  nominated  for 
the  presidency.  Although  he  was  by  no  means  un- 
known, he  had  been  sufficiently  obscure  to  be  uncon- 
nected with  factional  party  quarrels,  and  his  career  and 
character  were  without  blemish.  At  the  time  of  his  ac- 
cession to  the  executive  chair  he  was  fifty-six  years  of 
age,  a short  man  with  bearded  face,  and  with  head  set 
well  down  between  his  shoulders.  Accounts  of  his 
characteristics,  dra^vn  by  his  party  associates,  did  not 
differ  in  any  essential  detail.  As  a public  speaker,  the 
new  President  was  a man  of  unusual  charm — felicitous 
in  his  remarks,  versatile,  tactful.  In  a famous  trip 
through  the  South  and  West  in  1891,  he  made  speech 
after  speech  at  a wide  variety  of  places  and  occasions, 
and  created  a genuine  enthusiasm.  His  remarks  were 
widely  read  and  highly  regarded.  Nevertheless  there 
seems  to  have  been  some  truth  in  the  remark  of  one 
of  his  contemporaries  that  he  could  charm  ten  thou- 
sand men  in  a public  speech  but  meet  them  individually 
and  send  every  one  away  his  enemy.  His  manner, 
even  to  senators  and  representatives  of  his  own  party, 
was  reserved  to  the  point  of  frigidity.  When  he 
granted  requests  for  patronage  he  was  so  ungracious 
as  to  anger  the  recipients  of  favor.  Although  his  per- 
sonal character  and  integrity  were  as  unquestioned  as 


230 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


those  of  Hayes,  and  although  he  was  a man  of  cul- 
tured tastes,  well-informed,  thoughtful  and  conscien- 
tious, it  must  be  admitted  that  he  lacked  robust  leader- 
ship and  breadth  of  vision,  and  that  he  did  not  under- 
stand the  real  purposes  of  the  policies  which  his  party 
associates  were  embarking  upon,  or  if  he  did  that  he 
tamely  acquiesced  in  them.  The  party  leaders  were 
soon  engaged  in  initiating  practices  and  passing  leg- 
islation which  would  strengthen  the  organization  with 
certain  groups  of  interested  persons.  Harrison,  con- 
scientious but  aloof,  provided  no  compelling  force  to 
turn  attention  toward  wider  and  deeper  needs. 

Two  appointments  to  the  cabinet  were  important. 
Since  Blaine  was  the  foremost  leader  of  the  party  and 
had  done  much  to  bring  about  the  election  of  Harrison, 
it  was  well-nigh  impossible  for  the  latter  to  fail  to 
offer  him  the  position  of  Secretary  of  State.  The  ap- 
pointment was  so  natural  that  popular  opinion  looked 
upon  it  as  the  only  possibility,  yet  the  natures  of  the 
two  men  were  so  diverse  and  their  positions  in  the 
party  so  different  that  friction  seemed  likely  to  result. 
Even  before  the  administration  began  it  was  freely 
predicted  that  Blaine  would  “dominate”  the  cabinet,  a 
prophecy  that  might  well  create  a feeling  of  restraint 
between  the  two.  The  invitation  to  John  Wanamaker 
to  become  Postmaster-General  was  regarded  as  signifi- 
cant. Wanamaker  was  a wealthy  merchant  of  Phila- 
delphia, who  had  organized  an  advisory  campaign  com- 
mittee of  business  men  which  contributed  and  ex- 
pended large  sums  of  money  during  the  canvass.  Crit- 
ical reformers  like  the  editor  of  The  Nation  were  not 
slow  to  connect  Wanamaker ’s  large  contribution  to  the 
campaign  fund  with  his  elevation  to  the  cabinet,  and 
to  suggest  that  the  business  interests  were  being 
brought  into  close  relations  with  the  administration. 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM 


231 


T.  C.  Platt,  expectant  of  a return  for  his  campaign  as- 
sistance, in  the  form  of  a cabinet  position,  and  in  fact 
imderstancling-  that  a pledge  had  been  made  that  he 
would  be  appointed,  found  himself  superseded  by  AYil- 
liam  Windom  of  Minnesota  in  the  Treasury  and  became 
a bitter  opponent  of  the  Presidents 

It  was  an  odd  turn  of  the  fortune  of  politics  that 
brought  Benjamin  Harrison  face  to  face  with  the  re- 
sponsibility for  furthering  the  cause  of  civil  service 
reform — the  same  Harrison  who,  as  a senator,  had 
sneered  at  Cleveland  for  surrendering  to  difficulties. 
The  party  platform  had  urged  the  continuation  of  re- 
form, which  had  been  “auspiciously  begun  under  the 
Republican  administration”  and  had  declared  that  the 
party  promises  would  not  be  broken  as  Democratic 
pledges  had  been;  and  Harrison  had  announced  his  ad- 
herence to  the  party  statement.  In  some  respects  real 
progress  was  made.  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Tracy  in- 
troduced reform  methods  in  his  department.  The  ap- 
pointment of  Theodore  Roosevelt  to  the  Civil  Service 
Commission  was  productive  of  good  results.  The  work 
of  reform  was  defended,  forcefully  and  successfully; 
its  opponents  were  challenged  to  substantiate  their 
charges.  When  Senator  Gorman  declared  that  in  an 
examination  for  letter  carriers  in  Baltimore  the  candi- 
dates were  asked  to  tell  the  most  direct  route  from 
Baltimore  to  China,  Roosevelt  at  once  wrote  asking 
him  to  state  the  time  and  place  of  the  examination  him- 
self or  to  send  somebody  to  look  over  the  papers, 
copies  of  which  were  in  the  commission’s  office.  The 
senator  did  not  reply. 

The  removal  of  office  holders,  however,  proceeded 

1 The  remaining  members  of  the  cabinet  were:  Eedfield  Proctor,  Vt., 
Secretary  of  War;  W.  H.  H.  Miller,  Ind.,  Attorney-General;  B.  F.  Tracy, 
X.  Y.,  Secretary  of  the  Navy;  J.  W.  Xoble,  Mo.,  Secretarj^  of  the  In- 
terior; J.  M.  Rusk,  Wis.,  Secretary  of  Agriculture. 


232 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


with  amazing  rapidity.  The  First  Assistant  Post- 
master-General was  J.  S.  Clarkson,  who  had  been  vice- 
chairman  of  the  Republican  National  Campaign  Com- 
mittee. The  speed  with  which  he  cleared  the  service 
of  Democrats  earned  him  the  title  “headsman”  and 
is  indicated  by  the  estimate  that  he  removed  one  every 
three  minutes  for  the  first  year.  When  the  force  of 
clerks  was  increased  for  the  taking  of  the  census  of 
1890,  the  superintendent  of  the  census  office  found 
himself  “waist  deep  in  congressmen”  trying  to  get 
places  for  friends.  The  Republican  postmaster  of  New 
York  who  had  been  continued  by  Cleveland  was  not  re- 
appointed. It  was  soon  discovered,  also,  that  the 
President  was  placing  his  own  and  his  wife’s  rela- 
tives in  office  and  giving  positions  to  large  numbers 
of  newspaper  editors,  thus  indirectly  subsidizing  the 
press.  The  Commissioner  of  Pensions,  Corporal 
James  Tanner,  distributed  pensions  so  freely  as  to 
arouse  wide-spread  comment  and  was  soon  relieved  of 
his  position.^ 

Curtis,  addressing  the  National  Civil  Service  Re- 
form League,  flayed  the  President  because  he  had 
despoiled  the  service.  A Republican  newspaper,  he 
declared,  had  said  that  the  administration  whistled  re- 
form down  the  wind  “as  remorselessly  as  it  would  dis- 
miss an  objectionable  tramp.”  Prominent  members  of 
the  party  went  to  the  President  in  person  to  urge  on 
him  the  redemption  of  the  platform  promises. 

Although  progress  was  not  general,  nevertheless 
there  were  particular  reforms  that  commended  them- 

1 Corporal  Tanner  is  commonly  supposed  to  have  been  so  anxious  to 
have  a hand  in  the  generous  distribution  of  government  revenue  among 
the  old  soldiers  that  he  declared  one  morning  as  he  seated  himself  at 
his  desk,  “God  help  the  surplus.”  This  is  a mistake,  although  the  Cor- 
poral seems  to  have  been  more  ready  than  the  President  to  act  quickly 
and  generously  on  claims. 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM 


233 


selves.  The  offensive  Clarkson  gave  way  to  hostile 
criticism  and  retired.  During  the  last  half  of  the  ad- 
ministration, the  civil  service  rules  were  amended  so 
as  to  add  a considerable  number  of  employees  to  the 
classified  service,  especially  in  the  postoflBce  depart- 
ment. Quay  and  Dudley  found  their  methods  con- 
demned by  public  opinion  and  resigned  their  positions 
on  the  National  Republican  Committee.^ 

Aside  from  his  choice  of  subordinates,  Harrison  con- 
tributed little  to  the  political  history  of  his  adminis- 
tration, for  the  leadership  was  seized  by  a small  co- 
terie of  extreme  Republicans  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, of  whom  the  chief  figure  was  the  Speaker, 
Thomas  B.  Reed.  The  House  which  had  been  elected 
with  Harrison  contained  159  Democrats  and  166  Re- 
publicans. The  Republican  majority  was  too  slight  for 
safety,  for  the  questions  which  were  coming  before 
Congress  were  such  as  to  arouse  party  feeling  to  a 
high  pitch.  The  Republicans  felt  themselves  commis- 
sioned, by  a successful  election,  to  put  the  party  pro- 
gram into  force,  but  so  powerful  a minority  could 
readily  block  any  legislation  under  the  existing  par- 
liamentary rules.  Only  Reed  knew  what  expedient 
would  be  resorted  to  in  the  attempt  to  put  through  the 
party  program,  and  not  even  he  could  guarantee  that 
the  adventure  would  be  successful. 

Thomas  B.  Reed  had  long  represented  Maine  in  the 
House  of  Representatives.  He  was  a man  of  huge 
bulk,  bland  in  appearance,  imperturbable  in  his  seren- 
ity, caustic,  concise  and  witty  of  tongue,  rough,  sharp, 

1 The  open  character  of  the  financial  corruption  of  the  campaign  also 
gave  impetus  to  the  movement  for  the  secret  or  Australian  ballot  which 
was  first  introduced  in  Louisville,  Ky.,  on  Feb.  28,  1888,  and  in  Massa- 
chusetts on  May  20,  of  the  same  year.  Another  reform  movement  was 
that  which  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  the  Louisiana  lottery.  Cf. 
A.  K.  McClure,  Recollections,  173-183,  and  Peck,  Twenty  Years,  215-220. 


234 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


strong,  droll.  In  the  cut-and-tlirust  of  parliamentary 
debate  and  manoeuvre,  as  well  as  in  his  knowledge  of 
the  intricacies  of  procedure,  Reed  was  a past  master. 
He  worsted  his  adversaries  by  turning  the  laugh  on 
them,  and  his  stinging  retorts,  which  swept  the  House 
“like  grapeshot,”  made  him  a powerful  factor  in  part- 
isan contests.^ 

The  political  and  economic  philosophy  of  Reed  and 
his  associates  was  unusually  important,  because  it  con- 
trolled their  action  during  the  time  when  they  dom- 
inated the  House  and  determined  the  character  of  the 
legislation  passed  during  Harrison’s  time.  When 
President  Cleveland’s  tariff  message  welded  the  Demo- 
crats together  to  demand  reduction,  it  likewise  in- 
fluenced the  Republicans  to  adopt  the  other  extreme. 
That  is  not  to  say,  of  course,  that  the  Republican  at- 
titude was  due  solely  to  Cleveland,  for  the  party  was 
already  committed  to  protectionism.  Nevertheless, 
many  of  its  prominent  leaders,  including  its  presi- 
dents, had  urged  revision.  That  recommendation  was 
now  no  longer  heard.  Such  men  as  McKinley  in  the 
House  fairly  apotheosized  the  protective  system.  The 
philosophy  of  the  party  leaders  received  full  exposi- 
tion in  a volume  edited  by  John  D.  Long,  ex-governor 
of  Massachusetts,  and  composed  of  articles  written  by 
sixteen  of  the  most  prominent  Republicans.  It  had 
been  published  during  the  campaign.  The  attitude  of 
the  party  toward  its  chief  tenet  was  expressed  in  the 
phrase,  “The  Republican  party  enacted  a protective 
tariff  which  made  the  United  States  the  greatest  manu- 

1 An  incident  which  occurred  when  he  was  not  speaker  may  serve  to 
illustrate  the  manner  in  which  he  routed  his  opponents,  nejiresentative 
Springer,  of  Illinois,  who  had  a reputation  for  loquacity  and  insincerity, 
once  asked  for  unanimous  consent  to  correct  a statement  which  he  had 
))i-eviously  made  in  debate.  “No  correction  needed,”  shouted  Keed.  “We 
didn’t  think  it  was  so  when  you  made  it.” 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM 


235 


facturing  nation  on  earth”;  and  its  conception  of  the 
Democratic  party  in  the  statement  that  the  Democrats 
were  mainly  old  slave-holders,  liquor  dealers  and  crim- 
inals in  the  great  northern  cities.  In  the  field  of  na- 
tional expenditure,  also,  the  party  reacted  from  Cleve- 
land’s frugality.  Senator  Dolph  frankly  urged  the  ex- 
penditure of  the  surplus  revenue  rather  than  the  re- 
duction of  taxation.  McKinley  took  the  position  that 
prices  might  he  too  low.  “I  do  not  jorize  the  word 
cheap,”  he  said;  “cheap  merchandise  means  cheap 
men  and  cheap  men  mean  a cheap  country.  ’ ’ Harrison 
remarked  that  it  was  “no  time  to  he  weighing  the 
claims  of  old  soldiers  with  apothecary’s  scales.”  This 
philosophy  was  now  to  have  its  trial,  but  first  the  ob- 
structive power  of  the  minority  must  be  curbed. 
Reed’s  plan  for  accomplishing  this  result  appeared 
late  in  January,  1890. 

A contested  election  case  was  up  for  decision  in  the 
House.  The  roll  was  called  and  three  less  than  a 
quorum  of  representatives  answered.  Scores  of  Demo- 
crats were  present,  but  by  merely  refusing  to  answer 
to  their  names  they  could  be  officially  absent.  Unless 
the  Republicans  could  provide  a quorum — that  is,  more 
than  half  the  total  membership  of  the  chamber — of 
their  ovtl  number,  they  were  helpless.  Clearly  they 
could  not  muster  their  full  force  at  all  times  and  es- 
pecially on  questions  upon  which  the  party  might  be 
divided.  On  the  other  hand,  the  right  to  refuse  to 
vote  was  a long-standing  one  and  had  been  used  over 
and  over  again  by  Republicans  as  well  as  Democrats. 
Reed,  however,  had  made  up  his  mind  to  cut  the 
(rordian  knot.  Looking  over  the  House  he  called  the 
names  of  about  forty  Democrats,  directed  the  clerk  to 
make  note  of  them  and  then  declared  a quorum  pres- 
ent. The  meaning  of  the  act  was  not  lost  on  the  op- 


236 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


position.  Pandemonium  broke  loose.  Members  rushed 
up  the  aisle  as  if  to  attack  the  Speaker,  but  Reed, 
huge,  fearless  and  undisturbed,  stood  his  ground. 
The  Democrats  hissed  and  jeered  and  denounced  him 
with  a wrath  which  was  not  mollifie'd  by  the  derisive 
laughter  of  the  Republicans,  who  were  surprised  by 
the  ruling,  but  rallied  to  their  leader.  Two  days  later, 
when  a member  moved  to  adjourn,  the  Speaker  ruled 
the  motion  out  of  order  and  refused  to  entertain  any 
appeal  from  his  decision.  He  then  firmly  but  quietly 
stated  his  belief  that  the  will  of  the  majority  ought 
not  to  be  nullified  by  a minority  and  that  if  parlia- 
mentary rules  were  used  solely  for  purposes  of  delay, 
it  was  the  duty  of  the  Speaker  to  take  “the  proper 
course.” 

The  rules  committee  then  presented  a series  of 
recommendations  designed  to  expedite  business.  One 
of  the  proposed  changes  provided  that  the  chair  should 
entertain  no  dilatory  motions.  Such  motions,  whose 
purpose  was  merely  to  obstruct  action,  had  long  been 
common.  Opponents  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  of 
1854  were  said  to  have  alternated  motions  to  adjourn 
and  fix  a day  for  adjournment  no  less  than  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty-eight  times  in  their  attempt  to  defeat 
the  measure.  The  second  rule  allowed  the  speaker  to 
count  members  who  were  present  and  not  voting  in  de- 
termining whether  a quorum  was  present.  Other  rules 
systematized  procedure  and  facilitated  the  passage  of 
legislation.  The  Democrats  raged,  denounced  Reed  as 
a “Czar,”  fought  against  the  adoption  of  the  rules — 
all  to  no  avail.  The  majority  had  its  way ; the  Speaker 
dominated  legislation.^ 

1 In  his  Manual  of  General  Parliamentary  Law,  Reed  declared  that 
the  House  prior  to  1890  was  the  most  unwieldy  parliamentary  body  in 
the  world.  Three  resolute  men,  he  asserted,  could  stop  all  public  husi- 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM 


237 


Tlie  efficacy  of  the  Reed  reforms  in  expediting  legis- 
lation was  quickly  demonstrated.  One  of  the  earlies-t 
proposals  to  pass  the  House  was  Henry  Cabot  Lodge’s 
federal  election  law,  which  was  intended  to  insure  fed- 
eral control  at  polling  places.  Theoretically  the  meas- 
ure was  applicable  to  the  North  as  well  as  to  the  South, 
but  no  doubt  existed  that  it  was  really  designed  to  pre- 
vent southern  suppression  of  the  negro  vote.  The 
Democrats  rallied  to  the  opposition  and  denounced 
Lodge’s  plan  as  a “force  act.”  Despite  objections  it 
passed  the  House,  but  it  languished  in  the  Senate  and 
finally  was  abandoned.  The  generous  expenditure  pol- 
icy which  the  new  philosophy  called  for  brought  forth 
certain  increases  which  were  noteworthy.  The  de- 
pendent pension  bill  which  Cleveland  had  vetoed  was 
passed,  and  a direct  tax  which  had  been  levied  on  the 
states  during  the  Civil  "War  was  refunded.  Another 
extreme  party  measure  was  the  Sherman  silver  act 
which  became  law  on  July  14,  1890.  By  it,  4,500,000 
ounces  of  silver  were  to  be  purchased  each  month. 
Its  partisan  character  was  indicated  by  the  fact  that 
no  Republicans  voted  against  it,  and  no  Democrats  for 
it.  Since  the  amount  of  silver  to  be  purchased  was 
practically  the  total  output  of  the  country,  it  was  evi- 
dent that  the  western  mine  owners  were  receiving  the 
same  attention  that  was  being  accorded  manufacturers 
who  sought  protective  tariff  laws.  Indeed,  western 
Republicans,  who  were  opposed  to  the  high  tariff  which 
eastern  Republicans  favored,  were  brought  to  support 
such  legislation  only  by  a bargain  through  which  each 
side  assisted  the  other  in  getting  what  it  desired.^ 

ness.  A few  years  later,  when  the  Democrats  were  in  power,  they 
adopted  the  plans  which  Eeed  had  so  successfully  used. 

1 These  acts  were  part  of  the  general  financial  history  of  the  period 
and  in  that  connection  demand-  fuller  discussion  at  a later  point.  Cf. 
Chap.  XV. 


238 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


The  tariff  measure  which  was  thus  entAvined  Avith 
the  silver  bill  Avas  intended  to  carry  out  the  pledge 
made  in  the  party  platform.  Harrison  had  early  called 
the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  need  of  a reduction 
of  the  surplus,  had  urged  the  passage  of  a noAV  tariff 
laAv  and  the  remoAml  of  the  tobacco  tax  AAdiich,  he  de- 
clared, would  take  a burden  from  an  “important  agri- 
cultural product.”  The  framing  of  the  bill  was  in 
the  hands  of  William  McKinley,  the  chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Ways  and  Means.  McKinley  Avas  a 
thorough-going  protectionist  whose  attitude  on  the 
question  had  already  been  expressed  someAvhat  as  fol- 
loAvs:  previous  Democratic  tariffs  have  brought  the 
country  to  the  brink  of  financial  ruin ; Avithout  the  pro- 
tective tariff  English  manufacturers  Avould  monopolize 
American  markets;  under  the  protective  system  the 
foreign  manufacturer  largely  pays  the  tax  through  les- 
sened profits;  under  protection  the  American  laborer 
is  the  best  paid,  clothed  and  contented  workingman  in 
the  Avorld ; since  it  is  necessary,  then,  to  preserve  pro- 
tection, the  surplus  should  be  reduced  by  the  elimina- 
tion of  the  internal  revenues;  and  protective  tariff 
duties  should  be  raised  and  retained,  not  gradually 
loAvered  and  done  aAAmy  Avith. 

The  Committee  early  proceeded  to  hold  public  hear- 
ings at  Avhich  testimony  AA^as  taken,  and  to  Avhich  manu- 
facturers came  from  all  over  the  country  to  make 
knoAvn  what  duties  they  thought  they  ought  to  haA^e. 
The  bill  which  was  finally  presented  to  the  House  pro- 
posed a leA^el  of  duties  Avhich  Avas  so  high  that  it  has 
generally  been  considered  the  extreme  of  protection. 
McKinley  himself  justified  the  high  rates  only  on  the 
ground  that  AAuthout  them  the  bill  could  not  be  passed. 
With  the  help  of  the  Reed  rules  and  the  Avestern  Re- 
publicans the  McKinley  tariff  reached  the  President 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM  239 

and  was  signed  by  him  on  October  1,  1890.  It  went 
into  effect  at  once. 

The  more  prominent  features  of  the  measure  sprang 
from  the  tariff  creed  which  had  been  advocated  through 
the  campaign.  In  order  to  conciliate  the  farmers,  the 
protective  principle  was  applied  to  agricultural  pro- 
ducts, and  tariffs  Avere  laid  on  such  articles  as  cereals, 
potatoes  and  flax.  On  the  cheaper  grades  of  wool  and 
Avoolens  and  on  carpet  avooIs  there  Avas  a slight  rise 
OA^er  even  the  rates  of  1883.  On  the  higher  grades  of 
Avoolen,  linen  and  clothing  the  increase  A\"as  marked. 
The  duty  on  raAv  sugar  was  removed  and  one-half  cent 
per  pound  retained  on  the  refined  product,  but  domes- 
tic sugar  producers  AA^ere  gUen  a bounty  of  tAA^o  cents 
a pound  in  order  to  protect  them  against  the  free  im- 
portation of  the  raAA^  m.aterial.  As  the  sugar  dutA^  had 
been  productiA^e  of  large  amounts  of  revenue,  its  re- 
mission reduced  the  surplus  by  about  sixty  to  seA^enty 
millions  of  dollars.  In  order  to  encourage  the  manu- 
facture of  tin-plates,  a considerable  duty  AAms  imposed, 
AA’hich  AA’as  to  cease  after  1897  unless  domestic  produc- 
tion reached  specified  amounts.  As  the  result  of 
Blaine’s  urgency,  a reciprocity  feature  Avas  introduced. 
The  usual  plan  had  been  to  reduce  duties  on  certain 
products  in  case  concessions  to  American  goods  Avere 
gUen  by  the  exporting  countries,  but  in  the  McKinley 
act  the  Senate  inserted  a noA’el  provision.  Instead  of 
being  given  poAver  to  loAA^er  duties  in  case  reciprocal 
reductions  AA^ere  made,  the  President  Avas  authorized 
to  impose  duties  on  certain  articles  on  the  free  list 
AAdien  the  exporting  nation  leAued  “unjust  or  unreason- 
able” customs  charges  on  American  products.  It  Avas 
expected  that  this  plan  AAmuld  be  applied  to  Latin- 
American  countries  and  AA^ould  increase  our  exports 
to  them  in  return  for  sugar,  molasses,  tea,  coffee  and 


240 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


hides.  Ill  general,  the  McKinley  act  was  the  climax  of  , 
protection.  Under  the  impetus  of  President  Cleve- 
land’s reduction  challenge,  the  Republican  party  had  i 
recoiled  to  the  extreme.  I 

The  high  rates  levied  by  the  new  tariff  act  were  j 
quickly  reflected  in  retail  prices  and  caused  immediate  ! 
and  wide-spread  discontent.  The  benefits  which  the  j 

fanner  had  been  led  to  expect  did  not  put  in  their  ap-  1 
pearance.  Unhappily  for  McKinley  and  his  associates 
the  congressional  elections  occurred  early  in  Novem- 
ber, scarcely  a month  after  the  new  law  went  into  ef- 
fect, and  when  the  dissatisfaction  was  at  its  height. 
The  result  was  a stinging  defeat  for  the  Republicans. 
The  159  Democrats  were  increased  to  235,  and  the 
166  Republicans  dwindled  to  88.  Even  in  New  Eng- 
land the  Democrats  gained  eleven  members,  in  New 
York  eight,  and  in  Iowa  five.  In  Wisconsin  not  one 
Republican  survived,  and  among  the  lost  in  Ohio  was 
McKinley  himself. 

Although  the  Republicans  retained  control  of  the 
Senate  after  1890,  the  Democratic  House  brought  an 
end  for  a time  to  the  domination  of  Reed  and  the 
primacy  of  the  lower  chamber  in  the  government. 
Such  extreme  legislation  as  had  characterized  the  first 
half  of  the  Harrison  regime  stopped  abruptly.  The 
role  played  in  all  this  by  Harrison  himself  seems  to 
have  been  a minor  one.  Many  of  his  recommendations 
lacked  the  solid  character  of  those  made  by  Hayes, 
Arthur  and  Cleveland,  and  he  did  not  make  his  influ- 
ence felt  in  connection  with  the  silver  legislation,  of 
which  he  probably  disapproved.  It  is  significant  that 
the  one  piece  of  legislation  which  had  the  most  endur- 
ing results  was  not  a partisan  act.  This  act,  the  Sher- 
man Anti-Trust  law,  demands  attention  in  detail. 


EXTREME  REPUBLICANISM 


241 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

In  addition  to  the  general  and  special  works  already  men- 
tioned, C.  Hedges,  Benjamin  Harrison:  Speeches  (1892),  pro- 
vides useful  material;  Cleveland’s  tariff  message  of  Dec.  6, 
1887  is  in  J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the 
Presidents,  VIII,  580-591. 

On  the  administration,  and  particularly  the  ascendency  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  under  Reed,  consult : De  A.  S. 
Alexander,  History  and  Procedure  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives (1916)  ; Mary  P.  Follett,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  (1896)  ; C.  S.  Olcott,  William  McKinley  (2 
vols.,  1916)  ; J.  G.  Cannon  in  Harper’s  Magazine  (Mar., 
1920)  ; Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1890,  pp.  181-191 ; S.  W.  McCall, 
Thomas  B.  Reed  (1914),  well  written,  although  adding  little 
to  what  was  already  known;  H.  D.  Croly,  Marcus  A.  Hanna 
(1912)  ; W.  D.  Foulke,  Fighting  the  Spoilsman  (1919),  on 
Harrison  and  the  civil  service ; G.  W.  Curtis,  Orations  and 
Addresses  (2  vols.,  1894),  summarizes  the  administration’s 
attitude  toward  civil  service;  T.  B.  Reed,  Reed’s  Rules,  A 
Manual  of  General  Parliamentary  Law  (1894),  gives  a concise 
summary  of  parliamentary  conditions  from  Reed’s  stand- 
point; H.  B.  Fuller,  The  Speakers  of  the  House  (1909),  ex- 
cellent on  the  personal  side.  The  tariff  is  well  treated  in 
Stanwood,  Taussig  and  Tarbell.  On  pensions  consult  W.  H. 
Glasson,  History  of  Military  Pension  Legislation  in  the  United 
States  (1900),  or  better,  the  same  author’s  Federal  Military 
Pensions  in  the  United  States  (1918). 


CHAPTER  XI 


INDUSTBY  AND  LAISSEZ  FAIRE 

About  the  time  the  Sherman  Anti-trust  law  was 
being  passed,  in  1890,  Henry  D.  Lloyd  was  writ- 
ing his  book  Wealth  Against  Commonwealth,  in  which 
occurred  a memorable  passage: 

A small  number  of  men  are  obtaining  the  power  to  forbid 
any  but  themselves  to  supply  the  people  with  fire  in  nearly 
every  form  known  to  modern  life  and  industry,  from  matches 
to  locomotives  and  electricity.  They  control  our  hard  coal 
and  much  of  the  soft,  and  stoves,  furnaces,  and  steam  and  hot- 
water  heaters ; the  governors  on  steam-boilers  and  the  boilers ; 
gas  and  gas-fixtures ; natural  gas  and  gas-pipes ; electric  light- 
ing, and  all  the  appurtenances.  You  cannot  free  yourself  by 
changing  from  electricity  to  gas,  or  from  the  gas  of  the  city 
to  the  gas  of  the  fields.  If  you  fly  from  kerosene  to  candles, 
you  are  still  under  the  ban. 

To  understand  the  dangers  of  the  monopolies  which 
Lloyd  feared  and  denounced,  it  is  necessary  to  know 
the  principal  features  in  the  development  of  American 
industry  from  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  to  1890. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  consolidation  of 
small  railroad  lines  into  large  systems  was  accom- 
panied by  such  advantages  to  the  companies  and  to  the 
travelling  public,  as  to  demonstrate  that  combination 
was  the  inevitable  order  of  the  day.  The  similar  in- 
tegration of  small  industrial  and  commercial  enter- 
prises took  place  more  slowly  between  1870  and  1890, 
but  the  process  was  no  less  inevitable  on  that  account. 

242 


INDUSTRY  AND  LAISSEZ  FAIRE  243 


The  census  of  1890  indicated  that  the  production  of 
manufactured  articles  had  greatly  increased  since 
1870;  more  capital  was  engaged;  the  product  was  more 
valuable;  and  more  workmen  were  employed.  Never- 
theless the  number  of  establishments  which  were  in  op- 
eration had  shown  a considerable  decline  in  many  in- 
dustries. An  army  of  100,000  employees  represented 
the  expansion  of  the  wage-earning  force  in  the  iron 
and  steel  works,  for  example,  and  $270,000,000  the  in- 
crease in  the  value  of  their  products;  yet  the  number 
of  establishments  engaged  showed  a shrinkage  of 
nearly  fourteen  per  cent.  The  workers  in  the  textile 
mills  grew  from  275,000  to  512,000,  and  the  capital  out- 
lay from  $300,000,000  to  $750,000,000,  but  the  number 
of  factories  declined  from  4,790  to  4,114.  A cartoon  in 
Puck  on  January  26,  1881,  remarked  that  “the  tele- 
graph companies  have  been  consolidated,  which  in  sim- 
ple language  means  that  Mr.  Jay  Gould  controls  every 
wire  in  the  United  States  over  which  a telegram  can 
be  sent.” 

Some  of  the  reasons  for  the  prevalent  tendency  to- 
ward combination  were  not  hard  to  discover.  In  the 
first  place,  although  industrial  organizations  fought 
one  another  with  the  utmost  bitterness,  it  was  in  the 
nature  of  things  for  them  to  combine  if  threatened  by 
any  common  foe.  IMoreover,  production  on  a large 
scale  made  possible  savings  and  improvements  that 
were  outside  the  grasp  of  more  modest  enterprises; 
buying  and  selling  large  quantities  of  goods  com- 
manded opportunities  for  profit ; waste  products  could 
be  made  use  of  and  costly  scientific  investigations  con- 
ducted in  order  to  discover  improved  methods,  over- 
come difficulties  and  open  new  avenues  of  activity; 
large  salaries  and  important  positions  could  be  of- 
fered to  men  of  executive  capacity;  and  expensive 


244 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


equipment  could  be  purchased  and  utilized^  An  effec- 
tive force  which  tended  to  drive  industries  to  combine 
was  the  cut-throat  competition  which  prevailed.  Her- 
bert Croly  in  his  stimulating  book  The  Promise  of 
American  Life  vividly  describes  the  bitter,  warlike 
character  of  industrial  competition  after  1865.  Com- 
petition was  battle  to  the  knife  and  tomahawk.  The 
leaders  were  constantly  seeking  bigger  operations,  to 
which  the  bigger  risks  only  added  zest.  A company 
might  be  making  unbelievable  profits  one  year  and 
“skirting”  bankruptcy  the  next.  Exciting  as  all  this 
was,  however,  the  desire  for  adventure  was  not  as  pow- 
erful as  the  desire  for  profits,  and  cut-throat  competi- 
tion in  industry  led  as  naturally  to  combination,  as 
rate-wars  on  the  railroads  led  to  pooling  agreements. 

An  important  factor  in  the  development  of  large 
corporations  was  the  increasing  use  of  the  corpora- 
tion form  of  industrial  organization,  as  contrasted 
with  the  co-partnership  plan.  If  a few  men  enter  a co- 
partnership, each  of  them  must  supply  a considerable 
amount  of  capital;  but  if  a corporation  is  formed  and 
stock  is  sold,  the  par  value  of  the  shares  may  be  placed 
at  a low  figure — $100  or  less,  for  example — and  fhus  a 
large  number  of  persons  may  be  able  to  establish  an 
industry  which  is  far  beyond  the  financial  resources 
of  any  individual  or  small  group  among  them.  The 
corporation,  moreover,  is  relatively  permanent,  for 
the  death  of  one  stock-holder  among  many  is  unim- 
portant as  compared  with  that  of  one  member  of  a co- 

1 Charles  M.  Schwab  mentions  an  unusual  example.  Under  the  direc- 
tion of  Andrew  Carnegie,  the  wealthy  steel  magnate,  he  had  a new  mill 
erected,  which  seemed  likely  to  meet  all  the  demands  which  would  be 
placed  upon  it.  But  in  the  process  of  building  it  Schwab  had  seen  a 
single  way  in  which  it  could  be  improved.  Carnegie  at  once  gave  orders 
to  have  the  mill  taken  down  before  being  used  at  all,  and  rebuilt  on  the 
improved  plan. 


INDUSTRY  AND  LAISSEZ  FAIRE  245 


partnership.  In  case  of  disaster  to  the  enterprise  the 
liability  of  the  stock-holder  in  a corporation  is  limited 
to  the  amount  which  he  has  invested,  while  any  member 
of  a partnership  may  be  legally  held  for  all  the  debts 
of  the  organization.  IVith  such  advantages  in  its 
favor  the  corporation  plan  largely  dominated  the  or- 
ganization of  industry. 

The  most  famous  example  of  combination  before 
1800'  was"  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  which  was  the 
cause  of  more  litigation,  more  study  and  more  com- 
plaint than  any  other  industrial  organization  that  has 
ever  existed  in  America.  In  1865  Rockefeller  &:  An- 
drews started  an  oil-refining'  business  in  Cleveland, 
Ohio.  Samuel  Andrews  was  a mechanical  genius  and 
he  attended  to  the  technical  end  of  the  industry;  John 
D.  Rockefeller  had  bargaining  capacity,  and  to  him 
fell  the  task  of  buying  the  crude  oil,  providing  barrels 
and  other  materials  and  selling  the  product.  The 
firm  prospered.  H.  M.  Flagler  was  taken  into  the 
company  and  a branch  was  established  in  New  York. 
In  1870  these  three  with  a few  others  organized  the 
Standard  Oil  Company  of  Ohio,  with  a capitalization 
of  a million  dollars.  It  controlled  not  over  ten  per 
cent,  of  the  business  of  oil-refining  in  the  United  States 
at  that  time.  But  the  oil  business  was  so  profitable 
that  capital  flowed  into  it  and  competition  became 
keen.  Rockefeller  and  some  associates,  therefore,  de- 
vised the  South  Improvement  Company  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, a combination  of  refiners,  headed  and  controlled 
by  the  Standard,  the  purpose  of  which  wms  to  make 
advantageous  arrangements  with  the  railroads  for 
transportation  facilities.  Early  in  1872,  a most  re- 
markable contract  was  signed  betw’een  the  comiiany 
and  the  important  railroads  of  the  oil  country — the 
Pennsylvania,  the  New  York  Central  and  the  Erie. 


246 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


By  it  the  roads  agreed  to  establish  certain  freight 
rates  from  the  crude-oil  producing  region  of  western 
PennsylvaniaAo  such  rehning  and  shipping  centers  as 
New  York,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Pittsburg  and 
Cleveland.  From  these  rates  the  South  Improvement 
Company  was  to  receive  substantial  rebates,  amount- 
ing to  forty  or  fifty  per  cent,  on  crude  oil  and  twenty- 
five  to  forty-five  per  cent,  on  refined.  On  their  side  the 
railroads  were  promised  the  entire  freight  business 
of  the  Company,  each  to  have  an  assured  proiiortion 
of  the  traffic,  with  freedom  from  rate-cutting  competi- 
tion. All  this  was  the  common  railroad  practice  of  the 
times. 

But  another  portion  of  the  contract  was  not  so  com- 
mon. It  provided  that  the  roads  should  give  the  South 
Improvement  Company  rebates  on  all  oil  shipped  by 
its  competitors  and  furnish  it  with  full  way-bills  of 
all  such  shipments  each  day.  In  other  words,  the  Com- 
pany was  to  know  exactly  the  amount  of  the  business 
of  its  competitors  and  with  whom  it  was  being  done. 
The  contract  allowed  the  roads  to  make  similar  re- 
bates with  anybody  offering  an  equal  amount  of  traf- 
fic, but  the  likelihood  of  such  an  outcome  was  slender 
in  the  extreme.  Armed  with  this  powerful  weapon. 
Rockefeller  entered  upon  a campaign  to  eliminate  com- 
petition by  offering  to  buy  out  independent  refiners 
either  with  cash  or  with  Standard  Oil  stock,  at  his  esti- 
mate of  the  value  of  their  property.  Those  who  ob- 
jected to  selling  were  sho^vn  that  the  alliance  between 
the  South  Improvement  Company  and  the  railroads 
was  so  strong  that  they  faced  the  alternative  of  giving 
way  or  being  crushed.  Of  the  twenty-six  refineries  in 
Cleveland,  at  least  twenty-one  yielded.  The  capacity 
of  the  Standard  leaped  from  1,500  to  10,000  barrels  a 
day  and  it  controlled  a fifth  of  the  refining  business  of 


INDUSTRY  AND  LAISSEZ  FAIRE  247 


the  country.  'When  these  facts  came  to  be  known  in 
the  oil  country,  the  bitter  Oil  W"ar  of  1872  began.  In- 
dependent producers  joined  to  tight  for  existence,  and 
at  length  the  railroads  gave  way  and  agreed  to 
abandon  the  contract  with  the  South  Improvement 
Company,  and  the  legislature  of  Pennsylvania  an- 
nulled its  charter,  although  in  one  way  or  another  re- 
bates continued  and  the  absorption  of  rivals  went  on. 
In  1882  the  entire  combination — thirty-nine  refiners, 
controlling  ninety  to  ninety-five  per  cent,  of  the  prod- 
uct— was  organized  as  the  Standard  Oil  Trust.  All 
stock-holders  in  the  combining  companies  surrendered 
their  certificates  and  received  in  return  receipts  or 
“trust-certificates,”  which  showed  the  amount  of  the 
owner’s  interest  in  the  trust.  In  order  to  secure  unity 
of  purpose  and  management,  the  affairs  of  the  com- 
bination were  put  into  the  hands  of  nine  trustees,  with 
Rockefeller  at  the  head. 

The  wonderful  success  of  the  Standard  Oil  Com- 
pany, however,  was  not  due  solely  to  the  alliance  with 
the  railroads,  although  this  advantage  came  at  a strate- 
gic time  when  it  was  fighting  for  supremacy.  Its  mar- 
keting department  gave  it  an  unenviable  reputation, 
but  achieved  amazing  success.  The  department  was 
organized  to  cover  the  country,  find  out  everything  pos- 
sible about  competitors,  and  then  kill  them  off  by  price- 
cutting  or  other  means.  The  great  resources  of  the 
Company  enabled  it  to  undersell  rivals,  going  below 
cost  if  necessary,  and  thus  wearing  out  opposition. 
Continuity  of  control,  also,  contributed  to  Standard 
success;  the  narrow  limits  of  the  area  in  which  the 
crude  oil  was  produced  before  1890  rendered  the  prob- 
lem of  securing  a monopoly  somewhat  easier;  the 
organization  was  extremely  efficient  and  the  constit- 
uent companies  were  stimulated  to  a high  degree  of 


248 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


productivity  by  encouraging  the  spirit  of  emulation; 
men  of  ability  were  called  to  its  high  positions;  the 
policy  of  gaining  the  mastery  over  the  trade  in  pe- 
troleum and  its  products  was  kept  definitely  and  per- 
sistently to  the  front;  and  then  there  was  John  D. 
Rockefeller. 

Rockefeller  was  what  used  to  be  called  a ‘‘self- 
made”  man.  He  began  his  business  life  in  Cleveland 
as  a clerk  at  an  extremely  modest  salary.  Capacity 
for  details  and  for  shrewd  bargaining,  patience,  fru- 
gality, seriousness,  secretiveness,  caution,  an  instinc- 
tive sense  for  business  openings,  self-control — all  these 
were  characteristic  both  of  the  Cleveland  clerk  and  the 
later  oil-refiner.  In  the  bigger  field  he  developed  a 
daring  caution,  a quick  understanding  of  the  value  of 
new  inventions,  a capacity  for  organization,  quick 
grasp  of  essentials  and  a resourcefulness  that  dom- 
inated the  entire  Standard  combination.  He  built  his 
own  barrels,  owned  the  pipe-lines,  tank-cars,  tank- 
wagons  and  warehouses.  Consolidation,  magnitude 
and  financial  returns  were  his  aims,  and  in  achieving 
these  he  and  his  associates  were  so  successful  as  to 
make  the  Standard  a leader  in  all  branches  of  busi- 
ness, except  the  ethics  of  industry.  Litigation  has 
been  the  constant  accompaniment  of  Standard 
progress. 

Following  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  other  com- 
binations found  the  trust  form  of  organization  a con- 
venient one.  The  cotton  trust,  the  whiskey  trust,  and 
the  sugar,  cotton  bagging,  copper  and  salt  trusts  made 
the  public  familiar  with  the  term.  Moreover,  popular 
suspicion  and  hostility  became  aroused,  and  the  word 
“trust”  began  to  acquire  something  of  the  unpleas- 
ant connotatiop  which  it  later  possessed. 

Although  it  was  upon  the  Standard  Oil  Company 


INDUSTRY  AND  LAISSEZ  FAIRE  249 


that  people  turned  when  they  denounced  the  trusts  and 
feared  or  condemned  their  practices,  the  principles  to 
which  the  Standard  adhered  when  under  the  strain  of 
competition  were  the  practices  which  were  followed  by 
their  contemporaries,  both  big  and  little.  When  the 
Diamond  Match  Company,  for  example,  was  before  the 
Courts  of  Michigan  in  1889,  it  appeared  that  the  or- 
ganization was  built  up  for  the  purpose  of  controlling 
the  manufacture  and  trade  in  matches  in  the  United 
States  and  Canada.  Its  policy  was  to  buy  up  and  ‘ ‘ re- 
move” competition,  so  that  it  might  monopolize  the 
manufacture  and  sale  of  matches.  It  could  then  fix 
the  price  of  its  commodity  at  such  a point  that  it 
could  recoup  itself  for  the  expense  of  eliminating  com- 
petitors and  also  make  larger  profits  than  were  pos- 
sible when  its  rivals  were  active. 

Still  more  dangerous  was  the  combination  of  the 
hard  coal  operators.  By  1873,  six  corporations  owned 
both  the  hard  coal  deposits  of  Pennsylvania  and  the 
railroads  which  made  it  possible  to  haul  the  coal  out 
to  the  markets.  In  the  same  year  and  later  these 
companies  made  agreements  which  determined  the 
amounts  of  coal  that  they  would  mine,  the  price  which 
they  would  charge,  and  the  proportion  of  the  whole 
output  that  each  company  would  be  allowed  to  handle. 
Independent  operators — that  is,  operators  not  in  the 
combination — found  their  existence  precarious  in  the 
extreme,  for  their  means  of  transportation  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  six  coal-carrying  railroads,  who  could 
raise  rates  almost  at  ’svill  and  find  reasons  even  for 
refusing  service.  The  states  were  powerless  to 
remedy  the  situation  because  their  authority  did  not 
extend  to  interstate  commerce,  yet  it  was  intolerable 
for  a small  group  of  interested  parties  to  have  power 
to  fix  the  output  of  so  necessary  a commodity  as  coal, 


250  SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 

on  no  other  basis  than  that  provided  by  their  own 
desires. 

Other  abuses  appeared  Avhich  showed  that  indus- 
trial combinations  were  open  to  many  of  the  com- 
plaints which,  in  connection  with  the  railroads,  had 
led  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act.  Industrial  pools 
resembled  railroad  pools  and  were  objected  to  for  simi- 
lar reasons.  Bankers  and  others  who  organized 
combinations  were  given  returns  that  seemed  as  ex- 
travagant as  the  prices  paid  to  railroad  construction 
companies ; the  issues  of  the  stock  of  corporations  were 
bought  and  sold  by  their  own  officers  for  speculative 
purposes;  and  stock- watering  was  as  common  as  in 
railroading.  The  industrial  combinations  also  had 
somewhat  the  same  effect  on  politics  that  the  railroads 
had.  Lloyd  declared  that  the  Standard  Oil  Company 
had  done  everything  with  the  Pennsylvania  legislature 
except  refine  it. 

One  of  the  most  noted  cases  of  corporation  influence 
in  politics  was  that  of  the  election  of  Senator  Henry 
B.  Payne  of  Ohio.  In  1886  the  legislature  of  the  state 
requested  the  United  States  Senate  to  investigate  the 
election  of  Payne  because  of  charges  of  Standard  Oil 
influence.  The  debate  over  the  case  showed  clearlj^  the 
belief  on  the  part  of  many  that  the  Standard,  which 
controlled  “business,  railroads,  men  and  things”  was 
also  choosing  United  States  senators.  Senator  Hoar 
raised  the  question  whether  the  Standard  was  repre- 
sented in  the  Senate  and  even  in  the  Cabinet.  In  de- 
nying any  connection  with  the  Oil  Company,  Payne 
himself  declared  that  no  institution  or  association  had 
been  “to  so  large  an  expense  in  money”  to  accom- 
plish his  defeat  when  he  was  a candidate  for  election 
to  the  lower  house.  Popular  suspicion  seemed  con- 
firmed, therefore,  that  the  Company  was  taking  an 


IXDUSTEY  AND  LAISSEZ  FAIRE  251 


active  share  in  government.  Whether  the  trust  was 
for  or  against  Payne  made  little  difference. 

A complaint  that  brought  the  trust  problem  to  the 
attention  of  many  who  were  not  interested  in  its  other 
aspects  was  the  treatment  accorded  independent  pro- 
ducers. The  rough-shod  methods  employed  by  the 
Standard  Oil  Company,  the  Diamond  Match  Company 
and  the  coal  operators  were  concretely  illustrated  in 
many  a city  and  town  by  such  incidents  as  that  of  a 
Pennsylvania  butcher  mentioned  by  Lloyd.  An  agent 
of  the  great  meat-slaughtering  firms  ordered  the 
butcher  to  cease  slaughtering  cattle,  and  when  he  re- 
fused the  agent  informed  him  that  his  business  would 
be  destroyed.  He  then  found  himself  unable  to  buy 
any  meat  whatever  from  Chicago,  the  meat-packing 
center,  and  discovered  that  the  railroad  would  not 
furnish  cars  to  transport  his  supplies.  Faced  by  such 
overwhelming  force,  the  independent  producer  was  gen- 
erally compelled  to  give  way  to  the  demands  of  the 
big  concerns  or  be  driven  to  the  wall.  The  helpless- 
ness of  the  individual  under  such  conditions  was  strik- 
ingly expressed  by  Mr.  Justice  Harlan  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  a decision  in  a suit  against  the  Standard  Oil 
Company : 

All  who  recall  the  condition  of  the  country  in  1890  will 
remember  that  there  was  everywhere,  among  the  people  gen- 
erally, a deep  feeling  of  unrest.  The  Nation  had  been  rid  of 
human  slavery  . . . but  the  conviction  was  universal  that  the 
country  was  in  real  danger  from  another  kind  of  slavery 
sought  to  be  fastened  on  the  American  people,  namely,  the 
slavery  that  would  result  from  aggregations  of  capital  in  the 
hands  of  a few  . . . controlling,  for  their  own  . . . advan- 
tage exclusively,  the  entire  business  of  the  country,  including 
the  production  and  sale  of  the  necessaries  of  life. 

Observers  noted  that  fortunes  which  outstripped  the 


252 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


possessions  of  princes  were  being  amassed  for  the 
few  by  combinations  which  sometimes,  if  not  fre- 
quently, resorted  to  illegal  and  unfair  practices,  and 
they  compared  these  conditions  with  the  labor  unrest, 
the  discontent  and  the  poverty  which  was  the  lot  of  the 
many. 

In  the  meanwhile  there  had  arisen  a growing  de- 
mand for  action  which  would  give  relief  from  the  con- 
ditions just  described.  As  early  as- 1879  the  Hepburn 
committee  appointed  by  the  New  York  Assembly  had 
investigated  the  railroads  and  liad  made  public  a mass 
of  information  concerning  the  relation  of  the  trans- 
portation system  to  the  industrial  combinations.  In 
1880  Henry  George  had  published  Progress  and  Pov- 
erty in  which  he  had  contended  that  the  entire  bur- 
den of  taxation  should  be  laid  upon  land  values,  in 
order  to  overcome  the  advantage  which  the  ownership 
of  land  gave  to  monopoly.  In  1881  Henry  D.  Lloyd 
had  fired  his  first  volley,  “The  Story  of  a Great  Mo- 
nopoly,” an  attack  on  the  Standard  Oil  Company 
which  was  published  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly  and  whicli 
caused  that  number  of  the  periodical  to  go  through 
seven  editions.^  In  1888  Edward  Bellamy’s  Looking 
Backward  had  pictured  a socialized  Utopian  state  in 
which  the  luxuries  as  weill  as  the  necessities  of  life 
were  produced  for  the  common  benefit  of  all  the  peo- 
ple. Societies  had  been  formed  for  the  propagation 
of  Bellamy’s  ideas,  and  the  parlor  study  of  socialism 
had  become  popular. 

The  platforms  of  the  political  parties  had  given  evi- 
dence of  a continuing  unrest  without  presenting  any 
definite  proposals  for  relief.  As  far  back  as  1872  the 
Labor  Reformers  had  condenmed  the  “capitalists” 

1 It  was  not  until  1804  that  Lloyd  published  Wealth  Aga^inst  Common- 
icealth,  but  his  pen  had  been  busy  constantly  between  1881  and  1894. 


INDUSTRY  AND  LAISSEZ  FAIRE  253 


for  importing  Chinese  laborers;  in  the  same  year  the 
Republicans  and  Democrats  had  opposed  further 
grants  of  public  land  to  corporations  and  monopolies 
— referring  in  the  main  to  the  railroads;  in  1880  the 
Greenbackers  and  in  1884  the  Anti-Monopolists,  the 
Prohibitionists  and  the  Democrats  had  denounced  the 
corporations  and  called  for  government  action  to  pre- 
vent or  control  them;  and  in  1888  the  Union  Labor 
party,  the  Prohibitionists  and  the  Republicans  had 
urged  legislation  for  doing  away  vith  or  regulating 
trusts  and  monopolies.  By  1890  eight  states  had  al- 
ready passed  anti-trust  laws.  Among  unorganized 
forces,  possibly  the  independent  producers  were  as 
effective  as  any.  Although  usually  overcome  by  the 
superior  strength  of  their  big  opponents,  they  fre- 
quently conducted  vigorous  contests  and  sometimes 
carried  the  issue  to  the  courts  where  damaging  evi- 
dence was  made  public. 

The  solution  of  the  problem  of  trust  control  was 
not  easy  to  discover.  The  amount  of  property  in- 
volved was  so  great  that  forceful  legislation  would  be 
fought  to  the  last  ditch;  while  legislation  that  was 
obviously  weak,  on  the  other  hand,  would  not  satisfy 
public  opinion.  Public  officials  were  hopelessly  di- 
vergent in  their  views.  Cleveland  had  called  attention 
to  the  evils  of  the  trusts  in  his  tariff  message  of  1887, 
but  had  laid  his  emphasis  on  the  need  of  reduced  taxa- 
tion rather  than  upon  control  of  the  great  combina- 
tions. Blaine  was  opposed  to  federal  action.  Thomas 
B.  Reed  had  characteristically  ridiculed  the  idea  that 
monopolies  existed : 

And  yet,  outside  the  Patent  OtBce  there  are  no  monopolies 
in  this  country,  and  there  never  can  be.  Ah,  but  what  is  that 
I see  on  the  far  horizon’s  edge,  with  tong’ue  of  lambent  flame 
and  eye  of  forked  fire,  serpent-headed  and  griffin-clawed? 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


'i54 

Surely  it  must  be  the  great  new  chimera  “Trust.”  Quick, 
cries  every  masked  member  of  the  Ways  and  Means.  Quick, 
let  us  lower  the  tariff.  Let  us  call  in  the  British.  Let  them 
save  our  devastated  homes. 

More  serious  Avas  the  almost  universal  lack  of  knowl- 
edge of  the  elements  involved  in  the  situation.  In- 
dustrial leaders  Avere  unenlightened  and  Avrapi^ed  up 
in  the  attempt  to  outdo  rWals  Avho  Avere  equally  un- 
enlightened and  absoi'hed;  the  nation  needed  instruc- 
tion and  leadership,  and  neither  was  to  be  found.  In- 
stead, the  poorer  classes  became  more  and  more  hos- 
tile to  big  business  interests;  the  capitalist  class  set 
itself  stolidly  to  the  preservation  of  its  interests.  The 
one  saAV  only  the  abuses,  the  other  only  the  benefits  of 
combinations.  Thoughtful  men  felt  that  industrialism 
Avas  afflicted  Avith  a malady  Avhich  Avould  kill  the  nation 
unless  a remedy  Avere  found. 

The  legal  and  constitutional  position  of  the  trusts 
Avas  almost  impregnable.  Ever  since  the  decision  of 
the  Supreme  CAurt  in  the  Dartmouth  College  case, 
handed  doAAui  in  1819,  franchises  and  charters  granted 
by  states  to  corporations  had  been  regarded  as  con- 
tracts Avhich  could  not  be  altered  by  subsequent  legis- 
lation. Moreover,  the  Court  had  so  interpreted  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  as  has  been  seen,  that  the 
states  had  found  great  difficulty  in  framing  regulatory 
legislation  that  Avould  pass  muster  before  the  judi- 
ciary.^ It  was  doubtful  AAdiether  federal  attempts  at 
regulation  Avould  be  more  fortunate.  More  funda- 
mental still,  for  public  opinion  underlies  even  consti- 
tutional interpretation,  American  industrial  and  com- 
mercial expansion  had  run  ahead  of  our  conception 
of  the  possible  and  proper  functions  of  government. 

1 Cf.  above,  pp.  89-93,  on  Fourteenth  Amendment. 


INDUSTRY  AND  LA18SEZ  FAlRE  255 


Government  as  the  protector  of  property  was  an  an- 
cient concept  and  commonly  held  in  the  United  States ; 
government  as  the  guardian  of  the  individual  against 
the  powerful  holder  of  a great  deal  of  property  was  a 
new  idea  and  not  generally  looked  upon  with  favor. 

It  has  already  been  seen  that  the  prevailing  eco- 
nomic theory,  laissez  faire,  was  diametrically  opposed 
to  government  regulation  of  the  economic  activities  of 
the  individual.  According  to  this  view,  unrestricted 
industrial  liberty  would  result  in  adjustment  by  busi- 
ness itself  on  honorable  lines.  Men  whose  integrity 
was  such  that  they  were  in  control  of  great  enterprises, 
asserted  an  attorney  for  the  Standard  Oil  Company, 
would  be  the  first  to  realize  that  a fair  policy  toward 
competitors  and  the  public  was  the  most  successful 
policy.  Combination  was  declared  to  be  inevitable  in 
modern  life  and  reductions  in  the  price  of  many  com- 
modities were  pointed  to  as  a justification  for  leaving 
the  trusts  unhampered. 

Public  opinion,  however,  was  reaching  the  point 
where  it  was  prepared  to  brush  aside  theoretical  diffi- 
culties. President  Harrison,  Senator  Sherman  and 
others  urged  action.  Large  numbers  of  anti-monopoly 
bills  were  presented  in  Congress.  The  indifference  of 
some  members  and  the  opposition  of  others  was  some- 
what neutralized  by  the  fiery  zeal  of  such  men  as 
Senator  Jones  of  Arkansas,  who  declared  that  the  for- 
tunes made  by  the  Standard  Oil  Company  did  not  rep- 
resent a single  dollar  of  honest  toil  or  one  trace  of 
benefit  to  mankind.  “The  sugar  trust,”  declared  the 
senator,  “has  its  ‘long,  felonious  fingers’  at  this  mo- 
ment in  every  man’s  pocket  in  the  United  States, 
deftly  extracting  with  the  same  audacity  the  pennies 
from  the  pockets  of  the  poor  and  the  dollars  from  the 
pockets  of  the  rich.” 


256 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


After  much  study  of  the  mass  of  suggested  legisla- 
tion, Congress  relied  upon  its  constitutional  power  to 
regulate  commerce  among  the  several  states  and  passed 
the  Sherman  Anti-trust  Ant,  which  received  President 
Harrison’s  signature  on  July  2,  1890.  Its  most  sig- 
nificant portions  are  the  following: 

See.  1.  Every  contract,  combination  in  the  form  of  trust 
or  otherwise,  or  conspiracy,  in  restraint  of  trade  or  commerce 
among'  the  several  States,  or  with  foreign  nations,  is  . . . 
illegal. 

See.  2.  Every  person  who  shall  monopolize,  or  attempt  to 
monopolize,  or  combine  or  conspire  with  any  other  such  person 
. . . to  monopolize  any  part  of  the  trade  or  commerce  among 
the  several  States,  or  with  foreign  nations,  shall  be  deemed 
guilty  of  misdemeanor. 

The  purpose  of  the  framers  of  the  Act  seems  clearly 
to  have  been  to  draw  up  a general  measure  whose 
terms  should  be  those  usual  in  the  English  common 
law  and  then  rest  on  the  assurance  that  the  courts 
would  interpret  its  meaning  in  the  light  of  former 
practice.  For  some  centuries  restraint  of  trade  had 
been  considered  illegal  in  England,  but  no  contract 
was  held  to  be  contrary  to  law  if  it  provided  only  a 
reasonable  restraint— that  is,  if  the  restraint  was 
merely  minor  and  subsidiary.  The  Sherman  act  was  a 
Senate  mpasm'p,  was  presented  from  ihe  Judiciary 
Committee  and  was  passed  precisely  as  drawn  up  by 
it.  In  speaking  from  the  Committee,  both  Edmunds 
and  Hoar  took  the  attitude  which  the  latter  expressed 
as  follows:  “The  great  thing  that  this  hill  does,  . . . 
is  to  extend  the  common-law  principles,  which  pro- 
tected fair  competition  ...  in  England,  to  interna- 
tional and  interstate  commerce  in  the  United  States.” 
Just  how  far  the  members  of  Congress  who  were  2iot 


INDUSTRY  AND  LAISSEZ  FAIRE  257 


on  the  Judiciary  Committee  of  the  Senate  shared  in 
this  view  or  really  understood  the  bill  can  not  be 
said.  Indeed,  many  members  of  both  chambers  ab- 
sented themselves  when  the  bill  came  to  a vote.^ 

For  a long  time  the  Sherman  Act  like  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  was  singularly  ineffective  and  futile. 
Trusts  were  nominally  dissolved,  but  the  separate 
parts  were  conducted  under  a common  and  uniform 
policy  by  the  same  board  of  managers.  The  Standard 
Oil  Company  changed  its  form  by  selecting  the  Stand- 
ard Oil  Company  of  New  Jersey  as  a “ holding,  corpor- 
ation. ” Stock  of  the  members  of  the  combination 
was  exchanged  for  stock  in  the  New  Jersey  organiza- 
tion, leaving  control  in  the  same  hands  as  before.  The 
“same  business  was  carried  on  in  the  same  way  but 
‘under  a new  sign.’  ” The  wide  variety  of  conditions 
tolerated  under  the  corporation  laws  of  the  several 
states  made  confusion  worse  confounded.  In  its  early 
attempts  to  convict  corporations  of  violation  of  the 
law,  the  government  was  uniformly  defeated. 

In  1893  came  the  climax  of  futility.  The  American 
Sugar  Refining  Company  had  purchased  refineries  in 
Philadelphia  which  enabled  it  to  control,  with  its  other 
plants,  ninety-eight  per  cent,  of  the  refining  business 
in  the  country.  The  government  asked  the  courts  to 
cancel  the  purchase  on  the  ground  that  it  was  con- 

1 The  authorship  of  the  Sherman  law  has  often  been  a source  of 
controversy.  Senator  John  Sherman,  as  well  as  other  members,  intro- 
duced anti-trust  bills  in  the  Senate  in  1888.  Senator  Sherman’s  pro- 
posal was  later  referred  to  the  Judiciary  Committee,  of  which  he  was 
not  a member.  The  Committee  thoroughly  revised  it.  Senator  Hoar, 
who  was  on  the  Committee,  thought  he  remembered  having  written  it 
word  for  word  as  it  was  adopted.  Recent  investigation  seems  to  prove 
that  the  senator’s  recollection  was  faulty  and  that  Edmunds  wrote  most 
of  it,  while  Hoar,  Ingalls  and  George  wrote  a section  each  and  Evarts 
part  of  a sentence.  If  this  is  the  fact,  it  seems  most  nearly  accurate  to 
sa}'  that  Sherman  started  the  enterprise  and  that  almost  every  member 
of  the  Judiciary  committee,  especially  Edmunds,  shared  in  its  completion. 


258 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


traiy  to  the  Sherman  law,  and  to  order  the  return  of 
the  properties  to  their  former  owners.  The  Supreme 
Court  declared  that  the  mere  purchase  of  sugar  re- 
fineries was  not  an  act  of  interstate  commerce  and 
that  it  could  not  be  said  to  restrain  such  trade,  and 
it  refused  to  grant  the  request  of  the  government. 
Unhappily  the  prosecuting  officers  of  the  Attorney- 
General’s  office  had  drawn  up  their  case  badly,  making 
their  complaint  the  purchase,  not  the  resulting  re- 
straint. No  direct  evidence  was  presented  to  show 
that  interstate  commerce  in  sugar  and  the  control  of 
the  sugar  business  and  of  prices  were  the  chief  ob- 
jects of  the  combination.  To  the  public  it  seemed 
that  the  corporations  were  impregnable,  for  even  the 
United  States  government  could  not  control  them. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  early  history  of  anti-trust  agitation  centers  about 
Henry  D.  Lloyd.  His  earliest  article,  “The  Story  of  a Great 
^Monopoly,”  is  in  The  Atlantic  Monthly  (Mar.,  1881)  ; his 
classic  aceoiant  of  trust  abuses  is  Wealth  against  Comnion- 
•ivealth  (1894)  ; consult  also  C.  A.  Lloyd,  Henry  D.  Lloyd  (2 
vols.,  1912).  Early  and  valuable  articles  in  periodicals  are  in 
Political  Science  Quarterly,  1888,  pp.  78-98 ; 1889,  pp.  296- 
319;  W.  Z.  Ripley,  Trusts,  Pools,  and  Corporations  (rev.  ed., 

1916) ,  is  useful;  B.  J.  Hendrick,  Age  of  Big  Business  (1919), 
is  interesting  and  contains  a bibliography.  Ida  M.  Tarbell, 
History  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company  (2  vols.,  1904),  is  care- 
fully done  and  a pioneer  work.  Other  valuable  accounts  are : 
S.  C.  T.  Dodd,  Trusts  (1900),  by  a former  Standard  Oil  at- 
torney; Eliot  Jones,  The  Anthracite  Coal  Combination  in  the 
United  States  (1914);  J.  W.  Jenks,  Trust  Problem  (1900), 
contains  a summary  of  the  economies  of  large  scale  production ; 
J.  W.  Jenks  and  W.  E.  Clark,  The  Trust  Problem  (4th  ed., 

1917) ,  is  scholarly  and  complete;  J.  D.  Rockefeller,  Random 
Reminiscences  of  Men  and  Events  (1916),  is  a brief  defence  of 


INDUSTRY  AND  LA18SEZ  FAIRE  259 


the  Standard  Oil  Company;  W.  II.  Taft,  Anti-Trusi  Act  and 
the  Supreme  Court  (1914),  summarizes  a few  important  de- 
cisions on  the  Sherman  law.  Edward  Bellamy,  Looking 
Backivard  (1888),  describes  an  economic  Utopia.  Early  pro- 
posed anti-trust  laws,  together  with  the  Congressional  debates 
on  the  subject  are  in  Senate  Documents,  57th  Congress,  2nd 
session,  vol.  14,  No.  147  (Serial  Number  4428).  No  complete 
historical  study  has  yet  been  made  of  the  effects  of  industrial 
development,  immediately  after  the  Civil  War,  on  politics  and 
the  structure  of  American  society. 


CHAPTER  XII 


DEMOCRATIC  DEMORALIZATION 

IN  view  of  the  fact  that  Harrison  had  been  success- 
ful in  1888  and  that  Cleveland  had  been  the  most 
able  Democratic  leader  since  the  Civil  War,  it  seemed 
natural  that  their  parties  should  renominate  them  in 
1892.  Yet  the  men  at  the  oars  in  the  Republican  or- 
ganization were  far  from  enthusiastic  over  their 
leader.  It  is  probable  that  Harrison  did  not  like  the 
role  of  dispenser  of  patronage  and  that  he  indicated 
the  fact  in  dealing  with  his  party  associates;  at  any 
rate,  he  estranged  such  powerful  leaders  as  Platt, 
Quay  and  Reed  by  his  neglect  of  them  in  disposing  of 
appointments.  The  reformers  were  no  better  satis- 
fied ; much  had  been  expected  of  him  because  his  party 
had  taken  so  definite  a stand  in  1888,  and  when  his 
choice  of  subordinates  failed  to  meet  expectations,  the 
scorn  of  the  Independents  found  forceful  vent. 
Among  the  rank  and  file  of  his  party,  Harrison  had 
aroused  respect  but  no  great  enthusiasm. 

The  friends  of  Blaine  were  still  numerous  and  ac- 
tive, and  they  wished  to  see  their  favorite  in  the  execu- 
tive chair.  Perhaps  Blaine  felt  that  there  would  be 
some  impropriety  in  his  becoming  an  active  candidate 
against  his  chief,  while  remaining  at  his  post  as  Secre- 
tary of  State;  at  any  rate  he  notified  the  chairman  of 
the  National  Republican  Committee,  early  in  1892,  that 
he  was  not  a candidate  for  the  nomination.  The  de- 
mand for  him,  nevertheless,  continued  and  relations 

260 


DEMOCRATIC  DEMORALIZATION  261 


bet^reen  him  and  Harrison  seem  to  have  become 
strained.  Senator  Cullom,  writing  nearly  twenty 
years  afterward,  related  a conversation  which  he  had 
had  with  Harrison  at  the  time.  In  substance,  accord- 
ing to  the  senator,  the  President  declared  that  he  had 
been  doing  the  work  of  the  Department  of  State  him- 
self for  a year  or  more,  and  that  Blaine  had  given  out 
reports  of  what  was  being  done  and  had  taken  the 
credit  himself.  Cullom ’s  recollection  seems  to  have 
been  accurate,  at  least  as  far  as  relations  between  the 
two  men  were  concerned,  for  three  days  before  the 
meeting  of  the  Republican  nominating  convention 
Blaine  sent  a curt  note  to  the  President  resigning  his 
office  without  giving  any  reason,  and  asking  that  his 
withdrawal  take  effect  immediately.  The  President’s 
reply  accepting  the  resignation  was  equally  cool  and 
uninforming.  If  Blaine  expected  to  take  any  steps  to 
gain  the  nomination,  the  available  time  was  far  too 
short.  That  the  act  would  be  interjDreted  as  hostile 
to  the  interests  of  Harrison,  however,  admitted  of  no 
doubt,  and  it  therefore  seems  probable  that  Blaine  had 
changed  his  mind  at  a late  day  and  really  hoped  that 
the  party  might  choose  him.^ 

Despite  Blaine’s  apparent  change  of  purpose,  it 
seemed  necessary  to  renominate  Harrison  in  order  to 
avoid  the  appearance  of  discrediting  his  administra- 
tion, and  on  the  first  ballot  Harrison  received  535  votes 
to  Blaine’s  183  and  was  nominated.  The  only  ap- 
proach to  excitement  was  over  the  currency  plank  in 
the  platform.  lYestern  delegates  demanded  the  free 
coinage  of  silver,  which  the  East  opposed.  The  plank 
adopted  declared  that 

The  Eepubliean  party  demands  the  use  of  both  gold  and 

« Blaine  died  on  Jan.  27,  1893. 


2G2 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


silver  as  standard  money,  with  such  restrictions  and  under 
such  provisions,  to  be  determined  by  legislation,  as  will  secure 
the  maintenance  of  the  parity  of  values  of  the  two  metals. 

It  was  a meaningless  compromise,  but  it  seems  to  have 
satisfied  both  sides. 

Cleveland,  during  the  Harrison  administration,  had 
been  an  object  of  much  interest  and  not  a little  spec- 
ulation, After  seeing  President  Harrison  safely  in- 
stalled in  office,  he  went  to  New  York  city  where  he  en- 
gaged in  the  practice  of  law.  He  himself  thought  that 
he  was  retiring  permanently  and  not  a few  enemies 
were  quite  willing  that  this  should  be  the  case.  The 
eminent  Democratic  editor,  Henry  Watterson,  re- 
marked that  Cleveland  in  New  York  was  like  a stone 
thrown  into  a river,  “There  is  a ‘plunk,’  a splash,  and 
then  silence,”  He  was  constantly  invited,  neverthe- 
less, to  address  public  assemblies,  which  provided  am- 
ple opportunity  for  him  to  express  his  thoughts  to  the 
country.  Moreover,  the  McKinley  Act  of  1890  and 
the  political  reversal  which  followed  brought  renewed 
attention  to  the  tariff  message  of  1887  and  to  its  au- 
thor. In  February,  1891,  Cleveland  was  asked  to  ad- 
dress a meeting  of  New  York  business  men  which  had 
been  called  by  the  Reform  Club  to  express  opposition 
to  the  free  coinage  of  silver.  The  question  of  the  in- 
creased use  of  silver  as  a circulating  medium,  as  has 
been  seen,  was  a controverted  one;  neither  party  was 
prepared  to  take  a definite  stand,  and,  indeed,  division 
of  opinion  had  taken  place  on  sectional  rather  than 
partisan  lines.  While  the  subject  was  in  this  unset- 
tled condition  Cleveland  received  his  invitation  to  the 
Reform  Club,  and  was  urged  by  some  of  his  advisors 
not  to  endanger  his  chances  of  renomination  by  taking 
sides  on  the  issue.  The  counsel  had  no  more  effect 
than  similar  advice  had  produced  in  1887  when  the 


DEMOCRATIC  DEMORALIZATION  263 


tariff  was  in  the  same  unsettled  condition.  Although 
unable  to  attend,  Cleveland  wrote  a letter  in  which  he 
characterized  the  experiment  of  free  coinage  as  “dan- 
gerous and  reckless.”  Whether  right  or  wrong, 
he  was  definite;  people  who  could  not  understand  the 
intricacies  of  currency  standards  and  the  arguments 
of  the  experts  understood  exactly  what  Cleveland 
meant.  Little  doubt  now  existed  but  that  the  name 
of  the  ex-president  would  be  a powerful  one  before  the 
nominating  convention,  for  he  would  have  the  populous 
East  with  him  on  the  currency  issue — unless  David 
B.  Hill  should  upset  expectations. 

Hill  was  an  example  of  the  shrewd  politician.  Like 
Platt,  whom  he  resembled  in  many  ways,  he  was  ab- 
sorbed in  the  machinery  and  organization  of  politics, 
rather  than  in  issues  and  policies.  Beginning  in  1870, 
when  he  was  but  twenty-seven  years  of  age,  he  had 
held  public  office  almost  continuously.  In  the  state  as- 
sembly, as  Mayor  of  Elmira,  as  Lieutenant-Governor 
with  Cleveland  and  later  as  Governor,  he  developed 
an  unrivalled  knowledge  of  New  York  as  a political 
arena.  In  1892  he  was  at  the  height  of  his  power 
and  the  presidency  seemed  to  be  within  his  grasp. 
The  methods  which  he  used  were  typical  of  the  man — 
the  manipulation  of  the  machinery  of  nomination. 

The  national  Democratic  nominating  convention  was 
called  for  June  21,  but  the  New  York  state  Democratic 
committee  announced  that  the  state  convention  for  the 
choice  of  delegates  would  meet  on  February  22.  So 
early  a meeting,  four  months  before  the  national  con- 
vention, was  unprecedented,  and  at  once  it  became 
clear  that  a purpose  lay  behind  the  call.  It  was  to 
procure  the  election  of  members  to  the  state  conven- 
tion who  would  vote  for  Hill  delegates  to  the  nominat- 
ing convention,  before  Cleveland’s  supporters  could 


264 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


organize  in  opposition.  Furthermore,  it  was  expected 
that  the  action  of  New  York  would  influence  other 
states  where  sentiment  for  Cleveland  was  not  strong. 
Hill’s  plan  worked  out  as  he  had  expected — at  least 
in  so  far  as  the  state  convention  was  concerned — for 
delegates  pledged  to  him  were  chosen.  Cleveland’s 
supporters,  however,  denounced  the  “snap  conven- 
tion” and  a factional  quarrel  arose  between  the  “snap- 
pers” and  the  “anti-snappers”;  outside  of  New  York 
it  was  so  obvious  that  the  snap  convention  was  a mere 
political  trick  that  the  Hill  cause  was  scarcely  bene- 
fited by  it.  Delegates  were  chosen  in  other  parts  of 
the  country  who  desired  the  nomination  of  Cleveland. 

The  convention  met  in  Chicago  on  June  21  and  pro- 
ceeded at  once  to  adopt  a platform  of  principles.  The 
silver  plank  was  hardly  distinguishable  from  that  of 
the  Republicans,  except  that  it  was  enshrouded  with  a 
trifie  more  of  ambiguity.  The  adoption  of  a tariff 
plank  elicited  considerable  difference  of  opinion,  but 
the  final  result  was  an  extreme  statement  of  Demo- 
cratic belief.  Instead  of  adopting  the  cautious  posi- 
tion taken  in  1884,  the  convention  declared  that  the 
constitutional  power  of  the  federal  government  was 
limited  to  the  collection  of  tariff  duties  for  purposes  of 
revenue  only,  and  denounced  the  McKinley  act  as  the 
“culminating  atrocity  of  class  legislation.” 

Although  it  was  evident  when  the  convention  met, 
that  the  chances  of  Hill  for  the  nomination  were  slight 
indeed,  the  battle  was  far  from  over.  Hill  was  a 
“straight”  party  man,  a fact  which  he  reiterated  again 
and  again  in  his  famous  remark,  “I  am  a Democrat.” 
Cleveland  was  not  strictly  regular,  a fact  which  Hill 
apparently  intended  to  emphasize  by  constant  refer- 
ence to  his  own  beliefs.  The  oratorical  champion  of 
the  Hill  delegation  was  Bourke  Cockran,  an  able  and 


DEMOCRATIC  DEMORALIZATION  265 


appealing  stump  speaker.  For  two  hours  he  urged 
that  Cleveland  could  not  carry  the  pivotal  state,  New 
York,  and  that  it  was  folly  to  attempt  to  elect  a man 
who  was  so  handicapped.  Eloquence,  however,  was  of 
no  avail.  The  first  ballot  showed  that  the  Hill  strength 
was  practically  confined  to  New  York,  and  Cleveland 
was  easily  the  party  choice.  For  the  vice-presidency 
Adlai  E.  Stevenson,  a partisan  of  the  old  school,  was 
chosen. 

Among  the  smaller  parties  there  appeared  for  the 
first  time  the  “People’s  Party,”  later  and  better 
known  as  the  “Populists.”  Their  nominee  was  James 
B.  AYeaver,  who  had  led  the  Greenbackers  in  1880. 
Their  platform  emphasized  the  economic  burdens  un- 
der which  the  poorer  classes  were  laboring  and  listed 
a series  of  extremely  definite  demands. 

The  campaign  was  a quiet  one  as  both  Cleveland  and 
Harrison  had  been  tried  out  before.  So  unenthusias- 
tic  were  the  usual  political  leaders  that  Colonel  Robert 
G.  Ingersoll  declared  that  each  party  would  like  to 
beat  the  other  vdthout  electing  its  o^^^l  candidates. 
Although  the  financial  issue  was  kept  in  the  back- 
ground, the  tariff  was  fought  out  again  somewhat  as 
it  had  been  in  1888.  The  New  York  Sun  shed  some 
asperity  over  the  contest  by  calling  the  friends  of 
Cleveland  “the  adorers  of  fat  vfitted  mediocrity,”  and 
the  nominee  himself  as  the  “perpetual  candidate”  and 
the  “stuffed  prophet”;  and  then  added  a ray  of  humor 
by  advocating  the  election  of  Cleveland.  The  adop- 
tion of  the  Australian  ballot,  before  the  election,  in 
thirty-four  states  and  territories  constituted  an  impor- 
tant reform;  thereafter  it  was  impossible  for  “blocks 
of  five”  to  march  to  the  polls  and  deposit  their  ballots 
within  the  sight  of  the  purchaser.  The  Homestead 
strike  near  Pittsburg,  Pennsylvania,  somewhat  aided 


266 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


the  Democrats.  The  Carnegie  Steel  Company,  having 
reduced  wages,  precipitated  a strike  which  was  settled 
only  through  the  use  of  the  state  militia.  As  the  steel 
industry  was  highly  protected  by  the  tariff,  it  appeared 
that  the  wages  of  the  laboring  man  were  not  so  happily 
affected  as  Republican  orators  had  been  asserting.^ 

The  result  of  the  election  was  astonishing.  Cleve- 
land carried  not  merely  the  South  but  Connecticut, 
New  York,  New  Jersey,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Wisconsin 
and  California,  while  five  of  Michigan’s  fourteen  elec- 
toral votes  and  one  of  Ohio ’s  twenty-three  went  to  him. 
In  the  last-named  state,  which  had  never  gone  against 
the  Republicans,  their  vote  exceeded  that  of  the  Demo- 
crats by  only  1,072.  For  the  first  time  since 
Buchanan ’s  day,  the  Democrats  would  control  the  gov- 
ernment. More  surprising  and  more  significant  for 
the  future,  was  the  strength  of  the  People’s  Party. 
Over  a million  ballots,  twenty-two  electoral  votes,  two 
senators  and  eleven  representatives  were  included 
among  their  trophies.  It  was  an  important  fact,  more- 
over, that  twenty-nine  out  of  every  thirty  votes  cast  for 
the  People’s  Party  were  cast  west  of  Pennsylvania  and 
south  of  Maryland.  Something  apparently  was  hap- 
pening, in  which  the  East  was  not  a sharer.  The  poli- 
tician, particularly  in  the  East,  was  quite  content  to 
dismiss  the  Populists  as  “born-tired  theorists,” 
“quacks,”  “a  clamoring  brood  of  political  rain- 
makers,” and  “stump  electricians,”  but  the  student  of 
politics  and  history  must  appraise  the  movement  less 
provincially  and  with  more  information. 

It  was  in  the  nature  of  things  that  the  Populist 
movement  should  come  out  of  the  West.  From  the 
days  of  Clay  and  Jackson  the  westerner  had  been  char- 
acterized by  his  self-confidence,  his  assertiveness  and 

1 Below,  p.  320,  for  aai  account  of  the  strike  as  an  industrial  dispute. 


DEMOCEATIC  DEMOEALIZATION  267 


his  energy.  He  had  possessed  unlimited  confidence  in 
ordinary  humanity,  been  less  inclined  to  heed  authority 
and  more  ready  to  disregard  precedents  and  expe- 
rience. He  had  expressed  his  ideals  concretely,  and 
with  vigor  and  assurance.  He  had  broken  an  empire 
to  the  plow,  suffered  severely  from  the  buffetings  of 
nature  and  had  gradually  worked  out  his  list  of  griev- 
ances. One  or  another  of  his  complaints  had  been 
presented  before  1892  in  the  platforms  of  uninfluen- 
tial  third  parties,  but  not  until  that  year  did  the  dis- 
senting movement  reach  large  proportions. 

It  has  already  been  seen  that  the  people  of  the  West 
were  in  revolt  against  the  management  of  the  rail- 
roads. They  saw  roads  going  bankrupt,  to  be  sure, 
but  the  owners  were  making  fortunes ; they  knew  that 
lawyers  were  being  corrupted  with  free  passes  and  the 
state  legislatures  manipulated  by  lobbyists;  and  they 
believed  that  rates  were  extortionate.  The  seizure 
and  purchase  of  public  land,  sometimes  contrary  to 
the  letter  of  the  law,  more  often  contrary  to  its  spirit, 
was  looked  upon  as  an  intolerable  evil.  Moreover,  the 
westerner  was  in  debt.  He  had  borrowed  from  the 
East  to  buy  his  farm  and  his  machinery  and  to  make 
both  ends  meet  in  years  when  the  crops  failed.  In 
1889  it  was  estimated  that  seventy-five  per  cent,  of 
the  farms  of  Dakota  were  mortgaged  to  a total  of 
$50,000,000.  Boston  and  other  cities  had  scores  of 
agencies  for  the  negotiation  of  western  farm  loans ; 
Philadelphia  alone  was  said  to  absorb  $15,000,000  an- 
nually. The  advantage  to  the  West,  if  conditions  were 
right,  is  too  manifest  to  need  explanation.  But  some- 
times the  over-optimistic  farmer  borrowed  too  heav- 
ily; sometimes  the  rates  demanded  of  the  needy  west- 
erners were  usurious;  often  it  seemed  as  if  interest 
charges  were  like  “a  mammoth  sponge,”  constantly  ab- 


268 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


sorbing  the  labor  of  the  husbandman.  The  demand 
of  the  West  for  a greater  currency  supply  has  already 
been  seen,  for  it  appeared  in  the  platforms  of  minor 
parties  immediately  after  the  Civil  War.  Sometimes 
it  seemed  as  if  nature,  also,  had  entered  a conspiracy 
to  increase  the  hardships  of  the  farmer.  During  the 
eighties  a series  of  rainy  years  in  the  more  arid  parts 
of  the  plains  encouraged  the  idea  that  the  rain  belt 
was  moving  westward,  and  farmers  took  up  land  be- 
yond the  line  where  adequate  moisture  could  be  re- 
lied upon.  Then  came  drier  years;  the  com  withered 
to  dry  stalks ; farms  were  more  heavily  mortgaged  or 
even  abandoned;  and  discontent  in  the  West  grew 
fast. 

The  complaints  of  the  westerner  naturally  found  ex- 
pression in  the  agricultural  organizations  which  al- 
ready existed  in  many  parts  of  the  country.  The 
Grange  had  attacked  some  of  the  farmer’s  problems, 
but  interest  in  it  as  a political  agency  had  died  out. 
The  National  Farmers’  Alliance  of  1880  and  the  Na- 
tional Farmers’  Alliance  and  Industrial  Union  some- 
what later  were  both  preceded  and  followed  by  many 
smaller  societies.  Altogether  their  combined  mem- 
bership began  to  mount  into  the  millions.  When, 
therefore,  the  Alliances  began  to  turn  away  from  the 
mere  discussion  of  agricultural  grievances  and  toward 
the  betterment  of  conditions  by  means  of  legislation, 
and  when  their  principles  began  to  be  taken  up  by  dis- 
contented labor  organizations,  it  looked  as  if  they  might 
constitute  a force  to  be  reckoned  with. 

The  remedies  which  the  Alliances  suggested  for  cur- 
rent ills  Avere  definite.  Fundamentally  they  believed 
that  the  government,  state  and  federal,  could  remedy 
the  economic  distresses  of  the  people  and  that  it  ought 
to  do  so.  At  the  present  day  such  a suggestion  seems 


DEMOCRATIC  DEMORALIZATION  269 


commonplace  enough,  but  in  the  eighties  the  dominant 
theory  was  individualism — each  man  for  himself  and 
let  economic  law  remedy  injustices — and  the  Alliance 
program  seemed  like  dreaded  “socialism.”  The 
counterpart  of  the  demand  for  larger  governmental  ac- 
tivity was  a call  for  the  greater  participation  of  the 
people  in  the  operation  of  the  machinery  of  legislation. 
This  lay  hack  of  the  demand  for  the  initiative,  the  ref- 
erendum, and  the  popular  election  of  senators.  Cur- 
rency ills  could  be  remedied,  the  farmers  believed,  by 
a national  currency  which  should  be  issued  by  the  fed- 
eral government  only — not  by  national  banks.  They 
desired  the  free  coinage  of  silver  and  gold  until  the 
amount  in  circulation  should  reach  fifty  dollars  per 
capita.  Lesser  recommendations  were  for  an  income 
tax  and  postal  savings  banks.  In  relation  to  the  trans- 
portation system,  they  declared  that  “the  time  has 
come  when  the  railroad  corporations  will  either  own 
the  people  or  the  people  must  own  the  railroads.”  In 
order  'to  prevent  the  waste  of  the  public  land  and  to 
stop  its  being  held  for  speculative  purposes,  they 
urged  that  none  be  allowed  to  remain  in  the  hands  of 
aliens  and  that  all  be  taken  away  from  the  railroads 
and  corporations  which  was  in  excess  of  actual  needs. 

The  power  of  the  new  movement  first  became  evi- 
dent in  1890  and  distinctly  disturbed  both  the  Republi- 
can and  the  Democratic  leaders.  Determined  to  right 
their  wrongs,  the  farmers  deserted  their  parties  in 
thousands,  flocked  to  conventions  and  crowded  the 
country  schoolhouses  for  the  discussion  of  methods  and 
men.  Perhaps  it  was  true,  as  one  of  their  critics  as- 
serted, that  they  put  a “gill  of  fact  and  grievance  into 
a gallon  of  falsehood  and  lurid  declamation”  so  as 
to  make  an  ‘ ‘ intoxicating  mixture.  ’ ’ If  so,  the  mixture 
took  immediate  etfect.  Alliance  governors  were  elected 


270 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


in  several  southern  states;  many  state  legislatures  in 
the  South  and  West  had  strong  farmer  delegations; 
and  several  congressmen  and  senators  were  sent  to 
Washington.  Success  in  1890  made  the  Alliances  jubi- 
lant and  they  looked  to  the  possibility  of  a country- 
wide political  organization  and  a share  in  the  campaign 
of  1892.  The  first  national  convention  was  held  in 
Omaha  in  July,  1892,  at  which  many  of  the  farmers’ 
organizations  together  with  the  Knights  of  Labor  and 
other  groups  were  represented.  The  name  “People’s 
party”  was  adopted,  the  principles  just  mentioned 
were  set  forth  in  a platform  and  candidates  nominated. 
In  the  ensuing  election  the  party  exhibited  the  surpris- 
ing strength  which  has  been  seen. 

It  has  taken  more  time  to  describe  the  Populist 
movement  than  its  degree  of  success  in  1892  would 
justify.  But  it  deserves  attention  for  a variety  of 
reasons.  Its  reform  demands  were  important ; it  was 
a striking  indication  of  sectional  economic  interests; 
it  gave  evidence  of  an  effective  participation  in  poli- 
tics by  the  small  farmers,  the  mechanics  and  the  less 
well-to-do  professional  people— the  “middle  class,”  in 
a word ; it  was  a long  step  toward  an  expansion  of  the 
activities  of  the  central  government  in  the  fields  of 
economic  and  social  legislation;  and  finally  it  empha- 
sized the  significance  of  the  West,  as  a constructive 
force  in  American  life.  If  the  Populists  should  cap- 
ture one  of  the  other  parties  or  be  captured  by  it,  no- 
body could  foresee  what  the  results  would  be  on  Amer- 
ican political  history. 

The  second  administration  of  Grover  Cleveland, 
from  1893  to  1897,  was  the  most  important  period  of 
four  years  for  half  a* century  after  the  Civil  War. 
Eor  twenty-five  years  after  1865  American  politicians 
had  been  sowing  the  wind.  Issues  had  rarely  been 


DEMOCRATIC  DEMORALIZATION  271 


met  man-fashion,  in. direct  combat;  instead,  they  had 
been  evaded,  stated  with  skilful  ambiguity,  or  be- 
clouded with  ignorance  and  prejudice.  Politics  had 
been  concerned  with  the  offices — the  plunder  of  gov- 
ernment. It  could  not  be  that  the  whirlwind  would 
never  be  reaped. 

The  situation  in  1893  was  one  that  might  well  have 
shaken  the  stoutest  heart.  International  difficulties 
were  in  sight  that  threatened  unusual  dangers;  labor 
troubles  of  unprecedented  complexity  and  importance 
were  at  hand;  the  question  of  the  currency  remained 
unsettled,  the  treasury  was  in  a critical  condition,  and 
an  industrial  panic  had  already  begun.  Each  of  these 
difficulties  will  demand  detailed  discussion  at  a later 
point.^ 

To  no  small  degree,  the  settlement  of  the  political 
and  economic  issues  before  the  country  was  compli- 
cated by  the  unmistakable  drift  toward  sectionalism, 
and  by  the  particular  characteristics  of  the  President. 
If  the  administration  pressed  a tariff  reduction  policy, 
it  would  please  the  South  and  West  but  bring  hos- 
tility in  the  East.  The  demands  of  the  West,  so  far 
as  the  Populists  represented  them,  were  for  the  in- 
creased use  of  the  powers  of  the  federal  government 
and  the  application  of  those  powers  to  social  and  eco- 
nomic problems;  but  the  party  in  power  was  tradi- 
tionally attached  to  the  doctrine  of  restricted  activity 
on  the  part  of  the  central  authority.  The  sectional  as- 
pects of  the  silver  question  were  notorious;  and  only 
the  eastern  Democrats  fully  supported  their  leader  in 
his  stand  on  the  issue. 

The  personal  characteristics  of  President  Cleveland 
have  already  appeared.^  He  had  a burdensome  con- 

1 Below,.  Chaps.  XTII,  XIV,  XV. 

2 Above,  Chap.  VIII. 


272 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


sciousiiess  of  his  own  individual  duty  to  conduct  the 
business  of  his  office  with  faithfulness;  a courageous 
sense  of  justice  which  impelled  him  to  fight  valiantly 
for  a cause  that  he  deemed  right,  however  unimportant 
or  hopeless  the  cause  might  be;  a reformer’s  contempt 
for  hypocrisy  and  shams,  and  a blunt  directness  in 
freeing  his  mind  about  wrong  of  every  kind.  He  had 
the  faults  of  his  virtues,  likewise.  Sure  of  himself 
and  of  the  right  of  his  position,  he  had  the  impatience 
of  an  unimaginative  man  with  any  other  point  of  view; 
he  was  intransigeant,  unyielding,  rarely  giving  way 
a step  even  to  take  two  forward.  It  seems  likely  that 
his  political  experience  had  accentuated  this  charac- 
teristic. For  years  he  had  thrown  aside  the  advice  of 
his  counsellors  and  had  shown  himself  more  nearly 
right  than  they.  As  Mayor  of  Buffalo  he  had  used  the 
veto  and  had  been  made  Governor  of  the  state;  as 
Governor  he  had  ruggedly  made  enemies  and  had  be- 
come President ; as  President  he  had  flown  in  the  face 
of  caution  with  his  tariff  message  and  his  Reform  Club 
letter  and  had  three  times  received  a larger  popular 
vote  than  his  competitor.  And  each  time  his  plurality 
was  greater  than  it  had  been  before.  If  he  tended 
to  become  over-sure  of  himself,  it  should  hardly  oc- 
casion surprise.  Furthermore  he  looked  upon  the 
duties  and  possibilities  of  the  presidential  office  as 
fixed  and  stationary,  rather  than  elastic  and  develop- 
ing. He  was  a strict  constructionist  and  a rigid  be- 
liever in  the  checks  and  balances  of  the  Constitution. 
Although  constantly  aware  of  the  needs  and  rights  of 
the  common  people,  such  as  composed  the  Populist 
movement,  his  adherence  to  strict  construction  was  so 
complete  that  he  was  unable  to  advocate  much  of  the 
federal  legislation  desired  by  them.  It  was  only  with 
hesitation  and  constitutional  doubts,  for  example,  that 


DEMOCRATIC  DEMORALIZATION  273 


he  had  been  able  to  sign  even  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act.  In  brief,  then,  the  western  demand  for  social  and 
economic  legislation  on  a novel  and  unusual  scale  was 
to  take  its  chances  with  an  honest,  dogged  believer  in  a 
restricted  federal  authority. 

The  experience  of  the  administration  with  the  patron- 
age question  illustrates  how  much  progress  had  been 
made  in  the  direction  of  reform  since  the  beginning  of 
CDveland’s  first  term  in  1885.  In  the  earlier  year  it 
had  required  a bitter  contest  to  make  even  the  slight- 
est advance;  in  his  second  term  he  retained  Roosevelt, 
a Republican  reformer,  on  the  Commission  and  grad- 
ually extended  the  rules  so  as  to  cover  the  government 
printing  office,  the  internal  revenue  service,  the  pen- 
sion agencies,  and  messengers  and  other  minor  officials 
in  the  departments  in  Washington.  Finally  on  May 
6,  1896,  he  approved  an  order  revising  the  rules,  sim- 
plifying them  and  extending  them  to  great  numbers 
of  places  not  hitherto  included,  “the  most  valuable  ad- 
dition ever  made  at  one  stroke  to  the  competitive  serv- 
ice.” The  net  result  was  that  the  number  of  positions 
in  the  classified  service  was  more  than  doubled  between 
1893  and  1897,  making  a total  of  81,889  in  a service 
of  somewhat  over  200,000.^  By  the  latter  year  the 
argument  against  reform  had  largely  been  silenced. 
The  dismal  prediction  of  opponents  who  had  feared 
the  establishment  of  an  office-holding  aristocracy  had 
turned  out  to  have  no  foundation.  Agreement  was 
widespread  that  the  government  service  was  greatly 
improved.  There  were  still  branches  of  the  service 

1 The  sweeping  reform  order  of  Cleveland  late  in  his  second  term 
illustrated  the  most  common  and  effective  method  of  making  advance. 
Late  in  his  administration  the  President  adds  to  the  classified  service; 
his  successor  withdraws  part  of  the  additions,  Init  more  than  makes 
up  at  the  end  of  his  term, — a sort  of  two  steps  forward  and  one  back- 
ward process. 


274 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


for  the  reformers  to  work  upon  but  the  great  fight  was 
over  and  wond 

Although  the  Democrats  came  into  power  in  1893 
largely  on  the  tariff  issue,  Cleveland  felt  that  the  most 
urgent  need  at  the  beginning  of  the  administration  was 
the  repeal  of  the  part  of  the  Sherman  silver  law  that 
provided  for  the  purchase  of  4,500,000  ounces  of  silver 
each  month.  The  financial  and  monetary  aspects  of 
this  controversy  demand  relation  at  another  point. ^ 
Politically  its  results  were  important.  Western  and 
southern  Democrats,  friendly  to  silver,  fought  bitterly 
against  the  repeal,  and  became  thoroughly  hostile  to 
Cleveland  whom  they  began  to  distrust  as  allied  to  the 
“money-power”  of  the  East.  At  the  time,  then,  when 
the  President  was  most  in  need  of  united  partisan  sup- 
port, he  found  his  party  crumbling  into  factions. 

Other  circumstances  which  have  been  mentioned  com- 
bined to  make  the  time  inauspicious  for  a revision  of 
the  tariff — the  slight  Democratic  majority  in  the  Sen- 
ate, the  deficit  caused  by  rising  expenditure  and  falling 
revenue,  the  imminent  industrial  panic  and  the  prevail- 
ing labor  unrest.  Nevertheless  it  seemed  necessary  to 
make  the  attempt.  If  the  results  of  the  election  of 
1892  meant  anything,  they  meant  that  the  Democrats 
were  commissioned  to  revise  the  tariff. 

The  chairman  of  the  House  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means  was  William  L.  Wilson,  a sincere  and  well-read 
tariff  reformer  who  had  been  a lawyer  and  a college 
president,  in  addition  to  taking  a practical  interest  in 

1 Cleveland’s  second  cabinet  was  composed  of  the  following:  W.  Q. 
Gresham,  111.,  Secretary  of  State;  J.  G.  Carlisle,  Ky.,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury;  D.  S.  Lament,  N.  Y.,  Secretary  of  War;  R.  Olney,  Mass., 
Attorney-General;  W.  S.  Bissell,  N.  Y.,  Postmaster-General;  H.  A. 
Herbert,  Ala.,  Secretary  of  the  Navy;  Hoke  Smith,  Ga.,  Secretary  of  th* 
Interior;  J.  S.  Morton,  Neb.,  Secretary  of  Agriculture. 

2 Below,  pp.  336-340. 


DEMOCRATIC  DEMORALIZATION  275 


politics.  The  measure  which  he  presented  to  the  House 
on  December  19,  1893,  was  not  a radical  proposal,  hut 
it  provided  for  considerable  tariff  reductions  and  a 
tax  on  incomes  over  $4,000.  There  was  a slight  defec- 
tion in  party  support,  but  it  was  unimportant  because 
of  the  large  majority  which  the  Democrats  possessed, 
and  the  bill  passed  the  House  without  unusual  diffi- 
culty. 

In  the  Senate  a different  situation  presented  itself. 
The  Democratic  majority  over  the  Republicans,  pro- 
vided the  Populists  voted  with  the  former,  was  only 
nine ; and  in  case  the  Populists  became  disaffected,  the 
Democrats  could  outvote  the  opposition  only  by  the 
narrow  margin  of  three,  even  if  every  member  re- 
mained with  his  party.  Such  a degree  of  unanimity, 
in  the  face  of  prevailing  conditions,  was  extremely  nn- 
likely.  The  Louisiana  senators  were  insistent  upon 
protection  for  their  sugar;  Maryland,  West  Virginia 
and  Alabama  senators  looked  out  for  coal  and  iron  ore ; 
Senator  Hill  of  New  York  was  unalterably  opposed  to 
an  income  tax ; Senator  Murphy,  of  the  same  state,  ob- 
tained high  duties  on  linen  collars  and  cuffs ; and  Sen- 
ators Gorman  and  Brice  were  ready  to  aid  the  opposi- 
tion unless  appeased  by  definite  bits  of  protection  which 
they  demanded.  Many  years  later  Senator  Cullom,  a 
Republican,  explained  the  practical  basis  on  which  the 
Senate  proceeded : ‘ ‘ The  truth  is,  we  were  all — Demo- 

crats as  well  as  Republicans — trying  to  get  in  amend- 
ments in  the  interest  of  protecting  the  industries  of  our 
respective  States.” 

The  634  changes  made  in  the  Senate  were,  therefore, 
mainly  in  the  direction  of  lessening  the  reductions  made 
by  the  House.  After  the  bill  had  passed  the  Senate, 
it  was  put  into  the  hands  of  a conference  committee, 
where  further  changes  were  made.  At  this  stage  of 


276 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


the  proceedings,  Wilson  read  to  the  House  a letter 
from  the  President  condemning  the  form  which  the  bill 
had  taken  under  Senate  management,  and  branding  the 
abandonment  of  Democratic  principles  as  an  example 
of  “party  perfidy  and  party  dishonor.”  The  com- 
munication had  no  effect  except  to  intensify  differences 
within  the  party,  and  senators  made  it  evident  that 
they  would  have  their  way  or  kill  the  measure.  The 
House  thereupon  capitulated  and  accepted  what  be- 
came known  as  the  Wilson-Gorman  act — a law  which 
was  only  less  protectionist  than  the  McKinley  act. 
The  President,  chagrined  at  the  breakdown  of  the 
party  program,  allowed  the  act  to  pass  without  his 
signature,  but  expressed  his  mingled  disappointment 
and  disgust  in  a letter  to  Representative  T.  C. 
Catchings : 

There  are  provisions  in  this  bill  which  are  not  in  line  with 
honest  tariff  reform.  . . . Besides,  there  were  . . . incidents 
accompanying  the  passage  of  the  bill  . . . which  made  every 
sincere  tariff  reformer  unhappy.  ...  I take  my  place  with 
the  rank  and  file  of  the  Democratic  party  . . . who  refuse  to 
accept  the  results  embodied  in  this  bill  as  the  close  of  the  war, 
who  are  not  blinded  to  the  fact  thut  the  livery  of  Democratic 
tariff  reform  has  been  stolen  and  worn  in  the  service  of  Re- 
publican protection,  and  who  have  marked  the  places  where 
the  deadly  blight  of  treason  has  blasted  the  counsels  of  the 
brave  in  their  hour  of  might. 

A few  phases  of  the  attempt  at  tariff  reduction  indi- 
cate the  extent  to  which  political  decay  and  especially 
Democratic  demoralization  had  gone.  As  it  passed  the 
House,  the  Wilson  bill  left  both  raw  and  refined  sugar 
on  the  frere  list.  This  was  unsatisfactory  to  the  Louisi- 
ana sugar  growers,  who  desired  a protective  duty  on 
the  raw  product,  and  was  objected  to  by  the  Louisiana 
senators.  On  the  other  hand,  the  American  Sugar  Re- 


DEMOCRATIC  DEMORALIZATION 


277 


filling  Company,  usually  kno\vn  as  the  “Sugar  Trust,” 
desired  free  raw  materials  but  sought  protective  duties 
on  refined  sugar.  In  the  Senate,  a duty  was  placed  on 
raw  sugar,  partly  for  revenue  and  partly  to  satisfy 
the  Louisiana  senators.  On  refined  sugar,  rates  were 
fixed  which  were  eminently  satisfactory  to  the  Trust. 
Rumors  at  once  began  to  be  spread  broadcast  over  the 
country  that  the  sugar  interests  had  manipulated  the 
Senate.  The  people  were  the  more  ready  to  believe 
charges  of  this  sort  because  of  experience  with  previous 
tariff  legislation  and  because  the  Sugar  Trust  had  been 
one  of  the  earliest  and  most  feared  of  the  monopolies 
which  had  already  caused  so  much  uneasiness.  A 
Senate  committee  was  appointed,  composed  of  two 
Democrats,  two  Republicans  and  a Populist,  to  investi- 
gate these  and  other  rumors.  Their  report,  which  was 
agreed  to  by  all  the  members,  made  public  a depressing 
story.  It  appeared  that  one  lobbyist  had  offered  large 
sums  of  money  for  votes  against  the  tariff  bill  on  ac- 
count of  the  income  tax  provision.  Henry  0.  Have- 
meyer,  president  of  the  American  Sugar  Refining  Com- 
pany, testified  that  the  company  was  in  the  habit  of 
contributing  to  the  campaign  funds  of  one  political 
party  or  the  other  in  the  states,  depending  on  which 
party  was  in  the  ascendency ; that  these  contributions 
were  carried  on  the  books  as  expense;  and  that  they 
were  given  because  the  party  in  power  “could  give  us 
the  protection  we  should  have.”  Further,  one  or  more 
officers  of  the  company  were  in  Washington  during  the 
entire  time  when  the  tariff  act  was  pending  in  the  Sen- 
ate and  had  conferred  with  senators  and  committees. 
Senator  Quay  testified  that  he  had  bought  and  sold 
sugar  stocks  while  the  Senate  was  engaged  in  fixing  the 
schedules  and  added:  “I  do  not  feel  that  there  is 
anything  in  my  connection  with  the  Senate  to  inter- 


278 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


fere  with  my  buying  or  selling  the  stock  when  I please ; 
and  I propose  to  do  so.”  Finally  the  committee  sum- 
marized the  results  of  its  investigation,  taking  the  oc- 
casion to 

strongly  deprecate  the  importunity  and  pressure  to  which  Con- 
gress and  its  members  are  subjected  by  the  representatives  of 
great  industrial  combinations,  whose  enormous  wealth  tends 
to  suggest  undue  influence,  and  to  create  in  the  public  mind  a 
demoralizing  belief  in  the  existence  of  corrupt  practices. 

Yet  one  more  drop  remained  to  fill  the  cup  of  Demo- 
cratic humiliation  to  overflowing.  The  constitutional- 
ity of  the  income  tax  had  been  assumed  to  have  been 
settled  by  previous  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
especially  that  in  the  case  Springer  v.  United  States, 
which  had  been  decided  in  1880,  and  in  which  the  Court 
had  upheld  the  law.  The  new  tax  was  brought  before 
the  Court  in  1894,  in  Pollock  v.  Farmers’  Loan  and 
Trust  Company.  The  argument  against  the  tax  was 
pressed  with  great  vigor,  not  merely  on  constitutional 
grounds,  but  for  evident  social  and  economic  reasons. 
Important  financial  interests  engaged  powerful  legal 
talent  and  it  became  clear  that  the  question  to  be  settled 
was  as  much  a class  and  sectional  controversy  as  a con- 
stitutional problem.  Counsel  urged  the  Court  that  the 
tax  scattered  to  the  winds  the  fundamental  principles 
of  the  rights  of  private  property.  Justice  Field,  de- 
ciding against  the  tax,  declared  it  an  “assault  upon 
capital”  and  a step  toward  a war  of  the  poor  against 
the  rich.  There  was  fear  among,  some  that  the  exemp- 
tion of  the  smaller  incomes  might  result  in  placing  the 
entire  burden  of  taxation  on  the  wealthy.  Justice 
Field,  for  example,  felt  that  taxing  persons  whose  in- 
come was  $4,000  and  exempting  those  whose  income  was 
less  than  that  amount  was  like  taxing  Protestants,  as  a 


DEMOCRATIC  DEMORALIZATION  279 


class,  at  one  rate  and  Catholics  at  another.  The  sec- 
tional aspects  of  the  controversy  were  brought  out  in 
objections  that  the  bulk  of  the  tax  would  fall  on  the 
Northeast.  The  most  important  point  involved  was 
the  meaning -of  the  word  “direct”  as  used  in  the  Con- 
stitution in  the  phrase  “direct  Taxes  shall  be  appor- 
tioned among  the  several  States  . . . according  to  their 
respective  Numbers.”  If  an  income  tax  is  a direct 
tax,  it  must  be  apportioned  among  the  states  according 
to  population.  Unhappily  the  framers  of  the  Consti- 
tution were  not  clear  as  to  what  they  meant  by  the 
word  direct,  and  specifically  they  could  not  have  told 
whether  an  income  tax  was  direct  or  not,  because  no 
such  tax  existed  in  England  or  America  at  that  tim-e. 
Hence  the  Supreme  Court  was  placed  in  the  awkward 
position  of  defining  a word  which  the  framers  them- 
selves could  not  define,  although  the  uniform  practice 
hitherto  had  been  to  regard  the  income  tax  as  indirect 
and  therefore  constitutional,  even  if  not  apportioned 
according  to  population. 

The  Pollock  case  was  heard  twice.  The -result  of  the 
first  trial  was  inconclusive  and  on  the  central  point  the 
Court  divided  four  to  four.  After  a rehearing.  Justice 
Jackson,  who  had  been  ill  and  not  present  at  the  first 
trial,  gave  his  vote  in  favor  of  constitutionality,  but  in 
the  meantime  another  justice  had  changed  his  opinion 
and  voted  against  it.  By  the  narrow  margin  of  five  to 
four,  then,  and  under  such  circumstances,  the  income 
tax  provision  of  the  Wilson-Gorman  act  was  declared 
null  and  void.  Probably  no  decision  since  the  Dred 
Scott  case,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  Legal  Ten- 
der cases,  has  put  the  Supreme  Court  in  so  unfortunate 
a light.  Certainly  in  none  has  it  seemed  more  swayed 
by  class  prejudice,  and  so  insecure  and  vacillating  in 
its  opinion. 


280 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Before  the  question  regarding  the  constitutionality 
of  the  income  tax  was  settled,  the  Democrats  reaped  the 
political  results  of  the  Wilson-Gorman  taritf  act.  The 
law  went  into  force  on  August  27,  1894;  the  congres- 
sional elections  came  in  November.  The  Democrats 
were  almost  utterly  swept  out  of  the  House,  except  for 
those  from  the  southern  states,  their  number  being  re- 
duced from  235  to  105.  Reed  was  replaced  in  the 
speaker’s  chair;  tariff  reform  had  turned  out  to  be 
indistinguishable  from  protection ; and  the  Democracy, 
after  its  only  opportunity  since  1861  to  try  its  hand  at 
government,  was  demoralized,  discredited,  and  in  op- 
position again. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  election  of  1892  is  described  in  the  standard  histories 
of  the  period,  and  especially  well  in  Peck. 

The  rise  and  growth  of  the  Populist  movement  resulted  in 
a considerable  literature  of  which  the  following  are  best ; 
S.  J.  Buck,  The  Agrarian  Crusade  (1920),  is  founded  on  wide 
knowledge  of  the  subject  and  contains  bibliography ; F.  J. 
Turner  in  The  Atlantic  Monthly  (Sept.,  1896),  gives  a brief 
but  keen  account;  other  articles  in  periodicals  are  P.  E. 
Haynes,  in  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  X,  269,  W.  F. 
iMappin,  in  Political  Science  Quarterly,  IV,  433,  and  F.  B. 
Tracy,  in  Forum,  XVI,  240;  F.  E.  Haynes,  Third  Party  Move- 
ments (1916),  is  detailed;  M.  S.  AVildman,  Money  Inflation  in 
the  United  States  (1905),  presents  the  psychological  and  eco- 
nomic basis  of  inflation;  J.  A.  Woodburn,  Political  Parties  and 
Party  Problems  (1914)  ; F.  L.  Paxson,  New  Nation  (1915). 

Cleveland’s  administration  is  well  discussed  by  D.  R.  Dewey, 
National  Problems  (1907),  and  by  H.  T.  Peek,  who  also  pre- 
sents an  unusual  analysis  of  Cleveland  in  The  Personal  Equa- 
tion (1898).  The  income  tax  is  best  handled  by  E.  R.  A. 
Seligman,  The  Income  Tax  (1914).  Cleveland’s  own  ac- 
count of  the  chief  difficulties  of  the  administration  are  in  his 
Presidential  Problems. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


THE  TEEND  OF  DIPLOMACY 


FTER  the  international  issues  arising  from  the 


Civil  War  were  settled,  and  before  foreign  rela- 


tions began  to  become  more  important  late  in  the 
nineties,  our  diplomatic  history  showed  the  same  lack 
of  definiteness  and  continuity  that  stamped  the  history 
of  politics  during  the  same  years.  Eleven  different 
men  held  the  post  of  Secretary  of  State  during  the 
thirty-four  years  from  1865  to  1898,  one  of  them,  Blaine, 
serving  at  two  separate  times.  The  political  situation 
in  Washington  changed  frequently,  few  men  of  out- 
standing capacity  as  diplomatists  were  in  the  cabinets, 
and  most  of  the  problems  which  arose  were  not  such 
as  would  excite  the  interest  of  great  international 
minds.  That  any  degree  of  unity  in  our  foreign  rela- 
tions was  attained  is  due  in  part  to  the  continuous 
service  of  such  men  as  A.  A.  Adee,  who  was  connected 
with  the  state  department  from  1878,  and  Professor 
John  Bassett  Moore,  long  in  the  department  and  fre- 
quently available  as  a counselor.^ 

Even  before  the  Civil  War,  Americans  had  been  in- 
terested in  the  affairs  of  the  nations  whose  shores  were 
touched  by  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Missionaries  and  trad- 
ers had  long  visited  China  and  Japan.  During  the 
years  when  the  transcontinental  railroads  were  built, 

1 The  development  of  the  United  States  as  a comrhercial  power  was 
seen  in  the  increased  use  of  consuls  as  agents  for  procuring  and  pub- 
lishing industrial  and  commercial  information. 


281 


282 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


as  has  been  seen,  the  construction  companies  looked  to 
China  for  a labor  supply,  and  there  followed  a stream 
of  Chinese  immigrants  who  were  the  cause  of  a diffi- 
cult international  problem.  Our  relations  with  Japan 
were  extremely  friendly.  Until  the  middle  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  the  Japanese  had  been  almost  com- 
pletely cut  off  from  the  remainder  of  the  world,  desir- 
ing neither  to  give  to  the  rest  of  humanity  nor  to  take 
from  them.  In  1854  Commodore  Matthew  C.  Perry  of 
the  United  States  Navy  had  succeeded  in  obtaining  per- 
mission for  American  ships  to  take  coal  and  provisions 
at  two  Japanese  ports.  Townsend  Harris  shortly  aft- 
erwards had  been  appointed  consul-general  to  Japan 
and  his  knowledge  of  the  East  and  his  tactful  diplo- 
macy had  procured  increased  trade  rights  and  other 
privileges.  In  1863  a Japanese  prince  had  sought  to 
close  the  strait  of  Shimonoseki  which  connects  the  in- 
land sea  of  Japan  with  the  outside  ocean.  American, 
French  and  Dutch  vessels  had  been  fired  upon,  and 
eventually  an  international  expedition  had  been  sent 
to  open  the  strait  by  force.  Seventeen  ships  of  war 
had  quickly  brought  the  prince  to  terms.  An  indem- 
nity had  been  demanded,  of  which  the  United  States 
had  received  a share.  |The  fund  remained  in  the  treas- 
ury untouched  until  1883  when  it  was  returned  to 
Japan.  The  latter  received  the  refund  as  “a  strong 
manifestation  of  that  spirit  of  justice  and  equity  which 
has  always  animated  the  United  States  in  its  relations 
with  Japan. 

The  purchase  of  Alaska  in  1867,  stretched  a long, 
curved  finger  out  towards  the  Asiatic  coast,  but  there 
was  little  interest  in  the  new  acquisition  and  no  knowl- 
edge of  its  size  or  resources.^ 

1 Cf.  Fish,  American  Diplomacy,  308. 


THE  TREND  OF  DIPLOMACY 


283 


The  first  tangible  and  permanent  indication  that  the 
United  States  might  extend  its  interests  into  the  ^here 
of  the  Pacific  Ocean  appeared  as  early  as  1872,  when  an 
arrangement  with  a Samoan  chief  gave  us  the  right  to 
use  the  harbor  of  Pagopagg  on  the  island  of  Tutuila. 
Tutuila  is  far  frUnrAmerican  shores,  being  below  the 
equator  on  the  under  side  of  the  world,  but  the  harbor 
of  Pagopago  is  an  unusually  good  one  and  its  relation 
to  the  extension  of  American  commerce  in  the  South 
Pacific  was  readily  seen.  Not  long  afterward,  similar 
trading  privileges  were  granted  to  Germany  and  Great 
Britain.  Conditions  in  the  islands  had  by  no  means 
been  peaceful  even  before  the  advent  of  the  foreigners 
with  their  intrigues  and  jealousies,  and  in  1885  the  Ger- 
mans, taking  advantage  of  a native  rebellion,  hauled 
down  the  Samoan  flag  on  the  government  building  in 
Apia  and  seemed  about  to  take  control.  In  the  follow- 
ing year,  at  the  request  of  the  Samoan  king,  the  Ameri- 
can consul  Greenebaum  proclaimed  a protectorate  and 
hoisted  the  United  States  flag.  The  act  was  unauthor- 
ized and  was  disavowed  at  once  by  the  government  at 
Washington.  In  the  hope  of  establishing  order  in  the 
islands,  Bayard,  Secretary  of  State  in  President  Cleve- 
land’s first  administration,  suggested  a triple  confer- 
ence of  Germany,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
in  Washington.  During  a recess  in  the  conference  a 
native  rebellion  overturned  the  Samoan  government 
and  Germany  assumed  virtual  control.  While  civil 
war  raged  among  native  factions,  the  Germans  landed 
armed  forces  for  the  protection  of  their  interests.  The 
American  and  British  governments,  fearful  of  danger 
to  their  rights,  already  had  war  vessels  in  the  harbor 
of  Apia  and  armed  conflict  seemed  almost  inevitable 
when  a sudden  hurricane  on  March  16,  1889,  destroyed 
all  the  vessels  except  one.  The  Calliope,  (English), 


284 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


steamed  out  to  sea  in  the  teeth  of  the  great  storm 
aiid^caped  in  safety.  In  the  face  of  such  a catas- 
trophe all  smaller  ills  were  forgotten  and  peace  reigned 
for  the  moment  in  Samoa. 

Meanwhile,  just  as  Cleveland  was  retiring  from 
office  for  the  first  time,  another  conference  of  the  three 
powers  was  arranged  which  provided  a somewhat  com- 
plicated triple  protectorate.  After  a few  years  of 
quiet,  a-nother  native  insurrection  called  attention  to 
the  islands.  Cleveland  was  again  in  the  presidential 
chair,  and  in  a message  to  Congress  he  expressed  his 
belief  that  the  United  States  had  made  a mistake  in 
departing  from  its  century-old  policy  of  avoiding  en- 
tangling alliances  with  foreign  powers.  A year  later 
he  returned  to  the  subject  more  earnestly  than  ever.  A 
report  from  the  Secretary  of  State  presented  the  his- 
tory of  our  Samoan  relations  and  ventured  a judgment 
that  the  only  fruits  which  had  fallen  to  the  United 
States  were  expense,  responsibility  and  entanglement. 
The  President  thereupon  invited  an  expression  of  opin- 
ion from  Congress  on  the  advisability  of  withdrawing 
from  our  engagements  with  the  other  powers.  For  the 
time  nothing  came  of  Cleveland’s  recommendation,  but 
the  continuance  of  native  quarrels  later  necessitated 
another  commission  to  the  islands.  The  American 
member  reported  that  the  harbor  of  Apia  was  full  of 
war  vessels  and  the  region  about  covered  with  armed 
men,  but  that  “not  the  sail  or  smoke  of  a single  vessel 
of  commerce  was  to  be  seen  there  or  about  the  coasts 
of  these  beautiful  islands.”  In  1899,  the  triple  pro- 
tectorate was  abandoned,  as  it  had  complicated  the  task 
of  governing  the  islands.  The  United  States  received 
Tutuila  with  the  harbor  of  Pagopago,  Germany  took 
the  remainder  of  the  group,  and  England  retired  alto- 
gether. The  trend  of  Samoan  relations  was  signifi- 


THE  TEEND  OF  DIPLOMACY 


285 


cant:  our  connection  with  the  islands  began  witj|  the 
desire  to  possess  a coaling  station ; the  possession  first 
resulted  in  entanglements  with  other  nations,  and 
later  in  the  question  whether  we  ought  not  to  with- 
draw; and  eventually  we  withdrew  from  some  of  the 
responsibilities,  but  not  from  all.  Despite  its  tradi- 
tional policy  of  not  contracting  entangling  alliances, 
the  United  States  was  in  the  Pacific  to  stay. 

AVhen  Cleveland  came  into  power  the  first  time,  he 
found  a long-standing  disagreement  with  Canada  over 
the  fisheries  of  the  northeastern  coast.  An  arrange- 
ment which  had  resulted  from  the  Treaty  of  Washing- 
ton in  1871  came  to  an  end  in  1885,  and  the  rights  of 
American  fishermen  in  Canadian  waters  then  rested 
upon  a treaty  of  1818.  This  treaty  was  inadequate  ow- 
ing to  various  changes  which  had  taken  place  during  the 
nearly  seventy  years  that  had  elapsed  since  it  was 
drawn  up.  Several  difficulties  lay  in  the  way  of  the  ar- 
rangement of  a new  treaty,  an  important  one  being  the 
readiness  of  the  Republican  Senate  to  embarrass  the 
President  and  thus  discredit  his  administration.  Mat- 
ters came  to  a critical  point  in  1886  when  Canadian 
officials  seized  two  American  vessels  engaged  in  deep- 
sea  fishing.  Cleveland  then  arranged  a treaty  which 
provided  for  reciprocal  favors,  and  when  the  Senate 
withheld  its  assent  the  administration  made  a tempo- 
rary agreement,  {modus  vivendi),  under  which  Ameri- 
can ships  were  allowed  to  purchase  bait  and  supplies 
and  to  use  Canadian  bays  and  harbors  by  paying  a 
license  fee.^ 

The  peculiar  geographical  configuration  of  Alaska 
was,  meanwhile,  bringing  the  United  States  into  an- 

1 For  later  aspects  of  the  controversy,  see  below,  pp.  5.32-535. 


286 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


other  diplomatic  controversy.  An  arm  or  peninsula 
of  the  possession  extends  far  out  into  the  Pacific  and 
is  continued  by  the  Aleutian  Islands,  which  resemble  a 
series  of  stepping-stones  reaching  toward  Siberia.' 
Bering  Sea  is  almost  enclosed  by  Alaska  and  the  Is- 
lands. Within  the  Sea  and  particularly  on  the  islands 
of  St.  Paul  and  St.  George  in  the  Pribilof  group,  large 
numbers  of  seals  gathered  during  the  spring  and  sum- 
mer to  rear  their  young.  In  the  autumn  the  herds  mi- 
grated to  the  south,  passing  out  through  the  narrow 
straits  between  the  members  of  the  Aleutian  group, 
and  were  particularly  open  to  attack  at  these  points. 
As  early  as  1870  the  United  States  government  leased 
the  privilege  of  hunting  fur  seals  on  St.  Paul  and  St. 
George  to  the  Alaska  Commercial  Company,  but  the 
business  was  so  attractive  that  vessels  came  to  the 
Aleutian  straits  from  many  parts  of  the  Pacific,  and 
it  looked  as  if  the  United  States  must  choose  between 
the  annihilation  of  the  herds  and  the  adoption  of  some 
means  for  protecting  them.  The  revenue  service 
thereupon  began  the  seizure  in  1886  of  British  sealing 
vessels,  taking  three  in  that  year  and  six  during  the 
next.  The  British  government  protested  against  the 
seizures  on  the  ground  that  they  had  taken  place  more 
than  three  miles  from  shore — three  miles  being  the 
limit  to  the  jurisdiction  of  any  nation,  according  to 
international  law.  The  Alaskan  Court  which  upheld 
the  seizures  justified  itself  by  the  claim  that  the  whole 
Bering  Sea  was  part  of  the  territory  of  Alaska  and 
thus  was  comparable  to  a harbor  or  closed  sea  {mare 
clausum),  but  Secretary  Blaine  disavowed  this  conten- 
tion. The  United  States  then  requested  the  govern- 
ments of  several  European  countries,  together  with 

1 Cf.  map  p.  10. 


THE  TREND  OF  DIPLOMACY  287 

Japan,  to  cooperate  for  the  better  protection  of  the 
fisheries,  but  no  results  were  reached. 

Continuance  of  the  seizures  in  1889  brought  renewed 
protests  from  Lord  Salisbury,  who  was  in  charge  of 
foreign  atfairs.  Blaine  retorted  that  the  destruction 
of  the  herds  was  contra  bonos  mores  and  that  it  was 
no  more  defensible  even  outside  the  three  mile  limit 
than  destructive  fishing  on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland 
by  the  explosion  of  dynamite  would  be.  Lord  Salis- 
bury replied  that  fur  seals  were  wild  animals,  ferae 
naturae,  and  not  the  property  of  any  individual  until 
captured.  An  extended  diplomatic  correspondence  en- 
sued, which  resulted  in  a treaty  of  arbitration  in  1892.^ 
A tribunal  of  seven  arbitrators  was  established,  two 
appointed  by  the  Queen  of  England,  two  by  the  Presi- 
dent, and  one  each  by  the  rulers  of  France,  Italy  and 
Sweden  and  Norway,  the  last  two  being  under  one 
sovereign  at  that  time.  Several  questions  were  sub- 
mitted to  the  tribunal.  What  -exclusive  rights  does  the 
United  States  have  in  the  Bering  Sea?  What  right  of 
protection  or  property  does  the  United  States  have  in 
the  seals  frequenting  the  islands  in  the  Sea?  If  the 
United  States  has  no  exclusive  rights  over  the  seals, 
what  steps  ought  to  be  taken  to  protect  them?  Great 
Britain  also  presented  to  the  arbitrators  the  question 
whether  the  seizures  of  seal-hunting  ships  had  been 
made  under  the  authority  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States. 

The  decisions  were  uniformly  against  the  American 

1 J.  \V.  Foster,  who  was  intimately  connected  with  the  case,  suggests 
that  the  defects  in  the  American  argument  were  due  partly  to  follow- 
ing briefs  prepared  by  an  agent  of  the  Alaska  Commercial  Company  in 
Washington.  The  agent  was  interested  in  getting  everything  possible 
for  his  company  but  his  knowledge  of  the  law  in  the  case  was  slight. 
Cf . Foster,  Memoirs,  II,  26  f . ; Moore,  American  Diplomacy,  97-104. 


288 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


contention.  It  was  decided  that  our  jurisdiction  in  the 
Bering  Sea  did  not  extend  beyond  the  three  mile  limit 
and  that  therefore  the  United  States  had  no  right  of 
protection  or  property  in  the  seals.  A set  of  regula- 
tions for  the  protection  of  the  herds  was  also  drawn 
up.  Another  negotiation  resulted  in  the  payment  of 
$4-73,000  damages  by  the  United  States  for  the  illegal 
seizures  of  British  sealers.^ 

Relations  with  the  Latin  American  countries  south 
of  the  Mexican  border  had  been  unstable  since  the 
Mexican  War,  an  unhappy  controversy  that  left  an  in- 
eradicable prejudice  against  us.  John  Quincy  Adams 
and  Henry  Clay  had  hoped  for  a friendly  union  of  the 
nations  of  North  and  South  America,  led  by  the  United 
States,  but  this  ideal  had  turned  out  to  have  no  more 
substance  than  a vision.  Moreover,  the  increasing 
trade  activity  of  Great  Britain  and  later  of  Germany 
had  made  a commercial  bond  of  connection  between 
South  America  and  Europe  which  was,  perhaps, 
stronger  than  that  which  the  United  States  had  estab- 
lished. Yet  some  progress  was  made.  Disputes  be- 
tween European  governments  and  the  governments  of 
Latin  American  countries  were  frequently  referred  to 
the  United  States  for  arbitration.  An  old  claim  of 
some  British  subjects,  for  example,  against  Colombia 
was  submitted  for  settlement  in  1872  to  commissioners 
of  whom  the  United  States  minister  at  Bogota  was  the 
most  important.  The  problem  was  studied  with  great 

1 The  attempts  to  protect  the  herds  by  government  regulation  failed 
to  have  any  important  results.  An  international  arrangement  was  made 
in  1911,  but  the  slaughter  had  proceeded  so  far  that  grave  question 
arose  whether  any  agreement  would  be  effective  short  of  absolute  prohi- 
bition. In  1912  Congress  passed  a law  forbidding  any  killing  on  the 
land  for  a term  of  five  years;  in  1917  when  the  restrictions  were  re- 
leased the  herds  had  greatly  increased.  In  1918  the  seals  numbered 
530,480.  American  Year  Book,  1918,  503-4. 


THE  TREND  OF  DIPLOMACY 


289 


care  and  the  award  was  satisfactory  to  both  sides.  In 
1876  a territorial  dispute  between  Argentina  and  Para- 
guay was  referred  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  In  the  case  of  a boundary  controversy  between 
Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua,  President  Cleveland  ap- 
pointed an  arbitrator ; Argentina  and  Brazil  presented 
a similar  problem  which  received  the  attention  of 
Presidents  Harrison  and  Cleveland. 

It  fell  to  James  G.  Blaine  to  revive  the  idea  of  a 
Pan-American  conference  which  had  been  first  con- 
ceived by  Adams  and  Clay.  As  a diplomat,  Blaine  was 
possessed  of  outstanding  patriotism  and  enthusiastic 
imagination,  even  if  not  of  vast  technical  capacity  or 
of  an  international  mind.  As  Secretary  of  State  under 
President  Garfield  in  1881  he  invited  the  Latin  Ameri- 
can countries  to  share  with  the  LLiited  States  in  a con- 
ference for  the  discussion  of  arbitration.  The  early 
death  of  Garfield  and  the  ensuing  change  in  the  state 
department  resulted  in  the  abandonment  of  the  project 
for  the  time  being.  Blaine,  however,  and  other  inter- 
ested persons  continued  to  press  the  plan  and  in  1888 
Congress  authorized  the  President  to  invite  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  Latin  American  countries  to  send  dele- 
gates to  a conference  to  be  held  in  Washington  in  the 
following  year.  By  that  time  President  Harrison  was 
in  power.  Blaine  was  again  Secretary  of  State  and 
was  chosen  president  of  the  conference.  Among  the 
subjects  for  discussion  were  the  preservation  of  peace, 
the  creation  of  a customs  union,  uniform  systems  of 
weights,  measures  and  coinage,  and  the  promotion  of 
frequent  inter-communication  among  the  American 
states.  Little  was  accomplished,  beyond  a few  recom- 
mendations, except  the  establishment  of  the  Interna- 
tional Bureau  of  American  Republics.  This  was  to 
have  no  governmental  power,  but  was  to  be  supported 


290 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


by  the  various  nations  concerned  and  was  to  collect  and 
disseminate  information  about  their  laws,  products  and 
customs.  The  Bureau  has  become  permanent  under 
the  name  Pan  American  Union  and  is  a factor  in  the 
preservation  of  friendly  relations  among  the  American 
republics.  The  reciprocity  measure  which  Blaine 
pressed  upon  Congress  during  the  pendency  of  the 
McKinley  tariff  bill  was  designed  partly  to  further 
Pan-American  intercourse. 

In  the  case  of  a disagreement  with  Chile,  Blaine  was 
less  successful.  A revolution  against  the  Chilean 
President,  Balmaceda,  resulted  in  the  triumph  of  the 
insurgents  in  1891.  The  American  minister  to  Chile 
was  Patrick  Egan,  an  Irish  agitator  who  sympathized 
with  President  Balmaceda  against  the  revolutionists 
and  who  was  persona  non  grata  to  the  strong  English 
and  German  colonies  there.  While  Chilean  affairs 
were  in  this  strained  condition,  the  revolutionists  sent 
a vessel,  the  Itata,  to  San  Diego  in  California  for  mili- 
tary supplies,  and  American  authorities  seized  it  for 
violating  the  neutrality  laws.  While  the  vessel  was  in 
the  hands  of  our  officers,  the  Chileans  took  control  of 
it  and  made  their  escape.  The  cruiser  Charleston  was 
sent  in  pursuit  and  thereupon  the  revolutionists  sur- 
rendered the  Itata.  Not  long  afterward,  however,  a 
United  States  Court  decided  that  the  pursuit  had  been 
without  justification  under  international  law  and 
ordered  the  release  of  the  Itata.  The  result  was  that 
the  United  States  seemed  to  have  been  over-ready  to 
take  sides  against  the  revolutionists,  and  the  latter  be- 
came increasingly  hostile  to  Americans. 

Relations  finally  broke  under  the  strain  of  a street 
quarrel  in  the  city  of  Valparaiso  in  the  fall  of  1891. 
A number  of  sailors  from  the  United  States  ship  Balti- 
more were  on  shore  leave  and  fell  in  with  some  Chilean 


THE  TREND  OF  DIPLOMACY 


291 


sailors  in  a saloon.  A quarrel  resulted — just  how  it 
originated  and  just  who  was  the  aggressor  could  not  he 
determined — but  at  any  rate  the  Americans  were  out- 
numbered and  one  was  killed.  The  administration 
pressed  the  case  with  vigor,  declining  to  look  upon  the 
incident  as  a sailors’  brawl  and  considering  it  a hostile 
attack  upon  the  wearers  of  an  American  uniform.  For 
a time  the  outbreak  of  war  was  considered  likely,  hut 
eventually  Chile  yielded,  apologized  for  its  acts  and 
made  a financial  return  for  the  victims  of  the  riot. 
Later  students  of  Chilean  relations  have  not  praised 
Egan  as  minister  or  Blaine’s  conduct  of  the  negotia- 
tions, but  it  is  fair  to  note  that  the  Chileans  were  preju- 
diced against  the  American  Secretary  of  State  because 
of  an  earlier  controversy  in  which  he  had  sided  against 
them,  and  that  the  affair  was  complicated  by  the  pres- 
ence of  powerful  European  colonies  and  by  the  passions 
which  the  revolution  had  aroused. 

Blaine  was  compelled  to  face  another  embarrassing 
situation  in  dealing  with  Italy  in  1891-1892.  In  Oc- 
tober, 1890,  the  chief  of  police  of  New  Orleans,  D.  C. 
Hennessy,  had  been  murdered  and  circumstances  indi- 
cated that  the  deed  had  been  committed  by  members 
of  an  Italian  secret  society  called  the  Mafia.  A num- 
ber of  Italians  were  arrested,  of  whom  three  were  ac- 
quitted, five  were  held  for  trial  and  three  were  to  be 
tried  a second  time.  One  morning  a mob  of  citizens, 
believing  that  there  had  been  a miscarriage  of  justice, 
seized  the  eleven  and  killed  all  of  them.  The  Italian 
government  immediately  demanded  protection  for 
Italians  in  New  Orleans,  as  well  as  punishment  of  the 
persons  concerned  in  the  attack,  and  later  somewhat 
impatiently  demanded  federal  assurance  that  the  guilty 
parties  would  be  brought  to  trial  and  an  acknowledg- 


292 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


meiit  that  an  indemnity  was  due  to  the  relatives  of  the 
victims  of  the  mob.  Failing  to  obtain  these  guaran- 
tees, the  Italian  government  withdrew  its  minister. 
When  a grand  jury  in  New  Orleans  investigated  the 
affair  it  excused  the  participants  and  none  of  them 
was  brought  to  trial. 

The  government  at  Washington  was  hampered  by 
the  fact  that  judicial  action  in  such  a case  lies  with 
the  individual  state  under  our  form  of  government, 
whereas  diplomatic  action  is  of  course  entirely  federal. 
If  the  states  are  tardy  or  derelict  in  action,  the  national 
government  is  almost  helpless.  President  Harrison 
urged  Congress  to  make  offenses  against  the  treaty 
rights  of  foreigners  cognizable  in  the  federal  courts, 
but  this  was  never  done.  Diplomatic  activity,  however, 
brought  better  results,  and  an  expression  of  regret  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States,  together  with  the  pay- 
ment of  an  indemnity  of  $24,000  closed  the  incident. 

Among  the  many  troublesome  questions  that  faced 
President  Cleveland  when  he  entered  upon  the  Presi- 
dency in  1893  for  the  second  time,  the  status  of  the 
Hawaiian  Islands  was  important.  Since  the  develop- 
ment of  the  Pacific  Coast  of  the  United  States  in  the 
forties  and  fifties,  there  had  been  a growing  trade  be- 
tween the  islands  and  this  country.  Reciprocity  and 
even  annexation  had  been  projected.  In  1875  a reci- 
procity arrangement  was  consummated,  a part  of 
which  was  a stipulation  that  none  of  the  territory  of 
Hawaii  should  be  leased  or  disposed  of  to  any  other 
power.  In  this  way  a suggestion  was  made  of  ultimate 
annexation.  Moreover  the  commercial  results  of  the 
treaty  were  such  as  to  make  a friendly  connection  with 
the  United  States  a matter  of  moment  to  Hawaii.  The 
value  of  Hawaiian  exports  had  increased,  government 


THE  TREND  OF  DIPLOMACY 


293 


revenues  enlarged,  and  many  public  improvements  had 
been  made.  In  1884  the  grant  of  Pearl  Harbor  to  the 
United  States  as  a naval  station  made  still  another 
bond  of  connection  between  the  islands  and  their  big 
neighbor. 

The  King  of  Hawaii  during  this  period  of  prosperity 
was  Kalakaua.  During  a visit  to  the  United  States, 
and  later  during  a tour  of  the  world  he  was  royally 
received,  whereupon  he  returned  to  his  island  kingdom 
with  expanded  theories  of  the  position  which  a king 
should  occupy.  Unhappily  he  dwelt  more  on  the  pleas- 
ures which  a king  might  enjoy  than  upon  the  obliga- 
tions of  a ruler  to  his  people.  At  his  death  in  1891 
Princess  Liliuokalani  became  Queen  and  at  once  gave 
evidence  of  a disposition  to  rule  autocratically.  Be- 
cause of  her  attempts  to  revise  the  Hawaiian  system 
of  government  so  as  to  increase  the  power  of  the  crown, 
the  more  influential  citizens  assembled,  appointed  a 
committee  of  public  safety  and  organized  for  resist- 
ance. On  January  17, 1893,  the  revolutionary  elements 
gathered,  proclaimed  the  end  of  the  monarchical  regime 
and  established  a provisional  government  under  the 
leadership  of  Judge  S.  B.  Dole.  The  new  authorities 
immediately  proposed  annexation  to  the  United  States 
and  a treaty  was  promptly  drawn  up  in  accord  with 
President  Harrison’s  wishes,  and  presented  to  the 
Senate.  At  this  point  the  Harrison  administration 
ended  and  Cleveland  became  President. 

Cleveland  immediately  withdrew  the  treaty  for  ex- 
amination and  sent  James  H.  Blount  to  the  islands  to 
investigate  the  relation  of  American  officials  to  the  re- 
cent revolution.  The  appointment  of  Blount  was  made 
mthout  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  and  was 
denounced  by  the  President’s  enemies,  although  such 
special  missions  have  been  more  or  less  common  since 


294 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


tlio  beginning  of  our  history.^  Blount  reported  that 
the  United  States  minister  to  Hawaii,  J.  L.  Stevens, 
had  for  some  time  been  favorably  disposed  to  a revo- 
lution in  the  islands  and  had  written  almost  a year  be- 
fore that  event  asking  how  far  he  and  the  naval  com- 
mander might  deviate  from  established  international 
rules  in  the  contingency  of  a rebellion.  “The 
Hawaiian  pear  is  now  fully  ripe,”  Stevens  had  written 
to  the  State  Department,  early  in  1893,  “and  this  is  the 
golden  hour  for  the  United  States  to  pluck  it.”  Blount 
also  informed  the  President  that  the  monarchy  had 
been  overturned  with  the  active  aid  of  Stevens  and 
through  the  intimidation  caused  by  the  presence  of  an 
armed  naval  force  of  the  United  States. 

The  blunt  language  which  Cleveland  employed  in 
his  message  to  Congress  on  the  subject,  left  no  doubt 
about  his  opinion  of  the  transaction.  ‘ ‘ The  control  of 
both  sides  of  a bargain  acquired  in  such  a manner  is 
called  by  a familiar  and  unpleasant  name  when  found 
in  private  transactions.”  Believing  that  an  injustice 
had  been  done  and  that  the  only  honorable  course  was 
to  undo  the  wrong,  he  sent  A.  S.  Willis  as  successor  to 
Stevens  to  express  the  President’s  regret  and  to  at- 
tempt to  make  amends.  One  of  the  conditions  however 
which  President  Cleveland  placed  upon  the  restoration 
of  the  Queen  was  a promise  of  amnesty  to  all  who  had 
shared  in  the  revolution.  The  Queen  was  at  first  un- 
willing to  bind  herself  and  when  she  later  agreed,  a 
new  obstacle  appeared  in  the  refusal  of  the  provisional 
government  to  surrender  its  authority.  Indeed  it  be- 
gan to  appear  that  the  President’s  sense  of  justice  was 
forcing  him  to  attempt  the  impossible.  The  provi- 
sional government  had  already  been  recognized  by  the 
United  States  and  by  other  powers,  the  deposition  of 

1 Cf.  Political  Science  Review,  Aug.,  1916,  481-499. 


THE  TKEND  OF  DIPLOMACY 


295 


the  Queen  was  a fait  accompli  and  her  restoration  par- 
took of  the  nature  of  turning-  hack  the  clock.  More- 
over, force  would  have  to  be  used  to  supplant  the  revo- 
lutionary authorities, — a task  for  which  Americans  had 
no  desire.  The  President,  in  fact,  had  exhausted  his 
powers  and  now  referred  the  whole  affair  to  Congress. 
The  House  condemned  Stevens  for  assisting  in  the 
overturn  of  the  monarchy  and  went  on  record  as  op- 
posed to  either  annexation  or  an  American  protector- 
ate. Sentiment  was  less  nearly  uniform  in  the  upper 
chamber.  The  Democrats  tended  to  uphold  the  Presi- 
dent, the  Eepublicans  to  condemn  him.  Although  a 
majority  of  the  committee  on  foreign  relations  ex- 
onerated Stevens,  yet  no  opposition  appeared  to  a 
declaration  which  passed  the  Senate  on  May  31,  1894, 
maintaining  that  the  United  States  ought  not  to  inter- 
vene in  Hawaiian  affairs  and  that  interference  by  any 
other  government  would  be  regarded  as  unfriendly  to 
this  country. 

In  the  outcome,  these  events  merely  delayed  annexa- 
tion; they  could  not  prevent  it.  In  Hawaii  the  more 
influential  and  the  propertied  classes  supported  the 
revolution  and  desired  annexation.  In  the  United 
States  the  desire  for  expansion  was  stimulated  by  the 
fear  that  some  other  nation  might  seize  the  prize.  Tlie 
military  and  naval  situation  in  1898  increased  the  de- 
mand for  annexation,  and  in  the  summer  of  that  year 
the  acquisition  was  completed  by  means  of  a joint  reso- 
lution of  the  two  houses  of  Congress.^  While  negotia- 
tions were  in  progress  Japan  protested  that  her  inter- 
ests in  the  Pacific  were  endangered.  Assurances  were 
given,  however,  that  Japanese  treaty  rights  would  not 
be  affected  by  the  annexation  and  the  protest  was  with- 

iCf.  below,  p.  387  ff.  Hawaii  was  brought  into  the  Union  as  a terri- 
tory in  1900. 


296  SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

drawn.  The  United  States  was  now  “half-way  across 
to  Asia.” 

Most  dangerous  in  its  possibilities  was  the  contro- 
versy with  Great  Britain  over  the  boundary  between 
British  Guiana  and  Venezuela.  British  Guiana  lies  on 
the  northern  coast  of  South  America,  next  to  Vene- 
zuela and  extends  inland,  with  its  western  boundary 
roughly  parallel  to  the  valley  of  the  Orinoco  River.  A 
long-standing  disagreement  had  existed  about  the  exact 
position  of  the  line  between  the  two  countries — a dis- 
agreement which  harked  back  to  the  claims  of  the 
Dutch,  who  had  acquired  Guiana  in  1613  and  had  turned 
it  over'  to  the  British  in  1814.  In  1840  England  com- 
missioned a surveyor  named  Schomburgk  to  fix  the 
boundary  but  his  decision  was  objected  to  by  the  Vene- 
zuelans who  claimed  that  he  included  a great  area  that 
rightfully  belonged  to  them.  Gradually  the  British 
claims  included  more  and  more  of  the  territory  claimed 
by  Venezuela,  and  the  discovery  of  gold  in  the  disputed 
region  not  only  drew  attention  to  the  necessity  of  a set- 
tlement of  the  boundary  but  also  attracted  prospectors 
who  began  to  occupy  the  land.  In  1876  Venezuela  be- 
gan negotiations  for  some  means  of  deciding  the  dis- 
pute and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  arbitration  was 
her  only  recourse.  On  the  refusal  of  Great  Britain  to 
heed  her  protests,  the  Venezuelan  government  sus- 
pended diplomatic  relations  in  1887,  although  the 
United  States  attempted  to  prevent  a rupture  by  sug- 
gesting the  submission  of  the  difference  to  an  arbitral 
tribunal.  This  offer  was  not  accepted  by  Great  Brit- 
ain, and  repeated  exertions  on  the  part  of  both  Vene- 
zuela and  the  United  States  at  later  times  failed  to 
produce  better  results.  When  Cleveland  returned  to 
the  presidency  in  1893  he  again  became  interested  in 


THE  TREND  OF  DIPLOMACY 


297 


the  Venezuelan  matter  and  Secretary  of  State  Gresham 
urged  the  attention  of  the  British  government  to  the 
desirability  of  arbitration. 

President  Cleveland  was  a man  of  great  courage  and 
had  a very  keen  sense  of  justice.  In  his  opinion  a great 
nation  was  plajdng  the  bully  with  a small  one,  and  the 
injustice  stirred  his  feelings  to  the  depths.  With  the 
President’s  approval  Secretary  Olney,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Gresham  on  the  death  of  the  latter,  drew  up  an 
exposition  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  which  was  com- 
municated to  Lord  Salisbury.  This  despatch,  which 
was  dated  July  20,  1895,  brought  matters  to  a climax. 
In  brief  the  administration  took  the  position  that  under 
the  Monroe  doctrine  the  United  States  adhered  to  the 
principle  that  no  European  nation  might  deprive  an 
American  state  of  the  right  and  power  of  self-govern- 
ment. This  had  been  established  American  policy  for 
seventy  years.  The  V enezuelan  boundary  controversy 
was  within  the  scope  of  the  doctrine  since  Great  Britain 
asserted  title  to  disputed  territory,  substantially  ap- 
propriating it,  and  refused  to  have  her  title  investi- 
gated. At  the  same  time  Secretary  Olney  disclaimed 
any  intention  of  taking  sides  in  the  controversy  until 
the  merits  of  the  case  were  authoritatively  ascertained, 
although  the  general  argument  of  the  despatch  seemed 
to  place  the  United  States  on  the  side  of  Venezuela. 
Moreover,  Secretary  Olney  adopted  a swaggering  and 
aggressive,  not  to  say  truculent  tone.  He  drew  a con- 
trast between  monarchical  Europe  and  self-governing 
America,  particularly  the  United  States,  which  “has 
furnished  to  the  world  the  most  conspicuous  . . . ex- 
ample ...  of  the  excellence  of  free  institutions, 
whether  from  the  standpoint  of  national  greatness  or 
of  individual  happiness.”  The  United  States,  he  as- 
serted, is  “practically  sovereign  on  this  continent”  be- 


298 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


cause  “wisdom  and  justice  and  equity  are  the  invari- 
able characteristics”  of  its  dealings  with  others  and 
because  “its  infinite  resources  combined  with  its  iso- 
lated position  render  it  master  of  the  situation  ...  as 
against  any  or  all  other  powers.” 

Lord  Salisbury  did  not  reply  to  Secretary  Olney  for 
more  than  four  months.  He  then  asserted  that  Presi- 
dent Monroe’s  message  of  1823  had  laid  down  two 
propositions : that  America  was  no  longer  to  he  looked 
upon  as  a field  for  European  colonization;  and  that 
Europe  must  not  attempt  to  extend  its  political  system 
to  America,  or  to  control  the  political  condition  of  any 
of  the  American  communities.  In  Lord  Salisbury’s 
opinion  Olney  was  asserting  that  the  Monroe  doctrine 
conferred  upon  the  United  States  the  right  to  demand 
arbitration  whenever  a European  power  had  a frontier 
difference  with  a South  American  community.  He 
suggested  that  the  Monroe  doctrine  was  not  a part  of 
international  law,  that  the  boundary  dispute  had  no 
relation  to  the  dangers  which  President  Monroe  had 
feared  and  that  the  United  States  had  no  “apparent 
practical  concern”  with  the  controversy  between  Great 
Britain  and  Venezuela.  He  also  raised  some  objec- 
tions to  arbitration  as  a method  of  settling  disputes 
and  asserted  the  willingness  of  Great  Britain  to  arbi- 
trate her  title  to  part  of  the  lands  claimed.  The  re- 
mainder, he  declared,  could  he  thought  of  as  Venezuelan 
only  by  extravagant  claims  based  on  the  pretensions  of 
Spanish  officials  in  the  last  century.  This  area  he  ex- 
pressly refused  to  submit  to  arbitration.  The  lan- 
guage of  the  Salisbury  note  was  diplomatically  correct, 
a fact  which  did  not  detract  from  the  effect  of  the 
patronizing  tone  which  characterized  it. 

President  Cleveland  doggedly  proceeded  with  his 
demands.  On  December  17,  (1895),  he  laid  before 


THE  TEEND  OF  DIPLOMACY 


299 


Congress  the  correspondence  with  Lord  Salisbury,  to- 
gether mth  a statement  of  his  own  position  on  the 
matter.  Disclaiming  any  preconceived  conviction  as 
to  the  merits  of  the  dispute,  he  nevertheless  deprecated 
the  possibility  that  a European  country,  by  extending 
its  boundaries,  might  take  possession  of  the  territory  of 
one  of  its  neighbors.  Inasmuch  as  Great  Britain  had 
refused  to  submit  to  arbitration,  he  believed  it  incum- 
bent upon  the  United  States  to  take  measures  to  deter- 
mine the  true  divisional  line.  He  suggested  therefore 
that  Congress  empower  the  executive  to  appoint  a com- 
mission to  investigate  and  report.  His  closing  words 
were  so  grave  as  to  arouse  the  country  to  a realization 
of  the  dangerous  pitch  to  which  negotiations  had 
mounted : 

When  such  report  is  made  and  accepted  it  will  in  my 
opinion  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  resist  . . . the 
appropriation  by  Great  Britain  of  any  . . . territory  which 
after  investigation  we  have  determined  of  right  belongs  to 
Venezuela.  In  making  these  recommendations  I am  fully 
alive  to  the  responsibility  incurred,  and  keenly  realize  all  the 
consequences  that  may  follow.  I am  nevertheless  firm  in  my 
conviction  that  while  it  is  a grievous  thing  to  contemplate 
the  two  great  English-speaking  peoples  ...  as  being  other- 
wise than  friendly  . . . there  is  no  calamity  . . . which 
equals  that  which  follows  a supine  submission  to  wrong  and 
injustice. 

Congress  at  once  acceded  to  Cleveland’s  washes  and 
appropriated  $100,000  for  the  proposed  investigation. 
For  a brief  moment  neither  Great  Britain  nor  America 
quite  realized  the  meaning  of  the  President’s  warlike 
utterance.  In  America  it  had  generally  been  felt 
previously  that  his  foreign  policy  was  conciliatory 
rather  than  aggressive  and,  besides,  the  Venezuelan 


300 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


dispute  had  but  little  occupied  popular  attention. 
When  it  became  evident  that  war  was  a definite  possi- 
bility, public  interest  followed  every  step  with  anx- 
iety. Newspaper  sentiment  divided.  The  press  gen- 
erally judged  Cleveland’s  stand  strong  and  “Ameri- 
can.” On  the  other  hand,  a few  periodicals  like  the 
Nation  insinuated  that  the  President  was  actuated  by 
the  desire  to  make  political  capital  for  a third  term 
campaign  and  characterized  his  action  as  “criminally 
rash  and  insensate,”  “ignorant  and  reckless,”  “impu- 
dent and  insulting.”  Influential  citizens  in  both  coun- 
tries made  energetic  attempts  to  prevent  anything  that 
might  make  war  inevitable.  The  Prince  of  Wales  and 
Lord  Roseberry  threw  their  influence  on  the  side  of 
conciliation.  A.  J.  Balfour  declared  that  a conflict 
with  the  United  States  would  carry  something  of  the 
“horror  of  civil  war”  and  looked  forward  to  the  time 
when  the  country  would  “feel  that  they  and  we  have  a 
common  duty  to  perform,  a common  office  to  fulfill 
among  the  nations  of  the  world.” 

The  President  appointed  a commission  which  set  to 
work  to  obtain  the  information  necessary  for  a judicial 
settlement  of  the  boundary,  and  both  Great  Britain 
and  Venezuela  tactfully  expressed  a readiness  to  co- 
operate. Their  labors,  however,  were  brought  to  a 
close  by  a treaty  between  the  two  disputants  providing 
for  arbitration.  A prominent  feature  of  the  treaty  was 
an  agreement  that  fifty  years’  control  or  settlement  of 
an  area  should  be  sufficient  to  constitute  a title,  a pro- 
vision which  withdrew  from  consideration  much  of  the 
territory  to  which  Venezuela  had  laid  claim.  In  Octo- 
ber, 1899,  the  arbitration  was  concluded.  The  award 
did  not  meet  the  extreme  claims  of  either  party,  but 
gave  Great  Britain  the  larger  share  of  the  disputed 


THE  TREND  OF  DIPLOMACY  301 

area,  although  assigning  the  entire  mouth  of  the  Ori- 
noco River  to  Venezuela. 

Besides  giving  new  life  to  the  Monroe  doctrine  as  an 
integral  part  of  our  foreign  policy,  the  incident  served 
to  illustrate  the  dangers  of  settling  international  dis- 
putes in  haphazard  fashion.  In  January,  1897,  there- 
fore, Secretary  Olney  and  the  British  Ambassador  at 
Washington,  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote,  negotiated  a gen- 
eral treaty  for  the  settlement  of  disputes  between  the 
tv^o  countries  by  arbitration.  Even  with  the  example 
of  the  possible  consequences  of  the  Venezuelan  contro- 
versy before  it,  however,  the  Senate  failed  to  see  the 
necessity  for  such  an  expedient,  defeated  the  treaty  by 
a narrow  margin  and  left  the  greatest  problem  of  inter- 
national relations- — the  settlement  of  controversies  on 
the  basis  of  justice  rather  than  force — to  the  care  of  a 
future  generation. 

On  the  whole,  as  has  already  been  noted,  the  history 
of  American  diplomacy  from  1877  to  1897  is  scarcely 
more  than  an  account  of  a series  of  unrelated  incidents. 
Not  only  did  the  foreign  policy  of  Blaine  differ  sharply 
from  that  of  Cleveland,  but  there  was  no  great  question 
upon  which  public  interest  came  to  a focus,  except  tem- 
porarily over  the  Venezuelan  matter,  and  no  lesser 
problems  that  continued  long  enough  to  challenge  at- 
tention to  the  fact  that  they  remained  unsolved.  There 
were  visible,  nevertheless,  several  important  tenden- 
cies. Our  attitude  toward  Samoa  and  Hawaii  indi- 
cated that  the  instinctive  desire  to  annex  territory  had 
not  disappeared  with  the  rounding  out  of  the  continen- 
tal possessions  of  the  United  States ; American  interest 
in  arbitration  as  a method  of  settling  disputes  was  ex- 
pressed again  and  again ; the  place  of  the  Monroe  doc- 
trine in  American  international  policy  was  clearly 


302 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


shown ; and  the  determination  of  the  United  States  to 
be  heard  in  all  affairs  that  touched  her  interests  was 
demonstrated  without  any  possibility  of  doubt. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  most  complete  and  reliable  authority  is  J.  B.  Moore, 
A Digest  of  International  Law  (8  vols.  1906),  by  one  who  was 
intimately  connected  with  many  of  the  incidents  of  which  he 
wrote ; the  text  of  the  treaties  is  in  W.  M.  Malloy,  Treaties, 
Conventions,  International  Acts,  etc.,  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  other  Powers  (2  vols.,  1910).  Valu- 
able single  volumes  are : J.  B.  Moore,  American  Diplomacy 
(1905)  ; and  C.  R.  Fish,  American  Diplomacy  (1915).  W. 
P.  Johnson,  America’s  Foreign  Relations  (2  vols.,  1916),  is 
interesting  but  somewhat  marred  by  the  author’s  tendency  to 
take  sides  on  controversial  points;  see  also  j.  B.  Henderson, 
American  Diplomatic  Questions  (1901).  J.  S.  Bassett,  Short 
History  of  the  United  States  (1913),  contains  a brief  and  com- 
pact chapter. 

Essential  material  on  particular  incidents  is  found  in  the 
following.  On  Japan,  “Our  War  with  One  Gun,”  in  New 
England  Magazine,  XXYIII,  662;  J.  M.  Callahan,  American 
Relations  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East  (1901)  ; W.  E. 
Griffis,  Townsend  Harris  (1896).  On  Samoa,  J.  W.  Poster, 
American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient  (1903)  ; R.  L.  Stevenson, 
Eight  Years  of  Trouble  in  Samoa  (1892).  On  the  seal  fish- 
eries, J.  W.  Foster,  Diplomatic  Memoirs  (2  vols.,  1909).  On 
Hawaii,  Cleveland’s  message  in  J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages 
and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  IX,  460.  On  Venezuela, 
Grover  Cleveland,  Presidential  Problems,  Chap.  IV. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER 

IN  their  handling  of  the  labor  problem,  the  govern- 
ments of  the  states  and  the  nation  showed  greater 
ignorance  and  less  foresight  than  characterized  their 
treatment  of  any  of  the  other  issues  of  the  quarter  cen- 
tury following  the  Civil  War.  Yet  the  building  of  the 
railroads  and  their  consolidation  into  great  systems, 
the  development  of  manufacturing  and  its  concentra- 
tion into  large  concerns,  and  the  growth  of  an  army  of 
wage  earners  brought  about  a problem  of  such  size 
and  complexity  as  to  demand  all  the  information  and 
msion  that  the  countrj^  could  muster. 

The  phenomenal  accumulation  of  wealth  in  the  fields 
of  mining,  transportation  and  manufacturing  which 
characterized  the  new  industrial  America  formed  the 
basis  of  a powerful  propertied  class.  Some  of  the 
wealth  was  amassed  by  such  unscrupulous  methods  as 
those  which  caused  the  popular  demand  for  govern- 
ment regulation  of  the  railroads  and  trusts.  The 
prizes  of  success  were  big.  The  men  who  made  their 
way  to  the  top — men  like  Gould,  Fisk,  Vanderbilt, 
Rockefeller  and  Carnegie — were  pioneers  whose  cour- 
age, foresight,  and  daring  were  combined  with  suffi- 
cient ruthlessness  to  enable  them  to  triumph  where 
others  failed.  A few  of  them,  like  Carnegie,  had  some 
slight  conception  of  the  meaning  of  the  labor  problem ; 
most  of  them  did  not.  Linked  to  the  industrial 
pioneer  by  community  of  interest  was  the  holder  of  the 

303 


304 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


war  bonds  of  the  federal  government.  These  securi- 
ties were  purchased  with  depreciated  paper  currency 
but  increased  very  greatly  in  value  after  the  success- 
ful outcome  of  the  struggle,  and  formed  an  investment 
whose  value  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  estimate.  The 
owners  of  the  stocks  and  bonds  of  the  railroads  and 
manufacturing  combinations  further  swelled  the  ranks 
of  the  propertied  class.  Stability,  continuous  business 
and  large  earnings  were  the  immediate  considerations 
to  this  group.  Anything  which  interfered  was,  natu- 
rally, a thing  to  be  fought.  Never  before,  unless  in  the 
South  in  slavery  days,  had  a more  powerful  social 
class  existed  in  the  United  States.  A large  fraction 
of  the  group  was  composed  of  men  who  had  risen  from 
poverty  to  wealth  in  a short  time.  From  one  point  of 
view  such  a man  is  a “self-made”  man,  industrious, 
frugal,  able,  energetic,  bold.  From  another  point  of 
view  he  is  a parvenu,  narrow,  overbearing,  ostenta- 
tious, proud,  conceited,  uncultivated.  The  relatively 
small  size  of  the  propertied  class  and  an  obvious  com- 
munity of  interest  tended  to  make  its  members  reach  a 
class  consciousness  even  during  the  Civil  War.  The 
success  of  the  group  in  preventing  all  tariff  reduction 
after  1865  was  a striking  example  of  the  solidarity  of 
its  membership  and  its  readiness  for  action. 

Class  consciousness  among  the  wage  earners  de- 
veloped much  more  slowly,  and  in  the  nature  of  things 
was  much  less  definite.  Nevertheless  the  history  of 
the  industrial  turmoil  of  the  quarter  century  after  the 
Civil  War  is  the  history  of  a class  groping  for  political, 
social  and  economic  recognition. 

At  the  close  of  the  war  the  labor  situation  was  con- 
fused and  complicated.  A million  and  a half  of  men  in 
the  North  and  South  had  to  be  readmitted  to  the  ranks 
of  industry.  Approximately  another  million  had  died 


THE  EISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  305 


or  been  more  or  less  disabled  during  the  conflict.  A 
stream  of  immigrants,  already  large  and  constantly  in- 
creasing, was  pouring  into  the  North  and  seeking  a 
means  of  livelihood.  As  has  been  seen,  most  of  these 
settled  in  the  manufacturing  and  mining  sections  of 
the  northern  and  eastern  states,  helped  to  crowd  the 
cities,  and  overflowed  into  the  fertile,  free  lands  of  the 
mid- West.  Nearly  800,000  of  them  reached  the  United 
States  in  one  year,  1882.  Most  of  them  were  men — an 
overwhelming  portion  of  them  men  of  working  age, 
unskilled,  frequently  illiterate  and  hence  compelled  to 
seek  employment  in  a relatively  small  number  of  occu- 
pations. Both  the  chances  of  unemployment  and  the 
danger  of  a lowered  standard  of  living  were  increased 
by  the  immigrants. 

The  greater  use  of  machinery  during  the  progress 
of  the  war  has  already  been  alluded  to,  but  some  of  its 
results  demand  further  mention.^  Most  evident  was 
the  huge  increase  in  the  volume  and  value  of  the  prod- 
ucts of  the  factories.  The  labor  of  a single  worker 
increased  in  effectiveness  many  times ; in  other  words, 
the  labor  cost  of  a unit  of  production  greatly  dimin- 
ished with  the  improvement  of  mechanical  devices. 
The  labor  cost  of  making  nails  by  hand  in  1813  was 
seventy  fold  the  cost  of  making  them  by  machinery  in 
1899;  loading  ore  by  hand  was  seventy-three  times  as 
expensive  in  1891  as  machine  loading  was  in  1896.  In- 
creased production  encouraged  greater  consumption, 
enhanced  competition  for  markets,  and  opened  the 
world  to  the  products  of  American  labor.  Moreover, 
the  introduction  of  machinery  emphasized  the  import- 
ance of  capital.  When  iron  was  rolled  by  hand,  when 
cloth  was  produced  by  the  use  of  the  spinning  wheel 
and  hand-loom,  when  fields  were  tilled  by  inexpensive 

1 Cf.  above,  p.  64. 


306 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


plow  and  hoe,  relatively  small  amounts  of  capital  were 
needed  by  the  man  who  started  in  to  work.  Mechani- 
cal inventions  revolutionized  the  situation.  A costly 
power-loom  enabled  its  owner  to  eliminate  handwork- 
ing competitors.  If  a workman  could  raise  sufficient 
money  or  credit  to  purchase  a supply  of  machines  he 
could  “set  up  in  business,”  employ  a number  of 
“hands”  and  merely  direct  or  manage  the  enterprise. 
Under  such  a system  the  employer  must  make  enough 
profit  to  pay  interest  on  liis  investment  and  to  repair 
and  replace  his  equipment.  His  attention  was  fixed  on 
these  elements  of  his  industrial  problem  and  the  well- 
being of  the  laborer  sank  to  a lower  plane  of  import- 
ance. If  the  employer  found  the  labor  supply  plenti- 
ful he  had  the  upper  hand  in  setting  the  wage-scale ; 
the  unorganized  employee  was  almost  completely  at  his 
mercy,  because  the  employer  could  find  another  work- 
man more  easily  than  the  workman  could  find  another 
job.  Meanwhile  the  workman  knew  the  increased  prod- 
uct which  he  was  turning  out,  and  became  discontented 
because  he  did  not  see  a corresponding  increase  in  his 
remuneration. 

From  about  1830,  when  the  rapid  development  of  the 
use  of  mechanical  appliances  began,  to  the  late  eighties 
and  early  nineties  when  the  new  regime  was  meeting 
its  sternest  conflicts  in  the  trust  problem  and  the  mili- 
tant labor  unions,  the  army  of  the  wage  earner  was 
growing  faster  than  the  population.  Between  1870 
and  1890,  for  example,  the  population  increased  63 
per  cent.,  while  the  number  of  laborers  engaged  in 
manufacturing  increased  nearly  130  per  cent.  By  the 
latter  year,  6,099,058  persons,  about  a tenth  of  the  total 
population,  were  employed  in  transportation,  mining 
and  manufacturing. 

It  was  noticeable,  also,  that  the  wage  earners  tended 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  307 


to  concentrate.  The  laborers  engaged  in  manufactur- 
ing were  to  be  found,  for  the  most  part,  in  the  North- 
east, and  especially  in  such  leading  industrial  cities  as 
New  York,  Chicago  and  Philadelphia.  Furthermore, 
the  development  of  the  factory  system  and  the  con- 
solidation of  many  small  companies  into  a few  great 
ones  tended  to  localize  the  labor  problem  still  further — 
in  a relatively  small  number  of  plants.  The  concentra- 
tion of  industry  in  great  factories  where  large  numbers 
of  workers  labored  side  by  side  ended  the  paternal  care 
which  the  old-time  employer  had  expended  upon  his 
employees.  With  the  introduction  of  machinery,  the 
danger  of  accidents  due  to  the  ignorance  or  careless- 
ness of  fellow  workmen  increased.  The  use  of  me- 
chanical appliances  also  gave  opportunity  for  the  em- 
ployment of  women  and  children,  and  thus  raised  the 
question  whether  any  restrictions  ought  to  be  placed 
upon  the  employment  of  these  classes  of  people.  The 
construction  of  factories,  their  ventilation,  sanitary 
appliances,  and  safe-guards  for  health  and  comfort  be- 
came subjects  of  importance. 

With  the  example  of  consolidation  before  them  that 
was  presented  by  the  railroads  and  the  corporations, 
it  was  inevitable  that  the  wage  earners  should  organize 
for  their  protection  and  advancement.  Labor  organ- 
izations of  wage  earners  have  existed  in  the  United 
States  since  1827,  and  between  that  time  and  1840  came 
a considerable  awakening  among  the  laboring  classes 
which  was  part  of  a general  humanitarian  movement 
throughout  the  country.  Robert  Owen,  an  English  in- 
dustrial idealist,  had  visited  this  country  about  1825 
and  provided  the  initiative  for  a short-lived  communis- 
tic settlement  at  New  Harmony,  Indiana.  Similar  en- 
terprises were  established  at  other  points ; the  most 
famous  of  these  was  that  at  Brook  Farm  in  Massa- 


308 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


chusetts,  which  enlisted  the  interest  and  support  of 
many  of  the  literary  people  of  New  Eng-land.  The  ex- 
panding humanitarian  and  idealistic  movement  was  cut 
short  by  the  Civil  War,  but  the  development  of  indus- 
trialism went  on  uninfluenced  by  the  spirit  of  social 
progress  which  might  have  permeated  it.  After  recon- 
struction was  over,  a new  generation  had  to  become 
impressed  with  the  evils  which  needed  correction  and 
to  set  itself  to  the  task  which  civil  strife  had  thrust 
aside. 

The  need  of  a responsible  organization  of  wage  earn- 
ers was  indicated  by  the  career  of  the  Molly  Maguires. 
The  Molly  Maguires  constituted  an  inner  circle"  of  Irish 
Catholics  who  "controlled  the  activities  of  the  branches 
of  the  Ancient  Order  of  Hibernians  in  the  hard-coal 
counties  of  eastern  Pennsylvania.  During  the  war  and 
immediately  after  it  the  group  gained  a little  power  in 
local  politics,  and  also  undertoook  to  punish  mine  own- 
ers, bosses  and  superintendents  who  offended  members 
of  the  Order.  Intimidation  became  common,  and  even 
murder  was  resorted  to  until  the  region  was  fairly  ter- 
rorized. It  seemed  impossible  to  combat  the  Mollies 
because  their  activities  were  shrouded  in  secrecy. 
Usually,  for  example,  when  a murder  was  to  be  com- 
mitted, a member  would  be  brought  in  from  an  outside 
district  in  order  that  he  might  not  be  recognized  if 
discovered,  and  he  would  be  aided  in  escaping  after  the 
crime.  Finally  the  president  of  the  Philadelphia  and 
Reading  Railroad  procured  a Pinkerton  detective 
named  James  McParlan  who  went  into  the  region  and 
remained  for  two  years.  During  this  time  he  posed  as 
a fugitive  from  justice  and  as  a counterfeiter,  became 
a member  of  the  Order,  a confidant  of  the  Molly  Ma- 
guires, and  collected  evidence.  Armed  with  the  knowl- 
edge acquired  by  McParlan,  the  officials  were  able  to 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  309 


arrest  and  convict  twenty-four  criminals,  of  whom  ten 
were  executed,  and  the  career  of  the  Mollies  came  to 
an  end. 

,The  activities  oL-the-MolIv  Alabin' res,  were  sympto- 
niatic  of  whatmight  occur  throughout  the  ranks  of 
labor  during  the  confused  period  of  adjustment  after 
the  war,  and  yet  they  were  temporary  and  local  in  their 
effect  on  the  development  of  the  labor  movement.  The 
history  of  the  great  labor  controversies  after  the  war 
properly  begins  with  the  Knights  of  Labor,  an  associa- 
tion which  originated  in  Philadelphia  in  1869  as  the 
result  of  the  etforts  of  a garment  cutter  named  Uriah 
S.  Stephens.^  In  the  beginning,  the  affairs  of  the 
Knights  were  veiled  in  dense  secrecy ; even  the  name  of 
the  society  was  never  mentioned  but  was  indicated  by 
five  stars  *****.  As  the  number  of  members  increased, 
however,  all  manner  of  disquieting  and  untruthful 
rumors  spread  concerning  its  purposes,  so  that  the  ele- 
ment of  secrecy  was  done  away  with  in  1881  and  a 
declaration  of  principles  was  made  public.  The  funda- 
mental purpose  of  the  Knights  was  the  formation  of  an 
order  which  should  include  all  branches  of  the  wage 
earners  and  which  should  aim  to  improve  their  eco- 
nomic, moral,  social  and  intellectual  condition. 
Emphasis  was  placed,  that  is  to  say,  on  the  welfare  ^of 
the  laboring  classes  as  a whole,  rather  than  upon  that 
of  any  particular  trade  or  craft.  The  organization  was 
centralized  and  the  interests  of  the  group  were  de- 
veloped on  a national  scale.  The  growth  of  the  asso- 
ciation was  extremely  rapid  at  times,  reaching  a climax 
in  the  middle  eighties  when  about  700,000  members, 
both  men  and  women,  made  it  a power  in  industrial  dis- 
putes. Some  of  the  members  taken  in  at  this  time 

1 Two  earlier  organizations  had  a brief  existence,  the  National  Labor 
Union  and  the  Industrial  Brotherhood 


310 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


were  extremists — European  anarchists,  for  example — 
who  urged  a violent  policy  and  got  almost  if  not  quite 
out  of  control  of  the  officers  during  1886.  In  the  late 
eighties  the  membership  dwindled  rapidly,  owing  to  the 
failure  of  strikes  instituted  by  the  order,  and  its  place 
and  influence  were  largely  taken  by  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor. 

The  latter  body  was  the  outgrowth  of  a convention 
held  in  Pittsburg  in  1881,  but  it  did  not  adopt  its  final 
name  until  1886.  Its  purpose  was  to  group  labor  or- 
ganizations of  all  kinds,  leaving  the  government  of  each 
affiliated  body  with  the  body  itself.  Each  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Federation  is  composed  of  workers  in  a 
given  trade  or  industry,  like  the  International  Typo- 
graphical Union,  the  United  Mine  Workers,  and  many 
others.  The  annual  convention  is  composed  of  dele- 
gates from  the  constituent  societies.  The  growth  of 
the  organization  was  rapid  and  continuous.  Coinci- 
dently  with  the  expansion  of  the  Knights  of  Labor  and 
the  growth  of  the  American  Federation  came  the  great 
development  of  the  labor  press.  Professor  Ely  esti- 
mated late  in  the  eighties  that  possibly  five  hundred 
newspapers  were  devoted  to  the  needs  of  the  labor 
movement.  The  numerous  farmers’  organizations, 
typified  by  the  Patrons  of  Husbandry,  are  other  exam- 
ples of  the  growing  tendency  toward  cohesion  among 
the  less  powerful  classes.  Indeed,  the  Urange  origi- 
nated only  a year  earlier  than  the  Knights  of  Labor, 
and  like  it  was  a secret  order. 

The  wage  earners,  then,  were  rapidly  becoming  class- 
conscious. They  had  found  conditions  which  seemed 
to  them  intolerable,  had  formed  organizations  on  a 
national  scale  and  had  drawn  up  a definite  program  of 
principles  and  reforms.  The  exact  grievances  which 
inspired  the  Knights,  the  Federation  and  other  less 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  311 


important  organizations  are  therefore  of  immediate 
importance. 

In  order  to  secure  for  the  wage  earner  a sufficient 
money  return  for  his  work,  and  sufficient  leisure  for  the 
education  of  his  intellectual  and  religious  faculties, 
and  to  enable  him  to  understand  and  perform  his  duties 
as  a citizen,  the  Knights  demanded  the  establishment 
of  bureaus  of  labor  for  the  collection  of  information; 
the  reservation  of  the  public  lands  for  actual  settlers ; 
the  abrogation  of  laws  that  did  not  bear  equally  on 
capital  and  labor;  the  adoption  of  measures  for  the 
health  and  safety  of  the  working  classes ; indemnity  for 
injuries  due  to  the  lack  of  proper  safeguards;  the 
recognition  of  the  incorporation  of  labor  unions;  laws 
compelling  corporations  to  pay  laborers  weekly;  arbi- 
tration in  labor  disputes;  and  the  prohibition  of  child 
labor.  The  Knights  of  Labor  also  favored  state  owner- 
ship of  telegraphs  and  railroads,  as  well  as  an  eight 
hour  working  day.  The  purposes  of  the  American 
Federation  scarcely  differed  from  this  program,  al- 
though its  methods  and  its  form  of  'organization  were 
quite  distinct. 

At  the  present  time,  when  most  of  these  demands 
have  been  met  in  one  .degree  or  another,  it  is  difficult 
to  see  why  there  should  have  been  delay  and  contention 
in  agreeing  to  a program  which,  so  far  as  it  deals  with 
labor  problems  pure  and  simple,  appears  both  modest 
and  reasonable.  But  the  state  of  mind  of  a large  frac- 
tion of  the  nation  was  not  in  accord  with  ambitions 
which  doubtless  seemed  excessively  radical.  Funda- 
mentally a great  portion  of  the  propertied  classes  held 
a low  estimate  of  the  value  and  rights  of  the  laboring 
people,  as  well  as  of  the  possibilties  of  their  develop- 
ment, and  feared  that  evil  results  would  follow  from 
attempts  to  improve  their  condition.  The  employment 


312 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


of  children  in  factories,  it  was  thought,  would  incul- 
cate in  them  the  needed  habits  of  industry,  and  the  re- 
duction of  the  working  hours  would  merely  provide 
time  which  would  be  spent  in  the  acquirement  of  vicious 
practices.  If,  in  addition,  the  employers  opposed  such 
changes  as  the  abolition  of  child  labor  and  the  reduction 
of  the  working  day  to  eight  hours  on  the  ground  of  the 

financial  sacrifice  which  seemed  to  be  involved,  their 
• • • • ^ 
attitude  was  in  keeping  with  the  ruthless  exploitation 

of  the  human  resources  of  the  country  which  was  com- 
mon during  this  period.  It  should  be  remembered,  too, 
that  the  lofty  conception  which  most  Americans  held  of 
the  opportunities  and  customs  of  their  country  stood  in 
the  way  of  a frank  -study  of  conditions  and  an  equally 
frank  admission  of  abuses.  For  decades  we  had  re- 
iterated that  Am’erica  was  the  land  of  opportunity, 
that  economic,  political  and  social  equality  were  the 
foundations  of  American  life  and  that  the  American 
workingman  was  the  best  fed  and  the  best  clothed  work- 
ingman in  the  world.  In  the  face  of  this  view  of  in- 
dustrial affairs  it  was  difficult  to  be  alert  to  manifold 
abuses  and  needed  reforms.  To  one  holding  this  view 
of  affairs — and  it  was  a common  view — the  laborer  who 
demanded  better  conditions  was  unreasonable  and  un- 
appreciative of  how  “well  off”  he  was.  Hence  the 
blame  for  the  labor  unrest  was  frequently  laid  on  the 
foreigner,  who  was  supposed  to  bring  to  America  the 
opposition  to  government  which  had  been  fostered  in 
him  by  less  democratic  institutions  abroad.  Undoubt- 
edly immigration  greatly  complicated  industrial  condi- 
tions, as  has  been  indicated,  yet  essentially  the  labor 
question  arose  from  the  upward  progress  of  a class  in 
American  society  and  was  as  inevitable,  foreigner  or 
no  foreigner,  as  the  coming  of  a new  century. 

Two  illustrations  will  throw  light  upon  some  of  the 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  313 


demands  which  the  wage  earners  frequently  presented. 
Writing  in  August,  1886,  Andrew  Carnegie,  the  promi- 
nent steel  manufacturer,  discussed  the  proper  length 
of  the  working  day.  Every  ton  of  pig-iron  made  in 
the  world,  with  the  exception  of  that  made  in  two  es- 
tablishments, he  asserted,  was  made  by  men  working- 
twelve  hours  a day,  with  neither  holiday  nor  Sunday 
the  year  round.  Every  two  weeks  it  was  the  practice 
to  change  the  day  workers  to  the  night  shift  and  at 
that  time  the  men  labored  twenty-four  hours  consecu- 
tively. Moreover,  twelve  to  fifteen  hours  constituted 
a day’s  work  in  many  other  industries.  Working 
hours  for  women  and  children  had  almost  equally 
slight  reference  to  their  physical  well-being. 

The  “truck-system”  was  a less  widespread  abuse, 
but  one  that  caused  serious  trouble  at  certain  points. 
Under  this  plan,  a corporation  keeps  a store  at  which 
employees  are  expected  to  trade,  or  are  sometimes 
forced  to  do  so.  Obviously  such  a store  might  be 
operated  to  the  great  benefit  of  the  Avorkman  and  with- 
out loss  to  the  employer,  but  the  temptation  to  make  an 
unfair  profit  and  to  keep  the  laborer  always  in  debt  to 
the  company  was  Amry  great.  A congressional  com- 
mittee AA-hich  investigated  conditions  in  PennsyWania 
in  1888  found  that  prices  charged  in  company  stores 
ran  from  ten  per  cent,  to  160  per  cent,  higher  than 
prices  in  other  stores  in  the  vicinity,  and  that  a Avork- 
man was  more  likely  to  keep  his  position  if  he  traded 
AAith  the  company. 

The  most  insistent  cause  of  industrial  conflict  Avas 
the  question  of  Avages.  Forty-one  per  cent,  of  all  the 
strikes  between  1881  and  1900  Avere  for  more  pay; 
tAA'enty-six  per  cent.,  for  shorter  hours.  BetAveen  the 
close  of  the  Avar  and  the  early  nineties,  industrial  pros- 
perity Avas  AAddespread  except  for  the  period  of  pros- 


314 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


tration  following  1873  and  the  less  important  depres- 
sion of  1884.  Not  unnaturally  the  laborer  desired  to 
have  a larger  share  of  the  product  of  his  work.  The 
individual,  however,  was  impotent  before  a great  cor- 
poration, when  the  wage-scale  was  being  determined; 
hence  workmen  found  it  advantageous  to  combine  and 
bargain  collectively  with  their  employer,  in  the  expec- 
tation that  he  would  hesitate  to  risk  the  loss  of  all  his 
laboring  force,  whereas  the  loss  of  one  or  a few  would 
be  a matter  of  inditference. 

In  the  meanwhile,  a little  ameliorative  labor  legisla- 
tion was  being  passed  by  state  legislatures  and  by 
Congress.  A Massachusetts  law  of  1866  forbade  the 
employment  of  children  under  ten  years  of  age  in 
manufacturing  establishments,  prohibited  the  employ- 
ment of  children  between  the  ages  of  ten  and  fourteen 
for  more  than  eight  hours  per  day,  and  provided  that 
children  who  wmrked  in  factories  must  attend  school 
at  least  six  months  in  the  year.  In  1868  a federal  act 
constituted  eight  hours  a day’s  work  for  government 
laborers,  workmen  and  mechanics,  but  some  doubt 
arose  as  to  the  intent  of  part  of  it  and  the  law  was  not 
enforced.  In  many  states  eight-hour  bills  were  intro- 
duced, but  were  defeated  in  all  except  six,  of  which 
Connecticut,  Illinois  and  California  were  examples,  and 
even  in  these  cases  the  laws  were  not  properly  drawn 
up  or  were  not  enforced.  In  1869  a Bureau  of  Statis- 
tics of  Labor  was  established  in  Massachusetts  which 
led  the  way  for  similar  enterprises  in  other  states.  It 
collected  information  concerning  labor  matters  and 
reported  annually  to  the  legislature.  In  1874  a Massa- 
chusetts ten-hour  law  forbade  the  employment  of 
women  and  minors  under  eighteen  for  more  than  sixty 
hours  a week,  although  refraining  from  the  regulation 
of  working  hours  for  men.  In  1879,  in  imitation  of 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  315 


English  factory  acts,  Massachusetts  passed  a general 
law  relating  to  the  inspection  of  manufacturing  estab- 
lishments. It  provided  that  dangerous  machinery 
must  be  guarded,  proper  ventilation  secured,  elevator 
wells  equipped  with  protective  devices  and  fire-escapes 
constructed.  Other  states  followed  slowly,  but  legis- 
lation was  frequently  negatived  by  lack  of  effective  ad- 
ministration. In  brief,  then,  agitation  previous  to 
1877  had  resulted  in  the  passage  of  a few  protective  ^ 
acts,  but  even  these  were  restricted  to  a few  states  and 
were  not  well  enforced.  It  was,  therefore,  more  than 
a mere  coincidence  that  the  first  general  strike  move- 
ment spread  over  the  country  in  this  same  year,  1877. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  great  railroad  strikes 
of  that  year  extended  over  many  of  the  northern  roads 
but  caused  most  trouble  in  Martinsburg,  West  Virginia, 
Pittsburg  and  other  railway  centers.  Much  property 
was  destroyed,  lives  were  lost,  and  the  strikers  failed 
to  obtain  their  ends.^  Other  effects  of  the  controversy, 
moreover,  made  it  an  important  landmark  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  labor  question.  The  inconvenience  and 
suffering  which  the  strike  caused  in  cities  far  distant 
from  the  scene  of  actual  conflict  indicated  that  the 
transportation  system  was  already  so  essential  a fac- 
tor in  welding  the  country  together  that  any  interrup- 
tion to  its  operation  had  become  intolerable.  The  hos- 
tility of  some  of  the  railway  managers  to  union  among 
their  laborers  and  the  rumors  that  they  were  deter- 
mined to  crush  such  organizations  augured  ill  for  the 
future.  The  hordes  of  unemployed  workmen  and  the 
swarms  of  tramps  which  had  resulted  from  the  con- 
tinued industrial  depression  of  1873  insured  rioting 
and  violence  during  the  strike,  whether  the  strikers 
themselves  favored  it  and  shared  in  it  or  not.  The 

1 Above,  pp.  133-134. 


316 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


destruction  of  property  which  resulted  from  the  strike 
caused  many  state  legislatures  to  pass  conspiracy  laws 
directed  against  labor;  more  attention  was  paid  to  the 
need  of  trained  soldiers  for  putting  down  strikes,  and 
the  construction  of  many  armories  followed;  and  the 
courts  took  a more  hostile  attitude  toward  labor 
unions.  Equally  important  was  the  effect  on  the  work- 
men themselves.  When  the  strike  became  violent  and 
the  state  militia  failed  to  check  it,  the  strikers  found 
themselves  face  to  face  with  federal  troops.  President 
Hayes  could  not,  of  course,  refuse  to  repress  the  riot- 
ers; nevertheless  his  action  aligned  the  power  of  the 
central  government  against  the  strikers,  and  seemed  to 
the  latter  to  align  the  government  against  the  laborers 
as  a class.  Of  a sudden,  then,  the  labor  problem  took 
on  a new  and  vital  interest;  workingmen’s  parties  “be- 
gan to  spring  up  like  mushrooms”;  and  the  laboring 
men  saw  more  clearly  than  ever  the  essential  unity  of 
their  interests. 

Industrial  unrest  increased  rather  than  diminished 
during  the  prosperous  eighties ; for  the  first  five  years 
of  the  decade,  strikes  and  lockouts  together  averaged 
somewhat  over  five  hundred  annually.  The  climax 
came  in  “the  great  upheaval”  of  1884  to  1886.^  In  the 
latter  year  nearly  1600  controversies  involved  610,024 
men  and  a financial  sacrifice  estimated  at  $34,000,000. 
Early  in  May,  1886,  occurred  the  memorable  Hay- 
market  affair  in  the  city  of  Chicago.  The  city  was  a 
center  of  labor  agitation,  some  of  it  peaceful,  some  of 
it  in  the  hands  of  radical  European  anarchists  whose 
methods  were  shown  in  a statement  of  one  of  their 
newspapers,  The  Alarm,  on  Februaiy  21,  1885; 

Dynamite ! Of  all  the  good  stuff,  this  is  the  stuff.  Stuff 

I For  the  effect  on  the  Ivnights  of  Labor,  see  p.  310. 


THE  BISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  317 


several  pounds  of  this  sublime  stuff  into  an  inch  pipe  . . . 
plug  up  both  ends,  insert  a cap  with  a fuse  attached,  place 
this  in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  a lot  of  rich  loafers  . . . 
and  light  the  fuse.  A most  cheerful  and  gratifying  result  will 
follow. 

On  May  1 strikes  began  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
an  eight  hour  day.  During  the  course  of  the  strike 
some  workmen  gathered  near  the  McCormick  Reaper 
Works;  the  police  approached,  were  stoned,  and  re- 
torted by  tiring  upon  the  strikers,  killing  four  and 
w’ounding  many  others.  Thereupon  the  men  called  a 
meeting  in  Haymarket  Square  to  protest  against  the 
action  of  the  police;  in  the  main  they  were  orderly, 
for  Mayor  Carter  Harrison  was  present  and  found 
nothing  objectionable.  Later  in  the  evening,  when  the 
Mayor  and  most  of  the  audience  had  left,  remarks  of  a 
violent  nature  seem  to  have  been  made,  and  at  this 
point  a force  of  180  police  marched  forward  and 
ordered  the  meeting  to  disperse.  Just  then  a bomb 
was  thrown  into  the  midst  of  the  police,  killing  seven 
and  wounding  many  others.  The  entire  nation  was 
shocked  and  terrified  by  the  event,  as  hitherto  anarchy 
had  seemed  to  be  a far-away  thing,  the  product  of  auto- 
cratic European  governments.  The  thrower  of  the 
bomb  could  not  be  discovered,  but  numerous  anarchists 
were  found  who  themselves  possessed  such  weapons  or 
had  urged  violence  in  their  speeches  or  writings. 
Eight  of  them,  nearly  all  Germans,  were  tried  for  mur- 
der on  the  ground  that  the  person  who  threw  the  bomb 
must  have  read  the  speeches  or  writings  of  the  accused 
anarchists  and  have  been  thereby  encouraged  to  do  the 
act.  The  presiding  judge,  Joseph  E.  Gary,  was  of  the 
opinion  that  the  disposition  in  the  guilty  man  to  throw 
the  bomb  was  the  result  of  the  teaching  and  advice  of 
the  prisoners.  The  counsel  for  the  accused  declared 


318 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


that  since  the  guilty  person  could  not  be  found  it  was 
impossible  to  know  whether  he  had  ever  heard  or  read 
anything  said  or  written  by  the  prisoners,  or  been  in- 
fluenced by  their  opinions.  Eventually  eight  anar- 
chists were  convicted,  of  whom  four  were  hanged,  one 
committed  suicide,  and  three  were  imprisoned.  In 
1893  the  Governor  of  Illinois,  John  P.  Altgeld,  par- 
doned the  three  prisoners,  basing  his  action  mainly  on 
the  ground  that  no  proof  had  been  brought  forward  to 
show  that  they  were  in  any  way  acquainted  with  the 
unknown  bomb-thrower.  The  result  of  the  conviction 
was  the  break-up  of  the  radical  anarchistic  movement 
and  also  the  temporary  discrediting  of  the  general  agi- 
tation for  an  eight  hour  day,  although  neither  the 
Knights  of  Labor  nor  the  Federation  of  Labor  had  any 
connection  with  the  anarchists,  and  both  deprecated 
violence. 

In  the  meanwhile.  Congress  had  concerned  itself 
slightly  with  the  labor  problem.  In  1884  a Bureau 
Labor  had  been  established  to  collect  information  on 
the  relation  of  labor  and  capital.  Two  years  later, 
just  before  the  Haymarket  affair,  President  Cleveland 
had  sent  a message  to  Congress  in  which  he  adverted 
to  the  many  disputes  which  had  recently  arisen  be- 
tween laborers  and  employers,  and  urged  legislation  to 
meet  the  exigency.  Considerations  of  justice  and 
safety,  he  thought,  demanded  that  the  workingmen  as  a 
class  be  looked  upon  as  especially  entitled  to  legisla- 
tive care.  Although  Cleveland  deprecated  violence 
and  condemned  unjustifiable  disturbance,  he  believed 
that  the  discontent  among  the  employed  was  due 
largely  to  avarice  on  the  part  of  the  employing  classes 
and  to  the  feeling  among  workmen  that  the  attention 
of  the  government  was  directed  in  an  unfair  degree  to 
the  interests  of  capital.  On  the  other  hand,  he  sug- 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  S19 


gested  that  federal  action  was  greatly  limited  by  con- 
stitutional restrictions.  He  accordingly  urged  that  the 
Bureau  of  Labor  be  enlarged  and  that  permanent  offi- 
cers be  appointed  to  act  as  a board  of  arbitration  in  in- 
dustrial disputes.  The  legislative  branch  was  not  in- 
clined to  follow  Cleveland’s  lead,  although  he  returned 
to  the  subject  after  the  Haymarket  affair,  for  it  was 
commonly  felt  that  his  suggestion  was  too  great  a 
step  in  the  direction  of  centralization  of  government. 
Two  years  later,  in  1888,  a modest  act  was  passed 
which  provided  for  the  investigation  of  differences  be- 
tween railroads  and  their  employees,  but  only  when 
agreed  to  by  both  parties,  and  no  provision  was  made 
for  the  enforcement  of  the  decision  of  the  investigators. 
The  practical  results  were  not  important.  Similar  ac- 
tion had  already  been  taken  in  a few  states.  By  1895 
fifteen  states  had  laws  providing  for  voluntarj^  arbi- 
tration, but  the  results  were  slight  in  most  cases. 

Very  little  progress  was  being  made  in  the  states  in 
the  passage  of  other  industrial  legislation.  In  Ala- 
bama and  Massachusetts  in  the  middle  eighties  acts 
extended  and  regulated  the  liability  of  employers  for 
personal  injuries  suffered  by  laborers  while  at  work.^ 
At  the  same  time  the  attitude  of  the  legislatures  and  the 
courts  in  some  states  toward  strikes  underwent  a slight 
modification.  In  many  states  where  the  legislatures 
had  not  passed  definite  statutes  to  the  contrary,  it  had 
been  held  by  the  courts  that  strikers  could  be  tried 
and  convicted  for  conspiracy.  In  a few  cases,  states 
passed  acts  attempting  to  define  more  exactly  the  legal 
position  of  strikers.  A New  York  court  in  1887,  for 
example,  held  that  the  law  of  the  state  permitted  work- 
men to  seek  an  increase  of  wages  by  all  possible  means 

1 For  the  legal  side  of  this  matter,  consult  Wright,  Industrial  Evolu- 
tion, 278-282. 


320 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAK 


that  fell  short  of  threats  or  violence.  Before  the  close 
of  Cleveland’s  second  administration,  considerable 
progress  had  been  made  in  state  legislation  concerning 
conditions  and  hours  of  labor  for  women  and  children, 
protection  of  workers  from  dangerous  machinery,  the 
payment  of  wages,  employer’s  liability  for  accidents  to 
workmen,  and  other  subjects.  On  the  other  hand,  in 
some  cases  unreasonable  or  ill-considered  actions  on 
the  part  of  the  unions  or  their  active  agents — the 
“walking  delegates” — turned  popular  sentiment 
against  them.  Particularly  was  this  true  in  cases  of 
violence  and  of  strikes  or  boycotts  by  unions  in  support 
of  workmen  in  other  trades  at  far  distant  points. 

During  the  presidential  campaign  of  1892  a violent 
strike  at  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company’s  works  in  Home- 
stead, Pennsylvania,  arose  from  a reduction  in  wages 
and  a refusal  of  the  Company  to  recognize  the  Iron  and 
Steel  Workers’  Union.  An  important  feature  of  this 
disturbance  was  the  use  of  armed  Pinkerton  detectives 
by  the  Company  for  the  protection  of  its  buildings. 
Armed  with  rifles  they  fell  into  conflict  with  the  work- 
men, a miniature  military  campaign  was  carried  on, 
lives  were  lost  and  large  amounts  of  property  de- 
stroyed. Eventually  the  entire  militia  of  the  state  had 
to  be  called  out  to  maintain  peace. 

It  remained,  however,  for  Chicago  and  the  year  1894 
to  present  one  of  the  most  far-reaching,  costly  and 
complex  labor  upheavals  that  has  ever  disturbed  in- 
dustrial relations  in  America.  So  ill  understood  at 
the  time  were  the  real  facts  of  the  controversy  that  it  is 
doubtful  whether  it  is  possible  even  now  to  distinguish 
between  truth  and  rumor  in  regard  to  some  of  its 
aspects. 

The  town  of  Pullman,  near  Chicago,  was  the  home  of 
the  Pullman  Palace  Car  Company,  a prosperous  cor- 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  321 


poratioii  with  a capital  of  $36,U0U,0U0.  It  provided 
houses  for  its  employees,  kept  up  open  stretches  of 
lawn,  flower  beds  and  lakes.  In  1893  and  1894,  when 
general  business  conditions  were  bad,  the  Company 
reduced  the  wages  of  its  workmen  about  twenty-five 
per  cent.  A committee  of  the  men  asked  for  a return 
to  former  rates,  but  they  were  refused,  three  members 
of  the  committee  were  laid  off,  and  the  employees  then 
struck.  Late  in  June,  1894,  the  American  Railway 
Union,  to  which  many  of  the  workmen  belonged,  took 
up  the  side  of  the  men,  and  the  General  Managers  ’ As- 
sociation, comprising  officials  of  twenty-four  roads  en- 
tering Chicago,  took  the  side  of  the  Company. 
Through  the  entry  of  the  Union  and  the  Association, 
the  relatively  unimportant  Pullman  affair  expanded  to 
large  proportions.  Violence  followed;  cars  were 
tipped  over  and  burned;  property  was  stolen  and 
tracks  ruined;  and  eventually  the  United  States  gov- 
ernment was  drawn  into  the  controversy. 

Numerous  complaints  having  reached  Washington 
that  the  mails  were  being  obstructed  and  interstate 
commerce  interfered  with.  President  Cleveland  decided 
to  send  troops  to  Chicago.  The  Constitution  requireii 
that  the  United  States  protect  states  against  domestio 
violence  on  the  application  of  the  legislature,  or  of  the 
executive  when  the  legislature  is  not  in  session.  More- 
over the  statutes  of  the  United  States  empower  the 
President  to  use  federal  force  to  execute  federal  laws. 
The  position  taken  by  the  Governor  of  Illinois,  John  P. 
Altgeld,  was  expressed  in  his  telegram  to  President 
Cleveland  protesting  against  the  action  of  the  execu- 
tive: 

Should  the  situation  at  any  time  get  so  serious  that  we  can 
not  control  it  with  the  State  forces,  we  will  promptly  and 
freely  ask  for  Federal  assistance ; but  until  such  time  I protest 


322 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


with  all  due  deference  against  this  uncalled-for  reflection  upon 
our  people,  and  again  ask  for  the  immediate  withdrawal  of 
these  troops. 

The  President  replied  that  troops  were  being  sent  in 
accordance  with  federal  law  upon  complaint  that  com- 
merce and  the  passage  of  the  mails  were  being  ob- 
structed. A somewhat  acrimonious  correspondence 
between  the  Governor  and  the  President  resulted  but 
the  troops  were  retained  and  assisted  in  bringing  the 
strike  to  a conclusion. 

The  attitude  of  the  courts,  meanwhile,  had  brought 
up  a serious  situation.  On  July  2 a “blanket  injunc- 
tion” was  issued  by  the  United  States  District  Court  of 
Illinois  and  posted  on  the  sides  of  the  cars.  It  forbade 
officers,  members  of  the  Union  and  all  other  persons  to 
interfere  in  any  way  with  the  operation  of  trains  or  to 
force  or  persuade  employees  to  refuse  to  perform  their 
duties.  Under  existing  law,  anybody  who  disobeyed 
the  injunction  could  be  brought  before  the  Court  for 
contempt,  and  sentenced  by  the  judge  without  oppor- 
tunity to  bring  witnesses  and  to  be  tried  before  a jury. 
When  Eugene  V.  Debs,  the  president  of  the  Union,  and 
other  officers  continued  to  direct  the  strike  they  were 
arrested  for  contempt  of  court  and  imprisoned.^ 
With  federal  troops  against  them  and  their  officers 
gone,  the  strikers  could  hardly  continue  and  gave  up 
in  defeat.  The  loss  in  property  and  wages  had  already 
reached  $80,000,000. 

The  apportionment  of  the  blame  for  so  appalling  a 
controversy  was  not  a simple  task.  On  the  one  hand,  a 
writer  in  the  Forum  declared  that 

1 Tlie  Court  based  its  action  mainly  on  the  provisions  of  Section  2 
of  the  Sherman  anti-trust  law,  which  thus  had  an  unforeseen  effect. 
The  Supreme  Court  upheld  the  action,  although  on  broader  grounds. 
Above,  p.  256,  cf.  159  V.  S.  Reports,  564. 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  323 


The  one  great  question  was  of  the  ability  of  this  (jovernment 
to  suppress  insurrection.  On  the  one  side  was  the  party  of 
lawlessness,  of  murder,  of  incendiarism,  and  of  detiance  of 
authority.  On  the  other  side  was  the  party  of  loyalty  to  the 
United  States. 

But  this  was  a superficial  view.  A commission  of  in- 
vestigation appointed  by  President  Cleveland  looked 
into  the  matter  more  deeply.  Its  unanimous  report 
made  important  assertions:  the  Pullman  Company, 
while  providing  a beautiful  town  for  its  employees, 
charged  rents  twenty  to  twenty-five  per  cent,  higher 
than  were  charged  in  surrounding  towns  for  similar 
accommodations,  and  the  men  felt  a compulsion  to  re- 
side in  the  houses  if  they  wished  to  retain  their  posi- 
tions; when  wages  were  reduced,  the  salaries  of  the 
better  paid  officers  were  untouched,  so  that  the  burden 
of  the  hard  times  was  placed  on  the  poorest  paid  em- 
ployees ; there  was  no  violence  or  destruction  of  prop- 
erty in  Pullman,  and  much  of  the  rowdyism  in  Chicago, 
but  not  all  of  it  was  due  to  the  lawless  adventurers  and 
professional  criminals  who  filled  the  city  at  that  time;  ^ 
when  various  public  officials  and  organizations  at- 
tempted to  get  the  Company  to  arbitrate  the  dispute, 
the  uniform  reply  was  that  the  points  at  issue  were 
matters  of  fact  and  hence  not  proper  subjects  for  ar- 
bitration; and  the  Managers’  Association  selected, 
armed  and  paid  3,600  federal  deputy  marshals  wdio 
acted  both  as  railroad  employees  and  as  United  States 
officers,  under  the  direction  of  the  Managers. 

In  view  of  the  amount  of  labor  disturbance  after  the 
Civil  War,  it  was  noteworthy  that  it  attracted  the 
interest  of  political  parties  to  so  slight  a degree  previ- 

1 In  1893  the  “World’s  Fair”  in  Chicago  had  celebrated  the  four 
hundredth  anniversary  of  the  landing  of  Columbus,  and  many  of  the 
criminals  attracted  by  the  event  had  remained  in  the  city. 


324 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ous  to  1896.  In  general  the  national  platforms  of  the 
two  large  parties  reflected  an  indefinite  if  not  remote 
concern  with  the  welfare  of  the  wage  earner.  It  was 
urged,  to  be  sure,  by  both  protectionists  and  tariff  re- 
formers that  customs  duties  should  be  framed  with  the 
welfare  of  the  laborer  in  mind,  but  the  sincerity  of  this 
concern  was  sometimes  open  to  question.  The  smaller 
parties,  as  usual,  were  far  less  vague  in  their  de- 
mands. The  Labor  Reformers  in  1872  demanded  the 
eight-hour  day,  for  example;  the  Greenbackers  had  a 
definite  program  for  relief  in  1880;  the  Anti-Monopo- 
lists in  1884  and  the  Union  Labor  and  the  United  Labor 
parties  in  1888.  By  1892  the  great  parties  found  them- 
selves face  to  face  with  a growing  labor  vote.  The 
labor  planks  in  the  two  platforms  of  that  year  were 
strikingly  similar.  Each  called  for  federal  legislation 
to  protect  the  employees  of  transportation  companies, 
but  looked  to  the  states  for  the  relief  of  employees  en- 
gaged in  manufacturing.  Neither  the  Socialist  Labor 
party  nor  the  Populists,  however,  were  greatly  troubled 
by  the  question  of  the  proper  distribution  between  state 
and  nation  of  the  responsibility  for  the  welfare  of  the 
wage  earner.  Both  proposed  definite  action;  both 
urged  the  reduction  in  length  of  the  working  day.  The 
Populists  condemned  the  use  of  Pinkertons  in  labor 
disputes  and  the  Socialists  urged  arbitration,  the  pro- 
hibition of  child  labor,  restrictions  on  the  employment 
of  women  in  unhealthful  industries,  employers’  liabil- 
ity laws  and  the  protection  of  life  and  limb. 

In  brief,  then,  the  situation  of  the  wage-earning 
classes  in  the  middle  nineties  was  becoming  accurately 
defined.  The  strike  as  a weapon  was  open  to  serious 
objections.  The  leaders  of  the  two  large  parties  had 
given  no  evidence  of  an  effective  and  immediate  inter- 
est in  labor  unrest.  The  other  political  parties  were 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WAGE  EARNER  325 


too  small  to  afford  chances  of  success.  If  less  reliance 
was  to  be  placed  upon  the  strike  and  more  upon  politi- 
cal action,  either  a third  party  must  be  constructed  or 
the  leadership  in  one  of  the  old  ones  must  be  seized. 
When  the  conference  of  labor  officials  met  in  Chicago 
and  concluded  that  the  Pullman  strike  was  lost,  it  is- 
sued an  address  to  the  members  of  the  American  Rail- 
way Union  advising  a return  to  work,  closer  organiza- 
tion of  the  laboring  class  and  the  correction  of  indus- 
trial wrongs  at  the  ballot  box.  If  this  advice  should 
be  taken,  and  if  the  wage  earner  should  attempt  to  con- 
trol legislation  for  his  economic  interest,  as  the  prop- 
ertied class  had  long  been  doing  for  its  benefit,  the 
struggle  might  be  shifted  to  the  political  arena.  The 
interest  of  the  workers  in  the  South  and  West  in  the 
Populist  movement  suggested  the  possibility  that  such 
a shift  might  occur. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

Surprisingly  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  social  as- 
pects of  the  growdh  of  the  laboring  classes  before  1896. 
There  is  ample  material,  however,  on  the  more  obvious  sides 
of  the  labor  movement,  such  as  the  growth  of  the  organizations 
and  the  use  of  the  strike. 

The  Documentary  History  of  American  Industrial  Society 
(10  vols.,  1910-1911),  contains  a little  documentary  material 
on  the  period  after  1865 ; J.  R.  Commons  and  others.  History 
of  Labour  in  the  United  States  (2  vols.,  1918),  is  the  best  and 
most  recent  historical  account ; T.  S.  Adams  and  H.  L.  Sum- 
ner, Labor  Problems  (1905),  is  useful;  consult  also  R.  T.  Ely, 
Labor  Movement  in  America  (3rd  ed.,  1890)  ; C.  D.  Wright, 
The  Industrial  Evolution  of  the  United  States  (1897),  by  a 
practical  expert;  G.  E.  McNeill,  The  Labor  Movement  (1887)  ; 
J.  R.  Buchanan,  Story  of  a Labor  Agitator  (1903)  ; S.  P. 
Orth,  The  Arrmes  of  Labor  (1919),  contains  a good  bibliog- 


326 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


raphy;  John  Mitchell,  Organized  Labor  (1903)  ; T.  V.  Pow- 
derly,  Thirty  Years  of  Labor  (1890)  ; Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics  (Jan.,  1887),  Knights  of  Labor;  J.  H.  Bridge, 
Inside  History  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Co.  (1903).  On  the 
Ilaymarket  affair,  compare  Century  Magazine  (Apr.,  1893), 
and  J.  P.  Altgeld,  Reasons  for  Pardoning  Fielden,  Neebe  and 
Schwab;  on  the  Pullman  strike,  Grover  Cleveland,  Presiden- 
tial Problems,  and  the  report  of  the  commission  of  investiga- 
tion in  Senate  Executive  Documents,  53rd  Congress,  3rd  ses- 
sion, vol.  2 (Serial  Number  3276).  Edward  Stanwood,  His- 
tory of  the  Presidency,  contains  political  platform  planks  on 
labor.  The  reports  of  the  Commissioner  of  Labor  (1886-), 
and  of  the  state  bureaus  of  statistics  of  labor  in  such  states  as 
Massachusetts  (1870-),  and  New  York  (1884^),  are  essential 
for  the  investigator. 


CHAPTER  XV 


MONETARY  AND  FINANCIAL  PROBLEMS 

The  critical  monetary  and  financial  situation  dur- 
ing Cleveland’s  second  administration  is  under- 
standable only  in  the  light  of  a series  of  acts  which 
were  passed  between  1878  and  1893.  It  will  be  re- 
membered that  in  the  former  year  the  Bland-Allison 
act  had  provided  for  the  purchase  and  coinage  of  two 
million  to  four  million  dollars’  worth  of  silver  bullion 
per  month,  and  that  the  force  behind  the  measure  had 
been  f '^und  chiefly  among  westerners  who  wished  to  see 
the  volume  of  the  currency  increased  and  among  mine 
owners  who  were  producing  silver. 

The  passage  of  the  law  did  not  end  all  opposition 
to  the  greater  use  of  silver,  nor  did  it  solve  all  our 
monetary  difficulties.  In  the  first  place,  the  United 
States  sent  delegates  to  an  International  Monetary 
Conference  in  Paris,  in  conformity  with  one  of  the 
provisions  of  the  Bland-Allison  act,  to  discuss  a project 
for  the  utilization  of  silver  through  an  agreement 
among  the  commercial  nations  of  the  world.  No 
tangible  results  were  obtained,  however,  so  that  it  was 
plain  that  for  the  time,  at  least,  the  United  States 
would  be  alone  in  its  attempt  to  bring  about  the 
greater  use  of  the  white  metal.  In  the  meantime  the 
law  was  put  into  operation,  and  the  secretary  of  the 
treasury  exercised  his  option  by  purchasing  the  mini- 
mum amount,  two  million  dollars’  worth  of  bullion. 
It  was  impossible  to  keep  the  coins  in  circulation,  how- 

327 


328 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ever,  mainly  because  of  their  weight,  and  the  policy 
was  therefore  adopted  of  storing  part  of  the  silver  in 
the  government  vaults  and  issuing  paper  “silver  cer- 
tificates” in  its  place.  As  these  were  of  small  denom- 
inations and  circulated  on  a par  with  gold,  no  imme- 
diate difficulty  was  experienced  in  making  them  part  of 
the  currency  supply  of  the  country. 

The  currency  question,  nevertheless,  remained  as 
complicated  as  ever  and  the  differences  of  opinion  upon 
it  as  diverse  as  before.  The  market  price  of  silver 
steadily  declined  through  the  eighties  and  the  bullion 
value  of  the  metal  in  a dollar  sank  from  ninety-three 
cents  in  1878  to  less  than  seventy-one  cents  in  1889. 
Both  Republican  and  Democratic  secretaries  of  the 
treasury  gave  warning  that  the  inflow  of  silver  into 
the  currency  supply  was  too  great.  President  Arthur 
urged  the  repeal  of  the  Bland- Allison  act  in  his  first 
annual  message ; President  Cleveland  again  and  again 
reiterated  the  same  advice,  warning  Congress  of  the 
danger  that  silver  would  be  substituted  for  gold.  The 
argument  of  the  opponents  of  silver  could  hardly  be 
stated  in  more  concise  or  complete  terms.  As  soon  as 
the  supply  of  currency  became  too  great,  he  asserted, 
the  unnecessary  portion  would  go  out  of  circulation;^ 
it  was  the  experience  of  nations  that  the  more  desir- 
able coin — gold,  in  this  case — would  be  hoarded  by 
banks  and  speculators ; it  would  then  become  apparent 
that  the  bullion  value  of  the  gold  dollar  was  greater 

1 According  to  the  principle  known  as  Gresham’s  law,  had  money 
tends  to  drive  out  good;  or  overvalued  money  to  drive  out  undervalued 
money.  If  the  face  value  of  a coin  is  more  than  its  worth  as  bullion, 
it  is  “overvalued.”  Thus,  if  coins  of  equal  face  value,  but  of  different 
bullion  value,  circulate  side  by  side,  there  will  be  a tendency  for  the 
possessors  of  the  coins  to  pass  on  the  currency  with  the  smaller  bullion 
value  and  to  withdraw  the  others  for  sale  as  bullion  and  for  use  in  the 
arts. 


MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


329 


than  that  of  the  silver  dollar  and  the  two  coins  M'ould 
part  company ; those  who,  in  such  a contingency,  could 
get  gold  dollars  would  demand  a premium  for  them, 
while  the  laboring  man,  unable  to  demand  gold,  would 
find  his  silver  dollar  sadly  shrunken  in  value. 

Although  the  coinage  of  silver  in  the  twelve  years 
during  which  the  Bland-Allison  act  was  in  force 
amounted  to  $378,000,000,  the  danger  that  Cleveland’s 
prophecy  would  come  to  pass  was  lessened  by  several 
facts.  The  country  was,  in  the  first  place,  passing 
through  a period  of  industrial  expansion  that  required 
an  enlarged  circulating  medium;  the  revenues  of  the 
government  were  exceeding  expenditures,  and  part  of 
the  surplus  was  being  stored  in  the  vaults  in  Washing- 
ton ; and  the  volume  of  the  national  bank  notes  shrank 
more  than  $158,000,000  between  1880  and  1890.  Fall- 
ing prices  for  agricultural  products  continued  to  keep 
western  discontent  alive  and  far  from  being  convinced 
by  Cleveland’s  warnings,  western  conventions  and  rep- 
resentatives in  Congress  continued  to  urge  legislation 
to  increase  the  amount  of  silver  to  be  coined,  and  free- 
coinage  bills  were  constantly  introduced  and  frequently 
near  passage.  Manifestly  the  demand  that  something 
more  be  done  for  silver  was  not  at  an  end. 

Although  agitation  over  the  use  of  silver  currency 
resulted  in  no  further  important  legislation  for  the 
time  being,  the  general  financial  situation  was  compli- 
cated by  a series  of  important  acts.  During  the  eight- 
ies the  federal  revenues  mounted  to  an  unprecedented 
height  and  as  expenses  did  not  increase  proportion- 
ately, a surplus  of  large  and  finally  of  embarrassing 
and  dangerous  size  appeared. 

Between  1880  and  1890  it  averaged  more  than  $100,- 
000,000  annually.  Although  part  of  it  was  used  to  re- 
duce the  public  debt,  the  remainder  began  to  accumu- 


330 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


late  in  the  treasury  and  thereby  seriously  reduced  the 
amount  of  currency  available  for  the  ordinary  needs 
of  business.  In  1888,  for  example,  the  surplus  in  the 
treasury  was  one-fourth  as  great  as  the  entire  esti- 
mated sum  outside.  The  one  device  for  doing  away 
with  the  surplus  upon  which  all  leaders  could  unite 
was  the  reduction  of  the  national  debt.  Between  1879 


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and  1890  over  $1,000,000,000  were  thus  disposed  of. 
Yet  even  this  process  raised  difficulties.  Although  a 
portion  of  the  debt  came  due  in  1881  and  could  be  re- 
deemed at  the  pleasure  of  the  government,  other  bonds 
were  not  redeemable  until  1891  and  1907,  unless  the 
federal  authorities  chose  to  go  into  the  market  and 
buy  at  a premium.  Eventually  this  was  done  for 
a time,  although  prices  were  thereby  forced  up  to 
130  in  1888,  and  as  a result  the  redemption  of  $95,- 
000,000  during  the  year  cost  more  than  $112,000,000. 
The  treasury  also  adopted  the  expedient  of  depositing 


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nnanctoi  upcrar/ons 
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C<78'ro7n8 

1 1 . . . 

MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


331 


surplus  funds  in  banking  institutions,  but  the  plan 
was  open  to  serious  objections.  In  order  to  qualify 
for  receiving  government  deposits  the  banks  had  to 
present  United  States  bonds  as  security,  but  these  were 
already  at  a high  premium  because  of  purchase  by  the 
treasury  itself.  There  remained,  therefore,  two  gen- 
eral policies  which  might  be  followed — reduction  of 
revenue  or  enlargement  of  expenditure. 

Both  parties  were  theoretically  committed  to  the 
economical  conduct  of  the  nation’s  business,  but  Re- 
publican advocacy  of  a high  tariff  tended  to  restrict 
that  party’s  .answer  to  the  surplus  problem.  The 
revenue  came  largely  from  tariff  and  internal  taxes. 
The  latter  were  reduced,  as  has  been  seen,  by  the  tariff 
act  of  1883,  but  the  redundant  income  continued.  The 
Republicans  then  faced  the  alternative  of  lowering  the 
customs  or  turning  to  the  policy  of  increased  expendi- 
ture. The  latter  policy  would  delay  the  reduction  of 
duties  and  was  in  line  with  the  Republican  tendency 
toward  increased  federal  activity.  For  the  Democrats 
the  problem  was  easier.  Since  the  party  was  tending 
toward  advocacy  of  low  customs  duties,  had  constantly 
condemned  Republican  extravagance  in  administration 
and  was  traditionally  the  party  of  a restricted  national 
authority,  it  was  logical  to  turn  to  severe  reduction  of 
revenue  in  order  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  surplus. 

President  Cleveland’s  political  and  personal  phi- 
losophy led  toward  economy  in  expenditure  and  there- 
fore toward  revenue  reduction.  By  nature  he  was 
frugal;  in  politics,  a strict  constructionist.  In  vetoing 
an  appropriation  bill  he  succinctly  set  forth  his  creed : 

A large  surplus  in  the  Treasury  is  the  parent  of  many  ills, 
and  among  them  is  found  a tendency  to  an  extremely  liberal, 
if  not  loose,  construction  of  the  Constitution.  It  also  attracts 


332 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


the  ga^e  of  States  and  individuals  with  a kind  of  fascination, 
and  gives  rise  to  plans  and  pretensions  that  an  uneongested 
Treasury  never  could  excite. 

The  Republicans  were  becoming  committed  to  the 
policy  of  large  expenditures.  President  Harrison,  to 
be  sure,  in  his  first  annual  message  urged  the  reduc- 
tion of  receipts,  declaring  that  the  collection  of  money 
not  needed  for  public  use  imposed  an  unnecessary  bur- 
den upon  the  people  and  that  the  presence  of  a large 
surplus  in  the  treasury  was  a disturbing  element  in  the 
conduct  of  private  business.  Nevertheless  such  party 
leaders  as  Reed  and  McKinley,  who  effectively  con- 
trolled the  legislation  of  the  Harrison  administration, 
acted  on  the  philosophy  of  Senator  Dolph: 

If  we  were  to  take  our  eyes  off  the  increasing  surplus  in  the 
Treasury  and  stop  bemoaning  the  prosperity  of  the  country, 
. . . and  to  devote  our  energies  to  the  development  of  the 
great  resources  which  the  Almighty  has  placed  in  our  hands, 
to  increasing  (our  products)  ...  to  cheapening  transporta- 
tion by  the  improving  of  our  rivers  and  harbors,  ...  we 
would  act  wiser  than  we  do. 

Congress  was  more  inclined  to  follow  the  policy  sug- 
gested by  Dolph  than  that  proposed  by  Cleveland. 
One  project  was  the  return  of  the  direct  tax  which 
had  been  levied  on  the  states  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
Civil  War.  At  that  time  Congress  had  laid  a tax  of 
$20,000,000  apportioned  among  the  states  according  to 
population.  About  $15,000,000  had  been  collected, 
mainly,  of  course,  from  the  northern  states.  It  was 
suggested  that  the  levy  be  returned,  a plan  which  would 
give  the  northern  states  a return  in  actual  cash  and 
the  southern  states  “the  empty  enjoyment  of  the  re- 
mission from  a tax  which  no  one  now  dared  to  suggest 
was  ever  to  be  made  good.”  President  Cleveland  had 


MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


333 


vetoed  such  a bill,  during  his  first  administration,  be- 
lieving it  unconstitutional  and  also  objectionable  as  a 
“sheer,  bald  gratuity.”  Under  the  Harrison  adminis- 
tration the  scheme  was  revived  and  carried  to  comple- 
tion, March  2,  1891. 

Pension  legislation  was  even  more  successful  as  a 
method  of  reducing  the  unwieldy  surplus.  Garfield 
had  declared  in  1872,  when  introducing  an  appropria- 
tion bill  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  “We  may 
reasonably  expect  that  the  expenditures  for  pensions 
will  hereafter  steadily  decrease,  unless  our  legislation 
should  be  unwarrantably  extravagant,”  and  in  fact 
the  cost  of  pensions  for  1878  had  been  lower  by  more 
than  $7,000,000  than  in  1871.  The  Arrears  act  of  1879 
had  given  a decided  upward  tendency  to  pension  ex- 
pense, which  amounted  to  over  $20,000,000  more  in 
1880  than  in  1879.  The  surplus  was  a constant  invita- 
tion to  careless  generosity.  Liberality  to  the  veteran 
was  a patriotic  duty  which  lent  itself  to  the  fervid 
stump  oratory  of  the  time  and  presented  an  oppor- 
tunity to  the  undeserving  applicant  to  place  his  name 
on  the  rolls  of  pensioners  along  with  his  more  worthy 
associates.  Besides,  an  administration  which  seemed 
niggardly  in  its  attitude  toward  the  veterans  was  cer- 
tain to  lose  the  soldier  vote,  and  neither  party  was 
willing  to  incur  such  a risk.  Hence,  despite  Cleve- 
land’s vetoes  of  private  pension  legislation,  hundreds 
of  such  measures  passed  during  his  first  term.  The 
Harrison  administration  proceeded  upon  the  Presi- 
dent’s theory  that  it  “was  no  time  to  be  weighing  the 
claims  of  old  soldiers  with  apothecary’s  scales.”  A 
dependent  pension  bill  like  that  which  President  Cleve- 
land vetoed  in  1887  was  passed  in  1890.  The  list  of 
pensioners  more  than  doubled  in  length;  the  number 
of  applications  for  aid  increased  tenfold  in  two  years. 


334 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


It  became  necessary  for  President  Harrison  to  dis- 
place his  over-liberal  commissioner  of  pensions,  but 
the  mischief  was  already  done.  The  total  yearly  pen- 
sion expenditure  quickly  mounted  beyond  the  one  hun- 
dred million  mark,  where  it  has  remained  ever  since. 
Indeed,  the  cost  of  pensions  in  1872  when  Garfield  made 
his  prophecy  was  less  than  one-sixth  as  great  as  in 
1913.  Large  pension  expenditure  was  clearly  a per- 
manent charge. 

The  improvement  of  the  rivers  and  harbors  of  the 
country  has  always  been  a ready  means  of  disposing 
of  any  embarrassing  surplus  and  of  assisting  Congress- 
men to  get  money  into  their  districts.  “Promoters  of 
all  sorts  of  schemes,  beggars  for  the  widening  of  rivu- 
lets, the  deepening  of  rills,”  clustered  about  the  treas- 
ury during  the  eighties.  During  the  early  seventies 
expenditure  on  this  account  had  not  reached  $6,500,000 
annually,  although  in  1879  it  exceeded  $8,000,000.  In 
1882,  the  year  of  the  mammoth  surplus.  Congress 
passed  over  Arthur’s  veto  a bill  carrying  appropria- 
tions which  amounted  to  almost  nineteen  million  dol- 
lars.^ Expenditures  were  somewhat  reduced  in  the 
years  immediately  following,  and  Cleveland  continued 
the  repressive  policy  of  his  predecessor.  Harrison  in 
his  first  message  to  Congress  in  December,  1889,  recom- 
mended appropriations  for  river  and  harbor  improve- 
ment, although  deprecating  the  prosecution  of  works 
not  of  public  advantage.  The  recommendation  fell 
upon  willing  ears  and  appropriations  for  undertakings 
of  this  sort  at  once  increased  again.  Expenditure  for 
rivers  and  harbors,  like  that  for  pensions,  remained 
at  a high  level,  the  wise  and  necessary  portions  of  such 
measures  being  relied  upon  to  carry  the  unwise  and 
unnecessary  ones. 

1 Above,  p.  164. 


MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


335 


A project  which  lacked  many  of  the  unpleasant  fea- 
tures of  river  and  harbor  legislation  was  the  Blair 
educational  bill,  which  proposed  to  distribute  a con- 
siderable portion  of  the  surplus  among  the  states.  As 
discussion  of  the  Blair  bill  proceeded,  it  became  clear 
that  its  results  might  be  more  far-reaching  than  had 
been  anticipated.  A gift  from  the  national  govern- 
ment seemed  sure  to  retard  local  efforts  at  raising 
school  funds  and  would  initiate  a vicious  tendency  to 
rely  on  federal  bounty.  Hence  although  the  Senate 
passed  the  bill  in  1884,  1886  and  1888,  it  never  com- 
mended itself  sufficiently  to  the  House  and  eventually 
was  dropped. 

A small  portion  of  the  increased  expenditure  in  the 
eighties  was  due  to  improvements  in  the  navy,  in 
which  both  parties  shared.  Presidents  Arthur  and 
Cleveland  urged  upon  Congress  the  need  of  modem  de- 
fences. Progress  was  slow  and  difficult.  Although 
the  day  of  steel  ships  had  come,  the  American  navy  was 
composed  of  wooden  relics  of  earlier  days.  The  manu- 
facture of  armor  and  of  large  guns  had  to  be  developed, 
and  skill  and  experience  accumulated.  Results  began 
to  appear  in  the  late  eighties  when  the  number  of 
modern  steel  war  vessels  increased  from  three  to 
twenty-two  in  four  years.  Expenditures  mounted 
from  less  than  $14,000,000  in  1880  to  over  $22,000,000 
in  1890. 

As  effective  as  new  expenditure  was  the  McKinley 
tariff  act  of  1890,  the  details  of  which  from  the  point  of 
view  of  tanff  history  have  already  been  noted.^  The 
extremely  high  rates  levied  under  that  legislation 
caused  a slight  reduction  in  customs  revenue  in  1891 
and  a sharp  decline  in  1892.  Moreover  the  coinci- 
dence of  instability  in  the  currency  system,  business 

1 Above,  pp.  238-240. 


336 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


depression  and  the  relatively  high  Wilson-Gorman  tar- 
iff schedules  of  1894  continued  the  decline  of  income 
from  customs  during  the  middle  nineties. 

In  the  meantime  the  silver  agitation,  which  had  been 
somewhat  repressed  by  the  well-known  attitude  of 
Cleveland  during  his  first  administration  revived  with 
increased  vigor.  The  election  of  1888,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, had  turned  wholly  on  the  tariff  and  had  been 
a victory  for  the  Eepublicans.  The  western  states 
had  almost  uniformly  supported  Harrison  in  the  elec- 
tion and  during  1889  four  more  were  admitted  to  the 
Union.  Their  representatives  in  Congress  were 
mainly  silver  advocates.  In  his  first  message  to  Con- 
gress the  President  declared  that  the  evil  anticipa- 
tions which  had  accompanied  the  use  of  the  silver  dol- 
lar had  not  been  realized  but  he  feared  nevertheless 
that  either  free  coinage  or  any  “considerable  in- 
crease” of  the  present  rate  of  coinage  would  be  “dis- 
astrous” and  “discreditable.”  He  announced  that  a 
plan  would  be  presented  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury, to  which  he  had  been  able  to  give  only  a hasty 
examination.  The  scheme  for  expanding  the  silver 
coinage  which  the  Secretary,  William  Windom,  pre- 
sented was  not  acceptable  to  Congress,  but  the  result 
of  the  agitation  was  the  law  generally  known  as  the 
Sherman  silver  purchase  act,  which  was  passed  on  July 
14,  1890.  It  directed  the  secretary  of  the  treasury  to 
purchase  4,500,000  ounces  of  silver  bullion  per  month 
and  to  issue  in  payment  “Treasury  notes  of  the  United 
States.”  These  notes  w^ere  legal  tender  for  all  debts 
and  were  receivable  for  customs  and  all  public  dues. 
Further,  the  secretary  was  directed  to  redeem  the  notes 
in  gold  or  silver  at  his  discretion,  “it  being  the  estab- 
lished policy  of  the  United  States  to  maintain  the  two 
metals  on  a parity  with  each  other.” 


MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


337 


A/or£:  Sy  r/i£Acrc/^  /e3o  the s/i.v££  /=>c/jecHAS£a 

WAS  PA/O  POP  /W  7p£ASUPy  A/ar£S.  rWAr£>ATE,  tmepe- 

POPE,  rWE  CWAPT  /A/O/CATES  TWE  TOTAL  Ca/WA0£ OP  S/LVEP 
roGETHEP.  W/TH  TeEASOPT  /S/OTES  /SSUEP  FOP  THE  POPCHASE 
PP  BULA,/OA/. 


338 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


The  silver  to  be  purchased  was  substantially  the 
total  output  of  the  American  mines.  Fearing  the 
strength  of  the  silver  element  in  the  Senate  and  doubt- 
ful of  the  position  which  the  President  might  take,  for- 
mer Secretary  Sherman,  now  in  the  Senate,  supported 
the  act,  although  confessing  that  he  was  ready  to  vote 
for  repeal  at  any  time  when  it  could  be  done  without 
substituting  free  coinage.  The  provision  for  the  pur- 
chase of  four  and  one-half  million  ounces  instead  of 
four  and  one-half  million  dollars’  worth  was  intro- 
duced at  Sherman’s  suggestion.  This  clause  kept  the 
amount  to  be  absorbed  at  a uniform  level,  whereas  the 
purchase  of  a fixed  number  of  dollars’  worth  would 
have  increased  the  coinage  when  the  price  of  bullion 
fell.  The  vote  on  the  Sherman  act  was  strictly  parti- 
san— no  Republicans  opposing  it  and  no  Democrats 
favoring  it  when  the  measure  was  finally  passed,  al- 
though 116  members  of  the  House  failed  to  answer  to 
their  names  on  the  roll-call. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  industrial  and  commer- 
cial countries  of  Europe  were  almost  universally  re- 
ducing their  silver  coinage,  the  passage  by  the  United 
States  of  an  act  which  substantially  doubled  the 
amount  of  silver  purchased  under  the  Bland-Allison 
law  seems  extraordinary.  Moreover,  only  six  years 
later  a presidential  campaign  was  fought  almost  wholly 
on  the  silver  issue  and  at  that  time  the  Republican 
party  resolutely  opposed  free  coinage.  It  is  obvious 
that  powerful  forces  must  have  been  at  work  to  align 
the  party  so  unitedly  in  behalf  of  the  Sherman  law. 
It  was  to  be  expected  that  western  Republicans  would 
support  it,  but  the  eastern  members  were  found  voting 
for  it  as  well.  Doubtless  many  things  contributed  to 
the  result.  Some  perhaps  agreed  with  Sherman  that 
the  silver  advocates  were  so  strong  that  free  coinage 


MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


339 


would  result  in  case  Congress  refused  to  pass  legisla- 
tion of  any  kind.  Some  may  have  feared  with  Platt  of 
Connecticut,  that  a party  split  would  ensue  unless  the 
wishes  of  the  westerners  were  acceded  to — hence  an 
act  which  gave  liberal  assistance  to  silver  to  please 
the  West  and  South  but  stopped  short  of  free  coinage 
so  as  to  please  the  East.  That  opportunist  politics 
had  an  influence  with  certain  members  is  indicated  by 
the  remarks  of  a Massachusetts  Republican  represent- 
ative who  later  favored  the  gold  standard: 

It  is  pure  politics,  gentlemen ; that  is  all  there  is  about  it. 
"\Ve  Republicans  want  to  come  back  and  we  do  not  want  you 
(to  the  Democratic  side)  to  come  back  in  the  majority,  because, 
on  the  whole,  you  must  excuse  us  for  thinking  we  are  better 
fellows  than  you  are.  That  is  human  nature,  that  is  all  there 
is  in  this  silver  bill  (laughter  on  the  Republican  side)  ; pure 
politics. 

A Democrat  who  favored  free  coinage  denounced  the 
act  as  Janus-Facedf’^  moulded  so  as  to  look  like  sil- 
ver to  the  West  and  gold  to  the  East.  Important,  also, 
seems  to  have  been  the  attitude  of  the  western  mem- 
bers on  the  tariff.  The  party  had  returned  to  power 
on  the  tariff  issue  and  it  seemed  necessary  to  pass 
some  sort  of  legislation  on  the  subject.  Yet  the  party 
majority  in  Senate  and  House  was  slight  and  the  west- 
erners were  understood  to  be  ready  to  defeat  the  Mc- 
Kinley bill  which  was  then  pending,  unless  something 
was  done  for  silver.  Harrison  seems  to  have  been  un- 
willing to  endanger  successful  tariff  legislation  by  op- 
posing the  considerable  extension  of  the  coinage  of 
silver.^ 

Contrary  to  the  expectations  of  the  proponents  of 

1 The  law  remained  in  force  about  three  years.  During  that  interval 
nearly  $156,000,000  worth  of  silver  bullion  was  purchased  with  the  new 
treasury  notes.  The  government  began  retiring  these  notes  in  1900. 


340 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


the  act,  the  price  of  silver  fell  gradually  until  the  value 
of  the  bullion  in  a dollar  was  sixty  cents  in  1893  and 
forty-nine  cents  in  1894.  They  who  had  opposed  the 
law  saw  their  fears  verified;  as  they  had  prophesied, 
silver  began  to  replace  gold  in  circulation;  the  latter 
was  hoarded  and  used  for  foreign  shipments ; customs 
duties,  which  had  hitherto  been  paid  largely  in  gold, 
were  now  paid  in  paper  currency;  since  gold  was  now 
more  desired  than  silver,  large  amounts  of  paper  were 
presented  to  the  government  for  redemption  in  the 
more  valuable  metal.  To  be  sure,  the  Sherman  law  al- 
lowed the  secretary  of  the  treasury  to  redeem  the  treas- 
ury notes  of  1890  in  gold  or  silver  at  his  discretion, 
but  it  contained  a proviso  that  the  established  policy 
of  the  United  States  was  to  maintain  the  two  metals 
on  a parity  or  equality.  The  secretary  believed  that 
if  he  refused  to  redeem  the  treasury  notes  in  whatever 
coin  the  holder  desired,  that  is  if  he  insisted  on  re- 
demption in  silver  only,  a discrimination  would  be 
made  in  favor  of  gold  and  the  equa^lity.pf  the  two 
metals  would  be  destroyed.  Parity  would  be  main- 
tained, the  government  held,  only  when  any  kind  of 
money  could  be  exchanged  for  any  other  kind,  at  the 
option  of  the  holder. 

For  the  redemption  of  the  greenbacks,  the  govern- 
ment had  since  1879  maintained  a fund  known  as  the 
gold  reserve.  No  law  fixed  its  amount,  but  custom 
had  set  $100,000,000  as  the  minimum.  Hitherto  a 
negligible  amount  of  paper  had  been  presented  for  re- 
demption, but  as  soon  as  the  Sherman  law  came  into 
effective  operation  the  demand  for  gold  became  in- 
creasingly great  and  the  level  of  the  reserve  promptly 
fell.  Between  July  1,  1890,  and  July  15,  1893,  the  sup- 
ply of  gold  in  the  treasury  decreased  more  than  $132,- 
000,000,  while  the  stock  of  silver  increased  over  $147,- 


MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


341 


000,000.  Evidently  silver  was  replacing  gold  in  the 
treasury,  and  it  was  equally  clear  that  a continuation 
of  the  process  would  result  in  forcing  the  government 
to  pay  its  obligations  in  silver  and  to  refuse  to  redeem 
paper  in  gold — in  other  words,  go  upon  a silver 
standard. 

The  situation  when  Cleveland’s  second  administra- 
tion began  on  March  4,  1893,  was  complex  and  critical. 
The  annual  expenditures  had  increased  by  $119,000,- 
000  between  1880  and  1893,  while  the  revenue  had  ex- 
panded by  only  half  that  amount;  the  surplus  had 
decreased  every  year  during  Harrison’s  adminis- 
tration and  a deficit  had  been  avoided  only  by 
the  cessation  of  pajonents  on  the  public  debt ; the  sup- 
ply of  currency  in  circulation  was  being  heavily  in- 
creased by  the  operation  of  the  Sherman  law ; and  the 
gold  reserve  had  been  kept  at  the  traditional  amount 
only  through  extraordinary  efforts  on  the  part  of 
Harrison’s  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  as  the  adminis- 
tration came  to  a close. 

Cleveland’s  attitude  toward  the  Sherman  law  was 
well-known.  He  had  long  urged  the  repeal  of  the 
Bland- Allison  act;  before  the  election  of  1892  he  had 
predicted  disaster  in  case  the  nation  entered  upon  “the 
dangerous  and  reckless  experiment  of  free,  unlimited, 
and  independent  silver  coinage”;  it  was  his  belief  that 
the  distresses  under  which  the  country  labored  were 
due  principally  to  the  Sherman  silver  purchase  law. 
He  therefore  called  a special  session  of  Congress  for 
August  7,  (1893),  sent  a message  giving  a succinct 
account  of  the  operation  of  the  law  and  urged  its  im- 
mediate repeal.^  In  the  House,  repeal  was  voted  with 

1 The  call  for  the  extra  session,  together  with  news  of  the  suspension 
of  free-coinage  in  India,  sent  the  bullion  price  of  silver  down  twenty-one 
cents  per  ounce  in  two  weeks.  The  President  was  seriously  handicapped 


342 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


surprising  promptness,  although  a strong  free-silver 
element  fought  vigorously  to  prevent  it.  That  party 
lines  were  broken  was  indicated  by  the  fact  that  two- 
thirds  of  the  Democrats  and  four-fifths  of  the  Republi- 
cans voted  in  accord  with  the  President’s  request. 

In  the  Senate  the  silver  advocates  were  stronger. 
The  entire  history  of  coinage  was  discussed  at  length. 
Members  who  favored  repeal  disliked  to  overturn  the 
tradition  of  the  Senate  which  allowed  unlimited  debate, 
and  the  silver  senators  therefore  filibustered  through 
the  summer  and  early  fall.  Senator  Jones  of  Nevada 
made  a single  speech  that  filled  a hundred  dreary  pages 
of  the  Congressional  Record.  Senator  Allen  of  Ne- 
braska quoted  more  than  thirty  authorities,  ranging 
from  the  Pandects  of  Justinian  to  enlivening  doggerel 
poetry.  Feeling  ran  high.  In  the  West,  Jones,  Allen 
and  others  were  looked  upon  as  heroes ; in  the  East,  as 
villains.  To  a satirical  onlooker  it  seemed  that  the 
nation  had  become  insanely  obsessed  with  the  question 
of  repeal: 

All  men  of  virtue  and  intelligence  know  that  all  the  ills  of 
life — scarcity  of  money,  baldness,  the  comma  bacillus,  Home 
Rule,  . . . and  the  Potato  Bug — are  due  to  the  Sherman 
Bill.  If  it  is  repealed,  sin  and  death  will  vanish  from  the 
world,  . . . the  skies  will  fall,  and  we  shall  all  catch  larks. 

Not  until  October  30  were  the  silver  supporters  over- 
come. Including  members  who  were  paired,  twenty- 
two  Democrats  and  twenty-six  Republicans  favored 
repeal,  and  twenty-two  Democrats,  twelve  Republicans 
and  three  Populists  opposed.  Again  the  West  and 
South  were  aligned  against  the  North  and  East.  The 

at  this  time  by  a cancerous  growth  in  the  jaw,  necessitating  an  opera- 
tion, news  of  which  was  withheld  from  the  public  for  fear  of  its  ill 
effect  on  the  financial  situation.  Cf.  Saturday  Evening  Post,  22  Sept., 
1917. 


MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


343 


Democratic  party  was  divided  and  charges  and  count- 
ercharges had  been  made  that  augured  ill  for  party 
success,  as  has  been  seen,  in  dealing  with  the  tariff 
and  other  important  problems^  Worst  of  all,  the  chief 
question — the  volume  and  content  of  the  currency — 
was  still  unanswered.  Something  had  been  done  for 
silver — and  undone — but  there  was  no  scientific  settle- 
ment of  the  problem. 

The  disastrous  financial  and  industrial  crisis  of  1893 
made  yet  more  complex  the  already  tangled  skein  of 
economic  history  during  President  Cleveland’s  second 
administration.  The  catastrophe  has  been  ascribed 
to  a variety  of  causes  but  the  relative  importance  of 
the  various  factors  is  still  a matter  of  disagreement. 
Rash  speculation  on  the  part  of  industrial  interests 
here  and  abroad  seems  to  have  made  weak  links  in  the 
international  commercial  chain;  financial  conditions 
both  in  Germany  and  in  Great  Britain  were  precarious 
during  the  early  part  of  1890 ; the  collapse  of  the  Phil- 
adelphia and  Reading  Railroad  in  February,  1893,  and 
of  the  National  Cordage  Company  soon  afterwards 
were  warnings  of  what  was  to  follow;  the  silver  pur- 
chase law  produced  vddespread  fear  that  the  United 
States  would  not  be  able  to  continue  the  redemption 
of  paper  currency;  and  the  change  of  political  control 
had  produced  the  usual  feeling  of  uncertainty.  The 
dwindling  of  the  gold  reserve,  which  has  already  been 
mentioned,  assisted  in  causing  a critical  situation. 
Foreign  investors,  fearful  of  financial  conditions  here, 
sold  their  American  railroad  and  other  securities  and 
received  payment  in  gold.  The  one  place  where  the 
yellow  metal  could  be  readily  obtained  was  the  United 
States  treasury  and  upon  it  the  strain  centered.  Peo- 
ple attempted  to  turn  property  of  all  kinds  into  gold 

1 Above,  p.  274. 


344 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


before  the  existing  standard  should  change  to  a de- 
preciated silver  basis.  At  the  same  time  there  was  a 
rush  to  the  banks  to  withdraw  funds,  and  the  visible 
supply  of  currency  therefore  was  seriously  reduced. 
“Under  these  conditions  gold  seemed  scarce.  In 
reality  gold  was  only  relatively  scarce  in  comparison 
with  the  abnormal  offering  of  property  for  sale  on 
account  of  the  fear  of  the  silver  standard.”  In  an 
incredibly  short  time,  currency  became  so  scarce  as  to 
create  a genuine  panic  and  was  purchased  like  any 
commodity  at  premiums  ranging  from  one  to  three 
per  cent.  In  order  to  enable  their  families  to  pay  the 
running  expenses  of  every  day  at  the  summer  resorts, 
business  men  were  compelled  to  buy  bills  and  coin  and 
send  them  in  express  packages.  The  national  banks 
were  unable  to  supply  the  demand  for  currency  so 
quickly,  and  158  of  them  failed  in  1893  and  hundreds 
of  state  and  private  financial  institutions  were  forced 
to  close  their  doors.  Industrial  firms  were  affected  by 
the  uncertainty  and  panic  and  over  15,000  failures  re- 
sulted, with  liabilities  amounting  to  $347,000,000  in 
the  single  year.  Production  of  coal  and  iron  fell 
sharply;  railway  construction  nearly  ceased  and  the 
value  of  securities  shrank  to  a fraction  of  their  former 
value.  The  distress  among  the  wage-earners  became 
extreme ; unemployment  was  common ; strikes,  like  that 
beginning  in  Pullman  in  1894,  were  bitter  and  pro- 
longed. “Coxey’s  army,”  composed  of  unemployed 
workmen,  marched  to  Washington  with  a petition  for 
relief. 

As  is  usually  the  case  in  our  politics,  the  blame  for 
the  industrial  disturbance  was  laid  at  the  door  of  the 
party  in  power.  The  argument  of  an  Ohio  congress- 
man in  the  debate  over  the  repeal  of  the  Sherman  law 
typified  the  political  use  made  of  the  crisis  of  1893. 


MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


345 


Until  November,  1892,  the  orator  declared,  prosperity 
was  undimmed.  “Iron  furnaces  throughout  the  coun- 
try were  in  full  blast,  and  their  cheerful  light  was  going 
up  to  heaven  notifying  the  people  of  the  United  States 
of  existing  prosperity  and  warning  them  against 
change  of  conditions.”  Then  came  the  election  of  the 
party  “which  had  declared  war  on  the  system  upon 
which  our  whole  industrial  fabric  had  been  erected.” 
“One  by  one  the  furnaces  went  out,  one  by  one  the 
mines  closed  up,  one  after  another  the  factories  short- 
ened their  time.”  Business  interests,  he  asserted, 
were  fearful  of  Democratic  rule  and  especially  of  tariff 
reform;  hence  prosperity  and  confidence  could  be  re- 
newed only  by  leaving  the  Sherman  law  intact  and  by 
refusing  to  undertake  any  sweeping  revision  of  the 
protective  tariff. 

Further  to  complicate  the  financial  trials  of  the  bur- 
densome mid-nineties,  the  depletion  of  the  gold  reserve 
demanded  immediate  attention.  During  the  closing 
months  of  President  Harrison’s  administration,  in 
fact,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  had  ordered  the 
preparation  of  plates  for  engraving  an  issue  of  bonds 
by  which  to  borrow  sufficient  gold  to  replenish  the  re- 
demption fund.  By  a personal  appeal  to  New  York 
bankers,  however,  he  was  able  to  exchange  paper  for 
gold  and  so  keep  the  level  above  the  one  hundred  mil- 
lion mark,  and  when  Cleveland  succeeded  to  the  chair, 
the  reserve  was  $100,982,410.  In  the  meantime  the 
scarcity  of  gold  continued,  and  the  combination  of 
large  expenditures  and  slender  income  severely  em- 
barrassed the  government  in  its  attempts  to  obtain  a 
sufficient  supply  of  gold  to  keep  the  reserve  intact. 
The  administration,  indeed,  was  all  but  helpless.  Pa- 
per presented  for  redemption  in  gold  had  to  be  paid 
out  to  meet  expenses  and  was  then  turned  in  for  gold 


346 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


again.  Hence,  as  Cleveland  ruefully  reminded  Con- 
gress, “we  have  an  endless  chain  in  operation  con- 
stantly depleting  the  Treasury’s  gold  and  never  near 
a final  rest.”  On  April  22,  1893,  the  reserve  fell  mo- 
mentarily below  $100,000,000  and  later  in  the  year  it 
was  apparent  that  the  reduction  was  likely  to  become 
permanent.  By  January,  1894,  the  reserve  was  less 
than  $70,000,000,  while  $450,000,000  in  paper  which 


re93  tB94-  fB9S  re96 

Jan.  July  Jan.  JcfLY-  Jan.  July  Jan. 


SOLO  ffj  TNe  Z^SASOiey,  sr  montn-s-,  JAN.jeaa  ro 
Fes.jaae,  /n Nt/Lt./ONS  collars . 

might  be  presented  for  redemption  were  in  actual  cir- 
culation. Only  one  resource  seemed  available — bor- 
rowing gold.  The  treasury  therefore  sold  bonds  to 
the  value  of  $50,000,000.  Even  this,  however,  did  not 
remedy  the  ill.  Bankers  obtained  gold  to  purchase 
bonds  by  presenting  paper  currency  to  the  government 
for  redemption.  Belief  was  temporary.  On  the  last 
day  of  May  the  reserve  amounted  to  only  $79,000,000; 
in  November,  to  $59,000,000.  Another  issue  of  bonds 
was  resorted  to  in  November,  but  the  results  were  not 
better  than  before.  At  the  same  time  the  Pullman 


MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


347 


strike  during  the  summer  months,  the  Wilson-Gorman 
tarilf  fiasco  and  an  unfortunate  harvest  seemed  to  in- 
dicate that  man  and  nature  were  determined  to  make 
1894  a year  of  ill-omen. 

By  February,  1895,  the  treasury  found  itself  con- 
fronted with  a reserve  of  only  $41,000,000.  It  seemed 
useless  to  attempt  borrowing  under  the  usual  condi- 
tions, and  Cleveland  therefore  resorted  to  a new  de- 
vice. A contract  was  made  with  J.  P.  Morgan  and  a 
group  of  bankers  for  the  purchase  of  3,500,000  ounces 
of  gold  to  be  paid  for  with  United  States  four  per  cent, 
bonds.  In  order  to  protect  the  reserve  from  a re- 
newed drain,  the  bankers  agreed  that  at  least  half  the 
gold  should  be  obtained  abroad,  and  they  promised  to 
exert  all  their  influence  to  prevent  withdrawals  of  gold 
from  the  treasury  while  the  contract  was  being  filled. 
The  terms  of  the  contract  were  favorable  to  the  bank- 
ers, but  the  President  defended  the  agreement  on  the 
ground  that  the  promise  to  protect  the  reserve  en- 
titled the  bankers  to  a favorable  bargain.  The  fact, 
however,  that  the  Morgan  Company  was  able  to  mar- 
ket the  bonds  with  the  public  and  make  a large  profit, 
increased  the  demand  that  the  administration  sell  di- 
rectly to  the  people  and  make  the  profit  itself.  In 
January,  1896,  occurred  a fourth  sale — to  the  public, 
this  time — and  4,640  bids  were  received,  for  a total  sev- 
eral times  greater  than  the  $100,000,000  called  for.  By 
this  time,  business  conditions  were  improving,  confi- 
dence was  restored  among  the  financial  classes  and 
gold  again  began  to  flow  out  of  hiding  and  into  the 
treasury.  The  endless  chain  was  broken. 

The  denunciation  which  Cleveland  received  for  the 
untoward  monetary  and  industrial  events  of  his  ad- 
ministration was  unusual  even  for  American  politics 
in  the  middle  nineties.  Such  extreme  silver  men  as 


348 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE, 


Senator  Stewart  of  Nevada  declared  that  Cleveland’s 
second  administration  was  probably  the  worst  admin- 
istration that  ever  occurred  in  this  or  any  other  coun- 
try; that  he  was  a bold  and  unscrupulous  stock-job- 
ber; that  he  deliberately  caused  the  panic  of  1893  and 
that  he  sent  the  Venezuela  message  in  order  to  divert 
the  attention  of  the  people  from  the  silver  question. 
The  New  York  World  described  the  transaction  be- 
tween the  government  and  the  Morgan  Company  as  a 
“bunco”  game,  and  charged  that  Cleveland  had  dis- 
honest, dishonorable  and  immoral  reasons  for  bring- 
ing about  the  transaction  and  that  he  did  it  for  a “con- 
sideration.” Eepresentative  W.  J.  Bryan,  who  be- 
longed to  the  President’s  party  and  who  ordinarily 
was  chivalrous  to  his  opponents,  declared  that  Cleve- 
land could  no  more  escape  unharmed  from  association 
with  the  Morgan  sjmdicate  than  he  could  expect  to  es- 
cape asphyxiation  if  he  locked  himself  up  in  a room 
and  turned  on  the  gas.  The  Democratic  party,  he 
thought,  should  feel  toward  its  leader  as  a confiding 
ward  would  feel  toward  a guardian  who  had  squan- 
dered a rich  estate,  or  as  a passenger  would  feel  to- 
ward a trainman  who  opened  a switch  and  precipitated 
a wreck. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  standard  works,  mentioned  under  Chapter  Y,  by  Dewey, 
Hepburn  and  Noyes  continue  valuable.  The  attitude  of 
Hayes  and  of  succeeding  Presidents  is  found  in  J.  D.  Richard- 
son, Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents ; F.  W.  Taussig, 
The  Silver  Situation  in  the  United  States  (1892),  is  concise; 
Political  Science  Quarterly,  III,  226,  discusses  the  surplus 
revenue;  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  III,  436,  on  the 
direct  tax ; W.  H.  Glasson,  Federal  Military  Pensions,  has 
already  been  mentioned.  W.'  J.  Lauck,  Causes  of  the  Panic 
of  1893  (1907),  lays  the  blame  for  the  industrial  distress  of 


rjj  CJ1 


MONETARY  PROBLEMS 


349 


1893  wholly  on  the  silver  law  of  1890.  On  the  gold  reserve, 
consult  Grover  Cleveland,  Presidential  Problems;  D.  R.  Dewey, 
National  Problems  (1907)  ; Political  Science  Quarterly,  X, 
73;  and  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  XIII,  204.  “The 
ilver  Debate  of  1890,”  in  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  I, 
535,  contains  a detailed  account  of  the  discussion  in  Congress. 
W.  J.  Bryan,  First  Battle  (1897),  should  be  consulted. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
1896 

The  political  situation  in  1896,  when  the  parties 
began  to  prepare  for  the  presidential  election, 
was  more  complex  than  it  had  been  since  1860.  The 
repeal,  in  1893,  of  the  purchase  clause  of  the  Sherman 
silver  act  had  divided  the  Democrats  into  factions ; the 
financial  and  industrial  distress  in  the  same  year  had 
been  widely  attributed  to  fear  of  Democratic  misgov- 
ernment;  the  Wilson-Gorman  tariff  act  of  1894  had 
discredited  the  party  and  aroused  ill-feeling  between 
the  President  and  Congress;  the  Pullman  strike  and 
the  use  of  the  injunction  had  aroused  bitterness  in  the 
labor  element  against  the  administration;  the  income 
tax  decision  of  1895  had  done  much  to  shake  popular 
confidence  in  the  Supreme  Court;  the  Hawaiian  and 
Venezuelan  incidents  had  caused  minor  dissent  in 
some  quarters;  and  the  bond  sales  had  made  Cleve- 
land intensely  unpopular  in  the  West  and  South.  The 
Democratic  party  was  demoralized  and  leaderless. 
The  Republicans  were  better  off  because  they  had  been 
out  of  power  during  the  years  of  dissension  and  panic, 
but  they  had  been  without  a leader  since  the  death  of 
Blaine  in  1893  and  were  far  from  united  in  regard  to 
the  most  pressing  issues.  Indeed,  the  sectional. differ- 
ences in  both  parties,  and  the  unexpected  strength  of 
the  Populist  movement  caused  no  little  anxiety  among 
the  political  leaders.  And  finally,  the  volume  and  char- 
acter of  the  currency  was  still  undetermined.  The 

350 


1896 


351 


Democrats  had  divided  on  the  question.  The  Kepubli- 
caiis  were  almost  as  little  united ; they  had  played  poli- 
tics in  passing  the  Sherman  silver  act  and  three  years 
later  had  assisted  a President  of  the  opposite  party 
in  accomplishing  the  repeal  of  its  most  important  pro- 
vision. From  the  standpoint  of  the  silver  supporters 
neither  party  organization  was  to  be  trusted.  The 
outstanding  political  questions  of  1896,  therefore,  were 
whether  the  supporters  of  silver  could  capture  the 
machinery  of  one  of  the  parties  and  whether  the  other 
unsettled  issues  could  ride  into  the  campaign  on  the 
strength  of  the  financial  agitation.  The  answers  to 
these  questions  gave  the  campaign  and  election  its 
peculiar  significance. 

The  background  of  1896  is  to  be  found  in  the  South 
and  West,  where  the  farmers’  alliances  and  the  Popu- 
list party  continued  their  success  in  arousing  and  di- 
recting the  ambitions  of  the  discontented  classes.  In 
1892,  it  will  be  remembered,  the  Populists  had  cast 
more  than  a million  ballots  and  had  chosen  twenty-two 
presidential  electors,  two  senators,  and  eleven  repre- 
sentatives. In  1894,  at  the  time  of  the  congressional 
election,  they  had  increased  their  voting  strength  more 
than  forty  per  cent.,  and  had  elected  six  senators  and 
six  members  of  the  House,  besides  several  hundreds 
of  state  officials.  In  the  Senate  it  happened  that  the 
two  great  parties  had  been  almost  equally  strong,  after 
the  election  of  1894,  so  that  the  Populist  group  had 
held  the  balance  of  power.  The  insistence  of  the  South 
and  West  that  Congress  do  something  further  for  sil- 
ver had  not  lessened.  A measure  providing  for  the 
coinage  of  a portion  of  the  silver  bullion  in  the  treas- 
ury had  been  defeated  in  1894  only  through  the  Presi- 
dent’s veto.  Indeed  the  only  hope  of  the  East  and  of 
the  supporters  of  the  gold  standard  was  the  unflinch- 


352 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


ing  determination  of  the  head  of  a party  to  which  the 
East  and  the  gold  supporters  were,  in  the  main 
opposed. 

The  growing  enthusiasm  for  silver  which  was  sweep- 
ing over  the  South  and  West  and  rapidly  developing 
into  something  resembling  frenzy  was  difficult  for  the 
more  stolid  East  to  comprehend.  Not  merely  the  poli- 
tician, but  the  man  on  the  street  and  in  the  store,  the 
school-teacher,  the  farmer  and  the  laborer,  in  those 
portions  of  the  country,  fell  to  discussing  the  virtues 
of  silver  as  currency  and  the  effect  of  a greater  volume 
of  circulating  medium  upon  prices  and  prosperity. 
The  two  metals  became  personified  in  the  minds  of  the 
people.  Gold  was  the  symbol  of  cruel,  snobbish  plu- 
tocracy; silver  of  upright  democracy.  Gold  deserted 
the  country  in  its  hour  of  need;  silver  remained  at 
home  to  minister  to  the  wants  of  the  people.  Such  ar- 
guments as  those  presented  in  Coin’s  Financial  School, 
published  in  1894,  brought  financial  policy  within  the 
circle  of  the  emotions  of  its  readers  even  if  they  did 
not  satisfy  the  more  critical  student  of  monetary 
problems.  This  influential  little  volume,  written  by 
W.  H.  Harvey,  acted  as  a hand-book  of  free  coinage, 
cleverly  setting  forth  the  major  arguments  for  the  in- 
creased use  of  silver  and  bringing  forward  objections 
which  were  triumphantly  demolished.  Simple  illustra- 
tions enforced  the  lessons  taught  by  its  pages:  a wood- 
cut  of  a cripple  with  one  leg  indicated  how  handicapped 
the  country  was  without  the  free  coinage  of  two  metals ; 
in  another.  Senator  Sherman  and  President  Cleveland 
were  depicted  digging  out  the  silver  portion  of  the 
foundations  of  a house  which  had  been  erected  on  a 
stable  basis  of  both  gold  and  silver;  in  a third,  west- 
ern farmers  were  seen  industriously  stuffing  fodder 
into  a cow  which  capitalists  were  milking  for  the  bene- 


1896 


353 


fit  of  New  York  and  New  England^  With  the  en- 
thusiasm and  the  sincerity  of  the  early  crusaders,  the 
people  assembled  in  ten  thousand  schoolhouses  to  de- 
bate the  absorbing  subject  of  the  currency.  Indeed 
the  South  and  West  had  become  convinced  that  the 
miseries  inflicted  upon  mankind  by  war,  pestilence  and 
famine  had  been  less  “cruel,  unpitying,  and  unrelent- 
ing than  the  persistent  and  remorseless  exaction” 
which  the  contraction  of  the  volume  of  the  currency  had 
made  upon  society.  Low  prices,  the  stagnation  of  in- 
dustry, empty  and  idle  stores,  workshops  and  factories, 
the  increase  of  crime  and  bankruptcy — all  were  laid  at 
the  door  of  the  gold  standard. 

The  East  looked  upon  the  rising  in  the  West  at  first 
with  amusement,  and  was  quite  ready  to  accept  the 
diagnosis  of  a western  newspaper  man,  quoted  by 
Peck  in  his  Twenty  Years  of  the  Republic: 

What’s  the  matter  with  Kansas? 

We  all  know;  yet  here  we  are  at  it  again.  We  have  an  old 
moss-back  Jacksonian  who  snorts  and  howls  because  there  is  a 
bath-tub  in  the  State  House.  We  are  running  that  old  jay 
for  Governor.  ...  We  have  raked  the  ash-heap  of  failure  in 
the  State  and  found  an  old  human  hoop-skirt  who  has  failed 
as  a business  man,  who  has  failed  as  an  editor,  who  has  failed 
as  a preacher,  and  we  are  going  to  run  him  for  Congressman- 
at-large.  . . . Then  we  have  discovered  a kid  without  a law 
practice  and  have  decided  to  run  him  for  Attorney-General. 

Later  the  East  looked  upon  tendencies  in  the  West 
with  more  concern : Roosevelt,  although  admitting  the 
honesty  of  the  Populists,  characterized  their  ignorance 
as  “abysmal”;  others  were  more  inclined  to  doubt 
their  sincerity;  their  conventions  were  supposed  to  be 
made  up  of  cranks  and  unsexed  women;  and  their 

il  have  drawn  at  this  point  uprn  Peck,  Twenty  Years  of  the  Repub- 
lic, 453-456. 


354  SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

principles  were  looked  upon  as  “wild  and  crazy 
notions.” 

In  fact  it  was  no  simple  task  to  distinguish  between 
the  legitimate  grievances  and  ambitions  of  the  west- 
erners, and  their  eccentricities  and  errors.  Nor  was 
this  difficulty  lessened  by  the  reputation  with  which 
some  of  the  proponents  of  silver  were  justly  or  un- 
justl}"  credited.  “Sockless  Jerry”  Simpson  and  Mrs. 
Lease  were  among  them — the  Mrs.  Lease  to  whom  was 
ascribed  the  remark  “Kansas  had  better  stop  raising 
corn  and  begin  raising  hell!”  ^ Benjamin  R.  Tillman 
was  another — a rough,  forceful  character,  leader  of  the 
poor  whites  and  small  farmers  of  South  Carolina,  or- 
ganizer of  the  “wool  hats”  against  the  “silk  hats” 
and  the  “kid  gloves” — Governor  of  the  state  and  later 
member  of  the  federal  Senate.  Although  a Democrat, 
he  was  thoroughly  at  odds  with  Cleveland,  and  pub- 
licly declared  it  was  his  ambition  to  stick  his  pitchfork 
into  the  President’s  sides. ^ Richard  P.  Bland,  of  Alis- 
souri,  had  the  disadvantage  of  having  been  one  of  the 
earliest  of  the  silver  supporters,  since  he  had  initiated 
the  bill  which  resulted  in  the  Bland-Allison  act,  and 
was  looked  upon  in  the  East  as  a thorough-going,  free- 
silver  radical.  Governor  Altgeld,  of  Illinois,  leader 
of  the  Democrats  of  that  state  from  1892  to  1896,  was 
a successful  lawyer  who  was  looked  upon  by  his  friends 
as  a liberal-minded  humanitarian,  the  friend  of 

The  mocked  and  the  scorned  and  the  wounded, 
the  lame  and  the  poor, 

whose  sympathies  with  the  laboring  classes  had  given 
him  the  support  of  the  reformers  and  the  wage  earn- 

1 Peek,  451-453. 

2 For  brief  accounts  of  Tillman,  see  Leupp,  National  Miniatures,  117; 
N.  Y.  Times,  July  4,  1918;  N.  Y.  Evening  Post,  July  3,  1918. 


1896 


355 


ers.  But  his  pardon  of  the  Haymarket  anarchists  and 
his  attitude  during  the  Pullman  strike  had  led  the  East 
to  regard  him  as  a dangerous  revolutionist  and  an 
enemy  to  society.^ 

The  free-silver  movement  nevertheless  continued  to 
gather  momentum.  For  some  years  influential  silver 
advocates  had  been  associated  in  the  Bimetallic  League, 
an  organization  which  supported  the  free  coinage  of 
both  gold  and  silver.  Among'  its  members  were  promi- 
nent Democrats,  Eepuhlicans  and  Populists,  especially 
from  the  western  states,  and  some  of  the  foremost  la- 
bor leaders.  At  one  of  its  meetings  in  1893  it  was 
determined  to  invite  every  labor  and  industrial  or- 
ganization in  the  country  to  send  delegates.  A few 
experts,  even  in  the  East,  gave  some  scientific  support 
to  the  argument  for  the  greater  use  of  silver.  Eastern 
Republicans  like  Senator  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  proposed 
free  coinage  of  both  metals  by  an  international  agree- 
ment, which,  they  thought,  might  be  brought  about 
through  threats  of  tariff  discrimination  against  nations 
refusing  to  adhere  to  the  arrangement.  A silver  con- 
vention in  Nebraska  in  1894  was  attended  by  a thou- 
sand delegates.  From  the  point  of  view  of  party  har- 
mony the  subject  was  a nuisance.  Democratic  state 
conventions  were  badly  divided.  Thirty  of  them 
adopted  resolutions  distinctly  favorable  to  free  coin- 
age and  fourteen  opposed.  Ten  of  the  latter  committed 
themselves  definitely  to  the  gold  standard.  The  four- 
teen included  all  the  northeastern  states,  together  with 
Michigan,  Wisconsin  and  Minnesota.  S.uch  gold 
Democrats  as  President  Cleveland  sought  to  stem  the 
tide,  but  Cleveland’s  control  over  his  followers  was 
rapidly  dwindling,  and  it  seemed  likely  that  the  silver 

1 Cf.  Whitlock,  Forty  Years  of  It,  64  ff. ; Altgeld,  Live  Questions  and 
The  Cost  of  Something  for  Nothing. 


356 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


element  of  the  party  might  reach  out  to  seize  the  or- 
ganization and  displace  the  former  leaders. 

The  Republican  professional  politicians  were  as  ig- 
norant of  technical  monetary  problems  as  the  Demo- 
crats, and  moreover  did  not  wish  to  risk  popular  dis- 
approval in  any  section  by  utterances  which  might  be 
offensive  to  that  part  of  the  country.  The  first  Re- 
publican state  convention  during  1896  was  that  in 
Ohio.  Its  financial  plank  was  awaited  with  interest, 
because  of  the  early  date  of  the  meeting  and  because 
its  proceedings  were  in  the  hands  of  friends  of  the 
most  prominent  candidate  for  the  Republican  presi- 
dential nomination.  The  convention  dodged  the  issue 
by  demanding  that  all  our  currency  be  “sound  as  the 
Government  and  as  untarnished  as  its  honor,”  and  that 
both  metals  be  used  as  currency  and  kept  at  parity 
by  legislative  restrictions.  The  New  York  Tribune 
thought  that  this  could  mean  nothing  but  a gold  stand- 
ard ; the  Times  was  fearful  that  it  would  lead  to  silver ; 
the  Springfield  Republican  condemned  it  as  “chock 
full  of  double-dealing.”  Its  ambiguity,  however,  was 
in  line  with  the  purposes  and  ambitions  of  two  men 
who  were  actively  preparing  for  the  campaign  of  1896 
— Marcus  A.  Hanna  and  Major  William  McKinley. 

Marcus  A.  Hanna,  or  “Mark”  Hanna  as  he  was  uni- 
versally known,  was  an  Ohioan,  born  in  1837.^  As  a 
young  man  he  entered  upon  a business  career  in  Cleve- 
land, first  in  a wholesale  grocery  company,  later  in  a 
coal  and  iron  firm  and  finally  in  a variety  of  industrial 
and  commercial  enterprises  which  his  energy  and 
ability  opened  to  him.  The  expansion  of  industrial 
America  after  the  Civil  War  was  coincident  with  the 
greater  part  of  Hanna’s  career  and  he  was  a typical 

1 In  connection  with  the  following  pages,  consult  Croly,  Mwrous  A. 
Hanna,  one  of  the  few  satisfactory  biographies  of  this  period. 


1896 


357 


product  of  that  period  in  his  political,  economic  and 
social  philosophy.  After  he  had  attained  a degree  of 
business  success  he  became  actively  interested  in  poli- 
tics and  took  a prominent  part  in  placing  Joseph  E. 
Foraker  in  the  governor’s  chair  in  Ohio  in  1885. 
Strained  relations  between  the  two  turned  Hanna’s  at- 
tention to  the  fortunes  of  John  Sherman.  When  it 
became  apparent  in  1888  that  the  presidential  cam- 
paign would  turn  upon  President  Cleveland’s  tariff 
principles,  Hanna,  who  looked  upon  the  protective  tar- 
iff as  synonymous  with  industrial  expansion  and  even 
of  industrial  safety,  threw  his  weight  upon  the  side  of 
Sherman,  who  was  again  seeking  the  Republican  nomi- 
nation. The  failure  of  Sherman  was  a blow  to  Hanna, 
but  it  called  to  his  attention  the  pleasing  personality  of 
a more  prominent  protectionist,  William  McKinley. 
He  was  an  important  agent  in  McKinley’s  successful 
campaign  for  the  governorship  of  Ohio  in  1891.  Two 
years  later  the  Governor  met  serious  financial  re- 
verses, and  again  Hanna  proved  to  be  a firm  friend. 
Aided  by  other  men  of  means  he  rescued  McKinley 
from  bankruptcy.  Between  the  two  there  sprang  up 
a mutual  admiration  of  unusual  strength,  and  finally, 
in  1894-1895,  Hanna  withdrew  from  his  business  en- 
terprises in  order  to  devote  his  entire  time  to  the  po- 
litical fortunes  of  his  friend. 

Mark  Hanna  had  extraordinary  capacity  for  leader- 
ship. Sociable,  open-handed,  full  of  energy,  direct,  ag- 
gressive, shrewd,  daring,  a hard  fighter,  a loyal  friend, 
an  organizer  and  a man  of  his  word,  he  was  essen- 
tially a man  of  action.  In  politics  he  was  practical  and 
straight-forward.  He  wanted  results,  not  reforms,  and 
results  meant  accepting  the  prevailing  methods  and 
using  them.  When  he  wished  a street-railway  fran- 
chise in  Cleveland,  he  bought  enough  influence  with 


358 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE. 


the  city  government  to  get  what  he  wanted,  as  others 
of  his  day  did.  He  was  a strict  party  man ; good  gov- 
ernment and  safety  to  industry,  he  believed,  were  de- 
pendent upon  Republican  control.  Patriotism  there- 
fore demanded  his  utmost  energy  in  getting  Republi- 
cans elected.  In  political  campaigns  his  counsel,  his 
energy  and  his  money  were  always  available.  A pro- 
tective customs  tariff,  a “sound”  currency  system  and 
a free  hand  in  the  conduct  of  business  were  the  things 
which  he  most  desired  from  the  government. 

William  McKinley  would  have  been  a formidable 
competitor  for  the  presidential  nomination  in  1896 
even  without  the  assistance  of  his  rugged  friend.  His 
personality  was  attractive,  in  a pleasing,  soothing,  tact- 
ful, ingratiating  way.  His  military  career  had  been 
honorable  even  if  not  famous.  For  most  of  the  time 
from  1877  to  1891  he  had  been  a member  of  the  House 
of  Representatives,  becoming  identified  particularly 
with  the  high  protective  tariff  and  acting  as  sponsor 
for  the  McKinley  act  of  1890.  After  being  defeated 
for  re-election,  just  subsequent  to  the  passage  of  the 
tariff  law,  he  had  become  Governor  of  Ohio  for  two 
terms.  The  panic  of  1893  and  the  ill-fated  Wilson- 
Gorman  tariff  act  during  the  time  when  he  was  Gov- 
ernor caused  the  tide  of  popular  favor  to  swing  away 
from  the  Democrats ; McKinley,  as  the  apostle  of  pro- 
tection, appeared  in  a more  favorable  light;  and  his 
partisans  began  to  press  him  forward  as  the  logical 
nominee  for  1896  and  as  “the  advance  agent  of  Pros- 
perity.” The  fact  that  his  home  was  in  a populous 
state  in  the  Middle  West  was  also  in  his  favor,  because 
the  Republicans  had  frequently  chosen  their  candidate 
from  this  debatable  ground  rather  than  from  the  North- 
east, where  success  was  to  be  had  without  a struggle. 

Hanna’s  first  care  ujDon  determining  to  devote  him- 


1896 


359 


self  to  the  interests  of  McKinley  was  to  keep  the  candi- 
date before  the  people  as  the  one  man  who  could  res- 
cue the  nation  from  industrial  depression.  To  that 
end  he  widely  circulated  the  Cleveland  Leader,  a strong 
McKinley  organ,  for  eighteen  months  at  his  own  ex- 
pense ; he  rented  a house  in  Georgia,  entertained  Gov- 
ernor McKinley  there  and  brought  numbers  of  south- 
ern politicians  to  meet  the  candidate ; and  experienced 
political  workers  were  sent  all  over  the  country  and 
especially  to  the  South  to  prepare  the  way  for  the 
election  of  delegates  to  the  nominating  convention. 
Hanna  himself  went  to  the  East  to  discover  on  what 
terms  the  support  of  some  of  the  states  in  that  section 
could  be  obtained.  On  his  return  he  reported  that  aid 
would  be  assured  by  a guarantee  that  the  patronage 
of  the  administration  would  go  to  certain  powerful  poli- 
ticians; Hanna  thought  the  bargain  a desirable  one, 
but  the  candidate  objected  and  Hanna  acquiesced. 
The  campaign  of  publicity  and  of  personal  canvass  for 
delegates  and  influence  continued.  First  and  last,  it 
is  estimated,  Hanna  contributed  over  $100,000  for 
this  purpose,  urging  his  assistants  always  to  use  funds 
only  for  legitimate  ends,  although  promising  McKin- 
ley partisans  who  aided  in  the  work  that  they  would 
be  “consulted”  in  the  disposition  of  patronage. 

Two  difficulties  stood  in  the  way  of  completely  en- 
suring the  choice  of  McKinley  as  the  candidate  by  the 
convention.  Several  states  had  “favorite  sons”  whom 
they  would  be  sure  to  present,  and  if  so  many  of  these 
should  appear  as  to  prevent  McKinley’s  nomination  on 
the  first  ballot  or  at  least  on  an  early  one,  there  might 
be  a stampede  to  an  unknown  man — a “dark  horse” — 
and  then  Hanna’s  ambitions  would  be  frustrated. 
Thomas  B.  Eeed  of  Maine  was  an  especial  source  of 
anxiety  as  he  possessed  considerable  strength  through- 


360 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE, 


out  New  England.  To  guard  against  such  a danger, 
Hanna  sedulously  cultivated  the  popular  demand  for 
Governor  McKinley  and  also  fought  in  the  state  con- 
ventions for  delegates  even  against  favorite  sons.  A 
crucial  state  was  Illinois,  where  Senator  Cullom  was 
powerful.  The  Senator  says  that  a representative  of 
McKinley  offered  him  “all  sorts  of  inducements”  to 
withdraw,  but  McKinley’s  biographer  mentions  no 
such  attempt  at  a bargain.  Eventually  Cullom  made 
the  fight  and  was  defeated,  and  from  then  on,  the 
nomination  of  McKinley  seemed  sure  unless  he  should 
be  tripped  by  the  currency  issue. 

The  silver  question  was  the  second  obstacle  in  the 
way  of  success.  Not  only  was  the  party  divided,  but 
McKinley’s  record  on  the  subject  was  far  from  con- 
sistent. He  had  voted  for  the  Bland  free-silver  bill 
in  1877,  for  the  Bland-Allison  act  in  1878  and  for  the 
passage  of  that  act  over  President  Hayes’s  veto.  In 
1890  he  had  urged  the  passage  of  the  Sherman  silver 
purchase  law,  intimating  that  he  would  support  a free 
coinage  measure  if  it  were  possible  to  pass  it.  Hardly 
more  than  a year  later  he  was  campaigning  for  the 
governorship  of  Ohio,  and  there  he  denounced  the  free 
coinage  of  silver  and  advocated  international  bimetal- 
lism. In  1896  McKinley  feared  that  a definite  public 
utterance  on  the  one  side  or  the  other  of  the  question 
would  widen  the  division  in  the  party,  prevent  his 
nomination  and  lose  the  election.  Hence  the  ambig- 
uous currency  plank  in  the  Ohio  state  convention  and 
hence,  also,  the  refusal  of  the  candidate  to  commit  him- 
self openly.  Nevertheless  he  commissioned  a friend 
to  go  to  the  East  and  explain  his  attitude  privately  to 
certain  leaders  and  prominent  business  men,  urging 
them  not  to  force  a declaration  for  gold  before  the 
convention  met.  In  this  way,  he  thought,  the  cur- 


1896 


361 


rency  issue  might  be  subordinated,  the  tariff  empha- 
sized and  the  party  held  together.  In  this  state  of  un- 
certainty the  currency  situation  was  allowed  to  rest 
until  the  convention  met  at  St.  Louis  on  June  16. 

The  platform  adopted  was,  for  the  most  part,  of  the 
usual  sort.  It  urged  popular  attention  to  the  match- 
less achievements  of  thirty  years  of  Republican  rule 
and  contrasted  that  period  of  “unequalled  success  and 
prosperity”  with  the  “unparalleled  incapacity,  dis- 
honor, and  disaster”  of  Democratic  government;  it 
promised  the  “most  ample  protection”  to  the  prod- 
ucts of  mine,  field  and  factory;  generous  pensions, 
American  control  of  Hawaii,  a Nicaragua  canal,  the 
Monroe  doctrine,  restricted  immigration  and  the  ar- 
bitration of  labor  disputes  affecting  interstate  com- 
merce received  the  support  of  the  party. 

It  was  the  currency  plank,  however,  that  differen- 
tiated the  platform  of  1896  from  that  of  other  cam- 
paigns. Many  Republican  leaders  and  business  men, 
particularly  in  the  East,  were  disposed  to  call  for  a 
definite  party  statement  in  favor  of  a gold  standard 
and  had  reached  the  point  where  they  could  not  be 
put  off  by  the  usual  meaningless  straddle.  Thomas  C. 
Platt,  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  Joseph  B.  Foraker,  Charles 
W.  Fairbanks  and  other  party  chiefs  were  among 
them.  Hanna  was  ready  to  declare  for  gold  after  he 
had  been  assured  of  the  nomination  of  his  candidate. 
McKinley  was  willing  to  stand  for  gold,  although  he 
preferred  not  to  mention  that  word  in  the  plank  and 
hoped  to  make  the  contest  on  the  tariff.  Moreover 
so  many  silver  delegates  had  already  been  elected  to 
the  Democratic  convention,  which  was  soon  to  be  held, 
that  a definite  utterance  from  that  party  seemed  a 
certainty.  The  Prohibitionists  had  already  divided 
into  halves  over  the  dominant  issue.  It  was  almost 


362 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


imperative,  therefore,  for  the  Republican  convention 
to  be  more  explicit  than  it  had  hitherto  ventured  to  be. 
As  leader  after  leader  arrived  who  was  insistent  upon 
a gold  standard,  it  became  increasingly  evident  to 
Hanna  that  he  must  proceed  with  caution.  If  Mc- 
Kinley committed  himself  to  gold,  the  silver  advo- 
cates would  balk  at  his  candidacy,  and  perhaps  unite 
on  somebody  else;  if  he  committed  himself  to  silver, 
he  would  lose  the  eastern  leaders.  The  astute  Hanna 
therefore  allowed  sentiment  in  favor  of  the  gold  plank 
to  gather  force,  although  holding  the  discussion  as 
far  as  possible  under  cover,  and  kept  McKinley  from 
making  a definite  statement.  Then  at  the  last  minute, 
when  the  McKinley  delegates  were  numerous  enough 
to  ensure  the  nomination  of  the  Major  and  when  it  was 
too  late  for  the  silver  forces  to  agree  upon  an  opposi- 
tion candidate,  Hanna  gave  way  to  the  pressure  for 
gold  and  agreed  to  the  plank  which  he  had  always 
favored.^ 

Despite  the  canny  management  of  Hanna  a defec- 
tion took  place  over  the  decision  on  the  currency  issue. 
As  soon  as  the  platform  was  read.  Senator  Henry  M. 
Teller,  of  Colorado,  moved  to  replace  the  gold  plank 
by  one  advocating  the  free  coinage  of.  silver.  The  ear- 

1 As  finally  adopted,  the  gold  plank  asserted : “We  are  unalterably 
opposed  to  every  measure  calculated  to  debase  our  currency  or  impair 
the  credit  of  our  country.  We  are,  therefore,  opposed  to  the  free 
coinage  of  silver,  except  by  international  agreement  with  the  leading 
commercial  nations  of  the  world,  which  we  pledge  ourselves  to  promote, 
and  until  such  agreement  can  be  obtained  the  existing  gold  standard 
must  be  preserved.  All  our  silver  and  paper  currency  must  be  main- 
tained at  parity  with  gold,  and  we  favor  all  measures  designed  to  main- 
tain inviolably  the  obligations  of  the  United  States  and  all  our  money, 
whether  coin  or  paper,  at  the  present  standard,  the  standard  of  the  most 
enlightened  nations  of  the  earth.”  Several  leaders  claimed  to  have  been 
the  real  author  of  the  gold  plank.  It  seems  more  nearly  true  that  many 
men  came  to  the  convention  prepared  to  insist  on  a definite  statement 
and  that  each  thought  himself  the  originator  of  the  party  policy. 


1896 


363 


nestness  with  which  Teller  urged  the  adoption  of  the 
substitute  was  an  indication  of  the  sincerity  of  the 
western  wing  of  the  party.  He  had  been  a strict  Re- 
publican since  the  formation  of  the  party  in  the  mid- 
fifties, yet  he  now  found  himself  forced  to  accept  a 
policy  which  he  believed  to  be  pernicious  or  break  the 
political  bonds  which  had  held  him  for  forty  years. 
The  majority  of  the  convention,  however,  was  deter- 
mined to  adopt  the  gold  plank  and  overwhelmingly  de- 
feated the  Teller  amendment,  whereupon  the  Senator 
and  thirty-three  other  silver  supporters  solemnly  with- 
drew from  the  hall. 

The  way  was  now  clear  for  the  nomination  of  a 
candidate.  Thomas  B.  Reed,  Senator  Quay  and  other 
favorite  sons  received  but  scant  support,  and  McKin- 
ley was  nominated  by  an  overwhelming  majority  on  the 
first  ballot.  Garrett  A.  Hobart,  a lawyer  and  business 
man  whose  reputation  was  confined  to  New  Jersey,  his 
home  state,  was  nominated  for  the  vice-presidency. 
The  platform  and  the  candidate  were  generally  hailed 
with  favor  in  the  East.  To  be  sure,  critical  newspa- 
pers were  inclined  to  look  askance  upon  McKinley’s 
past.  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  for  example,  fav- 
ored a gold  standard  but  decried  the  candidate’s  “ab- 
sence of  settled  convictions  about  leading  questions  of 
the  day,  and  his  want  of  clear  knowledge  on  any  sub- 
ject.” Yet  on  the  whole,  the  platform  and  the  candi- 
date were  popular,  and,  in  view  of  the  serious  fac- 
tional disputes  among  the  Democrats,  the  Republicans 
seemed  likely  to  make  good  their  boast  that  victory 
would  be  so  easy  that  they  could  nominate  and  elect 
a “rag  baby”  if  they  chose.  The  redoubtable  Hanna 
was  appointed  chairman  of  the  National  Republi- 
can Committee,  from  which  office  he  was  to  direct  the 
campaign.  McKinley  still  believed  that  the  contest 


364 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


would  be  of  the  old-fashioned  sort  and  that  it  would 
turn  on  the  tariff,  despite  the  platform  utterance  of 
the  party.  And  so  it  might  have  proved  had  it  not 
been  for  an  important  change  of  purpose  and  leader- 
ship in  the  opposition. 

The  friends  of  free  silver  coinage  went  to  the  Demo- 
cratic convention  at  Chicago  on  July  7 with  the  same 
determination  to  get  a definite  statement  on  the  cur- 
rency question  that  had  characterized  the  eastern  lead- 
ers at  the  Republican  convention.  Without  the  loss  of 
a moment  they  wrested  the  control  of  the  organization 
from  the  former  leaders  by  defeating  Senator  Hill  of 
New  York,  a gold  Democrat,  for  the  temporary  chair- 
manship and  electing  Senator  Daniel  of  Virginia,  a 
recognized  proponent  of  free  silver.  Hill’s  support 
came  mainly  from  the  Northeast;  Daniel’s,  from  the 
West  and  South.  Senator  White  of  California,  a rep- 
resentative of  the  silver  wing,  was  then  chosen  per- 
manent chairman  and  the  convention  was  ready  for  the 
contest  over  the  platform.  While  it  awaited  that  docu- 
ment, however,  it  listened  to  several  favorite  leaders, 
of  whom  Senator  Tillman  and  Governor  Altgeld  of 
Illinois  were  the  best  known.  From  the  sentiments 
expressed  by  these  men  it  was  clear  that  the  radical 
' Democrats  believed  that  they  were  speaking  for  the 
masses  of  the  people  and  that  they  were  bent  upon 
making  far-reaching  changes  both  in  the  organization 
and  the  creed  of  the  party. 

A disquieting  feature  was  a degree  of  turbulence 
beyond  that  which  usually  characterizes  our  nominat- 
ing conventions.  The  official  proceedings  record  the 
following,  for  example,  while  Senator  Tillman  was  ad- 
dressing the  delegates; 

I hope  that  when  this  vast  assembly  shall  have  dispersed  to 
its  home  the  many  thousands  of  my  fellow-citizens  who  are 


1896 


365 


here  will  carr}’  hence  a different  opinion  of  the  pitchfork  man 
from  South  Carolina  to  that  which  they  now  hold.  I come  to 
you  from  the  South — from  the  home  of  secession — from  that 
State  where  the  leaders  of — (the  balance  of  the  sentence  of  the 
speaker  was  drowmed  by  hisses).  Mr.  Tillman  (resuming)  : 
There  are  only  three  things  in  the  world  that  can  hiss — a 
goose,  a serpent,  and  a man  . . . 

In  the  last  three  or  four  or  five  years  the  Western  people 
have  come  to  realize  that  the  condition  of  the  South  and  the 
condition  of  the  West  are  identical.  Hence  we  find  to-day 
that  the  Democratic  party  of  the  West  is  here  almost  in  solid 
phalanx  appealing  to  the  South,  and  the  South  has  responded 
— to  come  to  their  help.  . . . Some  of  my  friends  from  the 
South  and  elsewhere  have  said  that  this  is  not  a sectional  issue. 
I say  it  is  a sectional  issue.  (Long  prolonged  hissing.) 

At  length  the  platform  was  presented.  It  was  a 
summary  of  the  complaints  against  the  East  which 
had  been  forming  in  the  West  and  South  ever  since 
the  days  of  the  Greenbackers  and  the  “Ohio  idea.”  It 
recognized  first  that  the  money  question  was  para- 
mount to  all  others ; laid  hard  times  at  the  door  of  the 
gold  standard,  which  it  denounced  as  a British  policy; 
and  demanded  the  free  coinage  of  both  metals  at  the 
existing  legal  ratio,  under  which  sixteen  parts  of 
silver  by  weight  were  declared  equivalent  to  one  part 
of  gold  in  minting  coins.  Nor  would  the  party  wait 
for  the  consent  of  any  other  nation.  It  opposed  the 
issuance  of  interest-bearing  bonds  in  time  of  peace, 
condemned  the  bond  transactions  of  the  Cleveland 
administration  and  denounced  the  national  bank-note 
system.  The  McKinley  tariff  was  declared  a prolific 
breeder  of  trusts  which  enriched  the  few  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  many.  The  plank  concerning  the  income 
tax,  which  had  so  recently  been  declared  unconstitu- 
tional by  the  Supreme  Court,  excited  much  condenma- 


366 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


tion  among  Eepublicans  and  conservative  Democrats, 
who  denounced  it  as  an  attack  on  the  Court.  It  noted 
that  the  Court  had  uniformly  sustained  income  taxes 
for  nearly  a hundred  years  and  declared  it  to  be  the 
duty  of  Congress 

to  use  all  the  constitutional  power  which  remains  after  that 
decision,  or  which  may  come  from  its  reversal  by  the  court 
as  it  may  hereafter  be  constituted,  so  that  the  burdens  of 
taxation  may  be  equally  and  impartially  laid,  to  the  end  that 
wealth  may  bear  its  due  proportion  of  the  expenses  of  the 
government. 

The  reaction  of  the  party  on  the  labor  disputes  of 
recent  years  and  especially  the  Pullman  strike  was 
clearly  in  evidence.  Arbitration  of  such  controversies 
was  called  for;  “interference”  by  federal  authorities 
in  local  affairs  was  condemned ; government  by  injunc- 
tion was  objected  to;  and  the  passage  of  such  laws 
was  demanded  as  would  protect  all  the  interests  of  the 
laboring  classes. 

A minority  of  the  platform  committee  now  presented 
the  opposing  point  of  view.  It  objected  to  many  of 
the  planks;  complained  that  some  were  ill-considered, 
others  revolutionary ; and  offered  two  amendments,  one 
advocating  the  gold  standard,  the  other  expressing 
commendation  of  Cleveland’s  administration.  The 
contest  was  then  on.  Tillman  excoriated  Cleveland 
and  declared  that  the  East  held  the  West  and  South 
in  economic  bondage ; Hill  denounced  the  currency,  in- 
come tax  and  Supreme  Court  planks  as  furiously  as 
any  Eepublican  could  have  wished.  The  currency 
plank,  he  thought,  was  unwise,  that  on  the  income  tax 
unnecessary,  that  on  the  Court  assailed  the  supreme 
tribunal,  and  the  entire  program  was  “revolutionary.” 

As  yet,  nobody  had  quite  expressed  the  feelings  of 


1896 


367 


tlie  convention,  Tillman  was  too  crude;  Hill  had  no 
remedy  for  long-standing  ills.  At  this  juncture  AVil- 
liam  J.  Bryan  stepped  upon  the  platform.  He  was  a 
young  man — only  thirty-six  years  of  age — and  known 
but  slightly  as  a representative  from  Nebraska  who 
possessed  many  of  the  arts  and  abilities  of  an  orator. 
Bryan  began  with  a modest  and  tactful  declaration 
that  his  opposition  to  the  gold  wing  of  the  party  was 
based  solely  on  principles  and  not  at  all  on  personali- 
ties. The  convention  had  met,  he  insisted,  not  to  de- 
bate but  to  register  a judgment  already  rendered  by 
the  people.  Old  leaders  had  been  cast  aside  because 
they  had  refused  to  express  the  desires  of  those  whom 
they  aspired  to  lead.  Briefly  he  outlined  the  reply  of 
the  radicals  to  the  objections  made  by  Hill  and  the 
gold  wing  to  the  proposed  platform.  The  conserva- 
tives, Bryan  declared,  had  complained  that  free  silver 
coinage  would  disturb  business: 

We  say  to  you  that  you  have  made  the  definition  of  a busi- 
ness man  too  limited  in  its  application.  The  man  who  is  em- 
ployed for  wages  is  as  much  a business  man  as  his  employer ; 
the  attorney  in  a country  town  is  as  much  a business  man  as 
the  corporation  counsel  in  a great  metropolis ; the  merchant  at 
the  cross-roads  store  is  as  much  a business  man  as  the  merchant 
of  New  York;  the  farmer  who  goes  forth  in  the  morning  and 
toils  all  day — who  begins  in  the  spring  and  toils  all  sununer — 
and  who  by  the  application  of  brain  and  muscle  to  the  natural 
resources  of  the  country  creates  wealth,  is  as  much  a business 
man  as  the  man  who  goes  upon  the  board  of  trade  and  bets 
upon  the  price  of  grain ; the  miners  who  go  down  a thousand 
feet  into  the  earth,  or  climb  two  thousand  feet  upon  the  cliffs, 
and  bring  forth  from  their  hiding  places  the  precious  metals 
to  be  poured  into  the  channels  of  trade  are  as  much  business 
men  as  the  few  financial  magnates  who,  in  a back  room,  corner 
the  money  of  the  world.  We  come  to  speak  for  this  broader 
class  of  business  men. 


368 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


The  time  was  at  hand,  Bryan  insisted,  when  the  cur- 
rency issue  must  be  squarely  met: 

We  have  petitioned,  and  our  petitions  have  been  scorned; 
we  have  entreated,  and  our  entreaties  have  been  disregarded ; 
we  have  begged,  and  they  have  mocked  when  our  calamity 
came.  We  beg  no  longer;  we  entreat  no  more;  we  petition 
no  more.  We  defy  them. 

The  radical  wing  of  the  Democracy  had  now  found 
its  orator.  Every  word  was  driven  straight  to  the 
hearts  of  the  sympathetic  hearers.  The  income  tax 
law  had  been  constitutional,  Bryan  complained,  until 
one  of  the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  had  changed 
his  mind;  the  tariff  was  less  important  than  the  cur- 
rency because  ‘‘protection  has  slain  its  thousands,  the 
gold  standard  has  slain  its  tens  of  thousands.” 
Fundamentally,  he  insisted,  the  contest  was  between 
the  idle  holders  of  idle  capital  and  the  struggling 
masses  who  produce  the  capital: 

If  they  come  to  meet  us  on  that  issue  we  can  present  the 
history  of  our  nation.  More  than  that ; we  can  tell  them  that 
they  will  search  the  pages  of  history  in  vain  to  find  a single 
instance  where  the  common  people  of  any  land  have  ever  de- 
clared themselves  in  favor  of  the  gold  standard.  They  can 
find  where  the  holders  of  fixed  investments  have  declared  for 
a gold  standard,  but  not  where  the  masses  have  . . . 

You  come  to  us  and  tell  us  that  the  great  cities  are  in  favor 
of  the  gold  standard ; we  reply  that  the  great  cities  rest  upon 
our  broad  and  fertile  prairies.  Burn  down  your  cities  and 
leave  our  farms,  and  your  cities  will  spring  up  again  as  if  by 
magic;  but  destroy  our  farms  and  the  grass  will  grow  in  the 
streets  of  every  city  in  the  country  . . . 

Having  behind  us  the  producing  masses  of  this  nation  and 
the  world,  supported  by  the  commercial  interests,  the  laboring 
interests,  and  the  toilers  everywhere,  we  will  answer  their 
demand  for  a gold  standard  by  saying  to  them:  You  shall 


1896  369 

not  press  down  upon  the  brow  of  labor  this  crown  of  thorns, 
you  shall  not  crucify  mankind  upon  a cross  of  gold. 

The  frenzy  of  approval  which  this  brief  speech 
aroused  was  proof  that  the  West  and  South  had  found 
a herald.  Whether  wdsely  or  not,  the  radicals  ac- 
claimed their  leader  and  the  party  was  embarked  upon 
a program  that  made  the  campaign  of  1896  a mem- 
orable one.  Without  further  ado,  the  amendments  of 
the  conservatives  were  voted  down — the  vote  being  sec- 
tional, as  before.  Proposals  that  changes  in  the  mone- 
tary standard  should  not  apply  to  existing  contracts 
and  that  if  free  coinage  should  not  effect  a parity  be- 
tween gold  and  silver  at  a ratio  of  16  to  1 within  a year, 
it  should  be  suspended,  were  both  voted  down  without 
so  much  as  a division.  The  platform  was  then  adopted 
by  an  overwhelming  majority  and  radical  democracy 
had  the  bit  in  its  teeth.  In  the  East  the  platform  was 
viewed  with  amazement.  The  New  York  World,  a 
Democratic  newspaper,  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
only  doubt  about  the  election  would  be  the  size  of 
McKinley’s  victory.  The  Republican  Tribune  thought 
that  the  party  was  afflicted  with  “lunacy”;  that  it  had 
become  the  “avowed  champion  of  the  right  of  pillage, 
riot  and  trainwrecking” ; that  the  platform  was  an  an- 
archist manifesto  and  a “call  to  every  criminal  seek- 
ing a chance  for  outrage.” 

Before  Bryan’s  speech  it  had  been  impossible  to 
foretell  who  the  party  candidate  for  the  presidency 
would  be,  although  the  veteran  free  silver  leader,  Rich- 
ard P.  Bland,  had  been  looked  upon  as  a logical  choice 
in  case  his  well-known  principles  should  become  those 
of  the  convention.  After  the  speech,  however,  it  was 
clear  that  Bryan  embodied  the  feelings  of  many  of  his 
colleagues  and  on  the  fifth  ballot  he  was  chosen  as  the 


370 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


candidate.  The  vice-presidential  choice  was  Arthur 
Sewall,  of  Maine,  a shipbuilder  and  banker  who  be- 
lieved in  the  free  coinage  of  silver. 

The  gold  Democrats  were  now  in  a quandary.  Many 
of  them  had  refrained  from  voting  at  all  in  the  con- 
vention after  the  silver  element  had  gained  control. 
Strict  partisans,  however,  adopted  the  position  of  Sen- 
ator Hill  who  was  asked  after  the  convention  whether 
he  was  a Democrat  still.  “Yes,”  he  is  said  to  have  re- 
torted, “I  am  a Democrat  still — very  still.”  Some 
frankly  turned  toward  the  Eepublican  party,  while 
others  organized,  the  National  Democratic  party  and 
adopted  a traditional  Democratic  platform,  with  a 
gold  plank.  After  considering  the  possibility  of  nomi- 
nating President  Cleveland  for  a third  term,  the  party 
chose  John  M.  Palmer  for  the  presidency  and  Simon 
B.  Buckner  for  the  vice-presidency.  Soon  after  the 
Democratic  convention,  the  People’s  party  and  the  Sil- 
ver party  met  in  St.  Louis.  Both  nominated  Bryan 
for  the  presidency,  and  thereafter  the  Democrats  and 
the  Populists  made  common  cause. 

At  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  then,  it  was  evident 
that  class  and  sectional  hatreds  would  enter  largely 
into  the  contest.  The  Populists  and  the  radical  Demo- 
crats felt  that  they  were  fighting  the  battle  of  the 
masses  against  “plutocracy” — the  subtle  and  corrupt- 
ing control  of  public  affairs  by  the  possessors  of  great 
fortunes ; they  thought  that  they  saw  arrayed  against 
them  the  forces  of  wealth  and  the  corporations,  seek- 
ing to  enslave  them.  The  conservative  Democrats  and 
the  gold  Eepublicans  saw  in  their  opponents  an  organ- 
ized attempt  to  carry  out  a program  of  dishonesty  and 
socialism.  The  one  side  believed  that  the  creditor 
class  desired  to  scale  debts  upward;  the  other,  that  the 
debtor  class  wished  to  scale  them  down.  The  radicals 


1896 


371 


believed  that  the  Supreme  Court  was  in  the  control  of 
the  wealthy;  the  conservatives,  that  their  opponents 
sought  to  assail  the  highest  tribunal  in  the  land.  The 
peculiar  circumstances  preceding  the  year  1896,  how- 
ever, focussed  attention  on  the  monetary  standard 
rather  than  upon  the  other  demands  of  the  Populist- 
Democratic  fusion. 

Each  candidate  adopted  a plan  of  campaign  that  was 
suited  to  his  individual  situation.  Bryan  was  rela- 
tively unknown  and  he  therefore  decided  to  appeal  di- 
rectly to  the  people,  where  his  powers  as  a speaker 
would  have  great  effect.  The  usual  “ notification” 
meeting  was  held  in  Madison  Square  Garden,  in  New 
York  City,  so  as  to  carry  the  cause  into  the  heart  of 
“the  enemy’s  country.”  During  the  few  months  of 
the  campaign  the  Democratic  candidate  travelled  18,- 
000  miles,  made  600  speeches  and  addressed  nearly  five 
million  people.  The  effect  was  immediate.  The 
forces  of  social  unrest,  hitherto  silent  in  great  meas- 
ure, were  becoming  vocal  and  nobody  could  measure 
their  extent.  McKinley  had  prophesied  that  thirty 
days  after  the  Republican  convention  nothing  wonld 
be  heard  about  the  currency.  When  the  thirty  days 
had  passed,  on  the  contrary,  scarcely  anything  was 
heard  except  that  very  question.  Whatever  his  per- 
sonal wishes,  McKinley  must  meet  the  problem  face  to 
face,  and  in  alarm,  Hanna  and  the  Republican  cam- 
paign leaders  put  forth  unparalleled  efforts  to  save  the 
party  from  defeat. 

The  share  of  McKinley  in  these  efforts  was  a novel 
one.  Instead  of  going  upon  the  stump,  he  remained 
at  his  home  in  Canton,  Ohio.  A constant  stream  of 
visiting  delegations  of  supporters  from  all  points  of 
the  compass  came  to  hear  him  speak  from  his  front 
porch.  Some  of  the  delegations  came  spontaneously; 


372 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


the  visits  of  others  were  prearranged ; hut  in  all  cases 
the  speeches  delivered  were  looked  over  beforehand 
with  great  care.  The  candidate  memorized  or  read 
his  own  remarks  and  carefully  revised  those  which 
the  spokesman  of  the  visitors  planned  to  offer.  In 
this  way,  any  such  untoward  incident  as  the  Burchard 
affair  was  avoided  and  the  accounts  of  the  front-porch 
speeches  which  went  out  through  the  press  contained 
nothing  which  would  injure  the  chances  for  success. 
The  effectiveness  of  the  plan  was  attested  on  all 
sides. 

In  addition,  extraordinary  attempts  were  put  forth 
to  instruct  the  people  on  various  aspects  of  the  cur- 
rency question.  A small  army  was  organized  to  dis- 
tribute literature  and  address  rallies ; 120,000,000  docu- 
ments were  distributed  from  the  Chicago  and  New 
York  headquarters;  newspapers  were  supplied  with 
especially  prepared  matter;  posters  and  buttons  were 
scattered  by  the  carload.  At  the  dinner-table,  on  the 
street  corner,  in  the  railroad  train,  in  store,  office  and 
shop,  the  people  gave  themselves  over  to  a heated  dis- 
cussion of  the  merits  of  gold  and  silver  as  currency 
and  to  the  feasibility  of  free  coinage  at  a ratio  of  16 
to  1.  The  amount  of  money  which  these  efforts  re- 
quired was  unusually  large.  Business  men  and  bank- 
ing institutions,  especially  in  New  York,  contributed 
liberally.  The  Standard  Oil  Company  gave  $250,000; 
large  life  insurance  companies  helped  freely,  although 
the  fact  was  well  concealed  at  the  time.  Business  men 
were  fearful  that  Bryan’s  election  would  mean  a great 
shrinkage  in  the  value  of  their  properties.  Many 
feared  that  the  Democrats  would  assail  the  Supreme 
Court  and  that  their  leader  would  surround  himself 
with  advisors  of  a reckless  and  revolutionary  char- 
acter. Funds  therefore  poured  into  the  Republican 


1896 


373  . 


war-cliest  to  an  amount  estimated  at  three  and  a half 
million  dollars. 

Before  the  close  of  the  campaign  a feeling  akin  to 
terror  swept  over  the  East;  contracts  were  made  con- 
tingent upon  the  election  of  McKinley;  employees  were 
paid  on  the  Saturday  night  before  election  day  and 
notified  that  they  need  not  return  to  work  in  the  event 
of  Democratic  success.  Although  caution  and  good 
manners  characterized  the  utterances  of  the  two  candi- 
dates, their  supporters  were  hardly  so  restrained. 
The  following,  for  example,  is  typical  of  the  editorial 
utterances  of  the  New  York  Tribune: 

Let  us  begin  with  the  Ten  Commandments.  “Thou  shalt 
not  take  the  name  of  the  Lord  thy  God  in  vain.”  The  Bryan 
campaign  from  beginning  to  end  has  been  marked  with  such  a 
flood  of  blasphemj',  of  taking  God’s  name  in  vain,  as  this 
country,  at  least,  has  never  known  before.  “Thou  shalt  not 
steal.”  The  very  foundation  of  the  Bryan  platform  is  whole- 
sale theft.  “Thou  shalt  not  bear  false  witness.”  In  what 
day  have  Bryan  and  his  followers  failed  to  utter  lies,  libels 
and  forgeries?  “Thou  shalt  not  covet.”  Why,  almost  every 
appeal  made  by  Bryan,  or  for  him,  has  been  addressed  directly 
to  the  covetousness,  the  envy,  and  all  the  unhallowed  passions 
of  human  nature.  A vote  for  Bryan  is  a vote  for  the  abroga- 
tion of  those  four  Commandments. 

At  the  close  of  the  campaign  The  Nation  sagely  ob- 
served, “Probably  no  man  in  civil  life  has  succeeded 
in  inspiring  so  much  terror,  without  taking  life,  as 
Bryan.  ’ ’ 

The  result  of  the  election  was  decisive.  McKinley 
and  a Eepublican  House  of  Representatives  were 
elected,  and  the  choice  of  a Eepublican  Senate  assured. 
The  successful  candidate  received  seven  million  votes 
— a half  million  more  than  his  competitor.  All  the 
more  densely  populated  states,  together  with  the  large 


374 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


cities — where  the  greatest  accumulations  of  capital  had 
taken  place — were  carried  by  the  Republicans.  Not 
a state  north  of  the  Potomac — Ohio  line  and  east  of 
the  Mississippi  was  Democratic,  and  even  Kentucky, 
by  a narrow  margin,  and  West  Virginia  crowded  their 
way  into  the  Republican  colunm.  On  the  other  hand 
Bryan’s  hold  on  the  South  and  West  was  almost 
equally  strong-.  Never  before  had  any  presidential 
candidate  received  so  great  a vote  and  not  for  twenty 
years  did  a Democratic  candidate  surpass  it.  More- 
over, although  the  Democratic  vote  on  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  was  less  than  that  received  by  Cleveland  in 
1892,  Bryan’s  support  in  the  Middle  West  showed  con- 
siderable gains  over  the  earlier  year,  while  Kansas, 
Nebraska  and  all  the  mining  states  except  California 
were  carried  by  the  silver  cause.  On  the  whole  the 
election  seemed  to  indicate  that  the  voters  of  the  coun- 
try, after  unusual  study  of  the  issues  of  the  campaign, 
clearly  distrusted  the  free-silver  program,  but  that 
class  and  sectional  discontent  had  reached  large  pro- 
portions. 

The  political  results  of  the  election  of  1896  were  im- 
portant. It  definitely  fixed  the  attitude  of  the  Repub- 
lican party  on  the  currency  question;  it  gave  the  party 
control  of  the  executive  chair  and  of  Congress  at  an 
important  time;  and  it  ensured  the  domination  of  the 
proiDertied  classes  and  the  laisses  faire  philosophy  in 
the  party  organization.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Demo- 
cratic party  had  incurred  the  suspicion  and  hostility 
of  the  East,  with  hardly  a compensating  increase  of 
strength  in  the  West;  its  principles  had  become  radical 
for  that  day  and  had  abruptly  changed  from  those  of 
previous  years;  its  membership  included  more  of  the 
discontented  classes  than  before;  and  its  leadership 
had  been  snatched  from  the  hands  of  an  experienced 


376 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


and  conservative  leader  and  placed  in  the  care  of  an 
untried  radical.  It  remained  to  be  seen  whether  the 
victors  would  attempt  to  study  and  meet  the  com- 
plaints of  the  farmer  and  the  wage  earner;  whether 
the  new  Republican  leaders  would  be  able  to  preserve 
the  laissez  faire  attitude  toward  the  railroads  and  the 
corporations ; and  whether  the  forces  of  dissent  repre- 
sented in  Populism  and  radical  Democracy  had  re- 
ceived a death  blow  or  only  a rebuff. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

Peck  contains  one  of  the  most  illuminating  accounts  of  the 
rising  in  the  West,  together  with  the  campaign  of  1896.  H. 
Croly,  Marcus  A.  Hanna  (1912),  is  one  of  the  few  critical 
biographies  of  leaders  who  have  lived  since  the  Civil  War. 
AV.  J.  Bryan,  The  First  Battle  (1897),  is  indispensable;  C.  S. 
Olcott,  'William  McKinley  (2  vols.,  1916),  is  uncritical  and 
eulogistic,  but  makes  important  material  available;  C.  A. 
Beard,  Contemporary  American  History  (1914),  contains  a 
good  chapter;  W.  H.  Harvey,  Coin’s  Financial  School  (1894), 
is  mentioned  in  the  text;  Carl  Becker’s  clever  essay  in  Turner 
Essays  in  American  History  (1910),  throws  light  on  Kansas 
psychology;  S.  J.  Buck,  Agrarian  Crusade  (1920),  is  excel- 
lent. Consult  also  D.  R.  Dewey,  National  Problems  (1907)  ; 
J.  A.  Woodburn,  Political  Parties  and  Party  Problems  (1914)  ; 
Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  X,  269 ; and  F.  E.  Haynes, 
Third  Party  Movements  (1916).  The  files  of  The  Nation,  and 
the  New  York  Tribune  and  Sun  well  portray  eastern  opinion. 
The  references  to  the  rise  of  the  populist  movement  under 
Chap.  XII  are  also  of  service. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


REPUBLICAN  DOMINATION  AND  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

The  ceremonies  attendant  upon  the  inauguration 
of  William  McKinley  on  March  4,  1897,  were 
typical  of  the  care-taking  generalship  of  Mark  Hanna. 
The  details  of  policing  the  crowds  had  been  foreseen 
and  attended  to;  the  usual  military  review  was  effec- 
tively carried  out  to  the  last  particular;  “the  Republi- 
can party  was  coming  back  to  power  as  the  party  of 
organization,  of  discipline,  of  unquestioning  obedience 
to  leadership.”  ^ 

The  political  capacity,  the  characteristics  and  the 
philosophy  of  the  new  President  were  sufficiently  rep- 
resentative of  the  forces  which  were  to  control  Ameri- 
can affairs  for  the  next  few  years  to  make  them  mat- 
ters of  some  interest.  McKinley  was  a traditional 
politician  in  the  better  sense  of  the  word.  As  an  exec- 
utive he  was  patient,  calm,  modest,  wary.  Ordinarily 
he  committed  himself  to  a project  only  after  long  con- 
sideration, and  with  careful  propriety  he  avoided  en- 
tangling political  bargains.  His  engaging  personality, 
his  consummate  tact  and  his  thorough  knowledge  of 
the  temper  and  traditions  of  Congress  enabled  him  to 
lead  that  body,  where  Cleveland  failed  to  drive  it.  As 
a speaker  he  seldom  rose  above  an  ordinary  plane,  but 
he  was  simple  and  sincere.  His  messages  to  Congress 
breathed  an  atmosphere  of  serenity  and  of  deferential 
reliance  upon  the  wise  and  judicious  action  of  the  leg- 
islative branch.  Their  smug  and  genial  tone  formed  a 

1 Cf.  Peck,  518. 


377 


378 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAK 


sharp  contrast  with  his  predecessor’s  anxious  demands 
for  multifarious  reforms;  while  Cleveland  inveighed 
against  narrow  partisanship  and  selfish  aims,  McKin- 
ley benignantly  observed:  “The  public  questions 
which  now  most  engross  us  are  lifted  far  above  either 
partisanship,  prejudice,  or  former  sectional  differ- 
ences.” 

The  political  philosophy  of  McKinley  typified  that  of 
his  party.  The  possibilities  which  he  saw  in  protec- 
tive tariffs,  which  occupied  the  foremost  position 
among  his  principles,  were  well  set  forth  in  his  mes- 
sage to  Congress  on  March  15, 1897.  Additional  duties 
should  be  levied  on  foreign  importation,  he  asserted, 

to  preserve  the  home  market,  so  far  as  possible,  to  our  own 
producers ; to  revive  and  increase  manufactures ; to  relieve 
and  encourage  agriculture;  to  increase  our  domestic  and  for- 
eign commerce ; to  aid  and  develop  mining  and  building ; and 
to  render  to  labor  in  every  field  of  useful  occupation  the  liberal 
wages  and  adequate  rewards  to  which  skill  and  industry  are 
justly  entitled. 

Like  most  American  presidents,  McKinley  was  a peace- 
lover,'  pleasantly  disposed  toward  the  arbitration  of 
international  difficulties  and  prepared  to  welcome  any 
attempt  to  further  that  method  of  preserving  the  peace 
of  the  world.  His  conception  of  the  presidential  office 
differed  somewhat  sharply  at  several  points  from  that 
of  his  predecessor.  Like  Cleveland  he  looked  upon 
himself  as  peculiarly  the  representative  of  the  people, 
but  he  was  far  less  likely  either  to  lead  public  opinion 
or  to  attempt  to  hasten  the  people  to  adopt  a position 
which  he  had  himself  taken.  This  fact  lay  at  the  bot- 
tom of  the  complaints  of  his  critics  that  he  ahvays  had 
his  “ear  to  the  ground”  in  order  that  he  might  be  pre- 
pared to  go  with  the  majority.  On  the  other  hand,  al- 


EEPUBLICAX  DOMINATIOX 


379 


tliougli  lie  was  aware  of  constitutional  limitation  upon 
the  functions  of  the  executive,  he  was  not  so  continually 
hampered  by  the  strict  constructionist  view  of  the 
powers  of  the  federal  government  as  Cleveland  had 
been.  McKinley’s  attitude  toward  Congress  was  far 
more  sagacious  than  Cleveland’s.  He  distributed  the 
usual  patronage  with  skill;  he  approached  Congress- 
men indhudually  with  the  utmost  tact;  he  appointed 
them  to  serve  on  commissions  and  boards  of  arbitra- 
tion, and  later,  when  matters  upon  which  the  commis- 
sions had  been  engaged  came  before  Congress  in  the 
form  of  treaties  or  legislation,  these  men  found  them- 
selves in  a position  to  lead  in  the  adoption  of  the  prin- 
ciples which  the  President  desired.  All  this  indicated 
an  ability  to  “touch  elbows”  with  Congress  that  has 
rarely  been  exceeded.  When  coupled  with  the  organ- 
izing power  of  Hanna,  the  harmonizing  sagacity  of  the 
President  soon  brought  about  a notable  degree  of  party 
solidarity.  As  a political  organization,  the  Republi- 
can party  reached  a climax. 

McKinley  was  hardly  an  idealist,  and  distinctly  not 
a reformer.  Although  sensitive  to  pressure  from  the 
reform  element,  he  was  not  ahead  of  ordinary  public 
opinion  on  matters  of  economic  and  political  better- 
ment. Leaders  in  federal  railroad  regulation  found 
the  President  cold  toward  projects  to  strengthen  the 
Interstate  Commerce  law ; the  Sherman  Anti-trust  Act 
was  scarcely  enforced  at  all  during  McKinley’s  admin- 
istration, and  the  parts  of  his  messages  which  relate 
to  the  regulation  of  industry  are  vague  and  lacking  in 
purpose.  One  searches  these  documents  in  vain  for 
any  indication  that  the  Republican  leader  had  either 
vigorous  sympathy  with  the  economic  and  social  unrest 
which  had  made  the  year  1896  so  momentous  or  even 
any  thorough  understanding  of  it.  Even  if  he  had 


380 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


possessed  both  sympathy  and  understanding,  however, 
it  is  doubtful  whether  he  could  have  made  real  progress 
in  the  direction  of  economic  legislation  and  the  en- 
forcement of  the  acts  regulating  railroads  and  indus- 
try, in  view  of  his  long-continued  and  close  affiliation 
with  business  leaders  of  the  Mark  Hanna  type  and  his 
deep  obligation  to  them  at  the  time  of  his  financial  em- 
barrassments in  1893. 

McKinley’s  cabinet  was  composed  of  men  whose  ad- 
vanced age  and  conservative  characteristics  indicated 
that  his  advisers  would  commend  themselves  to  the 
business  world  and  would  instinctively  avoid  all  those 
radical  proposals  that  were  coming  to  be  known  as 
“Bryanism.”  The  dean  of  the  cabinet  in  age  and  ex- 
perience as  well  as  in  reputation  and  ability  was  John 
Sherman,  who  was  now  almost  seventy-four  years  of 
age  and  had  been  occupying  a position  of  dignity  and 
honor  in  the  Senate.  Two  reasons  have  been  given  for 
his  appointment  to  the  post  of  Secretary  of  State.  In 
the  first  place,  important  diplomatic  affairs  were  on 
hand,  in  the  settlement  of  which  his  long  experience 
as  a member  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Re- 
lations would  be  of  obvious  advantage.  The  second 
reason  was  the  ambition  of  Hanna  to  enter  the  Sen- 
ate. Since  Sherman  and  Hanna  were  both  from  Ohio, 
it  was  possible  to  call  the  former  to  the  cabinet  and 
rely  upon  the  Governor  of  the  state  to  appoint  the  lat- 
ter to  the  Senate.  The  propriety  of  this  course  of  ac- 
tion depended  somewhat  on  the  question  of  Sherman’s 
physical  condition.  Rumor  declared  that  he  was  suf- 
fering from  mental  decay,  due  to  his  age,  but  McKinley 
believed  tlie  rumor  to  be  baseless,  summoned  him  to  the 
cabinet,  and  Hanna  was  subsequently  appointed  to  the 
Senate.  When  Sherman  took  up  the  duties  of  his  of- 
fice it  appeared  that  the  rumor  had  been  all  too  true. 


EEPUBLICAN  DOMINATION 


381 


and  a serious  lapse  of  memory  on  his  part  in  a diplo- 
matic matter  forced  his  immediate  replacement  by  Wil- 
ham  R.  Day.  Somewhat  more  than  a year  later  Day 
retired  and  John  Hay  assumed  the  position.  Many 
critics  have  asserted  that  McKinley  was  aware  of  the 
precise  condition  of  Sherman  and  that  he  made  the 
choice  despite  this  knowledge,  but  it  now  seems  likely 
that  he  was  guilty  only  of  bad  judgment  and  careless- 
ness in  failing  to  inform  himself  about  Sherman’s  in- 
firmities. Another  error  of  judgment  was  made  in  the 
choice  of  Russell  A.  Alger  as  Secretary  of  War.  Al- 
ger failed  to  convince  popular  opinion  that  he  was  an 
effective  officer  and  he  resigned  in  1899.  As  in  the 
case  of  Sherman,  McKinley  then  somewhat  retrieved 
his  mistake  by  appointing  a successor  of  undoubted 
ability,  in  the  person  of  Elihu  Root.^  It  thus  came 
about  that  the  political  and  economic  theories  which 
had  been  characteristic  of  the  leaders  of  both  parties 
during  the  seventies  and  eighties,  but  more  particu- 
larly of  the  Republican  party,  were  again  in  the  ascend- 
ancy. The  President  and  his  cabinet  were  uniformly 
men  who  had  grovm  up  during  the  heyday  of  laisses 
faire,  and  Hanna,  who  would  inevitably  be  regarded  as 
the  mouthpiece  of  the  administration  in  the  Senate,  was 
the  embodiment  of  that  philosophy. 

McKinley’s  experience  with  the  distribution  of  the 
offices  emphasized  the  progress  that  had  been  made 
since  civil  service  reform  had  been  inaugurated.  One 
of  the  steps  which  President  Cleveland  had  taken  dur- 
ing his  last  administration,  it  will  be  remembered,  was 
to  increase  the  number  of  positions  under  control  of 

1 other  members  of  the  cabinet  were : Lyman  J.  Gage,  111.,  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury;  Joseph  ^McKenna,  Calif.,  Attorney -General ; J.  A.  Gary, 
Md.,  Postmaster-General;  J.  D.  Long,  Mass.,  Secretary  of  the  Xa\w; 
C.  X.  Bliss,  Secretary  of  the  Interior;  James  Wilson,  la.,  Secretary  of 
Agricultura. 


382 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


the  Civil  Sendee  Commission.  The  immediate  result, 
of  course,  was  to  increase  the  demand  for  places  in  the 
unclassified  service.  John  Hay  picturesquely  de- 
scribed the  situation  in  the  State  Department  a few 
years  later : 

All  other  branches  of  the  Civil  Service  are  so  rigidly  pro- 
vided for  that  the  foreign  service  is  like  the  topmost  rock 
which  you  sometimes  see  in  old  pictures  of  the  Deluge.  The 
pressure  for  a place  in  it  is  almost  indescribable. 

Both  in  his  inaugural  address  and  in  his  message  to 
Congress  on  December  6,  1897,  McKinley  expressed 
his  approval  of  the  prevailing  system,  hut  suggested 
the  possibility  of  exempting  some  positions  then  in  the 
classified  service.  President  Cleveland  had,  indeed, 
admitted  to  the  Civil  Service  Commission  that  a 
few  modifications  might  be  necessary.  The  Senate 
promptly  ordered  an  investigation  and  discovered 
10,000  places  which  it  believed  could  be  withdrawn, 
but  because  of  other  events  further  action  was  delayed. 
In  1899  the  President  returned  to  the  subject  and 
promulgated  an  order  authorizing  the  withdrawal  of 
certain  positions  from  competitive  examination  and  the 
transfer  of  others  from  the  Commission  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  War — a total  of  somewhat  less  than  5,000 
changes.^  It  appeared,  in  view  of  the  circumstances 
under  which  the  change  had  occurred,  that  a retrograde 
step  had  been  taken,  and  McKinley  received  the  con- 
demnation of  the  reformers. 

The  first  legislation  undertaken  by  the  administra- 
tion was  that  relating  to  the  tariff.  The  election  of 
1896,  to  be  sure,  had  been  fought  out  on  the  silver  is- 
sue, but  it  was  not  deemed  feasible  to  proceed  at  once 

1 The  National  Civil  Service  Reform  League  estimated  the  changes  at 
10,000. 


EEPUBLICAN  DOMINATION 


383 


to  legislation  on  the  subject,  because  of  the  strong  sil- 
ver contingent  within  the  party.  Several  other  con- 
siderations combined  to  draw  attention  away  from  the 
currency  question  and  toward  the  tariff.  The  Wilson- 
Gorman  Act  of  1894  had  been  passed  under  circum- 
stances that  had  caused  the  Democratic  President  him- 
self to  express  his  shame  and  disappointment;  the 
period  of  industrial  depression  following  the  panic  of 
1893  had  been  attributed  so  widely  to  Democratic  tar- 
iff legislation  that  a Eepublican  tariff  act  could  be 
hailed  as  a harbinger  of  prosperity;  and  the  annual 
deficit  which  had  continued  since  1893  indicated  a 
genuine  need  of  greater  revenue,  if  the  current  scale 
of  expenditures  was  to  be  continued.  The  President 
and  the  party  leaders  in  Congress  were  men  who  were 
prominently  identified  with  the  protective  system,  and 
it  was  not  likely  that  the  business  interests  which 
profited  from  protection,  which  believed  in  its  bene- 
ficent operation,  and  which  had  contributed  generously 
to  the  Eepublican  war-chest  would  remain  inactive  in 
the  presence  of  an  opportunity  to  revise  the  tariff. 

Immediately  after  his  succession  to  office,  therefore, 
McKinley  called  a special  session  of  Congress  to  legis- 
late upon  the  chosen  subject.  His  message  urged  an 
increase  in  revenue  to  be  brought  about  by  liigh  im- 
port duties  which,  he  suggested,  should  be  so  levied 
as  to  be  advantageous  to  commerce,  manufacturing, 
agriculture,  mining,  building  and  labor.  The  proj- 
ected bill  was  already  in  hand.  Eepublican  success  in 
the  election  had  insured  the  return  of  Thomas  B.  Eeed 
to  the  speaker’s  chair  and  Nelson  Dingley  to  the  Com- 
mittee on  Ways  and  Means.  The  latter  Avas  as  de- 
A'otod  to  the  high-tariff  cause  as  the  Speaker  and  the 
President,  and  had  laboriously  constructed  a bill  which 
was  distinctly  protective.  The  legislative  history  of 


384 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


the  Tariff  Act  of  1897 — more  commonly  known  as  the 
Dingley  act — was  in  several  respects  much  like  that  of 
similar  measures  of  earlier  years.  Its  passage 
through  the  House  was  expedited  by  the  masterful 
personality  and  vigorous  tactics  of  the  Speaker — a 
process  which  consumed  less  than  a fortnight.  In  the 
Senate,  bargain  and  delay  ruled  procedure;  a few  of 
the  silver  Republicans  held  the  balance  of  power  and 
demanded  a quid  pro  quo  for  their  support;  and  the 
Secretary  of  the  Wool  Manufacturers’  Association 
preserved  a suggestively  close  connection  with  the 
Finance  Committee  which  had  charge  of  the  bill. 
After  amending  the  House  draft  in  872  particulars, 
the  Senate  entrusted  its  interests  to  the  usual  confer- 
ence committee,  and  there,  as  had  happened  before,  the 
rates  were  in  many  cases  raised  above  those  desired  by 
either  the  Senate  or  the  House.  The  bill  became  law 
in  July,  1897. 

The  Dingley  act  added  little  to  the  settlement  of  the 
tariff  problem.  The  ordinary  consumer  was  as  little 
able  as  before  to  present  his  demands  effectively  and 
at  the  time  and  place  at  which  the  rates  were  really 
determined.  The  requirements  of  the  silver  Republi- 
cans were  met  by  the  imposition  of  high  duties  on  wool. 
For  one  reason  or  another,  duties  were  restored  or 
raised  upon  hides,  silks  and  linens,  although  those  on 
cotton  goods  were  slightly  lowered.  The  duty  on  sugar 
was  retained  at  a point  favorable  to  the  trust.  In 
brief,  then,  the  Act  of  1897  was  aggressively  protection- 
ist. An  abortive  section  of  the  act  empowered  the 
President  to  conclude  treaties  providing  for  reduc- 
tions, as  great  as  twenty  per  cent.,  in  return  for  com- 
mercial concessions  from  other  countries.  Such  reci- 
procity arrangements,  however,  must  be  made  within 
two  years  of  the  passage  of  the  law  and  might  not  re- 


EEPUBLICAN  DOMINATION 


385 


main  in  force  more  than  five  years,  and  each  treaty 
must  be  ratified  by  the  Senate.  The  President  was 
favorable  to  reciprocal  adjustments  and  several  were 
arranged  but  were  uniformly  rejected  in  the  Senate. 

Business  was  prosperous  after  the  enactment  of  the 
Dingley  tariff  and  little  agitation  for  a change  was  ob- 
servable for  a decade.  Prosperity,  being  world  wide, 
was  doubtless  not  due  in  its  entirety  to  the  American 
tariff,  yet  the  coincidence  of  protection  and  good  times 
gave  the  Dingley  act  a pleasant  reputation.  For  many 
years  enthusiastic  stump  speakers  placed  the  benefi- 
cence of  Providence  and  the  tariff  of  1897  on  an  equal- 
ity as  causes  of  Americaii  well-being. 

The  President’s  first  message  to  Congress  had  ex- 
tended congratulations  upon  the  fact  that  peace  and 
good  will  with  all  the  nations  of  the  earth  continued 
unbroken.  Nevertheless  it  was  necessary  for  him  to 
devote  much  attention  to  the  relations  between  Spain 
and  its  most  valuable  American  possession — the  island 
of  Cuba. 

American  interest  in  Cuba  was  by  no  means  of  re- 
cent growth.  The  situation  of  the  island — dominat- 
ing the  narrowest  point  of  the  waterw’ay  between  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico — insured  the 
importance  of  Cuba  as  a strategic  position.  The  tra- 
ditional attitude  of  Spain  toward  her  colony  had  been 
one  of  exploitation,  a policy  which  was  sure  to  be 
looked  upon  with  suspicion  by  a nation  which  had  itself 
revolted  from  oppression.  Eiots  and  rebellions  in  the 
island,  having  their  origin  in  Spain’s  colonial  policy, 
had  long  engaged  American  sympathy  and  attention. 
American  statesmen — Jefferson,  John  Quincy  Adams, 
Clay  and  Webster — had  pondered  upon  the  wisest  and 
most  advantageous  disposition  of  Cuba.  In  1859  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Eelations  had  even  con- 


386 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


eluded  that  “The  ultimate  acquisition  of  Cuba  may  be 
considered  a fixed  purpose  of  the  United  States.” 
From  1868  to  1878  the  “Ten  Years’  War”  between 
Cuba  and  Spain  had  raised  American  feeling  to  a high 
pitch.  The  struggle  was  characterized  by  a barbarity 
that  rivalled  mediaeval  warfare ; islanders  who  escaped 
to  the  United  States  sent  ships  to  Cuba  laden  with 
arms  and  men;  American  trade  rights  were  interfered 
with  and  American  citizens  seized  by  the  Spaniards  and 
shot;  the  Virginius  was  captured — a ship  carrying  the 
American  flag — and  many  of  her  crew  were  executed. 
Indignation  meetings  were  held,  the  navy  was  put  in 
order  and  war  was  in  sight.  Cautious  diplomatic  ne- 
gotiations delayed  hostilities,  however,  and  subse- 
quently exhaustion  caused  the  restoration  of  peace  be- 
tween Spain  and  her  distracted  colony. 

With  the  recurrence  of  insurrection  in  1895,  interest 
in  the  United  States  was  renewed,  and  this  time  cir- 
cumstances combined  to  bring  about  a climax  in  Ameri- 
can relations  with  Spain.  On  both  sides  the  contest 
between  Spain  and  her  colony  was  carried  on  with  un- 
utterable cruelty.  The  island  leader,  Maximo  Gomez, 
conducted  guerrilla  warfare,  devastating  the  country, 
destroying  plantation  buildings  and  forcing  laborers 
to  cease  work,  in  order  to  exhaust  the  enemy  or  to 
bring  about  American  intervention.  Spanish  proced- 
ure was  even  more  barbaric.  A “reconcentration”  or- 
der, promulgated  by  Valeriano  Weyler,  Governor-gen- 
eral of  the  island  and  General-in-chief  of  the  army, 
compelled  the  rural  population  to  herd  together  in  the 
garrisoned  towns.  Their  buildings  were  then  burned 
and  their  cattle  driven  away  or  killed;  hygienic  pre- 
cautions were  disregarded  and  the  people  themselves 
were  insufficiently  clothed  and  fed.  The  extermination 


REPUBLICAN  DOMINATION  387 

of  the  inhabitants  proceeded  so  rapidly  as  to  promise 
complete  devastation  in  a short  time. 

President  Cleveland  had  been  deeply  affected  by  the 
Cuban  situation.  His  last  animal  message  to  Congress 
had  noted  the  $30,000,000  to  $50,000,000  of  American 
capital  invested  in  the  island,  the  volume  of  trade 
amounting  yearly  to  $100,000,000,  the  use  of  American 
soil  by  Cubans  and  Cuban  sympathizers  for  raising 
funds  and  purchasing  equipment,  and  the  stream  of 
claims  for  damages  done  to  American  property  in 
Cuba.  In  spite  of  his  well-known  disinclination  to 
share  in  the  internal  affairs  of  other  peoples,  he  had 
voiced  a suggestive  warning  that  American  patience 
could  not  be  maintained  indefinitely. 

The  succession  of  McKinley  seemed  likely  to  result 
in  a change  in  the  attitude  of  America  toward  the 
Cuban  problem.  He  was  more  responsive  to  public 
opinion  than  his  predecessor  had  been,  public  opinion 
was  more  and  more  coming  to  favor  intervention,  and 
his  party  had  committed  itself  in  its  platform  to  Cuban 
independence  through  American  action.  Moreover, 
two  events  early  in  1898  greatly  irritated  the  United 
States. 

On  February  9 a New  York  newspaper  published  a 
letter  written  by  Senor  Enrique  Dupuy  de  Lome,  Span- 
ish minister  to  the  United  States,  to  a personal  friend 
in  Havana.  It  referred  to  President  McKinley  as  a 
“would-be  politician  who  tries  to  leave  a door  open 
behind  himself  while  keeping  on  good  terms  with  the 
jingoes  of  his  party.”  It  further  revealed  the  inten- 
tion of  the  Minister  to  carry  on  a propaganda  among 
senators  in  the  interest  of  a commercial  treaty.  On 
all  sides  it  was  seen  that  the  usefulness  of  Seiior  de 
Lome  was  at  an  end  and  his  government  immediately 


388 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


recalled  him.  On  February  15  the  whole  world  was 
shocked  by  the  destruction  of  the  United  States  bat- 
tleship Maine  in  Havana  harbor,  with  the  loss  of  260 
officers  and  men.  News  of  the  disaster  was  accom- 
panied by  the  appeal  of  Captain  Sigsby,  commander  of 
the  vessel,  that  popular  judgment  of  the  causes  of  the 
disaster  be  suspended  until  a court  of  inquiry  could 
investigate  and  report.  Nevertheless  on  March  9, 
Congress  placed  $50,000,000  at  the  President’s  dis- 
posal for  the  purposes  of  national  defence  and  the  navy 
prepared  for  a conflict  that  seemed  inevitable.  Botli 
the  Spanish  and  American  authorities  conducted  ex- 
aminations. The  American  court  reported  that  the 
ship  had  been  destroyed  by  the  explosion  of  a sub- 
marine mine,  which  had  caused  the  partial  explosion 
of  two  or  more  of  her  magazines.  No  evidence  could 
be  found  which  would  fix  the  responsibility  on  any  in- 
dividual. The  Spanish  court  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  catastrophe  was  due  solely  to  an  explosion  of 
the  ship’s  magazines.  American  opinion  naturally 
supported  the  findings  of  the  American  court,  and  feel- 
ing ran  high;  newspapers  demanded  war;  “Eemember 
the  Maine”  summarized  much  of  popular  discussion.^ 

Under  such  circumstances,  diplomatic  negotiations 
looking  toward  peace  were  difficult,  and  resulted  only 
in  disagreements  and  delay.  Accordingly  on  April  11 
the  President  laid  before  Congress  a succinct  account 
of  Cuban  affairs  and  earnestly  called  for  forcible  in- 
tervention. The  grounds  for  this  action  he  found  in 
“^the  sufferings  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  the  injuries  to 
Americans  and  to  American  property  and  trade,  and 
the  menace  to  American  peace  which  was  entailed  by 

1 In  1911  the  wreck  of  the  Maine  was  raised  and  examined.  The 
evidence  found  was  such  as  to  substantiate  the  findings  of  the  American 
court  of  inquiry.  Scientific  American,  January  27,  1912. 


REPUBLICAN  DOMINATION 


389 


coutiimous  conflict  at  our  very  threshold^  The  trans- 
fer of  the  Cuban  question  from  the  hands  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  those  of  Congress  was  equivalent  to  a decision 
in  favor  of  war.  On  April  19  the  Senate  and  House 
resolved  that  the  people  of  Cuba  were  and  ought  to 
be  independent,  demanded  that  Spain  withdraw  from 
the  island  and  directed  the  President  to  use  the  force 
of  the  nation  to  achieve  the  results  desired.  The  ap- 
proval of  the  Executive  on  the  following  day  com- 
pleted the  severance  of  peaceful  relations  with  Spain. 
At  daylight  on  April  22  Admiral  Sampson  and  his 
fleet  were  crossing  the  narrows  between  Florida  and 
Cuba,  on  the  way  to  establish  a blockade  of  the  greater 
part  of  the  island.  Within  three  days  more.  Commo- 
dore George  Dewey,  who  was  in  command  of  a fleet 
at  Hong-Kong,  had  been  instructed  to  proceed  at  once 
to  the  Philippine  Islands  and  capture  or  destroy  the 
Spanish  fleet  there.  On  April  25  Congress  formally 
declared  war  upon  the  kingdom  of  Spain. 

It  was  not  by  mere  chance,  of  course,  that  Admiral 
Sampson  and  Commodore  Dewey  were  prei3ared  to 
act  with  such  celerity.  Authorities  in  the  Navy  De- 
partment had  long  felt  that  a collision  with  Spain  was 
inevitable  and  had  been  preparing  for  such  an  event- 
uality. With  as  little  publicity  as  possible  the  Depart- 
ment completed  and  commissioned  ships  that  were  al- 
ready under  construction;  it  hastened  the  repair  of 
vessels  which  were  in  any  way  defective;  it  ordered 
target  practice  and  fleet  manoeuvres;  and  it  prepared 

1 It  has  commonly  been  felt  among  certain  classes  in  the  United 
States  since  1898  that  the  business  interests  whose  property  and  trade 
were  mentioned  by  President  McKinley  had  an  undue  share  in  bringing 
about  the  declaration  of  war.  While  it  can  not  be  doubted  that  the 
President  was  swayed  more  by  business  interests  than  most  of  our 
executives  since  the  Civil  War  have  been,  yet  it  is  also  true  that  the 
sufferings  of  the  Cubans  aroused  genuine  sympathy  in  the  United  States. 
The  President  himself  was  anxious  to  delay  war  as  long  as  possible. 


390 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


plans  for  the  conduct  of  a naval  war.  Commanders 
of  squadrons  were  instructed  to  keep  in  service  men 
whose  terms  of  enlistment  were  about  to  expire;  sup- 
plies of  ammunition  Avere  procured  and  shipped  to 
points  Avhere  they  would  be  needed;  the  Oregon,  which 
had  been  stationed  on  the  Pacific  coast,  wgis  ordered 
to  return  to  Key  West  by  way  of  the  Straits  of  Magel- 
lan and  so  began  a voyage  whose  closing  days  were 
watched  Avith  interest  by  a Avhole  nation.  A Northern 
Patrol  Squadron  AAms  organized  to  guard  NeAV  Eng- 
land; a Flying  Squadron  AAms  assembled  at  Hampton 
Eoads  for  service  on  the  Atlantic  coast  or  abroad;  and 
a formidable  array  gathered  at  Key  West  under  Eear- 
Admiral  Sampson  for  duty  in  the  West  Indies.  For- 
eign shipyards  Avere  scoured  for  vessels  in  process  of 
building  and  several  Avere  purchased,  completed  and 
renamed  for  American  service.  Greater  additions 
AA^ere  made  through  the  purchase  of  merchantmen  and 
their  transformation  into  auxiliary  cruisers,  gunboats 
and  colliers.  In  these  Avays  the  attempt  Avas  made, 
Avith  some  success,  to  improvise  a navy  on  the  eve  of 
Avar. 

The  people  of  the  country  had  scarcely  become  ac- 
customed to  the  thought  that  Avar  Avith  Spain  had  ac- 
tually come  to  pass  Avhen  Avord  was  received  in  Wash- 
ington of  the  exploit  of  Commodore  DcAvey  in  the 
Philippine  Islands.  Attention  for  the  moment  Avas  fo- 
cussed on  the  Far  East,  and  the  press  dilated  upon  the 
first  test  of  the  neAV  American  Navy. 

The  story  of  the  test  proAmd  to  have  points  of  in- 
terest and  importance.  When  Commodore  DeAvey  re- 
ceded the  orders  already  mentioned,  on  April  25,  he 
finished  immediately  the  preparations  for  conflict 
AAdiich  had  been  initiated  and  turned  his  flagship,  the 
Olympia,  in  the  direction  of  Manila.  His  available 


REPUBLICAN  DOMINATION 


391 


force  consisted  of  four  protected  cruisers,  two  gun- 
boats, a revenue  cutter,  a collier  and  a supply  ship. 
The  city  of  Manila  is  on  Manila  Bay,  a body  of  water 
twenty  miles  or  more  wide,  and  is  reached  only  through 
a narrow  entrance.  Dewey 
judged  that  the  channel  was 
too  deep  to  be  mined  success- 
fully except  by  trained  ex- 
perts and  that  both  contact 
and  electrical  mines  would  de- 
teriorate so  rapidly  in  tropi- 
cal waters  as  to  be  effective 
only  for  a short  time.  He 
therefore  decided  to  steam 
through  the  channel  at  night, 
disregarding  the  mines,  and 
to  attack  the  Spanish  fleet 
which  lay  mthin.  The  plans 
worked  out  even  better  than 
he  had  hoped.  With  all  lights 
masked  and  the  crews  at  the 
guns,  the  squadron  moved  silently  through  the  pas- 
sage with  no  other  opposition  than  three  shots  from 
a Angle  battery.  Once  within  the  Bay  Dewey  steamed 
slowly  toward  the  city  of  Manila  and  then  back  to  a 
fortified  point,  CavitA  where  he  found  his  quarry 
arranged  in  an  irregular  crescent  and  awaiting  the 
conflict.  Oblivious  of  the  hasty  and  inaccurate  fire 
from  the  batteries  on  shore,  he  deliberately  moved  to 
a position  within  two  and  a half  miles  of  the  Spamsh 
ships  and  said  to  the  Captain  of  the  Olympia,  “You 
may  fire  when  you  are  ready,  Gridley.” 

Three  times  westward  and  twice  eastward  the 
American  squadron  ran  slowly  back  and  forth,  using 
the  port  and  starboard  batteries  in  turn,  and  in  a 


The  Philippines. 


392 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


short  time  the  shore  batteries  and  the  Spanish  fleet 
were  masses  of  ruins.  Of  the  American  forces,  only 
eight  were  injured,  and  they  only  slightly,  while  167 
of  the  Spanish  were  killed  and  214  wounded.  News  of 
the  victory  was  as  unexpected  as  it  was  welcome  in  the 
United  States.  President  McKinley  appointed  Dewey 
an  acting  Rear-Admiral  and  on  all  sides  discussion  be- 
gan of  the  situation  and  possibilities  of  the  Philippines. 

In  the  meantime,  the  position  of  the  American 
squadron  was  far  from  secure.  To  be  sure,  all  re- 
sistance from  the  batteries  in  and  around  Manila  was 
quickly  suppressed  by  a threat  to  destroy  the  city;  nev- 
ertheless Admiral  Dewey  was  in  command  of  too  slight 
a force  to  enable  him  to  occupy  both  the  town  and  its 
environs.  He  accordingly  notified  Washington  that 
more  troops  were  necessary  if  it  were  intended  to  seize 
and  retain  Manila,  and  expeditionary  forces  were  des- 
patched, the  first  of  which  arrived  on  June  30.  Indeed 
it  was  high  time  that  assistance  be  forthcoming,  for 
new  possibilities  of  conflict  had  appeared  in  the  pres- 
ence of  a ijowerful  force  of  German  warships. 

As  soon  as  the  defeat  of  the  Spanish  squadron  had 
been  effected.  Admiral  Dewey  established  a blockade 
of  Manila  Bay  and,  according  to  custom,  the  war  ves- 
sels of  interested  nations  went  thither  to  observe  the 
effectiveness  of  the  blockade  and  to  care  for  the  well- 
being of  their  nationals.  Among  the  early  arrivals 
were  the  British,  the  French  and  the  Japanese,  all  of 
whom  observed  the  formalities  of  the  situation  and  re- 
ported to  the  American  Admiral  before  venturing  into 
the  harbor.  The  Germans,  however,  omitted  the  pro- 
prieties until  sharply  reminded  by  a shot  across  the 
bow  of  the  Cormoran.  By  mid-June  five  German  men- 
of-war  under  command  of  Vice  Admiral  von  Diedrichs 
were  in  the  Bay — a force  nearly  if  not  quite  the  match 


REPUBLICAN  DOMINATION 


393 


of  the  American  squadron.  'When  the  Germans  con- 
tinued their  disregard  of  the  regulations  controlling 
the  blockade,  indicating  a potential  if  not  an  actual  hos- 
tility, it  became  necessary  for  Admiral  Dewey  to  have 
done  with  the  Teutonic  peril  at  once.  He  sent  a ver- 
bal message  to  von  Diedrichs  which  effectually  ended 
all  controversy.  Admiral  Dewey  has  not  disclosed  the 
exact  phraseology  of  the  message,  nor  did  he  send  a 
record  of  it  to  the  Navy  Department.  A newspaper 
correspondent  who  was  acting  as  one  of  the  Admiral’s 
aides  asserted  that  the  protest  was  against  von  Died- 
rich’s  disregard  of  the  usual  courtesies  of  naval  inter- 
course and  that  it  closed  with  the  words,  “if  he  wants 
a fight  he  can  have  it  right  now.”  The  disclosure  by 
Captain  Edward  Chichester,  in  command  of  the  Eng- 
lish force,  that  he  had  orders  to  comply  with  Admiral 
Dewey’s  restrictions  and  that  his  sympathies  were  with 
the  Americans,  together  with  the  arrival  of  the  expedi- 
tionary force,  assured  American  supremacy  and  a 
peaceful  blockade.  On  August  13  a joint  movement 
of  the  naval  forces  and  the  infantry  under  General 
"Wesley  Merritt  resulted  in  the  speedy  surrender  of  the 
city  of  ^lanila.  The  Americans  were  now  in  control  of 
the  capital  of  the  Philippine  Islands  and  would,  per- 
force, face  the  question  of  the  ultimate  disposition  of 
the  archipelago  in  case  of  the  eventual  defeat  of  Spain. 
In  the  meanwhile,  popular  attention  turned  toward 
stirring  events  which  were  taking  place  in  the  Carib- 
bean Sea. 

On  April  28 — a week  after  Admiral  Sampson  started 
for  Cuba — the  Spanish  Admiral  Cervera  left  the  Cape 
Verde  Islands.  His  force  was  a considerable  one;  his 
goal  was  unknown,  although  naturally  believed  to  be 
some  point  in  the  Spanish  "West  Indies.  On  the  as- 
sumption that  this  hypothesis  was  a correct  one.  Samp- 


^94 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


son  patrolled  the  northern  coast  of  Cuba,  extending  his 
movement  as  far  as  Porto  Rico,  and  scouts  were  placed 
out  beyond  Guadeloupe  and  Martinique.  The  entire 
nation  anxiously  awaited  the  outcome  of  the  impending 
encounter. 

On  May  19  Cervera  slipped  into  Santiago,  a town  on 
the  eastern  end  of  Cuba  which  had  rail  connection  with 


Havana,  the  capital  of  the  island.  Commodore  W.  S. 
Schley  who  was  in  command  of  a squadron  on  the 
southern  coast  soon  received  information  of  the 
enemy’s  whereabouts  and  established  a blockade  of  the 
city,  while  Sampson  hastened  to  the  scene  and  assumed 
command  of  operations.  The  American  force  now  in- 
cluded four  first-class  battleships,  one  second-class  bat- 
tleship and  two  cruisers.  They  were  arranged  in  semi- 
circular formation  facing  the  harbor,  and  at  night 
poweilnl  search-lights  were  kept  directed  upon  the 
channel  which  Admiral  Cervera  must  take  in  case  of 


EEPUBLICAN  DOMINATION 


395 


an  attempt  to  escape.  The  main  part  of  Santiago  Bay 
is  between  four  and  five  miles  long  and  is  reached 
through  a narrow  entrance  channel.  Elevated  posi- 
tions at  the  mouth  of  the  channel  rendered  the  vigor- 
ous defence  of  the  harbor  a matter  of  some  ease. 
Early  in  the  progress  of  the  blockade  the  Americans 
attempted  to  sink  a collier  across  the  entrance,  but 
fortunately,  as  it  turned  out,  this  daring  project  failed, 
and  Admiral  Sampson  settled  down  to  await  develop- 
ments. 

It  was  apparent  that  the  capture  of  Santiago,  and 
the  destruction  of  the  fleet  could  be  brought  about  only 
through  a joint  movement  of  the  army  and  navy. 
Hitherto  the  war  had  been  entirely  on  the  sea.  Never- 
theless over  200,000  volunteers  had  been  called  for,  in 
addition  to  somewhat  over  50,000  regular  troops  and 
the  “Bough  Riders” — the  last  a regiment  of  volunteer 
cavalry  which  had  been  raised  by  Colonel  Leonard 
Wood  and  Theodore  Roosevelt  and  which  was  largely 
composed  of  cowboys,  ranchmen,  Indians  and  athletes 
from  eastern  colleges.  The  regulars,  together  with  a 
few  volunteers  and  the  Rough  Riders,  were  sent  to 
Tampa,  Florida,  while  most  of  the  volunteers  were 
trained  at  Chicamauga  Park,  in  Georgia.  It  had  been 
expected  that  the  important  military  operations  would 
take  place  around  Havana  and  for  that  reason  the 
officer  commanding  the  army.  General  Nelson  A.  Miles, 
with  most  of  the  regular  troops,  were  retained  for  the 
larger  service.  The  command  of  the  expedition  to 
Santiago  fell  to  General  William  R.  Shatter.  Sixteen 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty-seven  officers  and 
men  set  sail  from  Tampa  on  June  14  and  began  to 
disembark  eight  days  later  at  Daiquiri,  sixteen  miles 
to  the  east  of  Santiago. 

Advancing  "from  this  point  General  Lawton,  com- 


396 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


manding’  a division  of  infantry,  moved  parallel  to  the 
shore  and  seized  Siboney.  General  Wheeler,  a former 
Confederate  who  was  now  in  command  of  the  cavalry, 
met  and  defeated  a Spanish  force  at  Las  Guasimas. 
Further  advance  met  difficulties  that  were  more 
serious.  On  the  left  of  the  American  line  was  San 
Juan  Hill,  an  eminence  which  commanded  the  coun- 


try toward  the  east ; on  the  right  was  El  Caney,  a forti- 
fied village  held  by  a small  force  of  Spaniards.  The 
country  between  the  two  points  was  a jungle,  the  roads 
hardly  better  than  trails,  where  troops  frequently  had 
to  go  in  single  file.  The  fight  at  El  Caney  was  severe, 
the  enemy  being  well-entrenched,  well-armed  and  pro- 
tected by  wire  entanglements  and  block  houses,  and 
General  Lawton  suffered  a loss  of  more  than  400  killed 
and  wounded  before  driving  the  Spaniards  out  of  their 
position.  San  Juan  Hill  was  still  more  stubbornly 
defended,  and  an  American  advance  was  impeded  by 
the  heat,  the  tropical  growth  and  the  uneven  character 
of  the  country.  Under  these  circumstances  officers  be- 
came sei^arated  from  their  men  and  victoiy  was  gained 


KEPUBLICAN  DOMINATION 


397 


through  the  deteriniiiation  and  resourcefulness  of  the 
individual.  The  Spaniards  then  fell  back  upon  San- 
tiago. 

The  continued  success  of  the  Americans  compelled 
the  Spanish  authorities  to  make  an  immediate  decision 
in  regard  to  the  fleet.  To  remain  in  the  harbor  seemed 
to  mean  being  encircled  and  starved ; to  go  out  through 
the  narrow  channel  seemed  to  lead  to  sure  destruction. 
Yet  the  latter  venture  appealed  to  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  Cuba,  Captain-General  Blanco,  as  the  more 
honorable  one  and  on  July  2 orders  were  sent  to  Ad- 
miral Cervera  to  make  the  attempt.  Early  next  morn- 
ing, while  Admiral  Sampson  was  away  at  a conference 
with  General  Shatter,  lookouts  on  the  American  battle- 
ships descried  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa  feeling  her 
Avay  out  of  the  harbor,  followed  by  the  remainder  of 
the  Spanish  fleet,  three  armored  cruisers  and  two  tor- 
pedo-boat destroyers.  The  Americans  instantly  closed 
in,  directing  their  fire  first  against  the  Teresa  and  later 
against  the  rest  of  the  fieet  as  they  tried  to  follow  their 
leader  out  to  safety.  Once  out  of  the  harbor  the  entire 
Spanish  fleet  dashed  headlong  toward  the  west,  parallel 
to  the  coast,  while  the  Americans  kept  pace,  pouring  a 
gruelling  fire  from  every  available  gun.  The  Span- 
iards returned  the  fire  and  thus  “the  action  resolved 
itself  into  a series  of  magnificent  duels  between  power- 
ful ironclads.”  One  by  one  the  enemy’s  vessels  were 
sunk  or  forced  to  run  ashore — the  Cristobal  Colon  last, 
at  two  o’clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  Spanish  losses, 
besides  the  fieet,  were  323  killed  and  151  wounded ; the 
Americans  lost  one  killed  and  one  wounded.  The  city 
of  Santiago,  deprived  of  its  fleet,  found  itself  in  a des- 
perate plight  and  surrendered  on  July  16.  Shortly 
afterwards  General  Miles  led  an  expedition  into  Porto 
Pico,  but  operations  were  soon  brought  to  a close  be- 


398 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


cause  of  the  suspension  of  hostilities,  and  from  a mili- 
tary point  of  view  the  importance  of  the  campaign  was 
negligible. 

The  succession  of  overwhelming  defeats  drove  home 
to  Spain  the  futility  of  further  conflict.  The  despatch 
of  American  troops  to  the  Philippines  and  to  Porto 
Rico,  moreover,  indicated  that  Spain  would  soon  suffer 
other  losses.  Hence  the  Spanish  government,  acting 
through  Jules  Cambon,  the  French  ambassador  to  the 
United  States,'  sought  terms  for  the  settlement  of  the 
war.  The  President’s  reply  of  July  30  made  the  fol- 
lowing stipulations : Spain  to  relinquish  and  evacuate 
Cuba  and  to  cede  Porto  Rico  and  one  of  the  Ladrone 
Islands;  the  United  States  to  occupy  the  city  and  bay 
of  Manila,  pending  the  conclusion  of  peace  and  the  de- 
termination of  the  final  disposition  of  the  Philippines. 
Spain  wished  to  restrict  negotiations  to  the  Cuban 
question,  but  was  forced  to  accept  the  conditions  laid 
dovm  by  the  victor.  A preliminary  agreement  or  pro- 
tocol was  therefore  signed,  which  provided  for  a con- 
ference at  Paris  concerning  peace  terms. 

The  uniform  success  of  the  American  arms  could 
not  obscure  the  popular  belief  that  the  Department  of 
War  had  been  guilty  of  many  shortcomings.  It  will 
doubtless  be  always  a subject  for  dispute  as  to  whether 
the  major  portion  of  the  blame  is  to  be  laid  at  the  door 
of  the  traditional  American  disinclination  to  be  pre- 
pared for  warfare,  or  upon  Secretary  Alger  and  his 
immediate  advisors.  That  the  conduct  of  the  military 
affairs  was  inexpert,  however,  is  admitted  on  all  sides. 
The  facilities  for  taking  care  of  the  troops  at  Tampa 
were  inadequate.  When  transports  reached  Tampa  to 
take  the  troops  to  Santiago,  officers  wildly  scrambled 
to  get  their  men  on  board.  The  Rough  Riders,  for  ex- 
ample, made  their  way  into  a transport  intended  for 


REPUBLICAN  DOMINATION 


399 


two  other  regiments,  one  of  regulars  and  the  other  of 
volunteers,  with  the  result  that  the  volunteers  and 
half  of  the  regulars  were  left  on  shore.  The  clothing 
supplied  for  the  Cuban  campaign  was  better  suited  to 
a cold  climate  than  to  summer  in  the  tropics.  The 
health  of  the  troops  during  the  Santiago  campaign  was 
such  that  the  general  officers  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  army  must  immediately  be  removed  from  Cuba 
or  suffer  severe  and  unnecessary  losses  from  malarial 
fever.  AYhen  the  men  were  removed,  however,  they 
were  taken  to  Montauk  Point  on  Long  Island,  where 
the  climate  was  too  cool  and  bracing.  Unsanitary  con- 
ditions in  the  training  camps  within  the  borders  of 
the  United  States  were  the  cause  of  fatalities  esti- 
mated at  several  times  the  number  killed  in  battle.  A 
controversy  over  the  quality  of  the  beef  supplied  to 
the  troops  led  to  an  executive  commission  of  investiga- 
tion. Both  unnecessary  and  unfortunate  was  the 
Sampson-Schley  controversy,  which  originated  in  a dif- 
ference of  opinion  about  the  proportion  of  credit  which 
each  of  these  officers  should  have  for  the  success  of 
Santiago  and  which  was  continued  in  charges  that  the 
latter  had  made  serious  mistakes  in  the  conduct  of 
his  share  of  the  operations.  Subsequently  a Court  of 
Inquiry  investigated  the  accusations  and  made  a de- 
cision which  did  not  completely  satisfy  either  side. 

Despite  these  minor  mistakes,  however,  the  war  in- 
creased the  strength  of  the  administration.  The  most 
lasting  effects  of  the  conflict  on  constitutional  and  po- 
litical history  demand  detailed  discussion  at  a later 
point,  but  the  immediate  results  can  be  briefly  stated.^ 
The  successful  prosecution  of  a popular  war,  combined 
with  widespread  prosperity  and  the  demoralization 
of  the  opposition  party  greatly  heightened  the  pres^ 

1 Below,  Chap.  XVIII. 


400 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


tige  of  the  Republicans.  McKinley  appeared  to  have 
been  in  truth,  the  “advance  agent  of  prosperity”;  and 
his  party  obtained  a dominating  control  of  public 
policy. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

H.  Croly,  Marcus  A.  Hanna  (1912),  and  C.  S.  Olcott, 
William  McKinley  (2  vols.,  1916),  discuss  the  politics  of  the 
period,  subject  to  the  limitations  already  mentioned.  W.  D. 
Fonlke,  Fighting  the  Spoilsman  (1919),  describes  the  rela- 
tion of  the  administration  to  the  civil  service;  for  the  Diugley 
tariff,  Stanwood,  Tarbell  and  Taussig. 

The  literature  on  the  Spanish  war  is  extensive.  i\Iost  de- 
tailed and  reliable  is  F.  E.  Chadwick,  Relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Spain;  I,  Diplomacy,  II,  III,  The  Spanish  War 
(1909,  1911).  J.  H.  Latane,  America  as  a World  Powef 
(1907),  has  several  good  chapters;  H.  E.  Flack,  Spanish 
American  Diplomatic  Relations  Preceding  the  War  of  1898 
(1906),  and  E.  J.  Benton,  International  Law  and  Diplomacy 
of  the  Spanish- American  War  (1908),  take  up  the  diplomatic 
side.  On  naval  preparations,  J.  D.  Long,  Nexv  American 
Navy  (2  vols.,  1903),  is  by  McKinley’s  Secretary  of  the  Navy; 
see  also  E.  S.  Maclay,  History  of  the  United  States  Navy  (rev. 
ed.,  3 vols.,  1901-1902).  Good  autobiographical  accounts  are: 
C.  E.  Clark,  My  Fifty  Years  in  the  Navy  (1917);  George 
Dewey,  Autobiography  (1913)  ; Theodore  Roosevelt,  Autobi- 
ography; andAV.  S.  Schley,  Forty-five  Years  under  the  Flag 
(1914).  See  also  A.  T.  Mahan,  Lessons  of  the  War  with 
Spain  (1899). 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


IMPERIALISM 


HE  guns  of  Admiral  Dewey  did  something  more 


than  destroy  a Spanish  fleet  in  the  harbor  of 


j\Ianila.  Their  echo  came  back  to  us  in  a question  new 
in  the  history  of  our  government.”  The  new  problem 
was  Imperialism — was  it  wise  policy  and  was  it  con- 
stitutional to  annex  and  govern  territories  outside  the 
limits  of  continental  North  America?  In  colonial 
problems  the  United  States  had  had  no  experience; 
and  if  the  Philippines,  Cuba  or  Porto  Rico  were  an- 
nexed, it  would  be  necessary  to  administer  the  affairs 
of  peoples  whose  languages,  racial  characteristics  and 
forms  of  government  were  utterly  strange.  Such  ob- 
jections arose  in  the  minds  of  many  Americans  as  the 
conference  assembled  at  Paris  on  October  1 to  settle 
the  terms  of  peace.^ 

The  chief  controversies  between  the  Spanish  and 
the  American  negotiators  related  to  Cuba  and  the 
Philippines.  The  Spanish  commissioners  early  pro- 
posed to  transfer  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  the  latter 
to  turn  it  over  to  the  Cuban  people  in  due  time.  Witli 
the  sovereignty  of  Cuba  was  to  go  the  debt  of  the 

1 The  American  commissioners  were  W.  R.  Day,  Secretary  of  State; 
Whitelaw  Reid,  editor  of  tlie  New  York  Tribune;  and  Senators  C.  K. 
Davis,  \V.  P.  Frye  and  George  Gray.  Senator  Hoar  remonstrated  with 
McKinley  for  placing  senators  on  such  commissions  as  this,  on  the 
ground  that  the  independence  of  the  Senate  was  thereby  lessened  when 
the  question  of  ratifying  the  treaty  came  before  that  body.  He  de- 
clared that  McKinley  admitted  that  the  practice  was  wrong.  Cf. 
A^utobiography , II,  46-5 J. 


40< 


402 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


island.  On  the  refusal  of  the  Americans  to  accede  to 
this,  the  Spanish  commissioners  urged  the  transfer  of 
Cuba  to  the  United  States  without  any  promise  as  to 
its  future.  Instructions  from  Washington  both  on 
possession  and  on  debt,  however,  were  explicit  and  in 
the  end  Spain  had  to  relinquish  all  claim  to  Cuba 
and  assume  responsibility  for  its  indebtedness.  The 
proper  disposition  of  the  Philippines  presented  far 
greater  difficulty.  Not  only  was  there  a difference  of 
opinion  between  the  two  groups  of  commissioners,  but 
the  American  government  was  in  doubt  about  the 
wisest  course  to  pursue,  ajid  grave  diversity  of  opinion 
existed  among  the  people  and  in  the  peace  commission 
itself.  Moreover  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Manila 
had  taken  place  after  the  protocol  had  been  signed  and 
after  hostilities  had  been  ordered  suspended,  but  be- 
fore news  of  these  facts  had  reached  Admiral  Dewey. 
The  original  instructions  of  President  McKinley  to  the 
peace  commissioners  were  to  the  effect  that  the  out- 
come of  the  war  had  placed  new  duties  and  responsi- 
bilities on  the  United  States,  that  the  commercial  op- 
portunity which  possession  of  the  Philippines  would 
present  could  not  be  overlooked  and  that  the  island  of 
Luzon  at  least  must  be  ceded.  So  little  was  known 
about  the  people  and  the  possibilities  of  the  islands 
that  the  American  commission  was  compelled  to  go  far 
afield  to  obtain  information  from  writers  and  investi- 
gators in  regard  to  questions  of  defence,  the  political 
capacity  of  the  inhabitants,  the  danger  that  another  na- 
tion might  step  in  if  the  United  States  should  evacuate, 
commercial  prospects,  and  so  on.  President  McKinley 
soon  came  to  the  opinion  that  the  proper  course  was  to 
take  the  entire  archipelago.  To  give  them  back  to 
Spain  seemed  “dishonorable”;  to  turn  them  over  to 
our  commercial  rivals,  France  or  Germany,  seemed 


IMPERIALISM 


403 


“bad  business”;  to  leave  them  to  themselves  would  be 
to  leave  them  to  “anarchy  and  misrule”;  hence  there 
was  nothing  to  do  but  to  take  all  of  them  and  attempt 
to  spread  American  chdlization  among  the  Filipino 
people.  The  American  commissioners  therefore  de- 
manded the  Philippines,  but  realizing  the  defect  in 
their  case,  since  the  conquest  of  Manila  had  taken  place 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  protocol,  agreed  to  pay 
Spain  $20,000,000.  The  Spanish  commissioners  there- 
upon yielded  to  necessity  and  reluctantly  agreed. 

As  finally  signed,  the  treaty  of  December  10,  1898, 
contained  the  following  points : Spain  agreed  to  re- 
linquish Cuba,  and  the  United  States  was  to  protect 
life  and  property  during  its  occupancy  of  the  island; 
Spain  also  ceded  Porto  Rico  and  the  other  Spanish 
IVest  Indies,  Guam  in  the  Ladrones,  and  the  Philip- 
pines on  payment  of  $20,000,000;  the  United  States 
agreed  to  return  to  Spain,  at  its  own  cost,  all  Spanish 
prisoners  taken  at  the  time  of  the  capture  of  Manila; 
the  civil  and  political  rights  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
ceded  territories  were  to  be  determined  by  Congress; 
and  freedom  of  religion  was  guaranteed. 

The  reference  of  the  treaty  to  the  Senate  for  ratifica- 
tion elicited  many  divergences  of  opinion,  the  ablest 
opposition  being  presented  by  members  of  the  Presi- 
dent’s ovm  party.  In  particular,  the  position  taken  by 
Senator  Hoar,  a rigid  Republican  and  a close  friend 
of  President  McKinley,  made  a strong  impression. 
That  there  can  be  no  just  government  without  the 
consent  of  the  governed,  he  asserted,  was  the  central 
doctrine  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  More- 
over, the  acquisition  of  foreign  lands,  he  believed, 
would  lead  us  into  competition  with  European  powers 
for  territory,  and  thus  tempt  us  away  from  the  inter- 
national policy  which  had  been  laid  down  by  the 


404 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


“fathers”  and  followed  by  the  nation  ever  since. 
Most  of  the  Democrats  held  similar  views,  but  some  of 
them  heeded  the  advice  of  Bryan,  who  urged  that  the 
treaty  be  ratified  in  order  to  end  the  war,  and  that  the 
ultimate  disposition  of  the  new  possessions  be  decided 
in  the  next  presidential  campaign.  The  point  of  view 
which  seems  to  have  prevailed  with  most  Republicans 
was  that  the  United  States,  being  a sovereign  nation, 
possessed  power  to  acquire  territory  and  to  determine 
its  future  status,  and  that  as  a matter  of  expediency  it 
was  better  to  take  the  Philippines  than  to  risk  the  dan- 
gers which  lay  in  leaving  them  alone.  Shortly  before 
the  final  vote  was  taken,  an  insurrection  broke  out  in 
the  Philippines  against  American  control,  which  may 
have  influenced  some  senators  to  accept  the  President’s 
settlement.  Even  with  this  aid,  however,  ratification 
was  brought  about  by  the  narrow  margin  of  one  vote 
more  than  the  required  two-thirds  majority.^ 

Within  the  field  of  politics,  the  Republicans  in- 
creased the  advantage  which  they  had  gained  in  1896. 
The  congressional  and  state  elections  of  1898  con- 
tinued their  control  of  the  House  and  strengthened  it 
in  the  Senate;  the  world-wide  prosperity  which  has  al- 
ready been  mentioned  and  in  which  the  United  States 
shared,  was  in  striking  contrast  with  the  business  de- 
pression of  the  recent  Democratic  administration;  dis- 
coveries of  gold  deposits  in  the  Klondike  and  the  im- 
provement of  methods  of  extracting  the  metal  from 
the  ore  greatly  increased  the  currency  supply  and  as- 
sisted in  raising  the  level  of  prices,  thereby  giving 
greater  prosperity  to  the  western  farmer  and  lessening 
his  complaints.  The  gold  standard  act  of  March  14, 

1 Of  the  President’s  party,  T.  B.  Reed,  the  powerful  Speaker  of  the 
House,  retired  from  public  life  for  personal  reasons  and  because  of  his 
dissent  from  the  imperialist  policy  of  his  party.  McCall,  Reed,  237-8, 


niPERIALISM 


405 


190U,  pleased  the  tiiiancial  interests,  for  it  fixed  the 
standard  of  value,  set  the  amount  of  the  gold  reserve 
at  $150,000,000,  and  specified  adequate  means  by  which 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  could  maintain  other 
forms  of  money  on  a parity  with  the  precious  metal. 
IVithin  the  Republican  organization,  the  President’s 
soothing  personality  and  Hanna’s  meticulous  attention 
to  the  details  of  the  party  machinery  continued  undi- 
minished the  momentum  which  had  been  gathered. 
Defections  on  the  imperialism  issue,  while  affecting 
important  party  leaders,  were  numerically  unimpor- 
tant. Among  the  financial  and  industrial  classes, 
therefore,  confidence  in  President  McKinley  and  his 
advisors  was  thoroughgoing.  There  was  a strong 
bond  of  interest,  moreover,  between  territorial  expan- 
sion and  industrial  expansion,  between  Imperialism 
and  the  expansion  of  foreigm  markets.  The  primacy 
of  business  was  assured. 

The  renomination  of  McKinley  at  the  Republican 
Convention  in  Philadelphia,  on  June  19,  1900,  was 
unanimous.  The  vice-presidency,  contrary  to  tradi- 
tion, occupied  the  center  of  interest.  Several  men  of 
prominence  were  mentioned  in  this  connection  but  the 
name  which  evoked  most  enthusiasm  was  that  of  Theo- 
dore Roosevelt.  Roosevelt’s  career  during  the  war 
with  Spain  had  been  a prominent  factor  in  making  him 
Governor  of  New  York.  As  Governor  he  had  shown 
energy  and  independence,  especially  in  connection  with 
measures  for  taxing  street  railway  and  other  fran- 
chises, and  had  come  into  conflict  with  Senator  Thomas 
C.  Platt,  the  boss  of  the  state.  Senator  Platt,  there- 
fore, desired  to  divert  the  vigorous  Governor  into  the 
vice-presidency,  an  office  which  usually  casts  a “species 
of  political  oblivion”  over  its  occupant.  McKinley 
was  opposed  to  the  plan  and  so  were  Hanna  and  Roose- 


406 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


velt  himself.  The  latter  desired  to  put  into  effect 
further  plans  which  he  had  made  as  Governor,  and 
the  attempt  to  shelve  him  aroused  his  fighting  spirit. 
In  the  convention,  however,  sentiment  in  behalf  of 
Eoosevelt,  especially  from  the  West,  was  so  strong  as 
to  over-rule  both  the  administration  and  the  wishes  of 
the  Governor.  McKinley  sent  emphatic  word  that  he 
was  neither  for  nor  against  any  man,  but  would  ac- 
cept the  decision  of  the  delegates.  Hanna  then  with- 
drew his  objections  and  Roosevelt  was  nominated  with- 
out opposition. 

The  Republican  platform  emphasized  the  prosperity 
which  had  resuked  from  the  accession  of  the  party  to 
power;  it  pointed  out  the  danger  which  would  ensue 
if  the  opposition  were  allowed  to  conduct  public  af- 
fairs ; and  it  dwelt  upon  the  growth  of  the  export  trade, 
and  the  beneficence  of  the  Dingley  tariff.  An  anti- 
trust plank  deprecated  combinations  designed  to  create 
monopolies,  and  promised  legislation  to  prevent  such 
abuses.  Imperialism  was  briefly  dismissed;  “No 
other  course  was  possible  than  to  destroy  Spain’s 
sovereignty  throughout  the  West  Indies  and  in  the 
Philippine  Islands.  That  course  created  our  responsi- 
bility before  the  world  ...  to  provide  for  the  main- 
tenance of  law  and  order,  and  for  the  establishment  of 
good  government  and  for  the  performance  of  interna- 
tional obligations.” 

The  dissension  which  had  existed  within  the  Demo- 
cratic party  since  the  second  administration  of  Cleve- 
land was  still  the  important  fact  about  the  organiza- 
tion. Having  been  out  of  power,  the  party  could  take 
only  the  negative  position  of  hostile  criticism;  there 
had  been  no  reorganization  and  clarification  of  pur- 
poses, and  no  new  leader  had  appeared  who  combined 
the  personal  prestige  of  Bryan  with  those  qualities  of 


IMPEKIALISM 


407 


Gonservatism  and  solidity  wliicli  the  East  demanded, 
so  that  from  the  beginning  there  was  no  doubt  that 
Bryan  would  again  be  the  candidate  and  that  he  would 
take  the  lead  in  framing  the  platform.  The  convention 
met  in  Kansas  City,  on  July  4.  The  platform  placed 
most  emphasis  upon  three  issues.  The  first,  which  was 
declared  the  “paramount”  one,  was  imperialism.  The 
reasons  given  for  opposing  territorial  expansion  were 
mainly  those  brought  forward  by  Senator  Hoar  at  the 
time  when  the  peace  treaty  was  under  discussion. 

TVe  declare  again  that  all  governments  instituted  among  men 
derive  their  just  powders  from  the  consent  of  the  governed ; 
that  any  government  not  based  upon  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned is  a tj’ranny ; and  that  to  impose  upon  any  people  a gov- 
ernment of  force  is  to  substitute  the  methods  of  imperialism 
for  those  of  a republic. 

The  second  issue,  the  evils  of  big  business,  received 
renewed  attention,  although  an  old  complaint,  because 
of  the  many  industrial  consolidations  of  the  years  im- 
mediately preceding.  The  “trusts”  were  condemned 
for  appropriating  the  fruits  of  industry  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  few,  and  the  Eepublican  party  was  charged 
with  fostering  them  in  return  for  campaign  subscrip- 
tions and  political  support.  The  Dingley  act  was  de- 
nounced as  a “trust-breeding”  measure.  The  reme- 
dies proposed  were  severely  definite  in  comparison 
mtli  the  vague  plank  which  had  been  offered  by  the 
Eepublicans : they  included  publicity  as  to  the  affairs 
of  corporations  doing  an  interstate  business;  the  pro- 
hibition of  stock- watering  and  attempts  at  monopoly; 
and  the  use  of  all  the  constitutional  powers  of  Congress 
over  interstate  commerce  and  the  mails  for  the  enact- 
ment of  comprehensive  and  effective  legislation.  That 
the  silver  issue  was  mentioned  was  due  to  the  insist- 


408 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ence  of  Bryan,  who  believed  that  the  stand  which  had 
been  taken  by  the  party  in  1896  was  a right  one.  Not- 
withstanding the  objections  of  many  influential  leaders, 
therefore,  a free  silver  plank  was  inserted,  although  in 
brief  terms  and  in  an  inconspicuous  place. 

As  a political  contest,  the  campaign  of  1900  lacked 
life  in  comparison  with  that  of  1896.  Interest  in  anti- 
imperialism was  difficult  to  arouse,  and  waned  visibly 
as  the  weeks  wore  on.  Prosperity  and  the  increased 
money  supply  sapped  the  strength  of  earlier  discon- 
tent with  the  currency  situation,  so  that  the  choice 
presented  to  the  voters  simmered  down  to  imperialism 
and  Bryan.  A bit  of  vigor  was  infused  into  the  cam- 
paign through  the  energetic  speaking  tours  of  Roose- 
velt and  the  Democratic  leader.  Hanna,  as  Chairman 
of  the  Republican  National  Committee,  organized 
everything  with  his.  usual  skill,  and  raised,  his  biog- 
rapher tells  us,  $2,500,000  from  the  important  business 
men  of  the  country  — one-fifth  of  it  from  two  com- 
panies. The  result  of  the  election  was  the  choice  of 
McKinley,  whose  plurality  over  Bryan  exceeded  860,- 
000  in  a total  vote  of  less  than  14,000,000;  Bryan  re- 
ceived less  support  than  had  been  accorded  him  in 
1896. 

While  imperialism  as  a political  issue  was  being  dis- 
cussed and  decided,  the  history  of  American  control  in 
Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines  was  rapidly 
being  written.  Economic  conditions  in  the  first  of 
these  islands  at  the  time  of  the  American  occupation 
were  little  short  of  appalling.  The  streets,  houses  and 
public  institutions  were  filthy  and  in  disrepair ; anarchy 
ruled,  for  lack  of  any  stable  and  recognized  govern- 
ment; and  the  people  were  half-clothed,  homeless  and 
starving.  At  noon  on  January  1,  1899,  the  Spanish 
flag  was  hauled  down  in  Havana,  the  American  flag 


IMPERIALISM 


409 


was  hoisted  in  its  place,  and  representatives  of  the 
former  government  relinquished  all  rights  to  the 
sovereignty  and  public  property  of  the  island.  Gen- 
eral John  R.  Brooke,  and  later  General  Leonard  Wood 
controlled  affairs  as  military  governors. 

The  first  task  was  to  feed  the  hungry,  and  care  for 
the  sick  and  dying.  The  customs  service  was  revived 
under  command  of  Colonel  Tasker  H.  Bliss  and  began 
to  supply  needed  revenue.  The  penal  institutions  were 
investigated — noisome  holes  in  which  were  crowded 
wretched  prisoners,  many  of  whom  had  been  incar- 
cerated for  no  ascertainable  reason.  Education  was 
reorganized,  equipment  provided,  teachers  found,  and 
schools  repaired  or  rebuilt.  Most  remarkable,  was  the 
work  of  sanitation.  Heaps  of  rubbish  were  cleared 
away;  houses  washed  and  disinfected;  sewers  were 
opened  and  streets  cleaned.  Scientific  investigation 
disclosed  the  fact  that  the  mosquito  disseminated  the 
yellow  fever  and  steps  were  taken  to  prevent  the 
breeding  of  these  pests.  So  successful  were  the  ef- 
forts that  in  a fe^years  the  fever  had  become  a thing 
of  the  past. 

It  was  seen  that  the  economic  rehabilitation  of  Cuba 
must  come  about  mainly  through  the  production  of 
sugar,  and  since  the  United  States  was  the  chief  pur- 
chaser of  the  product,  the  tariff  schedule  was  of 
vital  importance.  In  1901  Congress  was  urged  to 
reduce  the  tariff  on  imports  from  Cuba,  but  the  op- 
position was  formidable.  The  American  Beet  Sugar 
Association  complained  that  their  industry,  which 
had  been  recently  established,  would  be  ruined  by 
allowing  reductions  to  Cuban  growers;  the  cane- 
sugar  planters  of  Louisiana  were  allied  with  them; 
and  the  friends  of  protection  feared  the  effect  of 
any  break  in  -the  tariff  wall;  On  the  other  hand, 


410 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


the  American  Sugar  Refining  Company,  popularly 
called  the  “Sugar  Trust,”  merely  refined  raw  sugar 
and  desired  an  increase  in  the  supply.  Lobbyists 
of  all  descriptions  poured  into  Washington  to  influ- 
ence committees  and  individuals,  and  General  Leon- 
ard Wood,  then  the  Governor  of  Cuba,  even  expended 
Cuban  funds  in  the  spread  of  literature  favorable  to  a 
reciprocal  reduction  of  duties.  In  the  meantime,  a 
reciprocity  treaty  was  made  and  submitted  to  the  Sen- 
ate, where  it  hung  fire  for  somewhat  more  than  a year, 
and  was  finally  ratified  on  December  16,  19^  It  pro- 
vided for  the  admission  of  Cuban  products  into  the 
United  States  at  a reduction  of  twenty  per  cent.,  and  a 
reciprocal  reduction  on  American  goods  entering -Cuba 
of  twenty-five  to  forty  per  cent. 

The  establishment  of  a policy  in  regard  to  perma- 
nent relations  between  the  United  States  and  Cuba 
was  brought  about  in  1901-1902.  When  Congress  had 
demanded  the  withdrawal  of  Spain  from  the  island  in 
1898,  its  action  had  been  accompanied  by  the  Teller 
Resolution,  disclaiming  any  intention  of  keeping  Cuba 
and  asserting  a determination  to  leave  the  control  of 
the  island  with  its  people.  After  the  close  of  the  war 
President  McKinley  and  his  closest  advisors  in  Con- 
gress had  determined  that  the  pledge  should  be  kept, 
and  public  sentiment  had  been  in  agreement  with  them. 
As  soon,  therefore,  as  American  control  was  an  estab- 
lished fact,  plans  were  formulated  for  relinquishing 
Cuba  to  the  people  of  the  island.  A constitutional  con- 
vention was  held,  and  a form  of  government,  modelled 
on  that  of  the  United  States,  was  framed  and  adopted 
on  February  21,  1901. 

While  the  Cuban  convention  was  deliberating,  it  be- 
came apparent  that  the  constitution  would  not  include 
any  statement  of  a policy  in  regard  to  future  relations 


IMPERIALISM 


411 


the  United  States.  The  American  Senate,  there- 
fore, under  the  leadership  of  Senator  0.  H.  Platt, 
passed  the  so-called  “Platt  Amendment.”  Its  several 
provisions  were  as  follows : the  Cuban  government 
shall  never  enter  into  agreements  wuth  other  powers 
which  tend  to  impair  the  independence  of  the  island; 
it  shall  not  contract  public  debts  of  such  size  that  the 
ordinary  revenues  would  be  inadequate  to  pay  interest 
charges  and  provide  for  a sinking  fund ; it  shall  permit 
the  intervention  of  the  United  States  when  needed  to 
preserve  Cuban  independence  and  the  maintenance  of 
an  adequate  government;  and  it  shall  sell  or  lease 
necessary  coaling  stations  to  the  United  States.  When 
satisfied  that  the  purpose  of  the  Amendment  was  not 
to  enable  the  United  States  to  meddle  in  affairs  in 
Cuba,  but  merely  to  secure  Cuban  independence  and 
set  forth  a definite  understanding  between  the  two  na- 
tions, the  convention  incorporated  it  in  the  final  con- 
stitution. On  May  20,  1902,  the  control  of  Cuba  was 
formally  relinquished  to  the  people  of  the  island,  with 
the  good  wishes  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
Only  once  since  that  time  has  the  United  States  in- 
tervened. During  the  summer  of  1906,  an  insurrection 
against  the  Cuban  government  took  place  during  which 
the  president  of  the  Republic  requested  American  as- 
sistance. A small  army  was  despatched,  which  re- 
mained until  March,  1909,  when  quiet  was  restored  and 
an  orderly  election  was  held. 

The  task  of  the  United  States  in  Porto  Rico  was 
far  simpler  than  in  Cuba.  The  island  was  small;  the 
people  homogeneous,  predominantly  white,  and  well- 
disposed  toward  American  occupation ; and  only  slight 
damage  had  been  done  by  the  troops  during  the  war 
because  of  the  cessation  of  hostilities  at  the  outset  of 


412 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


the  Porto  Rican  expedition.  The  development  of  a 
system  of  education,  therefore,  the  improvement  of 
roads  and  the  betterment  of  health  conditions  through 
vaccination  and  the  control  of  yellow  fever  presented 
a problem  which  was  relatively  simple. 

On  October  18,  1898,  United  States  officials  assumed 
control  of  the  island,  and  until  May  1,  1900,  the  gov- 
ernment was  in  the  hands  of  the  War  Department.^  On 
the  latter  date  a civil  government  was  established  under 
the  “Foraker  Act,”  an  organic  law  or  constitution 
passed  byUongress  on  April  12,  1900.  Under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Act  a governor  was  to  be  appointed  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  to  be  the  chief 
executive  officer  of  the  island.  The  people  of  Porto 
Rico  were  allowed  a voice  in  the  government  through 
the  power  to  elect  the  lower  house  of  the  legislature; 
but  control  by  the  United  States  was  assured  by 
giving  the  President  authority  to  choose  the  members 
of  the  upper  house,  and  by  giving  both  the  governor 
and  Congress  a veto  on  legislation  passed  by  the  island 
legislature.  In  the  course  of  time  the  Porto  Ricans 
desired  larger  self-government.  This  was  granted  by 
the  act  of  March  2,  1917,  which  made  the  islanders  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  and  gave  them  power  to 
elect  both  houses  of  the  legislature.^  ^ 

The  first  difficulty  met  by  the  United  States  in  the 
Philippines  was  an  inheritance  from  Spanish  rule.  In 
1896  the  Filipinos,  led  by  Aguinaldo,  had  risen  against 
the  government  in  order  to  secure  more  liberal  treat- 
ment and  to  eliminate  the  influence  of  the  Catholic 
friars  from  politics.  The  “embers  of  dissatisfaction” 

1 Under  the  provisions  of  the  Foraker  Act  only  fifteen  per  cent,  of  the 
usual  duties  were  to  he  paid  on  goods  passing  between  the  island  and 
the  United  States,  and  since  July  25,  1901,  complete  free  trade  has 
existed. 


IMPERIALISM 


413 


were  still  aglow  when  the  American  war  intervened. 
Relations  between  the  revolutionists  and  the  United 
States  forces  became  strained  when  the  former  were 
not  allowed  to  cooperate  with  the  Americans  against 
the  Spanish,  and  in  February,  1899,  open  warfare  fol- 
lowed. Not  until  July,  1902,  was  quiet  restored,  and 
during  the  process  enough  cruelties  were  practiced  by 
American  soldiers  to  make  the  anti-imperialists  doubly 
fearful  of  military  control.^ 

McKinley  and  his  Secretary  of  War — at  this  time 
Elihu  Root — desired  to  supplant  military  government 
with  civil  rule  as  quickly  as  possible  and  to  this  end 
the  President  appointed  the  first  Philippine  Commis- 
sion on  January  20,  1899,  with  Jacob  G.  Schurman,  of 
Cornell  University,  as  Chairman.  It  was  instructed 
to  investigate  the  situation  in  the  islands  and  to  recom- 
mend any  action  that  seemed  wise.  The  unsettled 
condition  of  affairs  seriously  hampered  the  work  of 
the  Commission  but  it  gathered  a fund  of  information 
which  it  later  published.  A second  Commission  was 
sent  out  in  1900,  with  Judge  William  H.  Taft  at  the 
head.  The  instructions  given  to  the  Commission  by 
President  McKinley  embodied  an  enlightened  colonial 
policy,  the  core  of  which  was  that  the  government  be- 
ing -established  was  “designed  not  for  our  satisfac- 
tion, or  for  the  expression  of  our  theoretical  views,  but 
for  the  happiness,  peace,  and  prosperity  of  the  people 
of  the  Philippine  Islands.”  The  Commission  wielded 
such  large  powers  that  gradually  the  area  controlled  by 
the  civil  government  increased  at  the  expense  of  the 
military  authorities,  and  by  1902  only  the  vuld  Moros 
were  under  military  control. 

1 The  Philippine  group  is  about  7,000  miles  southwest  of  San  Fran- 
cisco; the  chief  island,  Luzon,  is  almost  exactly  che  size  of  Ohio.  40.000 
sq.  miles;  the  largest  city,  Manila,  contained  over  250,000  people  at  the 
time  of  the  American  occupation. 


414 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


By  this  time  a definite  form  of  government  could  be 
planned  for,  built  upon  the  labors  of  the  second  Com- 
mission. The  Philippine  Act  of  July  1,  1902,  provided 
for  a governor  appointed  by  the  President,  with  the 
advice  of  the  Senate,  executive  departments,  and  a leg- 
islature, the  lower  house  of  which  was  elected  by  the 
people.  From  the  beginning  the  Filipinos,  like  the 
Porto  Ricans,  have  desired  a greater  range  of  self- 
government,  and  in  1916  long  steps  were  taken  in  the 
direction  desired  by  them.  The  Jones  act  of  that  year 
materially  increased  the  powers  of  the  Philippine  gov- 
ernment and  gave  the  Filipinos  power  to  elect  the 
upper  as  well  as  the  lower  house  of  the  legislature. 
The  passage  of  the  law  met  with  enthusiastic  approval 
in  the  islands. 

The  purpose  of  American  rule  in  the  Philippines 
has  been  to  fit  the  people  for  self-government,  although 
opinions  have  differed  as  to  how  soon  the  final  outcome 
could  be  brought  about.  An  early  and  bothersome 
problem  was  found  in  the  friars’  lands,  which  consisted 
of  about  425,000  acres,  for  the  most  part  in  the  vi- 
cinity of  Manila.  The  possession  of  so  great  an  area, 
together  with  the  religious  power  and  the  considerable 
political  authority  which  the  friars  exercised  under 
Spanish  rule,  gave  the  Church  a domination  which 
might  threaten  trouble  after  the  American  occupation. 
The  solution  of  the  problem  was  found  in  the  pur- 
chase of  the  lands  for  about  $7,000,000  by  the  United 
States.  Efforts  have  been  made  to  introduce  a com- 
plete system  of  education — physical  and  industrial,  as 
well  as  academic — with  such  success  that  when  the 
Jones  bill  was  being  discussed  in  Congress  in  1916  it 
was  asserted  that  every  member  of  the  Philippine  leg- 
islature at  that  time  was  a college  graduate.  In  1917 
the  Filipino  student  body  numbered  647,256,  with  11,- 


IMPERIALISM 


415 


822  teachers.  Political  education  has  also  been  a part 
of  the  American  idea.  Elementary  self-government 
was  gradually  introduced,  starting  in  the  more  civilized 
local  municipalities  and  provinces  and  confining  the 
suffrage  to  the  educated  people,  the  official  classes  and 
property  owners.  The  preservation  of  order  has  been 
more  and  more  entrusted  to  a Philippine  constabulary ; 
civil  service  officers  and  school  teachers  have  been  in- 
creasingly chosen  from  the  Filipinos;  and  the  courts 
have  been  partly  manned  with  native  judges.  Work 
in  sanitation  has  followed  the  lines  marked  out  in 
Cuba  and  Porto  Rico.  First  and  last  over  10,000,000 
vaccinations  were  performed  before  1914;  small-pox 
has  been  controlled;  attention  has  been  paid  to  the 
building  of  highways  and  railroads,  water  supply,  the  . 
disposal  of  sewage  and  allied  problems.  The  precise 
time,  if  ever,  when  independence  should  be  granted 
to  the  Philippines  is  the  one  great  question  remaining. 

The  first  attempt  to  revise  the  customs  laws  in  the 
Philippines  was  made  by  the  Commission  during  the 
governorship  of  William  H.  Taft.  These  schedules 
were  revised  in  Washington  in  such  a way  as  to  dis- 
criminate against  Philippine  interests,  but  they  had  re- 
mained in  force  only  a short  time  when  Congress 
passed  the  act  of  March  8,  1902,  allowing  goods  grown 
or  produced  in  the  Philippines  to  enter  the  United 
States  under  a twenty -five  per  cent,  reduction.  In 
1909,  the  tariff  makers  were  induced  to  relent  to  the 
extent  of  allovdng  the  free  importation  of  goods  grown, 
produced  or  manufactured  in  the  Philippines,  except 
that  only  a specified  annual  amount  of  Philippine 
sugar  and  tobacco  might  be  brought  in.  In  1913  the 
wall  was  entirely  removed  on  all  trade  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Philippines  in  articles  made 
or  grown  in  either  of  the  two  countries. 


416 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


While  Congress  and  the  President  were  concerning 
themselves  with  the  practical  problems  of  military  con- 
trol, sanitation  and  the  like,  the  Supreme  Court  was 
laboriously  considering  the  less  tangible  but  equally 
perplexing  question  of  the  constitutionality  of  the  sev- 
eral acts  which  the  legislative  and  executive  depart- 
ments had  committed.  The  power  of  Congress  to  ac- 
quire territory  and  the  right  of  the  executive  to  control 
new  territory  under  the  war  power  had  long  been  con- 
ceded. Admittedly,  however,  government  under  the 
war  power  was  temporary  and  transitional.  In  earlier 
times  such  accjuisitions  as  those  effected  by  the 
Louisiana  purchase  and  the  annexation  of  Texas  had 
been  consummated  with  the  distinct  understanding 
that  these  regions  should  immediately  or  eventuall)^  be- 
come territories  or  states  in  the  Union.  The  status  of 
Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines  was  novel.  “The 
civil  rights  and  political  status  of  the  native  inhabi- 
tants of  the  territories  hereby  ceded  to  the  United 
States,”  ran  the  words  of  the  treaty  of  peace  closing 
the  war  with  Spain,  “shall  be  determined  by  the  Con- 
gress.” Did  this  mean  that  Congress  might  govern 
the  new  acquisitions  independently  of  the  Constitu- 
tion! Could  it  abridge  freedom  of  speech,  and  permit 
cruel  and  unusual  punishments,  or  establish  slavery! 
Could  Congress  permanently  govern  these  lands  with- 
out giving  their  citizens  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  and  with  no  intention  of  ever  making 
them  territories  or  states ! On  the  other  hand,  if  Con- 
gress must  act  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  the  Con- 
stitution, would  the  wild  Moros  of  the  Philippines  be 
the  beneficiaries  of  the  amendment  preserving  the  right 
of  trial  by  jury!  In  the  popular  language  of  the  day, 
did  the  Constitution  follow  the  flag! 

It  was  not  long  before  the  Supreme  Court  was  called 


IMPERIALISM 


417 


upon  ill  the  “Iiisul^-  Cases”  to  express  itself  upon 
these  constitutional  questions.  The  first  case  was  De 
Lima  v.  Bidwell.  It  was  a suit  to  recover  duties  paid 
on  goods  sent  from  Porto  Rico  to  the  United  States 
during  the  interval  between  the  cession  of  the  island 
and  the  passage  of  the  Fqraker  Act.  The  duties  had 
been  paid  under  the  Dingley  law,  which  levied  customs 
of  specified  amounts  upon  all  goods  imported  ‘‘from 
foreign  countries.”  IVas  Porto  Rico  a “foreign” 
country?  The  majority  of  the  nine  members  of  the 
Court  thought  that  it  was  not  foreign,  that  there  was 
scarcely  a “shred  of  authority”  for  the  view  that  a 
“district  ceded  to  and  in  the  possession  of  the  United 
States  remains  for  any  purpose  a foreign  country.” 
Since  Porto  Rico  was  not  a foreign  country,  the  duties 
were  wrongfully  collected  and  must  be  returned.  The 
remaining  four  justices  dissented.  One  of  them  de- 
livered a dissenting  opinion  in  which  he  held  that 
Porto  Rico  occupied  middle  ground  between  that  of  a 
foreign  country  and  domestic  territory.  As  such  its 
status  ^ould  be  determined  by  Congress  only  and 
therefore  its  products  were  subject  to  duties  levied  by 
the  Dingley  act. 

In  Dovmes  v.  Bidwell  the  Court  was  compelled  to  de- 
termine the  constitutionality  of  the  part  of  the  Foraker 
Act  which  provided  for  a tariff  between  Porto  Rico 
and  the  United  States  equal  to  fifteen  per  cent,  of  that 
levied  by  the  Dingley  act.  Again  the  Court  divided 
five  to  four.  Mr.  Justice  Brovm  delivered  the  major- 
ity opinion.  It  was  to  the  effect  that  the  Constitution 
applied  only  to  States;  that  Congress  possessed  un- 
limited power  over  the  political  relations  of  the  terri- 
tories; that  Porto  Rico  was  a “territory  appurtenant 
to  and  belonging  to  the  United  States”.;  and  that  the 
part  of  the  Constitution  which  says  that  duties  shall 


418 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


be  uniform  throughout  the  United  States  did  not  apply 
to  Porto  Eico  unless  Congress  so  Avilled.  Hence  the 
customs  clause  of  the  Foraker  Act  was  valid.  Four  of 
the  majority,  however,  who  agreed  with  Mr.  Justice 
Brown  in  his  conclusion  that  the  tariff  clause  of  the 
Foraker  Act  was  constitutional  did  so  for  reasons 
which  they  asserted  to  be  “different  from,  if  not  in 
conflict  with,  those  expressed”  by  him. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  constitutional  law,  the 
decisions  were  unsatisfactory,  because  of  the  balanced 
division  of  opinion.  Yet  to  have  declared  all  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Constitution  in  force  in  all  the  acquisi- 
tions would  have  been  embarrassing.  Logic  and  the 
Constitution  went  to  the  winds,  while  the  executive 
and  legislative  departments  administered  the  terri- 
tories on  the  convenient  and  flexible  theory  that  cer- 
tain constitutional  provisions  must  be  heeded  and  that 
others  need  not. 

While  the  colonial  policy  of  the  United  States  was 
being  developed,  the  possession  of  the  Phi^pines 
added  interest  in  the  United  States  to  an  unu^al  in- 
ternational situation  in  China  which  immediately  in- 
volved several  European  nations  and  eventually  af- 
fected America.  The  Chinese-Japanese  War,  which 
came  to  a close  in  1895,  had  uncovered  to  the  world 
the  weakness  of  China  as  a military  power  and  had 
weakened  the  hold  of  the  reigning  monarch  upon  the 
people  of  the  Empire.  Thereupon  the  leading  com- 
mercial nations  of  Europe  began  to  seize  portions  of 
China  in  order  to  extend  their  trade  relations  in  the 
Far  East.  Russia  first  attempted  to  obtain  a sea- 
port, but  retired  when  an  uproar  of  protest  arose  from 
the  remainder  of  Europe.  Not  long  afterwards,  two 
German  missionaries  in  the  province  of  Shantung  were 


IMPERIALISM 


419 


murdered.  The  outrage  formed  a sufficient  pretext 
for  aggressive  action,  as  a result  of  which  China  leased 
Kiaochau  to  Germany  for  ninety-nine  years,  including 
in  the  grant  railway  and  mining  privileges  and  an  in- 
demnity; Russia  then  renewed  her  attempt  and  suc- 
ceeded in  leasing  Port  Arthur  and  Talienwan  for 
twenty-five  years.  Great  Britain  followed  with  the 
acquisition  of  rights  in  Weihaiwei  similar  to  those  of 
Russia  in  Port  Arthur;  Japan  found  its  share  in  the 
province  of  Fukien,  and  France  in  Kwangchaouwan. 
In  each  case,  moreover,  the  leasing  power  designated 
a large  area  around  its  holdings  as  a “sphere  of  influ- 
ence,” in  which  its  economic  and  political  mastery  was 
complete.  In  this  way,  thirteen  of  the  eighteen  prov- 
inces of  China,  including  the  most  desirable  harbors, 
waterways  and  mines,  were  partially  controlled  by  the 
powers. 

American  foreign  affairs  had  been,  since  October  1, 
1898,  in  the  skilful  hands  of  John  Hay,  who  was  pos- 
sessed of  an  intimate  knowledge  of  conditions  in  Eu- 
rope. Hay  perceived  the  danger  to  American  com- 
mercial interests^  in  China,  and  accordingly  in  Sep- 
tember, 1899,  he  addressed  a circular  note  to  the  pow- 
ers requesting  each  of  them  to  give  formal  assurances 
that  in  its  sphere  of  influence:  (1)  it  would  not  inter- 
fere with  any  treaty  port  or  vested  interest;  (2) 
it  would  agree  that  the  Chinese  tariff  should  apply 
equally  to  all  goods  shipped  to  ports  in  the  spheres, 
and  be  collected  by  the  Chinese  officials;  and  (3)  it 
would  charge  no  higher  harbor  and  railroad  rates 
for  citizens  of  other  nations  than  for  its  own.  The 
powers  having  agreed  more  or  less  directly.  Hay 
informed  them  by  a note  of  March  20,  1900,  that  all 
had  acceded  to  his  propositions  and  that  the  United 
States  considered  their  assent  as  “final  and  defini- 


420 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB, 


tive.”  There  could  be,  of  course,  no  effectual  guar- 
anty that  the  powers  would  fully  observe  this  “Open 
Door”  policy,  bnt  the  economic  penetration  of  China, 
which  wonld  soon  result  in  complete  political  posses- 
sion, was  at  least  retarded  for  the  moment. 

Domestic  affairs  in  China,  meanwhile,  had  been 
seething  under  the  surface.  An  ill-starred  reform 
movement,  initiated  by  the  Emperor,  had  failed,  the 
government  was  discredited,  and  the  Empress  Dow- 
ager seized  the  throne  for  herself.  All  China  inter- 
preted the  event  to  presage  a return  to  the  old  order 
of  things — a general  anti-foreign  movement.  Eco- 
nomic distresses,  bad  crops,  a disastrous  flood  and 
hatred  of  foreign  missionaries,  combined  with  a deep 
resentment  at  the  European  partition  of  their  country, 
caused  the  Chinese  to  break  out  in  a score  of  scattered 
attacks  on  the  hated  aliens.  The  cnlmination  was  the 
Boxer  Bebellion.  The  Boxers  was  a society  which  had 
long  existed  in  China  for  varions  religious,  patriotic 
and  other  purposes.  It  took  up  the  cry  “Drive  out 
the  foreigners  and  uphold  the  dynasty.”  Government 
officials  by  their  disinclination  to  qnell  the  Boxer  up- 
rising, showed  that  their  sympathies  were  with  the 
rioters. 

The  climax  of  the  outbreak  came  in  and  around 
Pekin,  the  capital  of  China.  The  railroad  from  the 
city  to  the  coast  was  seized,  telegraphic  connection  cut 
off,  and  the  representatives  of  the  foreign  powers 
were  compelled  to  fortify  themselves  within  the  city. 
On  June  19,  1900,  all  foreigners  were  ordered  to  leave 
within  twenty-four  hours,  and  the  German  minister 
was  shot  when  he  attempted  to  visit  the  proper  officer 
in  order  to  protest.  The  Chinese  army  poured  ou-t  to 
surround  the  quarter  of  the  city  where  the  legations 
were  situated  and  cnt  them  off  from  the  rest  of  the 


IMPERIALISM 


421 


world.  All  foreigners  fled  to  tlie  British  legation, 
where  they  constructed  bomh  proof  cellars,  raised  bar- 
ricades and  planted  artillery.^  The  powers,  including 
the  United  States,  combined  to  send  a punitive  expedi- 
tion to  Pekin,  while  the  legationers  settled  down  to  a 
state  of  siege,  determined  to  hold  out  as  long  as  possi- 
ble. At  last  on  August  14,  when  the  surviving  for- 
eigners were  reduced  to  eating  horse  flesh  and  when 
scores  had  been  killed  or  wounded,  the  relief  column 
reached  the  capital.  It  was  high  time.  The  foreign 
quarters  and  much  of  the  business  portion,  the  banks, 
and  the  theatres  had  been  burned,  and  the  entire  city 
threatened  with  destruction. 

By  the  time  that  the  uprisings  in  Pekin  and  elsewhere 
had  been  suppressed,  it  was  evident  that  the  powers 
would  have  a stern  accounting  with  China.  Hay  had 
already  openly  announced  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  in  his  note  of  July  3,  1900;  it  was  that  the 
LFnited  States  would  seek  a solution  which  should  bring 
about  permanent  safety  and  peace  to  China,  preserve 
the  territorial  entity  of  the  country,  protect  the  rights 
of  friendly  powers  and  insure  an  equal  opportunity  for 
all  nations  in  the  commerce  of  China.  Hay  continued 
through  the  negotiations  to  urge  joint  action  on  the 
part  of  the  powers,  and  procured  from  them  a state- 
ment disclaiming  any  purpose  to  acquire  any  part  of 
China.  At  length  in  December,  1900,  the  demands 
upon  China  were  formulated,  to  which  that  unhappy 
nation  was  compelled  to  accede.  The  most  important 
were,  punishment  for  the  guilty  rioters,  safeguards  for 
the  future,  indemnities  for  losses  and  the  improve- 
ment of  commercial  relations.  The  financial  indem- 

1 It  was  on  the  occasion  of  despatching  troops  to  avenge  the  death  of 
Von  Ketteler,  the  German  minister,  that  the  Emperor  gave  instructions 
to  “give  no  quarter  and  to  (act)  so  like  Huns  that  for  a thousand  years 
to  come  no  Chinese  would  dare  to  look  a German  in  the  face.” 


422 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


nity  finally  placed  upon  China  was  $333,000,000,  of 
which  $24,000,000  was  for  the  United  States.  The  lat- 
ter sum  proved  to  be  more  than  sufficient  to  satisfy  all 
claims  and  China  was  relieved  from  the  payment  of 
about  $11,000,000.  As  a mark  of  appreciation  for  this 
act,  the  Chinese  government  determined  to  use  the 
fund  in  sending  students  to  the  United  States  for  edu- 
cation. 

While  the  problems  concerning  China  and  the  col- 
onial possessions  of  the  United  States  were  reaching  a 
settlement,  on  September  6,  1901,  President  McKinley 
attended  the  Pan-American  Exposition  in  Buffalo, 
where  he  was  shot  by  a young  fanatic.  He  died  eight 
days  later  and  Vice-President  Roosevelt  succeeded 
him. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  framing,  contents  and  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  1898 
are  well  described  in  Chadwick,  Latane  and  Olcott.  The 
treaty  itself  is  conveniently  found  in  William  MacDonald, 
Documentary  Source  Book  of  American  History  (new  ed., 
1916). 

On  imperialism : L.  A.  Coolidge,  An  Old-Fashioned  Sen- 
ator, 0.  II.  Platt  (1910)  ; G.  F.  Hoar,  Autobiography  of 
Seventy  Years,  contains  a strong  argument  against  imperial- 
ism; A.  C.  Coolidge,  United  States  as  a World  Power  (1916). 

The  best  accounts  of  the  election  of  1900  are  in  Stanwood, 
Croly  and  Latane. 

The  island  possessions  have  given  rise  to  a considerable  body 
of  special  volumes  of  a high  order.  Especially  useful  are: 
(Cuba),  Elihu  Root,  Military  and  Colonial  Policy  of  the 
United  States  (1916),  by  McKinley’s  Secretary  of  War;  L.  A. 
Coolidge,  0.  H.  Platt  (1910)  ; A.  G.  Robinson,  Cuba  and  the 
Intervention  (1905)  ; C.  E.  Magoon,  Republic  of  Cuba  (1908), 
by  the  provisional  governor  during  the  second  intervention. 
(Porto  Rico),  W.  F.  Willoughby,  Territories  and  Dependent 


BIPEEIALISM 


423 


cies  of  the  United  States  (1905),  by  a former  treasurer  of 
Porto  Kico;  L.  S.  Rowe,  United  States  and  Porto  Pico  (1904). 
The  most  complete  work  on  the  Philippines  is  D.  C.  Worcester, 
Philippines:  Past  and  Present  (2  vols.,  1914),  by  a member  of 
the  Commission;  the  valuable  report  of  Commissioner  Taft  is 
in  Report  of  the  Philippine  Commission,  1907,  part  3,  printed 
also  as  Senate  Document  200,  60th  Congress,  1st  session,  vol.  7, 
(Serial  Number  5240). 

The  legal  and  constitutional  aspects  of  imperialism  are  best 
followed  in  the  Harvard  Law  Review,  vols.  XII,  XIII ; W.  W. 
Willoughby,  Constitutional  Law  of  the  United  States  (2  vols., 
1910)  ; C.  F.  Randolph,  The  Law  and  Policy  of  Annexation 
(1901)  ; the  “insular  cases”  are  in  United  States  Reports, 
vol.  182,  pp.  1,  244. 

The  most  complete  account  of  affairs  in  China  is  P.  H. 
Clements,  The  Boxer  Rebellion  (1915)  ; J.  B.  Moore,  Digest, 
vol.  V (1906),  is  useful,  as  always;  J.  W.  Foster,  American 
Diplomacy  in  the  Orient  (1903),  is  clear  and  concise;  W.  R. 
Thayer,  John  Hay  (2  vols.,  1915),  is  disappointing. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


THE  BEGINNING  OF  A NEW  CENTURY 

Most  of  the  tendencies  which  characterized  the 
growth  of  population,  the  expansion  of  the 
West,  the  concentration  of  the  people  in  cities,  the  de- 
velopment of  manufacturing  and  agriculture,  and  the 
extension  of  the  railway  system,  from  1870  to  1890, 
were  equally  significant  during  the  two  decades  fol- 
lowing the  latter  year.  Nevertheless  there  were  im- 
portant differences  of  detail  in  the  tendencies  of  the 
later  period;  and  about  the  year  1900  in  particular 
there  occurred  changes  that  were  far-reaching. 

The  rate  of  growth  of  population  slowed  up  slightly 
after  1890,  being  twenty-one  per  cent,  per  decade,  as 
contrasted  with  twenty-five  per  cent,  from  1870  to 
1890.  The  increases  Avere  distributed  over  a larger 
area  during  the  later  tAvo  decades,  and  aside  from  the 
industrial  states,  those  which  showed  the  greatest 
groAAdh  were  Oklahoma,  Texas  and  California.  Immi- 
gration continued  to  be  large,  and  concentrated  in  the 
north,  especially  in  the  cities.  In  NeAv  York  city,  for 
instance,  forty  per  cent,  of  the  inhabitants  in  1910  were 
foreign  born,  and  thirty-eight  per  cent,  more  were  of 
foreign,  or  mixed  foreign  and  native  parentage.  The 
chief  European  contributors  to  the  population  of 
America  in  1910  in  the  order  of  their  importance  were 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Russia,  Ireland,  Italy  and 
England.  Moreover  the  foreign  elements  had  fre- 
quently become  concentrated  in  especial  states:  the 

424 


425 


426 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


Germans  in  Wisconsin,  Minnesota  and  Illinois;  the 
Eussians  in  New  York,  North  Dakota  and  Connecti- 
cut; the  Austrians  in  Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey; 
and  the  Irish  in  Massachusetts,  Connecticut  and  New 
York.  The  immigration  of  Canadians,  which  had  been 
of  importance  before  1900,  appreciably  slowed  down 
after  that  year ; and  instead  there  was  a distinct  move- 
ment in  the  opposite  direction,  especially  from  Min- 
nesota, North  Dakota  and  Washington.  The  emigra- 
tion was  caused  mainly  by  the  desire  to  take  up  fertile 
lands  which  had  been  widely  advertised  by  the  Canad- 
ian government.  The  migration  from  the  eastern 
states  toward  the  West  continued  as  in  earlier  years. 
It  was  noticeable,  however,  that  whereas  previous  mi- 
gration had  been  almost  wholly  on  east  and  west  lines, 
there  was  in  later  years  a greater  tendency  to  seek 
favorable  openings  wherever  they  were  found.  Okla- 
homa, for  example,  in  1910  contained  71,000  natives 
of  Illinois,  101,000  Kansans  and  162,000  Missourians. 
The  trend  of  population  toward  the  cities  was  so  rapid 
between  1890  and  1910  as  to  suggest  the  likelihood  that 
by  1920  half  the  people  of  the  country  would  be  living 
in  communities  of  2,500  persons  or  more.  Of  the 
twenty-three  towns  that  more  than  doubled  in  numbers 
during  the  two  decades  after  1890,  seventeen  were  in 
the  South  and  on  the  Pacific  Coast,  indicating  that  the 
tendency  toward  urban  life  was  no  longer  confined  to 
the  North  and  East. 

Manufacturing  increased  its  importance  as  the  great- 
est economic  activity  in  the  Northeast,  and  was  mov- 
ing westward  so  rapidly  that  Ohio,  Michigan,  Indiana 
and  Illinois  found  their  interests  becoming  increas- 
ingly like  those  of  the  eastern  states.  Parts  of  the 
South,  also,  developed  considerable  industrial  inter- 
ests. The  manufacture  of  cotton  goods,  for  example. 


BEGINNING  OF  A NEW  CENTURY  427 


increased  with  such  rapidity  that  three  of  the  first 
five  states  in  the  value  of  their  product  in  1909  were 
southern  states — North  Carolina,  South  Carolina  and 
Georgia.  Since  1889  the  production  of  lumber  has 
taken  a prominent  place.  Louisiana  doubled  its  ac- 
tivity from  1889  to  1899  and  had  tripled  this  record  by 
1909.  Almost  the  entire  South  from  Virginia  to 
Louisiana  produced  large  amounts  during  the  twenty 
years  under  consideration.  The  iron  and  steel  indus- 
try in  Alabama,  and  the  production  of  turpentine, 
resin  and  fertilizers  were  other  important  southern  in- 
terests. Throughout  the  country  at  large  the  number 
of  wage  earners  engaged  in  manufacturing  grew  some- 
what more  rapidly  than  the  population,  being  about 
twenty-five  per  cent,  per  decade  from  1890  to  1910. 

The  center  of  agriculture  continued  to  be  in  the  Alid- 
dle  West,  in  which  was  to  be  found  nearly  fifty-three 
per  cent,  of  the  improved  farm  lands  and  fifty-eight  per 
cent,  of  the  value  of  all  farm  property.  It  was  in  this 
part  of  the  country  that  the  greatest  increases  in  the 
amount  of  improved  land  took  place,  and  particularly 
in  the  prairie  country  west  of  the  Mississippi.  By 
1890  the  Plains  had  lost  their  earlier  unique  and  pic- 
turesque characteristics  as  a cattle  country,  and  had 
given  way  to  the  homesteader.  Hence  the  greatest  ex- 
pansion in  agriculture  took  place  in  the  tier  of  states 
from  North  Dakota  to  Texas.  It  appeared,  therefore, 
that  manufacturing  was  driving  agriculture  farther 
and  farther  to  the  west:  New  England  cultivated  less 
farm  land  in  1910  than  in  1850 ; the  improved  area  in 
New  York,  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  declined 
after  1880;  Ohio  tilled  fewer  acres  in  1910  than  in 
1900,  and  the  gradual  replacement  of  agriculture  by 
manufacturing  was  observable  in  Indiana  and  Illinois. 
Oklahoma  and  Texas,  on  the  other  hand , together 


428 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


opened  to  cultivation  between  1890  and  1910  nearly 
24,000,000  acres,  an  expanse  almost  equivalent  to  the 
combined  areas  of  New  Hampshire,  Vermont,  Massa- 
chusetts and  Maryland. 

By  1890  it  was  clear  that  the  future  of  the  Far  West 
lay  in  agriculture,  rather  than  in  the  mining  of  the 
precious  metals.  Between  that  date  and  1910,  the 
amount  of  improved  farm  land  in  the  section  increased 
sixty-five  per  cent.  In  the  states  of  Washington,  New 
Mexico,  Colorado,  Idaho  and  Montana,  large  areas 
were  placed  under  cultivation.  In  Washington  the 
amount  of  improved  farm  land  increased  about  350  per 
cent.  The  growing  of  fruits  and  nuts  was  brought  to 
a high  state  of  excellence  in  the  coast  states.  The  tim- 
ber industry  developed  after  1880  and  particularly 
after  1900.  About  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  great  lumber  companies  began  to  seek  sources  of 
supply  to  take  the  place  of  those  around  the  Great 
Lakes.  They  turned  to  the  South  and  the  Far  West. 
The  methods  which  were  used  for  getting  control  of 
the  land,  and  the  recklessness  with  which  the  supplies 
of  timber  were  cut  off  became  of  importance  as  causes 
of  the  conservation  movement.  The  main  handicap  in 
the  way  of  the  development  of  trade  between  the  Far 
West  and  the  East  was  the  great  distances  involved. 
Hence  arose  the  interest  of  the  Coast  in  transconti- 
nental railway  rates  and  the  project  for  a canal  across 
the  isthmus  of  Panama. 

An  economic  fact  of  no  little  importance  was  a 
change  in  the  downward  tendency  of  the  price  level 
after  1896.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  constant 
fall  in  prices  from  1873  to  1896  had  brought  distress  to 
the  farmers  of  the  West  and  had  been  one  of  the  causes 
of  the  Populist  revolt.  After  1896  the  process  was  re- 
versed. Between  that  year  and  1913  the  quantity  of 


BEGINNING  OF  A NEW  CENTURY  429 


gold  in  circulation  considerably  increased,  as  has  been 
seen;  bank  deposits  subject  to  check  trebled  in  vol- 
ume, and  the  use  of  checks  became  more  common;  al- 
together it  was  estimated  by  Professor  Irving  Fisher 
that  the  quantity  of  money  in  circulation  increased 
two-fold.  Prices  were  fifty  per  cent,  higher  in  1913 
than  in  the  earlier  year,  and  accordingly  the  com- 
plaints of  the  farmer  were  less  frequently  heard.  The 


/goo  /go/  tdoz  /gos  /go4  /9os  /goe  /907  /go 8 /gog  /g/o  /g//  /g/z 


ffasee/ on  fhe  Bv//ef'/o  of/Ae  C/.S-  Bo/vau  a4  La/bor  -Oc^  /,  /g/Z 

wage  earner  in  the  factories,  however,  was  differently 
affected.  The  price  which  he  had  to  pay  for  the  neces- 
sities of  life  increased  faster  than  his  wages,  so  that 
his  standard  of  living  was  going  down.  Inasmuch  as 
the  number  of  wage  earners  in  the  factories  was  rap- 
idly increasing,  it  seemed  inevitable  that  the  problem 
of  rising  prices  after  1896  would  constitute  as  great  a 
problem  as  the  problem  of  falling  prices  had  done  be- 
fore that  year. 

In  industrial  enterprise  the  close  of  the  nineteenth 
century  and  the  opening  of  the  twentieth  were  char- 
acterized by  a mad  rush  toward  consolidation.  To  a 
milder  degree  the  process  had,  of  course,  been  under 


430 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Avay  I'or  many  years,  during  Avliicli  the  Standard  Oil 
Company  and  other  trusts  were  the  subject  of  much 
study  and  legislation.  In  the  course  of  time  some  of 
these  concerns  made  such  great  profits  that  their  lead- 
ers sought  attractive  openings  for  the  investment  of 
their  surplus.  They  began  to  appear  on  the  boards 
of  directors  of  railways,  banks,  electric  lighting  com- 
panies and  other  industrial  organizations.  Before 
1900  tAvo  powerful  groups  had  definitely  formed.  The 
Standard  or  Rockefeller  group  Avas  obtaining  large  in- 
terests in  such  railroads  as  the  Missouri,  Kansas  and 
Texas,  the  Delaware,  Lackawanna  and  Western,  and 
the  Chicago,  Mihvaukee  and  St.  Paul.  It  Avas  reach- 
ing out  to  the  gas  and  electric  companies  in  Ncav  York, 
had  an  alliance  Avith  the  National  City  Bank  and  others, 
and  Avas  in  touch  AAuth  great  life  insurance  companies 
such  as  the  Equitable  and  the  Mutual  of  Noav  York. 
Such  connections  enabled  them  to  determine  the  poli- 
cies and  direct  the  investments  of  these  important  con- 
cerns. The  Morgans  extended  their  influence  over  the 
Philadelphia  and  Reading,  the  NeAv  York,  Lake  Erie 
and  Western,  the  Lehigh  Valley  and  others.  Morgan 
himself  also  entered  the  industrial  field  as  organizer 
of  the  Federal  Steel  Company  and  the  National  Tube 
Company. 

The  mania  for  organizing  large  corporations  came 
to  a climax  about  1 900.  The  census  taken  in  that  year 
noted  ninety-two  that  had  been  formed  between  Jan- 
uary 1,  1899,  and  June  30,  1900.  Early  in  1904  the 
editor  of  Moody’s  Manual  of  Corporation  Securities 
noted  the  existence  of  440  large  industrial  and  trans- 
portation combinations  Avhose  capitalization  as  meas- 
ured by  the  par  A^alue  of  their  stocks  and  bonds  was 
nearly  $20,500,000,000.  The  securities— stocks  and 
bonds — of  the  new  companies  were  eagerly  taken  up  by 


BEGINNING  OF  A NEW  CENTURY  431 


the  investing  public.  Prosperity  was  wide-spread  and 
the  financial  strength  behind  the  organizations  seemed 
unlimited.  Speculation  became  common.  A few  in- 
dividuals amassed  wealth  through  the  shrewd  purchase 
and  sale  of  stocks,  and  countless  others  sought  unsuc- 
cessfully to  imitate  them.  Where  sales  of  400,000 
shares  on  the  stock  exchange  had  formerly  been  looked 
upon  as  a good  day’s  business,  the  record  jumped  to  a 
million,  then  two,  and  even  three. ^ 

A threatened  competitive  struggle  among  certain 
steel  manufacturers  in  1901  led  to  the  formation  of  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation,  the  most  famous  con- 
solidation of  the  period.  It  was,  strictly  speaking,  a 
“holding  corporation”  which  did  not  manufacture  at 
all,  but  merely  held  the  securities  and  directed  the 
policies  of  the  group  of  companies  of  which  it  was 
composed.  It  integrated  all  the  elements  of  the  indus- 
try— ore  deposits,  coal  mines,  limestone,  a thousand 
miles  of  railroads,  ore  vessels  on  the  Great  Lakes,  fur- 
naces, steel  works,  rolling  mills  and  other  related  in- 
terests. The  value  of  the  tangible  property  which  was 
thus  brought  under  the  control  of  a single  group  of 
men  was  estimated  by  the  United  States  Commissioner 
of  Corporations  at  about  $700,000,000.  The  company 
issued  securities,  however,  to  somewhat  over  twice  this 
amount.  In  other  words,  about  $700,000,000  of  the 
capitalization  was  “water,”  that  is,  securities  issued  in 
excess  of  the  value  of  the  tangible  properties  owned. 
The  prices  paid  to  those  who  controlled  the  constituent 
companies  were  such  as  to  make  them  multi-million- 
aires over  night,  and  the  commission  given  to  the 
financiers  who  organized  the  Corporation  was  un- 
paralleled in  size,  amounting  to  $62,500,000. 

1 The  shrinkage  of  the  value  of  these  securities  caused  the  “rich  men’s 
panic”  of  1903.  Consult  Xoyes,  Forty  Years,  308-311. 


432 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


The  appreciation  of  the  value  of  the  ore  deposits  con- 
trolled by  the  Steel  Corporation  later  replaced  some 
of  the  water  in  its  securities,  hut  in  many  cases  no  such 
process  came  about.  Investors  therefore  discovered 
that  the  paper  which  they  had  purchased  did  not  repre- 
sent real  property,  but  merely  the  hope  of  a company 
that  its  profits  would  be  large  enough  to  provide  re- 
turns upon  all  its  securities.  One  hundred  of  the  lead- 
ing industrial  stocks  shrank  in  value  $1,750,000,000 
within  eighteen  months.  In  the  case  of  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration it  was  noticeable  that  its  supremacy  depended 
to  a large  extent  on  the  possession  of  resources  of  ore 
on  land  much  of  which  had  originally  belonged  to  the 
public,  a fact  which,  the  Commissioner  of  Corpora- 
tions remarked,  made  the  affairs  of  the  company  a 
matter  of  public  interest. 

The  growth  and  consolidation  which  characterized 
the  history  of  industry  were  also  taking  place  in  the 
railway  system,  although  somewhat  more  slowly.  It 
has  already  been  noted  that  the  length  of  the  railroads 
had  reached  160,000  miles  by  1890.  For  the  next  two 
decades  the  rate  of  construction  diminished  slightly, 
yet  the  total  in  1914  was  252,231  miles,  and  the  par 
value  of  all  railroad  securities  was  estimated  at  $20,- 
500,000,000.  Nearly  four  and  a half  million  persons,  a 
railroad  president  estimated  in  1915,  were  at  that  time 
interested  in  the  industry  as  employees,  as  workmen  in 
shops  making  railroad  supplies,  or  through  the  owner- 
ship of  stocks  and  bonds. 

The  management  of  the  roads  is,  of  course,  continu- 
ally changing;  alliances  are  made  and  broken;  groups 
form  and  dissolve.  About  the  time  that  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation  was  being  organized,  how- 
ever, about  ninety-five  per  cent,  of  the  important  lines 
were  in  the  control  of  six  groups  of  influential  persons. 


433 


434 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


which  were  dominated  by  fourteen  individuals.  Each 
group  had  obtained  the  upper  hand  in  the  roads  of  one 
or  more  sections.  The  Morgan-Hill  group,  for  exam- 
ple, held  the  Chicago,  Burlington  and  Quincy,  the 
Northern  Pacific,  the  Great  Northern,  the  Southern,  the 
Atlantic  Coast  Line,  the  Erie  and  others,  amounting 
to  47,206  miles.  E.  H.  Harriman,  chairman  of  the 
board  of  directors  of  the  Union  Pacific,  succeeded  in 
obtaining  control  of  so  many  lines  that  by  1901  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  asserted  that  the 
consummation  of  plans  which  he  then  had  in  mind 
would  subject  nearly  one-half  the  territory  of  the 
United  States  to  the  power  of  a single  will.  Before  his 
death  in  1909  he  had  obtained  practical  control  of  a 
system  of  roads  running  from  coast  to  coast  and  pass- 
ing through  the  most  important  cities  of  the  country 
and  had  planned  to  continue  indefinitely  the  process  of 
acquiring  new  lines. 

The  concentration  of  the  banking  interests  of  the 
country  went  hand  in  hand  with  consolidation  in  indus- 
try and  railway  control.  The  unprecedented  opera- 
tions which  have  just  been  mentioned  demanded  un- 
precedented amounts  of  capital  and  credit,  and  the 
concentration  of  these  necessities  occurred  in  New 
York  City.  The  Standard  Oil  group  and  the  Morgan 
group  dominated  the  banking  interests  to  such  an  ex- 
tent that  it  was  doubtful  whether  any  great  business 
enterprise  demanding  large  capital  could  be  started 
without  the  aid  of  one  or  the  other  of  them.  Some 
years  later  a congressional  investigation  was  started, 
to  discover  whether  the  control  of  a few  men  over  the 
financial  affairs  of  the  nation  amounted  to  a “money 
trust,”  and  at  that  time  it  was  found  that  the  members 
of  four  allied  financial  institutions  in  New  York  City 
held  341  directorships  in  banks,  insurance  companies, 


BEGINNING  OP  A NEW  CENTURY  435 

railroads,  steamship  companies  and  trading  and  pub- 
lic utility  corporations,  having  aggregate  resources  of 
$22,245,000,000. 

The  financial  power  thus  placed  in  the  hands  of  a 
small  number  of  men  was  the  cause  of  much  legislation 
passed  by  the  states  and  by  Congress  in  connection 
with  the  railroads  and  trusts.  Opinions  varied  widely 
in  regard  to  the  effects  of  concentration.  On  the  one 
hand  it  was  argued  that  the  men  of  greatest  ability  and 
vision  naturally  came  to  the  top ; that  industry  received 
the  necessary  stabilizing  influence ; that  production  and 
demand  were  compelled  to  harmonize;  that  scientific 
research  directed  toward  the  discovery  of  new  proc- 
esses and  products,  and  the  better  utilization  of  old 
ones  could  be  successfully  carried  on  only  by  concerns 
with  large  resources;  and  that  efficiency  and  economy 
resulted  from  large-scale  operation.  On  the  other 
hand  it  was  pointed  out  that  a small  number  of  persons 
who  were  responsible  to  nobody  could  dominate  the 
fortunes  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  wage  earners, 
manipulate  production,  make  or  break  a region  or  a 
rival,  bring  about  financial  crises  and,  in  a controversy 
or  for  private  gain,  use  a great  industry  or  a railroad 
as  a weapon  and  wreck  it  regardless  of  the  welfare  of 
the  public  at  large. 

Among  the  intellectual  forces  underlying  American 
history  after  1890,  a prominent  place  should  be  given 
to  the  expansion  of  the  public  library,  the  growth  of 
public  education  and  the  development  of  the  press. 
]\[any  libraries,  of  course,  had  been  established  long- 
before  the  Civil  War — the  Library  of  Congress,  for 
example,  ha\dng  been  founded  in  1800 — but  the  great 
growth  of  the  public  library  supported  by  taxation  and 
open  to  all  citizens  alike  occurred  after  1865.  Between 


436 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


that  year  and  1900  no  fewer  than  thirty-seven  states 
passed  laws  enabling  the  towns  within  their  borders  to 
levy  taxes  for  the  support  of  public  libraries ; private 
bequests  amounted  to  fabulous  sums,  the  outstanding 
example  of  which  were  the  gifts  of  Audrey/  Carnegie, 
amounting  to  $62,500,000  between  1881  and  1915.  By 
1914  there  were  over  2.,000  libraries  containing  at  least 
5,000  volumes,  and  forty  that  contained  more  than  200,- 
000  each. 

The  significant  features  in  the  growth  of  education 
between  1865  and  1890  had  been  the  improvement  of 
the  public  grammar  school,  the  establishment  of  high 
schools  and  the  foundation  of  the  great  state  universi- 
ties. After  1890  the  public  high  schools  were  greatly 
improved,  business  and  vocational  courses  were  added, 
and  the  enrollment  at  the  colleges  and  universities  re- 
ceived large  additions.  Such  universities  as  that  in 
Wisconsin  exerted  an  unusual  influence  on  intellectual 
and  political  currents  in  individual  states. 

A large  proportion  of  the  political,  social  and  eco- 
nomic changes  and  reforms  that  have  taken  place  in 
the  United  States  since  1890  have  done  so  because  pub- 
lic opinion  was  educated,  quietly  influenced  or  noisily 
bestirred  by  the  press.  Governors  and  presidents  ap- 
pealed to  their  constituents  through  the  newspaper  and 
the  periodical.  Political  campaigns  have  become  in- 
creasingly matters  of  publicity;  candidates  for  office 
have  their  press  bureaus;  corporations,  abandoning 
their  traditional  policy  of  silence,  explain  their  prac- 
tices ; and  railroads  defend  their  policies  by  means  of 
advertisements  in  the  newspapers.  Newspaper  corre- 
spondents go  out  through  the  country  months  before 
candidates  for  the  presidency  are  nominated,  and  dis- 
cover and  publish  sentiment  favorable  to  the  individual 
whom  the  particular  organ  desires  to  see  placed  in 


437 


438 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


ofifice.  in  1918  the  circulation  of  the  daily  newspapers 
amounted  to  approximately  28,000,000  copies  for  each 
issue.  In  the  North,  the  Middle  West,  and  on  the 
Pacific  Coast  the  number  published  was  sufficient  to 
provide  every  family  with  one  copy.  The  South  and 
the  Rocky  Mountain  region  were  less  well  supplied. 
The  great  metropolitan  newspapers  circulate  widely, 
not  only  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  publisher’s 
office,  but  over  a wide  area  outside.  At  least  one  of 
them  in  1918  approached  half  a million  copies  daily, 
another  exceeded  800,000,  and  a third  issued  nearly 
three-fourths  of  a million  on  Sunday.  William  R. 
Hearst  established  a chain  of  newspapers  which  gave 
him  an  audience  of  over  a million  readers  every  day. 
Several  of  the  weekly  and  monthly  magazines  circu- 
lated in  hundreds  of  thousands  of  copies;  and  one 
weekly  periodical  which  presented  newspaper  opinion 
of  all  shades  of  political  partisanship  had  a circulation 
of  750,000  copies  for  every  issue. 

The  rise  of  the  “muck-rake”  ^ magazines  was  typi- 
cal of  the  ten  years  at  the  opening  of  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury. These  periodicals  printed  articles  which  por- 
trayed a side  of  American  life  not  commonly  discussed 
in  the  newspapers.  One  of  the  earliest  serials  of  this 
type  was  Miss  Ida  M.  Tarbell’s  History  of  the  Stand- 
ard Oil  Company,  published  in  McClure’s  Magazine  iii 
1902-1903.  Instead  of  the  ordinary  eulogy  of  the  size 
and  success  of  the  Company,  Miss  Tarbell  presented 
many  of  its  unfair  practices.  At  the  same  time  and  in 
the  same  publication  Lincoln  Stetfens  was  exposing  the 
seamy  side  of  municipal  affairs  in  “The  Shame  of  the 
Cities.”  Between  1901  and  1906  one  of  the  muck-rake 

iThe  word  originated  in  1906  with  President  Eoosevelt,  who  likened 
certain  sensational  journalists  to  the  man  with  the  Muck-Rake  in 
Bunyan’s  Pilgrim’s  Progress.  Annual  Register,  1900,  442. 


BEGINNING  OF  A NEW  CENTURY  439 


periodicals  increased  its  sales  threefold,  another  four 
and  another  seven. 

Cooperation  among’  newspapers  in  the  gathering  of 
information  is  no  novelty  in  the  United  States,  but  the 
greatest  strides  have  been  taken  since  1890.  By  1915 
the  Associated  Press  had  leased  50,000  miles  of  tele- 
graph wires  forming  a net  all  over  the  country;  it  had 
agents  in  every  important  news  center;  it  exchanged 
services  with  three  European  press  associations ; and 
it  had  its  own  representatives  not  only  in  London, 
Paris,  and  Berlin,  but  in  Fez,  Madeira,  Colombo,  Tsing- 
tan  and  Sydney.  News  from  Europe  reached  New 
York  in  less  than  an  hour  and  was  promptly  sent  to 
900  newspapers,  whence  it  was  copied  in  thousands  of 
daily  and  weekly  publications.  As  in  the  case  of  other 
enterprises  the  publication  of  newspapers  showed  a 
tendency  towards  consolidation.  The  establishment  of 
a new  periodical  became  a million-dollar  venture,  and 
it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  tendency  toward  cen- 
tralization will  result  in  the  publication  only  of  such 
news  or  such  phases  of  the  news  as  meet  the  approval 
of  the  relatively  small  number  of  persons  that  can 
launch  a million-dollar  organization. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  laissez  fairs  was  the  pre- 
vaihng  theory  in  regard  to  the  proper  relation  be- 
tween government  and  industry  during  the  twenty-five 
years  after  the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  except  in  so  far 
as  industrial  organizations  desired  protective  tariffs. 
In  brief  the  upholders  of  this  creed  contended  that 
legislation  should  concern  itself  as  little  as  possible 
Avith  the  regulation  of  trade,  that  it  should  restrict 
itself  to  protecting  commerce  from  interference  and 
that  business  men  should  be  permitted  to  Avork  out 
their  oaa'u  problems  Avith  the  least  possible  reference 


440 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


to  sucli  artificial  forces  as  were  supplied  by  legal  en- 
actments.^ It  would  be  inaccurate  to  say  that  the  the- 
ory of  laissez  faire  had  completely  given  way  by  the 
end  of  the  half  century  after  the  Civil  War.  Nor 
would  it  be  wholly  correct  to  say  that  any  other  the- 
ory has  yet  demonstrated  its  permanent  reliability. 
Nevertheless  the  distinctive  philosophy  upon  which 
later  legislation  has  been  built  is  the  theory  of  public 
interest.  The  theory  needs  definition  in  some  detail, 
because  it  forms  the  philosophy  which  underlies  most 
of  the  political  developments  and  much  of  the  legisla- 
tion of  the  early  twentieth  century. 

As  the  men  of  the  eighties  and  nineties  contemplated 
the  vast  amounts  of  wealth  created  during  those  dec- 
ades they  saw  it  concentrated  to  a great  extent  in  the 
hands  of  the  few.  The  few  believed  that  the  public 
good  was  best  cared  for  in  this  way,  but  an  increasing 
majority  of  the  people  looked  upon  the  tendency  with 
greater  and  greater  alarm.  They  complained  that  the 
railroads  discriminated  in  favor  of  the  powerful  few; 
that  corporations  were  achieving  monopoly;  and  that 
the  government  itself  often  assisted  the  process  by 
framing  tariff  schedules  primarily  for  the  interest  of 
the  manufacturers.  When  the  reaction  against  this 
situation  started,  it  was  of  course  found  that  the  seats 
of  power  were  already  occupied  by  the  adherents  of 
laissez  faire, — the  party  committees,  the  legislatures, 
the  executive  offices  and  the  courts.  There  ensued, 
therefore,  a long  struggle  for  power  and  for  a new 
theory  of  government.  The  land-marks  of  the  contro- 
versy were  to  be  found  in  interstate  commerce  acts, 
anti-trust  laws,  income  taxes,  bureaus  of  labor  and 
factory  legislation. 

The  proponent  of  laissez  faire  would  allow  the  few 

1 Cf.  pp.  94-96  above. 


BEGINNING  OF  A NEW  CENTURY  441 


to  accumulate  large  fortunes  ■which  they  might  share 
with  the  many  through  benefactions,  gifts  to  education, 
libraries,  and  other  public  enterprises ; the  adherent  of 
pubhc  interest  would  inquire  why  the  many  are  poor, 
and  attempt  so  to  change  economic  conditions  as  to  re- 
duce the  number  of  the  poor  to  a minimum.  Instead  of 
framing  laws  so  that  wealth  and  power  would  get  into 
the  hands  of  a small  number  of  individuals,  in  the  ex- 
pectation that  prosperity  would  filter  down  to  the 
many,  the  advocate  of  public  interest  would  aim  his 
legislation  directly  at  what  he  considers  the  needs  of 
the  less  povrerful  classes.  He  would  interfere  wfith 
the  railroads,  for  example,  to  compel  them  to  charge 
uniform  rates,  prevent  corporations  from  electing  pub- 
lic officers  by  means  of  large  contributions  to  campaign 
funds,  force  industry  even  at  some  cost  to  protect  em- 
ployees through  safety  devices,  and  would  hold  the 
great  forests  on  the  public  lands  for  the  direct  good  of 
the  vrhole  people.  The  transfer  of  emphasis  from 
laissez  faire  to  public  interest  was  based  upon  a steady 
growth  in  the  value  placed  upon  the  worth  of  the  indi- 
vidnal  man,  and  upon  a shift  from  legislating  for  the 
fe^v  to  legislating  directly  for  the  multitude.  The 
change  was  greater  than  can  be  indicated  by  citing  any 
one  law  or  group  of  laws.  It  was  “a  new  intellectual 
perspective  through  which  we  view  all  moral  issues 
affecting  society.  ’ ’ ^ 

Underlying  many  of  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  re- 
placing laissez  faire  with  a new  theory,  was  the  atti- 
tude of  the  courts  toward  certain  parts  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  It  will  be  remembered  that  a por- 

1 1 have  drawn  largely  at  this  point  upon  Dr.  W.  J.  Tucker’s  article 
“The  Progress  of  the  Social  Conscience”  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  Sept., 
1915,  289-303.  The  clearest  idea  of  the  transition  from  laissez  faire 
to  public  interest  is  gained  by  reading  the  biography  of  M.  A.  Hanna, 
by  Croly,  and  La  Follette’s  and  Koosevelt’s  autobiographies. 


442 


SIKCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


tioii  of  section  one  of  the  Aniendment  forbids  the  states 
to  “deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property, 
without  due  process  of  law.”  It  will  also  be  remem- 
bered that  the  majority  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  early 
decisions  interpreting  the  Amendment  had  expressed 
the  belief  that  its  purpose  was  the  protection  of  the 
negro.  By  189U,  however,  the  Court  had  come  to  hold 
that  the  word  “person”  as  used  in  the  first  section  in- 
cluded corporations,  and  thus  had  given  the  language 
of  the  Amendment  a greatly  widened  application.  Of 
528  decisions  given  by  the  Court  on  the  Amendment 
between  1890  and  DIO,  only  nineteen  concerned  the 
negro  race,  while  289  affected  corporations.  In  the 
decision  of  the  case  Lochner  v.  New  York,  a state  la^v 
regulating  hours  of  labor  in  bakeries  was  declared  to 
confiict  with  th-e  Amendment,  because  the  right  of  the 
laborer  to  work  as  many  hours  as  he  pleased  was  part 
of  the  “liberty”  which  was  protected  by  the  Amend- 
ment. Laws  regulating  railroad  rates  through  com- 
missions were  held  to  deprive  corporations  of  property 
without  due  process.  Until  recently  changed,  the 
statutes  did  not  allow  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  in 
cases  where  state  courts  declared  state  laws  in  conflict 
with  the  United  States  Constitution,  and  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  therefore  acted  as  a protective  bul- 
wark in  state  as  well  as  nation.  In  brief,  then,  the 
legal  position  of  the  big  industrial  organizations  was 
almost  impregnable  because  of  the  fortuitous  circum- 
stance that  the  words  of  a part  of  the  Constitution 
might  be  held  to  mean  something  which  probably  did 
not  enter  the  minds  of  the  Congress  or  the  state  legis- 
latures which  placed  the  words  in  the  document. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  have  usually  avoided 
hostile  criticism  of  the  Constitution  and  the  decisions 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  they  have  reflected  this  feel- 


BEGINNING  OF  A NEW  CENTURY  443 


ing  in  their  acquiescence  in  the  unexpected  turn  given 
to  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The 
members  of  the  Court,  however,  have  frequently  ex- 
pressed disquietude.  Dissenting  opinions  opposing 
the  view  which  the  Court  has  taken,  have  been  common. 
Mr.  Justice  Harlan  declared  that  the  scope  of  the 
Amendment  was  being  enlarged  far  beyond  its  original 
purpose;  i\fr.  Justice  Holmes  asserted  that  the  word 
“liberty”  was  being  “perverted”  and  that  the  Consti- 
tution was  not  intended  to  embody  laisses  faire  or  any 
other  economic  theory.^ 

The  most  prominent  pioneers  in  replacing  the  old  by 
the  new  theory  were  William  J.  Bryan,  Robert  M. 
LaFollette  and  Theodore  Roosevelt.  Bryan’s  leader- 
ship in  1896  has  already  been  mentioned.  With  cour- 
age and  sincerity  he  attempted  to  solve  the  social  and 
economic  problems  of  his  day,  but  his  youth,  his  inex- 
perience, his  radicalism,  and  the  fact  that  he  did  not 
choose  issues  that  were  immediately  practicable  made 
it  impossible  for  him  to  command  the  confidence  of 
the  majority.  Unable  himself  to  scale  the  heights  of 
reform,  he  nevertheless  pointed  them  out  to  others. 
With  a voice  that  has  been  likened  to  an  organ  with  a 
hundred  stops,  with  persistence,  energy  and  good  na- 
ture he  spread  far  and  wide  a new  conception  of  social 
obligation.  He  insisted  that  the  social  and  economic 
discontent  of  the  South  and  West  were  real,  and  that 
they  could  not  be  laughed  out  of  court  or  frightened 
into  silence. 

La  Follette’s  constructive  pioneer  work  was  done  for 
the  most  part  in  Wisconsin.  During  the  ascendency  of 
the  laissez  faire  theory,  the  state  was  largely  controlled 

1 Usually  cases  involving  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  have  also  in- 
volved other  parts  of  the  Constitution.  The  main  reliance,  however,  in 
such  cases  has  been  the  Amendment  mentioned. 


444 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


by  the  lumber,  railroad  and  other  interests,  using  the 
Republican  party  as  their  political  agency;  and  a small 
but  powerful  group  controlled  the  election  of  state  and 
federal  officials,  the  press  and  state  legislation.  Be- 
tween 1885  aiKl  1891  La  Pollette,  who  was  himself  a Re- 
publican, was  a representative  in  the  federal  House. 
In  the  latter  year  he  came  into  collision  with  Senator 
Sawyer,  a wealthy  lumber  merchant  who  was  the  leader 
of  the  dominant  party  in  the  state.  For  years  the  state 
treasurers  had  been  lending  the  state’s  money  to  fav- 
ored banks  without  interest.  Senator  Sawyer  had 
acted  as  bondsman  for  the  treasurers  and  was  sued  by 
the  attorney-general  of  the  state  for  back  interest. 
LaFollette  threw  himself  into  this  controversy  on  the 
side  of  the  state ; and  being  unable  to  obtain  a hearing 
through  the  usual  medium  of  the  press,  he  and  his 
Supporters  went  directly  to  the  people,  speaking  from 
town  to  town  before  interested  audiences;  and  subse- 
quently the  state  won. 

In  the  Sawyer  controversy  were  visible  all  the  ele- 
ments of  the  later  creed  and  methods  of  LaFollette. 
He  always  remained  mth  the  Republican  party,  pre- 
ferring to  attempt  change  from  within ; and  he  always 
opposed  the  interests  and  found  his  strength  in  direct 
appeals  to  the  people  of  his  state.  Out  of  those  years 
came  the  “Wisconsin  idea,” — a program  which  in- 
cluded the  taxation  of  railroads  and  corporations,  pri- 
maries in  which  the  people  could  nominate  their  own 
candidates  for  office,  the  prohibiting  of  the  acceptance 
of  railroad  passes  by  public  officials,  and  the  conserva- 
tion of  the  forests  and  water  power  of  the  state.  The 
conflict  between  laissez  faire  and  public  interest  in 
Wisconsin  was  long  and  bitter,  but  it  led  to  a series  of 
triumphs  for  LaFollette,  who  was  elected  governor  in 
1900,  1902  and  1904,  and  chosen  to  the  federal  Senate 


BEGINNING  OF  A NEW  CENTUEY  445 


in  1905.  In  the  meanwhile  there  was  a widespread  de- 
mand throughout  the  West  for  legislation  along  the 
lines  marked  out  by  Wisconsin. 

Party  lines  are  so  dra^^^l  in  the  United  States  that 
it  is  difficult  for  like-minded  men  of  different  parties  to 
cooperate  in  furthering  a program.  The  three  pio- 
neers were  men  whose  capacities  and  personal  qualities 
differed  greatly,  but  in  their  economic  and  political 
philosophy  they  were  nearer  to  one  another  than  to  the 
rank  and  file  of  their  o^^^l  parties.  Bryan  in  1902  re- 
fused to  take  part  in  the  Democratic  campaign  in  Wis- 
consin because  he  favored  LaFollette’s  program,  and 
in  1905  he  even  aided  the  latter  in  his  fight  for  railroad 
regulation;  in  1912  Bryan  found  Eoosevelt  leading  a 
revolt  in  the  Eepublican  party  on  a program  to  much  of 
which  he  could  give  unqualified  assent;  and  of  LaFol- 
lette,  Eoosevelt  said  in  the  same  year : ‘ ‘ Thanks  to  the 

movement  for  genuinely  democratic  popular  govern- 
ment which  Senator  LaFollette  led  to  overwhelming 
victory  in  Wisconsin,  that  state  has  become  literally  a 
laboratory  for  wise  experimental  legislation  aiming  to 
secure  the  social  and  political  betterment  of  the  people 
as  a whole.” 

Eoosevelt ’s  own  share  in  the  history  of  the  early 
twentieth  century  was  of  such  magnitude  as  to  require 
a more  extended  account. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  literature  is  voluminous  and  not  easy  to  evaluate.  On 
population  changes  and  immigration,  the  best  source  is  the 
Abstract  of  the  Thirteenth  (1910)  Census  (1913),  with  the 
Atlas  accompanying  it  (1914)  ; Keports  of  the  Immigration 
Commission,  appointed  under  the  Congressional  Act  of  Feb. 
20,  1907  (42  vols.,  1911),  is  exhaustive;  F.  A.  Ogg,  National 
Progress  (1918),  has  a good  chapter;  consult  Joseph  Schafer, 


446 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAK 


A History  of  the  Pacific  Northwest  (rev.  ed.,  1918),  for  Wash- 
ington and  Oregon. 

The  consolidation  in  industry,  railroads  and  finance  may  be 
followed  in : A.  D.  Noyes,  Forty  Years  of  American  Finance 
(1909)  ; John  Moody,  I'he  Truth  about  the  Trusts  (1904)  ; 
Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Corporations  on  the  Steel  In- 
dustry (3  parts,  1911),  on  the  United  States  Steel  Corpora- 
tion; Anna  P.  Youngman,  Fconomic  Causes  of  Great  For- 
tunes (1909)  ; C.  K.  Van  Hise,  Concentration  and  Control  a 
Solution  of  the  Trust  Problem  in  the  United  States  (rev.  ed., 
1914)  ; E.  R.  Johnson  and  T.  W.  Van  i\Ietre,  Principles  of 
Railroad  Transportation  (1916)  ; John  Moody,  The  Railroad 
Builders  (1919)  ; Jolui  iMoody,  The  Masters  of  Capital  (1919)  ; 
and  Report  of  the  Committee  Appointed  Pursuant  to  House 
Resolut'ons  429  and  501  to  Pnvestigate  the  Concentration  of 
Control  of  Money  ami  Credit,  (Pujo  Committee)  1913. 

There  is  no  satisfactory  study  of  the  social  and  political 
effects  of  the  great  increase  in  the  circulation  of  newspapers 
and  periodicals.  Suggestive  articles  are;  World’s  Work 
(Oct.,  1916),  “Stalking  for  Nine  Million  Votes”;  Arena 
(July,  1909),  “The  IMaking  of  Public  Opinion”;  Atlantic 
Monthly.  (Mar.,  1910),  “Suppression  of  Important  News.” 
Less  superficial  articles  are  those  of  AV alter  Lippmann  in  the 
Atlantic  Monthly  (Nov.,  Dee.,  1919).  The  statistics  are 
available  in  N.  W.  Ayer,  American  N etvspaper  Annual  and 
Directory. 

The  emergence  of  the  theory  of  public  interest  is  best  seen 
in  the  Autobiography  of  R.  M.  La  Pollette  (4th  ed.,  1920)  ; 
consult  also  Theodore  Roosevelt,  Autobiography,  and  C.  G. 
Washburn,  Theodore  Roosevelt;  the  Logic  of  his  Career 
(1916).  A profound  article  is  W.  J.  Tucker,  “The  Progress 
of  the  Social  Conscience,”  in  Atlantic  Monthly  (Sept.,  1915). 

On  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  consult  the  volumes  al- 
ready mentioned  under  Chap.  IV. 

There  are  no  thorough  estimates  of  Bryan  and  LaFollette. 
On  the  former:  Atlantic  Monthly  (Sept.,  1912),  and  Nine- 
teenth Century  (July,  1915)  ; H.  Croly,  Promise  of  Ameri- 
can Life  (1914),  is  critical.  W.  J.  Bryan,  First  Battle  (1897), 


BEGINNING  OF  A NEW  CENTURY  447 


is  essential.  On  La  Follette,  his  own  narrative  as  given  in  the 
Autobiography  is  best,  but  should  be  read  with  care  as  it  was 
written  in  the  heat  of  partisan  controversy.  See  also  F.  C. 
Howe,  Wisconsin  an  Experiment  in  Democracy  (1912), 
friendly  to  La  Follette. 

Frank  Norris,  The  Octopus,  and  The  Pit;  Winston 
Churchill,  Coniston  and  Mr.  Crewe’s  Career;  and  Upton  Sin- 
clair, The  Jungle,  are  illustrative  fiction. 


CHAPTER  XX 


THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 

SELDOM,  in  times  of  peace,  is  the  personality  of  a 
single  individual  so  important  as  that  of  Theo- 
dore Roosevelt  during  the  early  years  of  the  twentieth 
century.  At  the  time  of  his  accession  to  the  presi- 
dency, he  lacked  a month  of  being  forty-three  years 
old,  but  the  range  of  his  experience  in  politics  had  been 
far  beyond  his  age.  In  his  early  twenties,  soon  after 
leaving  Harvard,  he  had  entered  the  Assembly  of  the 
state  of  New  York.  President  Harrison  had  made  him 
Civil  Service  Commissioner  in  1889,  and  he  had  been 
successively  President  of  the  Board  of  Police  Commis- 
sioners of  New  York  City,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  an  important  figure  in  the  war  with  Spain,  and 
Governor  of  New  York.  He  had  been  known  as  a 
young  man  of  promise — energetic,  independent  and 
progressive — and  in  addition  to  his  political  activities 
he  had  found  time  to  write  books  on  historical  subjects, 
see  something  of  life  on  a western  ranch  and  develop  a 
somewhat  defective  physique  into  an  engine  of  physi- 
cal power. 

Brimming  with  energy,  nimble  of  mind,  impetuous, 
sure  of  himself,  quick  to  strike,  a fearless  foe,  frank, 
resourceful,  audacious,  honest,  versatile — Roosevelt 
possessed  the  qualities  which  would  challenge  the  ad- 
miration of  the  typical  American.  One  who  frequently 
saw  him  at  work  described  thus  the  way  in  which  he 
prepared  a message  to  be  sent  to  the  Senate: 

448  • 


THEODOEE  EOOSEVELT 


449 


He  storms  up  and  dowui  the  room,  dictating  in  a loud  and 
oratorical  tone,  often  stopping,  recasting  a sentence,  striking 
out  and  filling  in,  hospitable  to  every  suggestion,  not  in  the 
least  disturbed  by  interruption,  holding  on  stoutly  to  his  pur- 
pose, and  producing  finally,  out  of  these  most  unpromising 
conditions,  a clear  and  logical  statement,  Tvhieh  he  could  not 
improve  with  solitude  and  leisure  at  his  command. 

The  breadth  of  his  interests,  the  democratic  character 
of  his  friendships — for  he  was  equally  at  home  with 
blue-stocking,  politician,  cowboy  and  artisan — his  com- 
plete loyalty  to  his  friends  and  his  disregard  of  con- 
ventionalities gave  him  a grip  upon  popular  favor  that 
had  not  been  duplicated  since  the  days  of  Andrew 
Jackson,  unless  by  Lincoln.  The  effectiveness  of  so 
compelling  a personality  Avas  in  no  way  diminished  by 
EooseAmlt’s  possession  of  Avhat  a journalist  Avould  call 
“news  sense.”  He  was  made  for  publicity;  he  had  an 
instinct  for  the  dramatic.  His  speeches  were  remoA^ed 
from  mediocrity  by  his  evudent  sincerity,  his  abounding 
interest  in  eAmry  occasion  at  Avhich  he  was  called  upon 
to  talk  and  the  phrases  that  Avere  half  victories  AAdiich 
he  coined  almost  at  Avill.  “Mollycoddle,”  “muckrak- 
ing,” “the  square  deal,”  “the  big  stick”  became 
familiar  idioms  in  the  vernacular  of  politics  and  the 
street.  The  political  leadership  of  Eoosevelt  rested 
mainly  upon  his  personal  prestige  and  upon  his  attri- 
butes as  a reformer.  With  unerring  prescience  he 
chose  those  political  issues  Avhich  Avould  make  a AAude 
appeal  and  Avhich  could  be  pressed  quickly  to  a success- 
ful conclusion.  His  complete  integrity  saAmd  him  from 
mere  opportunism;  his  ruggedly  practical  common- 
sense  saA^ed  him  from  that  combination  of  high  pur- 
pose and  slight  accomplishment  Avhich  has  character- 
ized many  other  reformers. 

Xo  estimate  of  the  deficiencies  in  Eoosevelt ’s  per- 


450 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAH 


soiiality  and  leadership  would  be  agreed  upon  at  the 
present  time.  In  some  cases — as  in  the  realm  of  inter- 
national relations — only  the  future  can  decide  whether 
he  was  a prophet  or  a chauvinist ; in  all  cases,  opinions 
have  differed  widely,  for  Roosevelt  could  scarcely  ex- 
plore a river,  describe  a natural  phenomenon  or  urge 
a political  innovation  without  thereby  arousing  a con- 
troversy in  which  his  friends  and  his  opponents  would 
participate  with  equal  intensity.  His  identification  of 
himself  with  his  purposes  was  as  complete  as  that  of 
Andrew  Jackson;  opposition  to  his  proposals  was  reck- 
oned as  opposition  to  him  as  an  individual.  Like  many 
leaders  of  the  fighting  type,  he  was  frequently  weak 
when  judging  the  motives  of  those  who  disagreed  with 
him.  One  of  his  admirers  declared  that  his  greatest 
political  defect  was  an  impatience  of  any  interval  be- 
tween an  expressed  desire  for  an  act  and  the  accom- 
plishment of  the  deed  itself — an  inability  to  stand 
through  years  of  defeat  for  the  future  success  of  an 
ideal.  A keener  and  equally  sympathetic  critic  dubbed 
him  the  “sportsman”  in  politics — honest,  hard-hitting, 
but  playing  the  issue  which  had  an  immediate  political 
effect.  , 

At  the  outset  of  his  administration  Roosevelt  was 
apparently  an  adherent  of  the  prevailing  Republican 
creed — protective  tariff,  gold  standard,  imperialism, 
laissez  faire  and  the  rest.  His  first  official  utterance 
after  becoming  President  was  an  indication  that  he 
would  continue  unbroken  the  policies  of  his  predeces- 
sor, and  to  this  end  he  insisted  that  the  cabinet  should 
remain  intact.^  His  foreign  policy  was  aggressive ; his 
interest  in  the  military  and  naval  establishments,  real 

1 In  view  of  the  later  activities  of  President  Roosevelt,  there  is  point 
in  the  remark  of  a satirist  that  Roosevelt  did  carry  out  the  policies  of 
McKinley — and  bury  them.  Atlantic  Monthly,  CIX,  164. 


THEODOEE  ROOSEVELT 


451 


and  constant.  Roosevelt  was  more  venturesome  tlian 
McKinley,  and  more  ready  to  experiment  with  new 
ideas.  He  took  up  the  duties  of  his  position  Avith  an 
unaffected  zest  and  enthusiasm;  he  looked  upon  the 
presidential  office  as  an  exhilarating  adventure  in 
national  and  eA^en  international  affairs.  As  time  Avent 
on,  therefore,  it  became  more  and  more  evident  that  he 
AA'as  prepared  to  play  a big  role  on  a great  stage. 
MoreoA’er,  feAV  doubts  concerning  the  constitutional 
poAA'ers  of  the  executHe  position  seem  eA’er  to  haA^e 
assailed  him.  WhateA^er  may  haAm  been  his  theory  at 
the  outset  of  his  presidency,  he  came  eventually  to  be- 
lieve that  the  executiA'e  poAA’er  Avas  limited  only  by  the 
specific  restrictions  and  prohibitions  appearing  in  the 
Constitution,  or  imposed  by  Congress  in  Iuaa^s  which  it 
had  constitutional  authority  to  pass.  The  scope  AAdiich 
this  theory  presented  for  the  exercise  of  his  energetic 
originality  is  eAudent  AAdien  contrasted  Avith  the  theory 
of  his  predecessors,  Avho  had,  in  times  of  peace,  held  to 
the  belief  that  the  executHe  possessed  only  the  poAA^ers 
specifically  designated  by  the  Constitution. 

Not  until  some  future  time,  when  the  events  of  the 
early  tAventieth  century  are  better  understood,  aauII  it 
be  possible  to  judge  accurately  the  value  of  President 
RooseA^elt’s  regime  in  its  relation  to  the  control  of 
railroads  and  corporations.  There  can  be  no  doubt, 
however,  that  one  of  the  most  serious  problems  that 
faced  the  American  people  during  that  time  Avas  the 
position  which  the  gwernment  ought  to  occupy  toAA^ard 
the  business  interests  of  the  nation.  Not  only  Avere 
the  railroads  and  the  great  corporations  the  center  of 
the  economic  life  of  the  people,  but  their  social  and 
political  effects  Avere  momentous. 

Neither  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  of  1887  nor  the 


452 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Sherman  Anti-trust  law  of  1890,  it  will  be  remembered, 
had  accomplished  what  had  been  expected  of  them. 
The  Interstate  Commerce  law  had  met  with  grave  ob- 
stacles in  the  courts  ;the  Sherman  act  had  been  seldom 
invoked  by  the  federal  executive,  and  in  the  most 
prominent  case.  United  States  v.  E.  C.  Knight  Co.,  the 
government  had  failed  to  obtain  the  decision  it  desired. 
Government  regnlation  seemed  like  a broken  reed.^  A 
few  cases,  however,  had  indicated  the  possibility  that 
strength  might  be  discovered  in  the  law.  In  United 
States  V.  the  Trans-Missouri  Freight  Association,  the 
Supreme  Court  had  declared  that  the  Anti-trust  act 
applied  to  railroads  and  that  it  forbade  agreements 
among  them  to  maintain  rates;  two  years  later,  in 
1899,  the  Court  pronounced  illegal  a combination  of 
pipe  manufacturers  in  the  Middle  West,  on  the  ground 
that  its  result  was  to  restrain  interstate  commerce. 

Roosevelt,  like  Bryan  and  LaFollette,  had  been  grop- 
ing his  way  to  an  understanding  of  the  importance  of 
the  new  problem.  During  his  term  as  Governor  of 
New  York  he  had  clashed  with  the  older  political  lead- 
ers when  he  supported  an  act  looking  to  the  heavier 
taxation  of  railway  franchises.  The  first  recommenda- 
tions in  his  message  to  Congress  on  December  3,  1901, 
concerned  the  subject  of  the  relation  of  government 
and  industry.  The  accumulation  of  wealth  in  recent 
years  in  the  United  States,  he  asserted,  had  been  due  to 
natural  causes,  and  much  of  the  antagonism  aroused 
thereby  was  without  warrant.  Nevertheless  grave 
evils  had  attended  the  process : overcapitalization  was 
one;  untruthful  representations  concerning  the  value 
of  the  properties  in  which  business  asked  the  public  to 
invest  was  another.  Such  evils  should  be  attacked; 
with  extreme  care,  to  be  sure,  but  also  with  resolution. 

1 Above,  p.  257. 


THEODOEE  EOOSEVELT 


453 


Combination  and  concentration,  lie  tliouglit,  should  be 
supervised  and,  within  reasonable  limits,  controlled. 
The  remedies  which  the  President  suggested  were 
simple:  in  the  interest  of  the  public  the  government 
should  have  the  right  to  inspect  the  workings  of  organ- 
izations engaged  in  interstate  commerce;  because  of 
the  lack  of  uniformity  in  corporation  legislation  within 
the  states,  the  federal  government  should  so  extend 
its  iiower  as  to  include  supervision  of  corporations ; a 
Department  of  Commerce  and  Industries  should  be  es- 
tablished, whose  head  should  be  a cabinet  officer;  the 
Interstate  Commerce  law  should  be  amended;  railway 
rates  should  be  just,  and  should  be  the  same  to  all 
shippers  alike,  and  the  government  should  be  the  agent 
to  provide  a remedy  to  this  end. 

The  enthusiastic  reception  accorded  the  message  by 
the  press  indicated  that  one  or  another  of  its  numerous 
recommendations  met  with  approval.  The  effect  on 
Congress,  however,  of  the  portion  dealing  with  inter- 
state commerce  was  represented  by  a cartoon  in  the 
New  York  World.  Uncle  Sam  was  there  portrayed 
stowing  away  for  later  attention  a bundle  of  manu- 
script labelled  “President’s  Message  1901.  30,000 
words,”  while  he  smilingly  remarked  “When  I git 
time!”  But  Roosevelt  was  not  content  to  let  the  mat- 
ter drop,  and  in  the  following  summer  he  took  the  un- 
usual step  of  carrying  his  message  directly  to  the 
people.  In  the  New  England  states  first,  and  later 
in  the  West,  he  declared  his  creed  on  the  federal  regula- 
tion of  industry.  The  effectiveness  of  the  campaign 
was  increased  by  the  moderation  of  the  President,  by 
his  increasing  popularity  and  by  the  many  telling 
phrases,  with  which  he  enforced  his  main  thesis.  The 
Sherman  act  looked  less  like  a broken  reed  when  the 
chief  executive  of  the  nation  declared:  “As  far  as  the 


454 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


anti-trust  laws  go  they  will  be  enforced  . . . and  when 
(a)  suit  is  undertaken  it  will  not  be  compromised  except 
upon  the  basis  that  the  Government  wins.”  Here  and 
there  objection  was  raised  that  the  program  was  not 
sufficiently  definite;  now  and  then  a critic  hazarded  a 
conjecture  that  Roosevelt  had  not  consulted  the  lead- 
ers of  his  party;  but  in  the  main  he  succeeded  in  ob- 
taining a sympathetic  hearing.  At  this  juncture  the 
coal  strike  of  1902  gave  him  one  of  those  fortunate  op- 
portunities which  were  commonly  referred  to  as  a part 
of  “Roosevelt’s  luck.”  With  no  uncertain  hand  he 
seized  the  opportunity  which  chance  presented. 

Before  1899,  there  had  been  no  organization  of  the 
anthracite  miners  with  sufficient  strength  to  force  any 
changes  in  the  conditions  under  which  the  men  per- 
formed their  work.  During  that  year  the  United  Mine 
Workers  of  America  began  to  send  organizers  into  the 
Pennsylvania  region.  In  1900  the  men  struck,  but  an 
agreement  was  reached  with  the  operators  and  work 
was  resumed.  The  settlement,  however,  was  not  satis- 
factory to  either  side,  and  in  1902  the  workers  asked 
for  a conference.  The  presidents  of  the  coal  companies 
and  the  coal-carrying  railroads  replied  that  they  were 
always  ready  to  meet  their  own  employees  but  would 
have  no  dealings  with  a general  labor  organization. 
Smaller  causes  of  unrest  were  the  demand  for  more 
pay,  shorter  hours,  and  payment  for  coal  by  weight 
instead  of  by  the  car,  but  the  fundamental  issue  was 
the  recognition  of  the  union — the  workmen  insisting  on 
collective  bargaining,  the  operators  refusing  it.  The 
men  were  helpless  except  as  a union;  the  roads  were 
sure  of  keeping  the  upper  hand  if  they  dealt  with  the 
men  individually  or  in  small  groups.  When  attempts 
at  conference  failed,  the  miners  struck  and  from  May 
12  until  October  23  nearly  147,000  of  them  remained 


THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  455 

idle.  The  total  loss  to  miners  and  operators  was 
nearly  $100,000,000. 

Since  the  Pennsylvania  fields  were  almost  the  sole 
source  of  supply  for  anthracite  coal,  discomfort  was 
soon  felt  in  the  North  and  West,  and  as  the  cooler 
weather  came  on,  suffering  became  acute  and  public 
feeling  bordered  on  panic.  A winter  without  hard  coal 
could  hardly  be  contemplated  without  grave  misgiv- 
ings. Popular  opinion,  meanwhile,  went  increasingly 
to  the  side  of  the  miners.  The  refusal  of  the  operators 
to  confer,  and  the  propriety  of  the  conduct  of  the  work- 
men made  a wide  impression  that  was  favorable  to  the 
union.  Moreover,  George  F.  Baer,  President  of  the 
Philadelphia  and  Reading  Company,  spoke  of  himself 
and  his  associates  in  a letter  to  a correspondent  as 
those  “Christian  men  to  whom  God  in  His  infinite  wis- 
dom has  given  the  control  of  the  property  interests  of 
the  country.”  The  remark  was  widely  quoted  and 
generally  looked  upon  as  evidence  of  a selfish  and  un- 
compromising individualism.^  The  strike  having  now 
become  a matter  of  national  importance.  President 
Roosevelt  requested  the  operators  and  representatives 
of  the  miners  to  meet  him  in  Washington,  October  3. 
At  this  conference  the  spokesman  of  the  railroads  re- 
fused mediation,  while  the  leader  of  the  United  Mine 
Workers,  John  Mitchell,  proposed  arbitration  and 
pledged  the  workers  to  accept  it. 

After  the  refusal  of  the  operators  to  accept  the 
President’s  conciliatory  offer,  he  decided  to  apply  pres- 
sure. He  obtained  the  consent  of  Grover  Cleveland 
to  act  as  chairman  of  a commission  of  investigation  and 
determined  to  seize  the  mines  by  military  force,  if 

1 It  was  later  denied  that  Baer  made  the  statement,  but  a photographic 
copy  of  the  letter  was  printed  in  Lloyd,  Henry  D.  Lloyd,  II,  190.  See 
also  Mitchell,  Organized  Labor,  384;  Peck,  Twenty  Years,  693-6. 


456 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


necessary,  operate  them  as  a receiver  and  await  the 
report  of  his  commission.  In  some  way,  which  can 
not  now  be  indicated  with  certainty,  the  operators  were 
influenced  to  accept  mediation,  and  the  President  ap- 
pointed a commission  with  Judge  George  Gray  as  chair- 
man.^ The  miners  immediately  returned  to  work,  coal 
began  again  to  flow  to  the  North,  and  public  rejoicing 
was  extreme.  The  President’s  Commission  at  once 
repaired  to  Pennsylvania,  heard  558  witnesses,  visited 
the  mines,  and  inspected  machinery  and  the  homes  of 
the  miners.  It  concluded  that  neither  side  was  com- 
pletely in  the  right,  and  therefore  made  an  award  that 
satisfied  some  of  the  complaints  of  both  parties.  In 
the  history  of  the  relation  between  the  federal  govern- 
ment and  the  business  interests  of  the  nation,  the 
anthracite  strike  of  1902  is  of  marked  significance.  The 
operators  had  given  evidence  of  a failure  to  understand 
that  their  business  so  concerned  the  nation  that  the 
interest  of  the  public  in  it  must  be  heeded.  The  suc- 
cessful outcome  enhanced  the  prestige  of  the  govern- 
ment and  of  the  President,  and  an  example  of  the  need 
of  greater  control  over  corporations  received  wide 
publicity  at  the  precise  moment  when  the  general  sub- 
ject was  uppermost  in  the  popular  mind. 

The  first  legislative  evidence  of  the  result  of  the  agi- 
tation for  the  more  effective  regulation  of  industry 
was  an  act  approved  on  February  11,  1903,  by  which 
any  suit  brought  in  a Circuit  Court  by  the  United 
States  government  under  the  Sherman  Anti-trust  act 
or  the  Interstate  Commerce  law,  could  be  given  prece- 
dence over  other  cases  at  the  desire  of  the  Attorney- 
General.  Three  days  later  a law  was  passed  wliich 

1 Rumor  says  that  Roosevelt  sent  Elihu  Root  to  the  eminent  financial 
magnate,  J.  P.  Morgan,  with  information  of  his  intent  to  appoint  the 
Cleveland  Commission,  and  that  Morgan  applied  the  pressure  to  the 
coal  operators. 


TPiEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


457 


established  a Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor, 
whose  chief  was  to  be  a cabinet  officer.  Included  in  the 
Department  was  a Bureau  of  Corporations  headed  by 
a Commissioner,  who  was  authorized  to  investigate  the 
organization  and  conduct  of  the  business  of  corpora- 
tions. Within  another  five  days  the  Elkins  Act  had 
been  passed — a law  designed  to  eliminate  rebating. 
Despite  the  Interstate  Commerce  act,  the  practice  of 
rebating  had  continued.  Agreement  was  general  that 
railroad  men  who,  in  other  respects,  were  perfectly 
scrupulous,  commonly  violated  the  law  in  order  to  get 
business  in  competition  with  their  rivals.  Among  the 
railroad  men  who  had  violated  the  law  but  who  depre- 
cated the  necessity  of  so  doing,  was  Paul  Morton,  presi- 
dent of  the  Santa  Fe  system.  Morton  volunteered  to 
assist  Roosevelt  in  stamping  out  the  evil,  and  the 
Elkins  law  was  designed  to  aid  in  this  process.  It  for- 
bade any  variation  from  published  rates,  made  both  a 
corporation  and  its  agents  punishable  for  offenses 
against  the  law,  prohibited  the  receiving  of  rebates  as 
well  as  giving  them,  and  made  the  penalty  for  failure 
to  observe  the  provisions  of  the  Act  a fine  of  one  thou- 
sand to  twenty  thousand  dollars.  Furthermore,  dur- 
ing February,  1903,  Congress  appropriated  $500,000 
to  be  expended  under  the  direction  of  the  Attorney- 
General  for  the  better  enforcement  of  the  anti-trust 
and  interstate  commerce  laws. 

In  1903,  likewise,  was  initiated  an  important  judicial 
proceeding  in  the  direction  of  the  enforcement  of  the 
Sherman  law.  The  Great  Northern  Railway  Company 
and  the  Northern  Pacific  Railway  Company  operated 
parallel  competing  lines  of  road  extending  from  the 
region  of  Lake  Superior  to  the  Pacific  Coast.  An  at- 
tempted consolidation  of  the  two  had  been  declared 
illegal  under  the  statutes  of  the  state  of  Minnesota. 


458 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


On  November  13,  1901,  under  the  leadership  of  two  of 
the  foremost  railway  magnates  of  the  nation,  J.  J. 
Hill  and  J.  P.  Morgan,  there  had  been  organized  the 
Northern  Securities  Company,  to  purchase  and  control 
at  least  a majority  of  the  shares  of  the  capital  stock 
of  the  two  lines  of  railway.  In  this  way  the  two  roads 
would  be  operated  as  one,  their  earnings  pooled,  com- 
petition between  the  two  eliminated  and  a virtual  con- 
solidation effected.  On  the  advice  of  the  Attorney- 
General,  Philander  C.  Knox,  President  Roosevelt  di- 
rected that  proceedings  be  instituted  against  the  hold- 
ing company- — an  act  that  seemed  almost  useless  in 
view  of  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the 
Knight  Case.  But  the  decision  in  the  Northern  Se- 
curities Case,  handed  down  in  1904,  was  a surprise. 
By  a vote  of  five  to  four  the  Court  declared  the  com- 
pany a combination  in  restraint  of  trade,  and  therefore 
illegal  under  the  Sherman  act,  and  enjoined  any  at- 
tempt on  its  part  to  control  the  affairs  of  either  of  the 
two  railways. 

Nineteen  hundred  and  four,  the  year  of  the  presi- 
dential election,  found  Roosevelt  in  a strong  position. 
His  success  in  handling  the  coal  strike  and  his  energetic 
preparations  for  the  crusade  against  trust  evils  had 
struck  a responsive  chord  in  the  popular  mind.  Late 
in  1903  he  had  announced  to  Congress  that  frauds  had 
been  discovered  in  the  post  office  and  land  office,  and 
urged  the  appropriation  of  funds  for  the  prosecution 
of  the  offenders.  The  result  was  a house-cleaning 
which  involved  the  conviction  of  many  officials,  includ- 
ing two  United  States  senators.  Roosevelt’s  popular- 
ity became  greater  than  ever. 

U was  to  be  expect '^d,  however,  that  some  opposition 
would  appear  to  the  nomination  of  Roosevelt  for  a con- 


THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


459 


tinuation  of  his  term  of  office,  and  it  was  around  the 
forceful  Mark  Hanna  that  the  opposition  began  gradu- 
ally to  center.  Hanna  had  attained  remarkable  in- 
fluence as  a senator,  was  highly  trusted  by  the  business 
interests  and  was  popular  among  southern  Republi- 
cans. But  his  death  in  February,  1904,  effectively 
ended  any  opposition  to  Roosevelt,  since  it  was  then 
too  late  to  focus  attention  upon  any  other  competitor. 

The  Republican  nominating  convention,  therefore, 
which  met  in  Chicago  on  June  21,  lacked  any  semblance 
of  a contest,  and  the  President  was  renominated  with- 
out opposition.  The  platform  was  of  the  traditional 
sort.  The  history  of  the  party  was  approved ; its 
achievements  in  giving  prosperity  to  the  country  and 
peaceful  government  to  the  island  possessions  were 
recounted;  the  protective  tariff,  the  gold  standard,  an 
isthmian  canal,  the  improvement  of  the  army  and 
navy,  the  continuation  of  civil  service  reform  and  a 
vigorous  foreign  policy, — on  all  these  the  party  utter- 
ance was  that  of  other  days.  Surprisingly  little  was 
said  upon  the  subject  of  the  regulation  of  coiporations. 
The  few  steps  already  taken  were  approved,  hut  as  to 
the  future,  the  platform  was  almost  colorless: 

Combinations  of  capital  and  of  labor  are  the  results  of  the 
economic  movement  of  the  age,  but  neither  must  be  permitted 
to  infringe  upon  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  people.  Such 
combinations,  when  lawfully  formed  for  lawful  purposes,  are 
alike  entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  laws,  but  both  are  sub- 
ject to  the  laws,  and  neither  can  be  permitted  to  break  them. 

The  Democratic  convention  met  in  St.  Louis  on  July 
6,  and  the  excitement  which  marked  its  proceedings 
compensated  for  the  lack  of  interest  at  the  Republican 
meeting.  As  dravm  up  by  a sub-committee  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Resolutions,  the  platform  was,  in  many  of 


460 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


its  planks,  a distinct  return  to  the  programs  of  the 
days  before  1896.  It  urged  a reduction  of  the  tariff, 
generous  pensions  and  civil  service  reform,  together 
with  the  enforcement  of  the  anti-trust  laws  and  the 
popular  election  of  senators.  In  the  main,  it  was  de- 
voted to  a condemnation  of  the  existing  Republican 
administration,  which  it  denounced  as  “spasmodic, 
erratic,  sensational,  spectacular  and  arbitrary.”  It 
also  contained  a paragraiDh  declaring  that  the  question 
of  the  money  standard  had  ceased  to  be  an  issue,  on  the 
ground  that  recent  discoveries  of  gold  had  enormously 
increased  the  supply  of  currency  in  the  country. 
Bryan  did  not  approve.  With  characteristic  energy  he 
threw  himself  into  an  all-night  fight  in  the  Committee 
in  behalf  of  a silver  plank.  His  defeat  indicated  that 
the  convention  was  in  the  hands  of  his  opponents  and 
the  platform  as  adopted  contained  no  reference  to  the 
currency. 

The  delegates  had,  in  fact,  come  to  the  meeting  with 
the  distinct  purpose  of  returning  to  the  “safe  and 
sane”  democracy  of  Grover  Cleveland.  To  that  end, 
the  platform  was  to  drop  the  silver  issue  and  Bryan 
was  to  be  replaced  by  a more  conservative  leader.  The 
radical  forces  centered  their  strength  upon  William  R. 
Hearst,  but  they  were  in  a distinct  minority,  and  in  the 
end,  the  Cleveland  wing  succeeded  in  nominating  Judge 
Alton  B.  Parker  of  New  York.  As  soon  as  he  was 
notified  of  his  nomination.  Judge  Parker  telegraphed 
to  the  convention  that  he  regarded  the  gold  standard 
as  irrevocably  established  and  that  he  must  decline  to 
be  the  party  candidate  if  his  attitude  on  the  currency 
was  unsatisfactory  to  the  delegates.  Thereupon  the 
convention  replied  that  the  platform  was  silent  on  the 
question  of  a monetary  standard  because  it  was  not 
regarded  as  a campaign  issue.  Parker  was  satisfied 


THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


461 


with  the  reply,  and  the  last  word  was  written  upon  a 
question  that  had  disturbed  politics  for  many  years. 

The  succeeding  campaign  was  unusually  listless. 
Parker  did  not  inspire  enthusiasm,  although  a man  of 
undoubted  integrity  and  ability,  and  the  personality  of 
Roosevelt  was  the  controlling  force.  Only  at  the  close 
of  the  canvass  did  a passing  interest  appear  in  some 
charges  made  by  Parker.  He  called  attention  to  the 
fact  that  Secretary  Cortelyou  of  the  Department  of 
Commerce  and  Labor  had  been  charged  with  the  duty 
of  examining  the  acts  of  corporations  and  had  then  re- 
signed to  become  chairman  of  the  National  Republican 
Committee.  Parker  insinuated  that  Cortelyou  was 
using  information  about  corporate  misdoing,  which  he 
had  discovered,  in  order  to  force  large  contributions 
from  the  business  interests.  He  also  declared  that  the 
Republican  campaign  was  being  financed  by  the  cor- 
porations. Roosevelt  did  not  answer  the  charges  until 
three  days  before  the  election,  and  then  he  asserted  that 
the  statements  made  by  Parker  were  “unqualifiedly 
and  atrociously  false.”  Later  investigations  have 
shown  that  in  general  Parker  was  correct  in  his  com- 
plaint as  to  the  activities  of  the  corporations,  although 
he  would  have  found  difficulty  in  pro\dng  his  charges 
in  detail.  The  same  investigations,  however,  indicated 
that  some  of  the  Democratic  campaign  fund  had  come 
from  similar  sources. 

The  election  resulted  in  the  choice  of  President 
Roosevelt,  whose  popular  vote  was  7,600,000  to  Park- 
er’s 5,000,000.  In  the  more  populous  sections  of  the 
country,  which  Avere  normally  Republican,  the  party 
vote  scarcely  exceeded  that  of  1900,  but  in  the  Far 
West,  the  increases  Avere  notable.  Beyond  the  Missis- 
sippi River,  except  in  the  southern  states,  hardly  a 
county  gave  a majority  for  Parker,  showing  that  the 


462 


Note:  Arizona.  New  Mexico  and  Oklahoma,  being  territories,  had  no  vote. 


THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


463 


region  whicli  had  gone  to  Bryan  in  1896  was  substan- 
tially solid  for  Roosevelt.  Indeed,  the  policies  to  which 
Roosevelt  was  committed  bore  a greater  resemblance 
to  the  principles  of  Bryan  than  to  the  laissez  faire  phi- 
losophy to  which  many  important  Republican  leaders 
adhered.  Despite  their  dissent,  however,  his  victory 
in  the  election  was  so  overwhelming  that  he  could  carry 
out  his  program  vdth  the  irresistible  pressure  of  public 
opinion  behind  him. 

During  the  campaign  year,  the  Commissioner  of  Cor- 
porations was  busy  investigating  the  activities  of  the 
so-called  “beef-trust,”  and  a suit  against  the  combina- 
tion was  pressed  to  a successful  conclusion  in  January, 
1905.  In  its  decision  in  the  case  (Swift  & Company  v. 
United  States),  the  Supreme  Court  dwelt  at  some 
length  on  the  charges  made  against  the  Company.  A 
dominant  proportion  — six-tenths — of  the  dealers  in 
fresh  meat  in  the  United  States  were  alleged  to  have 
agreed  not  to  bid  against  one  another  in  the  live-stock 
markets ; to  restrict  the  output  of  meat  in  order  to  raise 
prices ; to  keep  a black-list ; and  to  get  illegal  rates  from 
the  railroads  to  the  exclusion  of  competitors.  To  the 
objection  of  the  members  of  the  trust  that  the  charges 
against  them  were  general  and  did  not  set  forth  any 
specific  facts,  the  Court  retorted  that  the  scheme  ah 
leged  was  so  vast  as  to  present  a new  problem  in  plead' 
ing.  The  decision  was  against  the  combination,  which 
was  ordered  to  dissolve.  The  publicity  given  to  the 
case  and  to  the  methods  of  the  meat  packers  assisted  iu 
the  passage  of  legislation  requiring  government  in- 
spection  of  meats. 

An  unexpected  phase  of  the  Sherman  act  appeared  in 
1908,  in  the  case  Loewe  v.  Lawlor.  The  American 
Federation  of  Labor,  acting  through  its  official  organ. 


464 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


had  declared  a boycott  against  D.  E.  Loewe,  a hat 
manufacturer  of  Danbury,  Connecticut.  The  Court 
decided  that  a combination  of  labor  organizations  de- 
signed to  boycott  a dealer’s  goods  was  a combination 
in  restraint  of  trade  and  that  the  manufacturer  might 
maintain  an  action  against  the  Hatters’  Union  for 
damages.^ 

In  the  meantime,  another  prominent  trust  had  played 
into  the  hands  of  the  administration.  The  American 
Sugar  Refining  Company  imported  large  amounts  of 
raw  sugar,  on  which  it  paid  tariff  duties.  In  Novem- 
ber, 1907,  it  was  discovered  that  the  Company  had 
tampered  with  the  scales  on  which  the  incoming  sugar 
was  weighed,  in  such  a manner  as  to  defraud  the  gov- 
ernment. In  the  resulting  legal  actions,  over  $4,000,- 
000  were  recovered  from  the  Company,  criminal  prose- 
cutions were  carried  on  against  the  officials  and  em- 
ployees, and  several  of  them  were  convicted.  The 
close  relation  between  the  railroads  and  the  great  cor- 
porations was  indicated  when  the  Standard  Oil  Com- 
pany of  Indiana  was  brought  into  court  on  the  charge 
of  receiving  rebates  on  petroleum  shipped  over  the 
Chicago  and  Alton  Railroad.  The  decision  by  Judge 
K.  M.  Landis  was  that  the  Company  was  guilty  on 
1,462  separate  counts  and  must  pay  a fine  of  $29,240,- 
000.  On  appeal  to  a higher  court  the  case  was  dis- 
missed, partly  on  a question  concerning  the  meaning  of 
the  law. 

The  efforts  of  Roosevelt  in  the  direction  of  control  of 
the  railroads  resembled  his  activities  in  relation  to  in- 
dustrial combinations.  A variety  of  circumstances 
had  combined  to  arouse  a popular  demand  for  the  rein- 

1 In  1917,  fourteen  years  after  Loewe’s  first  suit,  he  recovered  dam- 
ages from  the  Union 


THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


465 


forcemeiit  of  existing  legislation:  the  discovery  of 
grave  abuses  in  connection  with  the  transportation  of 
petroleum ; the  continuance  of  favoritism  and  rebating, 
together  with  increasing  public  knowledge  of  their 
existence;  the  rise  in  freight  rates;  and  the  consolida- 
tion of  the  railroads  into  a few  large  systems,  with  the 
accompanying  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  a 
small  number  of  persons.  In  his  public  speeches  and 
in  liis  messages  to  Congress  in  1904  and  1905,  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  made  himself  the  spokesman  of  the 
popular  will.  In  particular — and  it  was  here  that  the 
conflict  was  destined  to  rage — the  President  called  for 
the  transfer  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
of  the  power  to  determine  the  rates  which  the  roads 
should  be  allowed  to  charge.  The  project  was  not  a 
new  one,  having  already  taken  shape  in  previous  years, 
but  at  no  time  was  Congress  prepared  to  pass  definite 
legislation.  The  reaction  of  the  railroads  to  the  rising 
demand  was  energetic.  A costly  propaganda  was  en- 
tered upon  designed  to  prove  to  the  public  that  the 
roads  should  be  let  alone.  A powerful  lobby  worked 
insistently  upon  Congress,  first  to  prevent  action  and 
later,  when  action  was  seen  to  be  inevitable,  to  weaken 
the  legislation  wherever  possible.  The  railroad’s 
campaign  of  popular  education,  however,  helped  to 
convince  the  popular  mind  that  new  laws  were  needed, 
and  came  coincidently  with  the  disclosures  of  corporate 
mismanagement  and  wrong-doing.  The  outcome  was 
the  Hepburn  Act  of  June  29,  1906. 

Its  major  provisions  were  five  in  number.  It  en- 
larged the  scope  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  so  as 
to  include  control  of  express  and  sleeping  car  com- 
panies, pipe  lines,  switches,  spur  tracks  and  terminals. 
Free  passes,  which  had  hitherto  been  productive  of 
much  favoritism  and  the  source  of  political  corruption. 


466 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


were  strictly  forbidden,  except  to  a few  specified 
classes.  The  “commodity  clause”  forbade  railroads 
to  carry  goods,  other  than  timber,  in  which  they  had  an 
interest,  except  such  as  they  were  going  to  use  them- 
selves. This  provision  was  designed  mainly  to  check 
the  activities  of  those  companies  which  owned  both  coal 
mines  and  railroads,  and  which  used  their  advanta- 
geous position  to  crush  independent  operators.  Its 
force,  however,  was  largely  nullified  by  subsequent  de- 
cisions of  the  courts.  The  Hepburn  law  also  enabled 
the  Commission  to  prescribe  the  methods  of  book-keep- 
ing which  the  roads  must  follow,  to  call  for  monthly 
or  special  reports  and  to  employ  examiners  who  should 
have  access  to  the  books  of  the  carriers.  The  roads 
were  even  denied  the  right  to  keep  any  records  except 
those  approved  by  the  Commission.  These  drastic 
features  of  the  law  were  due  in  part  to  the  practices  of 
certain  roads  which  hid  away  corrupt  expenditures  in 
their  accounts  in  such  a manner  that  detection  was  al- 
most impossible.  Most  important,  however,  among  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  was  that  in  relation  to  rate-mak- 
ing, which  not  only  empowered  the  Commission  to  hear 
complaints  that  rates  were  unjust  or  unreasonable,  but 
even  enabled  it  to  determine  what  would  be  a just  and 
reasonable  charge  in  the  case,  and  to  order  the  carrier 
complained  of  to  adhere  to  the  new  rate.  The  rate- 
making  section  of  the  Hepburn  Act  immediately  re- 
sulted in  a large  increase  in  the  number  of  complaints 
entered  by  shippers  against  the  carriers.  Previously, 
few  cases  had  been  taken  to  the  Commission — only  878 
in  eighteen  years — because  relief  was  seldom  obtained 
and  then  only  at  great  cost  in  time  and  money.  Under 
the  new  law  more  than  1500  cases  were  entered  within 
two  and  a half  years,  and  several  thousand  others  were 
informally  settled  out  of  court. 


THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


467 


The  example  of  the  federal  government  in  adopting 
restrictive  railway  legislation  was  followed  by  the 
states,  on  a nation-wide  scale.  Hours  of  labor  were 
regulated,  liability  for  accidents  defined,  railroad  com- 
missions given  larger  powers,  and  freight  and  passen- 
ger rates  determined.  The  result  was  a tangle  of  local 
regulations,  many  of  which  were  designed  to  embarrass 
the  roads  and  others  of  which  were  passed  with  slight 
knowledge  of  the  practical  questions  involved. 

Aside  from  his  connection  with  the  anti-trust  cam- 
paign and  the  movement  for  railroad  regulation,  Roose- 
velt’s  most  significant  activities  during  his  second  ad- 
ministration related  to  conservation.  As  early  as  1880 
the  Superintendent  of  the  Census  had  called  attention 
to  the  exhaustion  of  the  best  public  lands.  The  truth 
of  his  assertion  had  been  exemplified  in  the  rush  of  set- 
tlers to  Oklahoma  when  the  former  Indian  Territory 
was  opened  to  settlement  on  April  22,  1889.  At  noon 
on  that  day  the  blast  of  a cavalry  bugle  was  the  signal 
that  any  settler  might  enter  and  stake  out  his  claim. 
On  foot,  on  fleet  horses,  in  primitive  wagons,  an  ex- 
cited, jostling  mob  rushed  toward  those  lands  that 
seemed  most  desirable.  Trains  were  crowded  to  the 
roofs;  tools,  furniture,  and  portable  houses  were  car- 
ried in  from  Texas,  Nebraska  and  Kansas.  By  night- 
fall a stretch  of  waving  prairie  became  Guthrie,  with  a 
population  of  10,000  persons ; by  the  evening  of  the  first 
day  Oklahoma  possessed  a population  of  50,000 ; twenty 
years  later  it  had  over  a million  and  a half,  contained 
flourishing  cities,  many  public  enterprises,  and  a beau- 
tiful state  university. 

The  fact  that  desirable  land  was  becoming  so  rare 
called  attention  to  the  Avaste  and  dishonesty  in  connec- 
tion with  our  public  land  system.  In  his  annual  report 


468 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


for  1884  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  had  complained 
that  large  amounts  of  land  had  been  acquired  under 
fictitious  names  or  by  persons  employed  for  the  pur- 
pose. Their  holdings  were  then  passed  over  to  specu- 
lators who  retained  huge  areas  for  a rising  market. 
Railroads  had  kept  lands  granted  to  them,  without  ful- 
filling the  conditions  of  the  grants.  Titled  Englishmen 
and  English  land  companies  had  gained  control  of 
tracts  of  unbelievable  size,  one  of  them  being  estimated 
at  3,000,U0U  acres.  The  history  of  the  disjjosal  of  the 
public  land  had  almost  been  duplicated  in  the  history  of 
the  forest-bearing  public  domain,  except  that  measures 
had  earlier  been  taken  to  conserve  the  remnant  of  the 
once  magnificent  supply  of  standing  timber.  An  act  of 
1891  had  enabled  the  president  to  set  apart  as  public 
reservations  any  lands  bearing  forests.  All  the  presi- 
dents, from  Harrison  down,  had  availed  themselves  of 
their  power,  and  had  established  great  numbers  of 
reservations,  most  of  them  in  states  west  of  the  Missis- 
sippi.^ 

A few  far-sighted  individuals  had  long  urged  cau- 
tion in  the  disposal  of  the  public  resources.  Some  be- 
ginnings in  fact  had  already  been  made  in  the  Division 
of  Forestry  in  the  Department  of  Agriculture,  where 
Gifford  Pinchot  was  actively  interested  in  forest  pres- 
ervation. In  1901  and  later  his  functions  had  been  ex- 
panded, and  the  forestry  service  had  taken  up  protec- 
tion against  fire,  the  sale  of  timber,  and  reforestation. 
In  1907  President  Roosevelt  appointed  a commission 
to  study  the  inland  waterways,  which  after  careful  in- 
vestigation recommended  a convention  for  the  discus- 
sion of  conservation  problems.  Thereupon  the  Presi- 
dent invited  the  governors  of  the  states  to  Washington 

1 In  1918,  151  national  forests  aggregated  176,000,000  acres.  Secre- 
tary of  the  Interior,  Annual  Report,  1918,  61. 


THEODOEE  ROOSEVELT 


469 


for  a conference,  at  which  conservation  questions  were 
thoroughly  discussed.  The  resulting  recommenda- 
tions composed  a complete,  although  general  plan  of 
reform : the  natural  resources  of  the  country  to  be  used 
for  the  prosperity  of  the  American  people;  reclama- 
tion of  arid  lands;  conservation  of  forests,  minerals 
and  water-power ; the  protection  of  the  sources  of  the 
rivers;  and  cooperation  between  Congress  and  the 
states  in  developing  a conservation  program.  A Na- 
tional Conservation  Commission  was  later  appointed 
which  coordinated  the  work  of  organizing  the  move- 
ment, and  made  an  exhaustive  inventory  of  the  nation’s 
natural  resources. 

The  conservation  movement  also  called  attention  to 
the  possibilities  of  the  arid  region  between  the  western 
parts  of  Kansas,  Nebraska  and  the  Dakotas,  and  the 
eastern  border  of  California.  Within  this  vast  area 
were  large  tracts  of  land  that  would  be  fertile  if  suffi- 
ciently supplied  with  water.  The  most  important 
legislation  in  a series  of  acts  designed  to  meet  this 
need  was  the  Reclamation  Act  of  1902.  Under  its  pro- 
visions the  federal  government  set  aside  the  proceeds 
of  the  sale  of  public  land  in  sixteen  states  and  terri- 
tories as  a fund  for  irrigation  work.  With  the  re- 
sources thus  obtained,  water  powers  were  developed, 
reservoirs  built  and  large  tracts  supplied  with  water. 
Private  companies  and  western  states  also  carried  out 
numerous  projects.  The  Department  of  Agriculture 
after  its  establishment  in  1889  also  conducted  many 
undertakings  which,  in  effect,  were  conservation  enter- 
prises. It  helped  educate  the  American  farmer  in 
scientific  methods,  sought  new  crops  in  every  corner  of 
the  globe,  discovered  and  circulated  means  of  combat- 
ing diseases  and  insects,  studied  soils,  distributed 
seeds  and  gathered  statistics.  In  the  arid  and  semi- 


470 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


arid  regions  the  discovery  of  dry  farming  was  of  great 
value.  This  consists  in  planting  the  seed  deep  and 
keeping  a mulch  of  dust  on  the  surface  by  frequent 
cultivation,  in  order  to  retard  the  evaporation  of  the 
moisture  in  the  ground  underneath.^ 

Nothing  can  be  more  apparent  tlran  the  complete 
change  of  position  which  was  brought  about  during  the 
eight  years  after  the  death  of  President  McKinley.  At 
the  end  of  that  period,  both  the  industrial  corporations 
and  the  railways  were  on  the  defensive,  and  the  public 
had  secured  the  whip  hand.  Industry,  especialh^  the 
railroads,  was  tamed  and  hobbled — some  thought,  crip- 
pled. Many  factors  contributed  to  the  revolution. 
President  Roosevelt  was  its  most  active  agent,  to  bo 
sure, — its  “gigantic  advertiser”  and  popularizer. 
But  it  could  hardly  have  taken  place — at  least  at  the 
time  and  in  the  way  it  did — without  the  great  u])heaval 
of  1896,  without  the  publicity  which  the  “muck-rake” 
magazines  and  daily  newspapers  were  able  to  offer, 
without  the  industrial  consolidations  of  1898  and  later, 
and  without  the  refusal  of  industry  and  the  railways 
to  obey  earlier  and  less  drastic  laws,  and  their  skilled 
and  insistent  attempts  to  find  loop-holes  in  legislation. 

From  the  standpoint  of  politics,  the  effect  of  the 
Roosevelt  administrations  was  notable.  As  has  been 
seen,  the  Republican  party  had  become  largely  the 
party  of  the  business  and  commercial  classes,  conserva- 
tive and  unyielding  to  the  new  demands  of  the  late  nine- 
teenth century.  Its  leadership  had  been  sharply  chal- 

1 The  territory  of  Alaska  contains  immense  stores  of  natural  re- 
sources which  are  being  conserved  with  more  wisdom  than  characterized 
the  disposal  of  our  continental  supplies.  The  area  of  the  territory, 
586,400  square  miles,  constitutes  a kingdom.  It  has  uncounted  wealth 
in  fish,  furs,  timber,  coal  and  precious  metals.  At  present  the  federal 
government  is  building  a railroad  which  will  tap  some  of  the  resources 
of  the  region.  Eno.  Brit.,  “Alaska.” 


THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


471 


leiiged  by  the  forces  of  unrest  in  1896.  On  an  issue 
other  than  a monetary  one,  the  success  of  Bryan  would 
have  been  possible.  The  failure  of  the  attempt  to  get 
control  of  the  federal  government  in  the  interest  of  the 
Populist  program  was  only  a temporary  defeat,  for  the 
revival  of  unrest,  although  checked  by  the  war  with 
Spain,  was  sure  soon  to  reappear.  In  President  Roose- 
velt, the  forces  of  discontent,  especially  in  the  Middle 
and  Far  "West,  saw  their  hoped-for  champion,  and  their 
support  of  him  was  instant  and  complete.  The  domi- 
nant leadership  and  much  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
Republican  party  had  become  liberal.  The  situation 
was  anomalous,  however,  for  no  great  political  party 
can  experience  a thorough-going  change  of  philosophy 
in  a few  years.  Only  the  future,  therefore,  could  tell 
whether  the  newer  and  more  liberal  element  would 
continue  to  control  the  party,  or  whether  a reaction 
against  its  leadership  would  take  place. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

It  is  too  early  to  expect  a biography  of  Roosevelt  which  is 
informed  and  critical,  as  well  as  sympathetic.  The  keenest 
judgment  is  to  be  found  in  Atlantic  Monthly  (CIX,  577), 
“Mr.  Roosevelt.”  The  following  are  also  available:  L.  F. 
Abbott,  Impressions  of  Theodore  Roosevelt  (1919)  ; F.  E. 
Leupp,  The  Man  Roosevelt  (1904)  ; W.  R.  Thayer,  Theodore 
Roosevelt  (1919)  ; C.  G.  Washburn,  Theodore  Roosevelt;  the 
Logic  of  His  Career  (1916).  Roosevelt  can  be  partly  under- 
stood through  a critical  reading  of  his  writings,  especially  his 
Addresses  and  Presidential  Messages  (1904),  and  his  Auto- 
biography (1913). 

On  the  coal  strike  consult  the  Autobiography , and  Senate 
Reports,  58th  Congress,  special  session.  Document  No.  6 
(Serial  Number  4556),  the  report  of  the  President’s  Commis- 
sion. The  election  of  1904  is  discussed  in  Latane,  Croly  and 


472 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


Stanwood:  see  also  C.  M.  Pepper,  The  Life  and  Times  of 
Henry  Gassaway  Davis  (1920).  The  new  railroad  acts  are 
well  discussed  in  W.  Z.  Ripley,  Railroads:  Rates  and,  Regida- 
tions  (1912),  and  by  F.  H.  Dixon  in  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics,  XXI,  22. 

The  literature  of  conservation  is  very  large.  An  excellent 
single  chapter  is  in  Katherine  Coman,  Industrial  History  of 
the  Vyiited  States  (rev.  ed.,  1910)  ; C.  R.  Van  Hise,  The  Con- 
servation of  Natural  Resources  in  the  Ufiited  States  (1913), 
is  a standard  work;  R.  P.  Teele,  Irrigation  in  the  United 
States  (1915),  is  detailed;  for  documents  concerning  the  con- 
ference of  governors.  House  of  Representatives  Document  No. 
1425,  60th  Congress,  2nd  session  (Serial  Number  5538). 

The  anti-trust  campaign  is  best  followed  in  Theodore  Roose- 
velt, Addresses  and  Presidential  Messages,  and  in  the  Auto- 
biography. The  Northern  Securities  decision  is  in  United 
States  Reports,  vol.  193,  p.  197. 


CHAPTER  XXI 


POLITICS,  1008-1912 

By  1908,  the  year  of  the  presidential  election,  an 
influential  portion  of  the  Republican  members  of 
Congress,  particularly  in  the  Senate,  were  bitterly  op- 
posed to  President  Roosevelt.  His  attitude  on  the 
trusts  and  the  railroads  was  offensive  to  many,  and  on 
several  occasions  he  had  gained  the  upper  hand  over 
Congress  by  means  which  were  coming  to  be  known  as 
“big-stick”  methods.  The  so-called  “constructive  re- 
cess” of  1903  was  an  example. 

Under  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  the  presi- 
dent appoints  many  officials  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate,  when  it  is  in  session,  and  fills  va- 
cancies that  happen  during  a recess  by  granting  com- 
missions which  expire  at  the  end  of  the  next  session. 
On  December  2,  1903,  at  noon,  one  session  of  Congress 
came  to  an  end  and  another  began.  Precisely  at  12 
o’clock,  according  to  the  official  statement,  the  Presi- 
dent issued  new  commissions  to  W.  D.  Crum,  a negro, 
to  be  collector  of  the  port  of  Charleston,  and  also  to 
168  army  officers,  of  whom  the  President’s  close  friend 
Brigadier-General  Leonard  Wood  was  one.  General 
Wood  was  to  be  promoted  to  a major-generalship  and 
the  remaining  promotions  were  dependent  upon  his  ad- 
vance. The  President’s  theory  was  that  a “construc- 
tive recess”  intervened  between  the  two  sessions,  dur- 
which  he  could  make  recess  appointments.  Although 
the  Senate  Avas  hostile  to  both  Crum  and  Wood,  it 

473 


474 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


reluctantly  succumbed  to  Roosevelt’s  wishes  rather 
than  withhold  promotion  from  the  167  officers  to  whom 
it  had  no  objection. 

In  1908,  Senator  Tillman,  an  outspoken  Democratic 
critic  of  the  President,  declared  that  senators  vigor- 
ously denounced  Roosevelt’s  radical  ideas  in  private 
but  that  in  public  they  opposed  merely  by  inaction. 
Party  loyalty  was  sufficient  to  keep  these  Republicans, 
in  most  cases,  from  open  and  continued  rebellion. 
Hardly  less  hostile  to  the  President  were  many  of  the 
business  men  of  the  country,  who  objected  to  his  eco- 
nomic policies,  but  the  only  alternative  to  Roosevelt 
was  Bryan,  who,  as  one  of  the  earliest  proponents  of 
radical  legislation,  was  even  more  offensive.  On  the 
other  hand,  a large  majority  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
party,  especially  in  the  North  and  West,  upheld  the 
President  with  unfeigned  enthusiasm  and  made  his 
position  in  the  party  so  strong  that  he  could  practically 
name  his  successor.  Several  candidates  had  more  or 
less  local  support  for  the  nomination — Senator  Knox, 
of  Pennsylvania,  G\)vernor  Hughes,  of  New  York, 
Speaker  Cannon,  of  Illinois,  Vice-President  Fairbanks, 
of  Indiana,  Senator  LaFollette,  of  Wisconsin  and  Sen- 
ator Foraker,  of  Ohio.  The  President’s  prestige  and 
energy,  however,  were  frankly  behind  the  candidacy  of 
his  Secretary  of  War,  William  H.  Taft. 

The  Republican  convention  of  1908  met  in  Chicago 
on  June  16.  Early  in  the  proceedings  the  mention  of 
Roosevelt’s  name  brought  an  outburst  of  enthusiasm 
which  indicated  the  possibility  that  he  might  be  nomi- 
nated for  a third  term,  despite  his  expressed  refusal 
to  allow  such  a move  to  be  made.  In  the  platform  the 
achievements  of  the  retiring  administration  were  re- 
counted in  glowing  terms;  tariff  reform  was  promised; 
and  a postal  savings  bank,  the  strengthening  of  the 


475 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

Interstate  Commerce  law  and  the  Sherman  Anti-trust 
act,  the  more  accurate  definition  of  the  rules  of  pro- 
cedure in  the  issuance  of  injunctions,  good  roads,  con- 
servation, pensions  and  the  encouragement  of  ship- 
ping, received  the  stamp  of  party  approval.  Planks 
pledging  the  party  to  legislation  requiring  the  publicity 
of  campaign  expenditures,  the  valuation  of  the  physi- 
cal property  of  railroads  and  the  popular  election  of 
senators  were  uniformly  rejected.  The  closing  para- 
graph declared  that  the  “trend  of  Democracy  is  toward 
Socialism,  while  the  Eepublican  party  stands  for  wise 
and  regulated  individualism.”  The  contest  over  the 
nomination  was  extremely  brief,  as  Taft  received_7-02 
out  of  979  votes  on  the  first  ballot.  James  S.  Sherman 
of  New  York  was  nominated  for  the  vice-presidency. 

The  Democrats,  meanwhile,  were  in  a quandary.  A 
considerable  fraction  of  the  party  desired  the  nomina- 
tion of  somebody  other  than  Bryan,  whose  defeats  in 
1896  and  1900  had  cast  doubts  upon  the  wisdom  of  a 
third  trial.  Nevertheless  the  failure  of  Parker  in  1904 
had  been  so  ovenvhelming  that  the  nomination  of  a 
conservative  seemed  undesirable  and,  moreover,  no 
candidate  appeared  whose  achievements  or  promise 
could  overcome  the  prestige  of  Bryan.  The  national 
convention  was  held  in  Denver,  July  7-10,  and  Bryan 
dominated  all  its  activities.  The  platform  welcomed 
the  Republican  promise  to  reform  the  tariff,  but 
doubted  its  sincerity;  promised  changes  in  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  law,  a more  elastic  currency,  improve- 
ments in  the  law  of  injunctions,  generous  pensions, 
good  roads  and  the  conservation  of  the  national  re- 
sources. In  the  main,  however,  the  platform  was  an 
emphatic  condemnation  of  the  Republican  party  as  the 
party  of  “privileges  and  private  monopoly.”  It  de- 
clared that  the  Republican  speaker  of  the  House  of 


476 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Representatives  exercised  such  absolute  domination  as 
to  stop  the  enactment  of  measures  desired  by  the  ma- 
jority. It  demanded  the  termination  of  the  ‘‘partner- 
ship ■which  has  existed  between  corporations  of  the 
country  and  the  Republican  party,”  by  which  the  busi- 
ness interests  contributed  great  sums  of  money  in  elec- 
tions in  return  for  an  unmolested  opportunity  to  “en- 
croach upon  the  rights  of  the  people.  ’ ’ It  promised  the 
enactment  of  laws  preventing  corporation  contribu- 
tions to  campaign  funds  and  providing  for  the  publi- 
cation before  election  of  all  contributions  by  individ- 
uals. Detailed  and  definite  planks  in  relation  to  trusts 
indicated  that  the  framers  of  the  platform  possessed 
at  least  the  courage  of  their  convictions.  Three  laws 
were  promised:  one  preventing  the  duplication  of 
directors  among  competing  corporations;  another  es- 
tablishing a license  system  which  would  place  under 
federal  authority  those  corporations  engaged  in  inter- 
state commerce  which  controlled  as  much  as  twenty-five 
per  cent,  of  the  product  in  which  they  dealt,  and  which 
should  likewise  protect  the  public  from  watered  stock 
and  prohibit  any  single  corporation  from  controlling 
over  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  total  amount  of  any  com- 
modity consumed  in  the  United  States;  and,  third,  a 
law  forcing  corporations  to  sell  to  purchasers  in  all 
sections  of  the  country  on  the  same  terms,  after  mak- 
ing due  allowance  for  transportation  costs. 

As  soon  as  the  platform  was  out  of  the  way,  the  con- 
vention turned  to  the  nomination  of  the  candidate. 
Only  George  Gray,  of  Delaware,  and  John  A.  Johnson, 
of  Minnesota,  contested  the  leadership  of  Bryan,  but 
their  support  was  so  slight  that  he  was  chosen  on  the 
first  ballot.  John  W.  Kern,  of  Indiana,  was  nominated 
for  the  vice-presidency. 

Of  the  smaller  parties  which  shared  in  the  election  of 


477 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

1908,  the  People’s  party  and  the  Socialists  should  be 
mentioned.  The  Populists  adopted  a program  of  eco- 
nomic reforms  many  parts  of  which  had  been  prominent 
in  their  platforms  of  1892  and  1896.  Both  the  Repub- 
licans and  the  Democrats,  however,  had  adopted  so 
many  of  these  earlier  demands  that  the  Populists 
rapidly  lost  strength  and  disappeared  after  1908.  The 
Socialists  likewise  advocated  economic  reforms,  to- 
gether with  government  ownership  of  the  railroads, 
and  of  such  industries  as  were  organized  on  a national 
scale.  The  candidate  nominated  was  Eugene  V.  Debs, 
a labor  leader  who  had  gained  prominence  at  the  time 
of  the  Pullman  strike.^ 

The  only  novelty  in  the  campaign  was  Bryan ’s  stand 
in  regard  to  campaign  funds.  By  calling  upon  his  sup- 
porters for  large  numbers  of  small  individual  contribu- 
tions, he  drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  corpora- 
tions were  helping  generously  to  meet  Taft’s  election 
expenses.  At  their  leader’s  direction  the  Democratic 
committee  announced  that  it  would  receive  no  contri- 
butions whatever  from  corporations,  that  it  would  ac- 
cept no  offering  over  $10,000  and  that  it  would  publish 
a list  of  contributors  before  the  close  of  the  campaign. 

The  result  of  the  election  was  the  triumph  of  Taft 
and  his  party.  The  Republican  popular  vote  was 
7,700,000;  the  Democratic,  6,500,000;  the  Socialist, 
420,890.  The  election  also  gave  the  Republicans  con- 
trol of  Congress,  which  was  to  he  constituted  as  fol- 
lows during  1909-1911:  Senate,  Democrats,  32,  Re- 
publicans, 61;  House  of  Representatives,  Democrats, 
172,  Republicans,  219. 

Few  men  in  our  history  have  had  a wider  judicial 
and  administrative  experience  before  coming  to  the 
presidency  than  that  of  William  II.  Taft.  H^  was  bom 


1 Above,  p.  322. 


478 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


in  1857  in  Ohio,  graduated  from  Yale  University  with 
high  rank  in  the  class  of  1878  and  later  entered  upon 
the  study  of  law.  A judicial  temperament  early  mani- 
fested itself  and  Taft  became  successively  judge  of  the 
Superior  Court  in  Cincinnati  and  of  a United  States 
Circuit  Court.  From  the  latter  post  he  was  called  to 
serve  upon  the  Philippine  Commission,  was  later  Gov- 
ernor of  the  Philippines  and  Secretary  of  War  in 
Roosevelt’s  cabinet.  During  the  period  of  his  con- 
nection with  the  Philippines  and  his  membership  in  the 
Cabinet  he  visited  Cuba,  Panama,  Porto  Rico,  Japan 
and  the  Papal  Court  at  Rome  in  connection  with  mat- 
ters of  federal  importance. 

Personally  Taft  is  kindly,  unaffected,  democratic, 
full  of  good  humor,  courageous.  As  a public  officer  he 
was  slow  and  judicial,  rather  than  quick  and  executive 
like  his  predecessor.  Although  in  sympathy  with  the 
reforms  instituted  by  Roosevelt,  Taft  was  less  the  re^ 
former  and  more  conscious  of  considerations  of  consti- 
tutionality. Roosevelt  thought  of  the  domain  of  the 
executive  as  including  all  acts  not  specifically  forbid- 
den by  the  Constitution  or  by  the  laws  of  the  nation; 
Taft  thought  of  it  as  including  only  those  which  were 
specifically  granted  by  the  Constitution  and  laws.  The 
one  was  voluble,  a dynamo  of  energy,  quick  to  seize  and 
act  upon  any  innovation  that  gave  promise  of  being 
both  useful  and  successful;  the  other  thought  and 
acted  more  slowly  and  was  less  sensitive  to  the  feasi- 
bility of  change.  One  possessed  well-nigh  all  the  at- 
tributes necessary  for  intense  popularity;  the  other 
inspired  admiration  among  a smaller  group.  Roose- 
velt had  a peculiarly  keen  perception  of  the  currents 
of  public  opinion,  enjoyed  publicity  and  knew  how  to 
achieve  it;  Taft  was  less  quick  at  discovering  the  pop- 
ular thing  and  less  adept  at  those  tricks  of  the  trade 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 


479 


that  heightened  the  popularity  of  his  predecessor. 

Despite  the  patent  differences  of  temperament  and 
philosophy  between  Taft  and  Roosevelt,  both  expected 
that  the  new  administration  would  be  an  extension  of 
the  old  one.  Roosevelt  indicated  this  in  his  frank  pref- 
erence for  Taft  as  his  successor;  Taft  indicated  it  in 
his  thorough  acceptance  of  the  policies  of  the  preced- 
ing seven  years  and  in  his  intention,  expressed  at  the 
time  of  his  inauguration,  to  maintain  and  further  the 
reforms  already  initiated.  His  first  act,  however,  the 
appointment  of  his  official  advisors,  caused  some  sur- 
prise among  the  friends  of  his  predecessor  who  ex- 
pected that  he  would  retain  most  if  not  all  of  the  Roose- 
velt cabinet.  "When  he  did  not  do  so,  it  seemed  as  if 
the  attempt  to  further  the  Roosevelt  policies  would 
lack  continuity.^ 

The  immediate  problem  that  faced  the  new  execu- 
tive was  the  revision  of  the  tariff.  The  task  was  one 
which  has  frequently  resulted  in  political  disaster,  but 
the  platform  left  no  choice  to  the  President: 

The  Republican  party  declares  unequivocally  for  a revision 
of  the  tariff  by  a special  session  of  Congress  immediately  fol- 
lowing the  inauguration  of  the  next  President.  ...  In  all 
tariff  legislation  the  true  principle  of  protection  is  best  main- 
tained by  the  imposition  of  such  duties  as  will  equal  the  dif- 
ference between  the  cost  of  production  at  home  ‘and  abroad, 
together  with  a reasonable  profit  to  American  industries. 

The  precise  meaning  of  this  declaration  will  perhaps 
always  remain  a matter  of  dispute,  although  it  is  cer- 

1 The  cabinet  was  composed  of:  P.  C.  Knox,  Pa.,  Secretary  of  State; 
F.  ]klac  Veagh,  111.,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury;  J.  M.  Dickinson,  Tenn., 
Secretary  of  War;  G.  W.  Wickersham,  N.  Y.,  Attorney-General;  F.  H. 
Hitchcock,  Mass.,  Postmaster-General;  G.  vL.  Meyer,  Mass.,  Secretary 
of  the  Navy;  R.  A.  Ballinger,  Wash.,  Secretary  of  the  Interior;  J. 
Wilson,  la..  Secretary  of  Agriculture;  C.  Nagel,  Mo.,  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce and  Labor.  Meyer  and  Wilson  had  been  in  Roosevelt’s  cabinet. 


480 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


tain  that  the  public  in  general  understood  it  to  mean 
a distinct  lowering  of  the  tariff  wall,  and  Taft  com- 
mitted himself  to  downward  revision  in  his  inaugTiral 
address.  Moreover,  whether  it  was  intended  by  the 
framers  to  commit  the  party  to  downward  revision 
or  not,  the  method  of  defining  the  amount  of  protec- 
tion to  be  granted  was  both  novel  and  unsatisfactory, 
as  Professor  Taussig  has  pointed  out.  How  could 
the  costs  of  production  at  home  or  abroad  be  deter- 
mined? To  what  extent  would  the  principle  announced 
in  the  platform  be  carried?  Almost  any  commodity 
can  be  produced  almost  anywhere  if  the  producer  is 
guaranteed  the  cost  of  production,  together  with  a 
reasonable  profit.  The  wise  revision  of  the  tariff  is 
difficult  enough  under  any  circumstances;  under  so 
vague  a theory  as  was  proposed  in  1908,  the  chances 
of  success  became  remote. 

The  drafting  of  the  tariff  bill  proceeded  in  the  usual 
manner.  The  Ways  and  Means  Committee  of  the 
House,  the  chairman  of  which  was  Sereno  Payne,  held 
preliminary  public  “hearings,”  which  were  open  to 
any  who  desired  to  offer  testimony  or  make  requests. 
Naturally,  however,  the  great  body  of  the  consuming 
public  was  little  represented;  most  of  those  who  ap- 
peared were  manufacturers,  importers  and  other  in- 
terested parties.  The  bill  drawn  up  by  the  Committee 
and  passed  by  the  House  revised  existing  duties,  on 
the  whole,  in  the  downward  direction.  The  Senate 
Finance  Committee,  however,  under  the  leadership  of 
Nelson  W.  Aldrich,  an  experienced  and  able  proponent 
of  a high  protective  tariff,  made  847  amendments, 
many  of  them  important  and  generally  in  the  direction 
of  higher  rates.  The  Senate,  like  the  House,  con- 
tained several  Republicans,  usually  called  “insur- 
gents,” who  were  inclined  to  break  away  from  cer- 


481 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

tain  of  the  party  doctrines.  Senators  Bristow,  Cum- 
mins, Dolliver  and  La  Follette  were  among  them. 
This  contingent  had  hoped  for  a genuine  downward 
revision,  and  when  they  saw  that  the  bill  was  not  in 
accord  with  their  expectations,  they  prepared  to  de- 
mand a thorough  debate.  Each  of  the  insurgents  made 
an  especial  study  of  some  particular  portion  of  the 
proposed  measure  so  as  to  be  well  prepared  to  urge 
reductions.  Their  etforts  were  unavailing,  however, 
and  the  bill  passed — the  insurgents  voting  with  the 
great  majority  of  the  Democrats  in  the  negative.  The 
bill  then  went  to  a conference  committee.  Up  to  this 
point,  the  President  had  taken  little  share  in  the  for- 
mation of  the  bill.  Yet  as  leader  of  the  party  he  had 
pledged  himself  to  a downward  revision  and  the  result 
seemed  likely  not  to  be  in  the  promised  direction.  He 
therefore  exerted  pressure  on  the  conference  commit- 
tee and  succeeded  apparently  in  getting  some  reduc- 
tions, chiefly  the  abolition  of  the  duty  on  hides.  The 
bill  was  then  passed  by  both  houses  and  signed  by  the 
President  on  August  5,  1909. 

The  question  whether  the  Payne-Aldrich  act  re- 
deemed the  pledge  embodied  in  the  platform  of  1908 
Avill  doubtless  remain  a debatable  question.  On  the 
one  hand,  a prominent  Kepublican  member  of  the 
Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  and  of  the  Confer- 
ence Committee,  declared  that  the  act  represented  the 
greatest  reduction  that  had  been  made  in  the  tariff 
at  any  single  time  since  the  first  revenue  laAV  Avas 
signed  by  George  Washington.  Roosevelt  also  de- 
fended the  act.  Experts  outside  of  Congress  sharply 
differed.  Professor  Taussig  analyzed  the  act  in  all 
its  aspects  and  concluded  that  no  essential  change 
had  been  made  in  our  tariff  system.  “It  still  left 
an  extremely  high  scheme  of  rates,  and  still  shoAved 


482 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


an  extremely  intolei’ant  attitude  on  foreign  trade.” 
General  public  opinion  was  most  atfected  by  the  fact 
that  duties  on  cotton  goods  were  raised,  and  those  on 
Avoolen  goods  left  at  the  high  rates  levied  under  the 
Dingley  act.  It  also  appeared  that  many  silent  influ- 
ences had  been  at  work — the  duty  on  cheap  cotton 
gloves,  for  example,  being  doubled  through  the  efforts 
of  an  interested  individual  who  procured  the  assist- 
ance of  a New  England  senator.^ 

Not  long  after  the  passage  of  the  act  President  Taft 
defended  it  in  a speech  at  Winona,  Minnesota,  as  the 
best  tariff  bill  that  the  Republican  party  had  ever 
passed.  In  regard  to  the  woolen  schedule  he  frankly 
said : 

Mr.  Payne  in  the  House,  and  Mr.  Aldrich,  in  the  Senate, 
although  both  favored  reduction  in  the  schedule,  found  that 
in  the  Republican  party  the  interests  of  the  wool  growers  of 
the  Far  West  and  the  interests  of  the  woolen  manufacturers 
in  the  East  and  in  other  States,  reflected  through  their  repre- 
sentatives in  Congress,  were  sufficientl.y  strong  to  defeat  anj^ 
attempt  to  change  the  woolen  tariff  and  that,  had  it  been  at- 
tempted, it  would  have  beaten  the  bill  reported  from  either 
committee.  ...  It  is  the  one  important  defect  in  the  present 
Payne  tariff. 

The  response  of  the  press  and  the  insurgent  Republi- 
cans to  the  passage  of  the  bill  and  to  the  Winona 
speech  were  ominous  for  the  future  of  the  party.  Al- 
though not  unanimous,  condemnation  was  common  in 
the  West,  even  in  Republican  papers.  Particular  ob- 
jection was  made  to  the  high  estimate  which  the  Presi- 
dent placed  upon  the  act  and  to  his  defence  of  Sena- 
tor Aldrich,  who  had  come  to  be  looked  upon  as  the 

1 other  features  of  the  act  were  the  establishment  of  a Court  for 
the  settlement  of  tariff  disputes,  provisions  for  a tariff  commission  and 
a tax  on  corporation  incomes. 


483 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

forefront  of  the  “special  interests”;  and  -western  state 
Republican  platforms  in  1910  declared  that  the  act  had 
not  been  in  accord  with  the  plank  of  1908d 

Coincidently  with  the  disagreement  over  the  Payne- 
Aldrich  act,  there  raged  the  unhappy  Pinchot-Ballinger 
controversy.  One  of  the  last  acts  of  President  Roose- 
velt had  been  to  vdthdraw  from  sale  large  tracts  of 
public  laud  which  contained  valuable  water-power. 
The  purpose  and  the  effect  of  the  order  was  to  pre- 
vent these  natural  resources  from  falling  into  private 
hands  and  particularly  into  the  hands  of  syndicates  or 
corporations  who  would  develop  them  mainly  for  indi- 
vidual interests.  President  Taft’s  Secretary  of  the 
Interior,  Richard  A.  Ballinger,  took  the  attitude  that 
the  withdrawals  were  without  statutory  justification 
and  he  therefore  revoked  the  order  for  withdrawals 
immediately  after  coming  into  office.  Upon  further 
investigation,  however,  he  re-withdrew  a part  of  the 
land,  although  somewhat  doubtful  of  his  power  to  do 
so. 

During  the  summer  of  1909,  Gifford  Pinchot,  the 
Chief  Forester,  addressed  'an  irrigation  Congress  in 
Spokane  and  asserted  that  the  water-power  sites  were 
being  absorbed  by  a trust.  Much  interest  was  aroused 
by  the  charge,  which  was  looked  upon  as  an  attack  on 
the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  and  his  policy.  Within 
a short  time  the  idea  became  widespread,  through  the 
press,  that  Ballinger  was  associated  with  interests 
which  were  desirous  of  seizing  the  public  resources  and 
that  this  fact  lay  back  of  his  partial  reversal  of  the 

1 Mr.  Dooley,  who  was  well  known  as  a humorous  character  created 
by  F.  P.  Dunne,  made  merry  with  the  claim  that  the  tariff  had  been 
reduced,  by  reading  to  his  friend  Mr.  Hennessy  the  ‘‘necessities  of  life” 
which  had  been  placed  on  the  free-list  and  which  included  curling 
stones,  teeth,  sea-moss,  newspapers,  nuts,  nux  vomica,  Pulu,  canary  bird 
seed,  divy  divy  and  other  commodities. 


484 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


policy  of  liis  predecessor.  This  impression  was  deep- 
ened by  the  charges  of  L.  E.  Glavis,  an  employee  of 
the  Department  of  the  Interior,  concerning  the  claims 
of  a certain  Clarence  Cunningham,  representing  a 
group  of  investors,  to  some  exceedingly  valuable  coal 
lands  in  Alaska.  Glavis  asserted  that  the  Cunningham 
claims  were  fraudulent,  that  many  of  the  Cunningham 
group  were  personal  friends  of  Ballinger  and  that  the 
latter  had  acted  as  attorney  for  them  before  becoming 
Secretary  of  the  Interior.  President  Taft,  with  the 
backing  of  an  opinion  from  Attorney-General  Wicker- 
sham,  upheld  Ballinger  and  dismissed  Glavis.  The 
press  again  took  the  matter  up  and  the  controversy  was 
carried  into  Congress,  where  an  investigation  was  or- 
dered. About  the  same  time  Pinchot  was  removed 
for  insubordination,  and  additional  heat  entered  into 
the  disagreement.  The  majority  of  the  congressional 
committee  of  investigation  later  made  a report  exon- 
erating Ballinger,  but  his  position  had  become  intol- 
erable and  he  resigned  in  March,  1911.  The  result  of 
the  quarrel  was  to  weaken  the  President,  for  the  idea 
became  common  that  his  administration  had  been 
friendly  with  interests  that  wished  to  seize  the  public 
lands. 

Republican  complaint  in  regard  to  the  tariff  and  the 
Pinchot-Ballinger  controversy  were  surface  indica- 
tions of  a division  in  the  party  into  conservative  or 
“old-guard,”  and  progressive  or  insurgent  groups. 
The  same  line  of  demarcation  appeared  in  a quarrel 
over  the  power  of  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, Joseph  G.  Cannon.  Cannon  had  served  in 
the  lower  branch  of  Congress  almost  continuously  for 
twenty-seven  years,  and  in  1910  was  filling  the  position 
of  speaker  for  the  fourth  consecutive  time.  Much  of 


485 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

liis  official  influence  rested  on  two  powers : he  appointetl 
the  committees  of  the  House  and  their  chairmen,  a 
power  which  enabled  him  to  punish  opponents,  re- 
ward friends  and  determine  the  character  of  legisla- 
tion; and  he  Avas  the  chairman  and  dominant  poAver 
of  the  Committee  on  Rules  Avhich  determined  the  pro- 
cedure under  existing  practice  and  made  special  or- 
ders AvheneA-er  particular  circumstances  seemed  to  re- 
quire them.  It  Avas  Avidely  believed  that  Cannon,  like 
Aldrich  in  the  Senate,  effectually  controlled  the  passage 
of  legislation,  Avith  slender  regard  to  the  Avishes  or 
needs  of  the  people.  “Cannonism”  and  “Aldrich- 
ism”  Avere  considered  synonymous.  For  several  years 
an  influential  part  of  the  Republican  and  Independent, 
as  Avell  as  the  Democratic  press  had  attacked  Speaker 
Cannon  as  the  enemy  of  progressive  legislation.  Many 
of  them  laid  much  of  the  blame  for  the  character  of 
the  Payne-Aldrich  act  at  his  door.  The  Outlook  de- 
cried “gOAmrnment  by  oligarchy”;  The  Nation  de- 
clared that  he  belonged  to  another  political  age ; Bryan 
queried  Avhat  Cannon  Avas  selling  and  hoAV  much  he  got ; 
Gompers,  the  head  of  the  American  Federation  of  La- 
bor, pointed  him  out  as  the  enemy  of  all  reforms. 

The  outcry  against  the  Speaker  in  the  House  itself, 
reinforced  by  the  gathering  opposition  outside,  found 
effective  voice  in  a coalition  of  the  Democrats  and  the 
insurgent  Republicans.  In  mid-March,  1910,  an  in- 
surgent presented  a resolution  designed  to  replace  the 
old  Committee  on  Rules  by  a larger  body  Avhich  should 
be  elected  by  the  House,  and  on  which  the  speaker 
AAmuld  have  no  place.  The  friends  of  Cannon  rallied 
to  his  defence ; other  business  fell  into  the  background : 
and  debate  became  sharp  and  personal.  One  contin- 
uous session  lasted  twenty-six  hours,  parliamentary 


486 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


fencing’  mingling  with  horse-play  while  each  side  at- 
tempted to  get  a tactical  advantage  over  the  otherd 
Eventually  about  forty  insurgent  Republicans  joined 
with  the  Democrats  to  pass  the  resolution.  The  result 
of  the  change  was  to  compel  the  speaker  to  be  a presid- 
ing officer  rather  than  the  determining  factor  in  the 
passage  of  legislation.  About  the  time  that  Cannon’s 
domination  in  the  House  was  being  broken,  the  an- 
nouncement that  Senator  Nelson  W.  Aldrich  and  his 
staunchly  conservative  associate,  Eugene  Hale,  of 
Maine,  were  about  to  retire  indicated  a similar  change 
in  the  Senate.  These  men  had  served  for  long  pe- 
riods in  Congress  and  were  looked  upon  as  the  ablest 
and  most  influential  of  the  “reactionary”  element  in 
the  upper  house. 

Coincidently  with  the  partial  disintegration  of  the 
conservative  wing  of  the  Republican  party  in  Congress, 
there  was  passed  a large  volume  of  legislation  of  the 
type  desired  by  the  insurgents.  The  public  land  laws 
were  improved;  acts  requiring  the  use  of  safety  ap- 
liances  on  railroads  were  strengthened;  a Bureau  of 
Mines  was  established  to  study  the  welfare  of  the 
miners;  a postal  savings  bank  system  was  erected; 
and  an  Economy  and  Efficiency  Commission  appointed 
to  examine  the  several  administrative  departments  so 
as  to  discover  wasteful  methods  of  doing  business.  Of 

1 A sample  of  the  jocosity  that  partially  relieved  the  tension  is  the 
following  portion  of  the  Congressional  Record  for  March  18: 

The  Speaker  pro  tempore:  The  House  will  be  in  order.  Gentlemen 
will  understand  the  impropriety  of  singing  on  the  floor,  even  though  the 
House  is  not  at  this  moment  transacting  any  business.  The  House  is 
not  in  recess. 

Chorus.  “There’ll  be  a hot  time  in  the  old  town  to-night.” 

The  Speaker  pro  tempore.  That  was  last  night,  not  to-night. 
(Laughter.)  The  House  will  be  in  order. 

Mr.  Shackleford.  Mr.  Speaker,  I make  the  point  of  order  that  the 
tap-tapping  of  the  Chair’s  gavel  interferes  with  the  music.  (Laugh- 
ter.) Cf.  Atkinson,  Committee  on  Rules,  115. 


487 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

especial  importance  was  the  Maim-Elkins  Act  of  June 
18,  1910,  which  further  extended  the  powers  of  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission.  Experience  had 
brought  out  serious  defects  in  the  rate-fixing  procedure 
set  up  by  the  Hepburn  Act.  By  that  law,  to  be  sure,  a 
shipper  could  complain  that  the  roads  were  charging 
him  an  unreasonable  rate  and  the  Commission  might, 
in  course  of  time,  uphold  him  and  order  relief;  but  in 
the  meantime  the  shipper,  especially  if  he  were  a small 
one,  might  be  crushed  out  of  existence  through  the 
large  rates,  and  the  consuming  public  would  have  paid 
increased  prices  for  commodities  with  no  possibility 
of  a remuneration  to  them,  even  if  the  Commission  de- 
cided that  the  rates  levied  were  unreasonably  high. 
The  Mann-Elkins  law,  therefore,  provided  that  the 
Commission  might  suspend  any  proposed  change  in 
rates  for  a period  not  greater  than  ten  months,  and 
decide  during  that  time  whether  it  was  reasonable  and 
should  go  into  effect  or  not.  In  this  way  the  burden 
of  proving  the  justice  of  a suggested  change  was  placed 
upon  the  railroads.^ 

An  act  of  June  25,  1910,  which  was  amended  a year 
later,  required  the  publication  of  the  names  of  per- 
sons contributing  to  the  federal  campaign  funds  of 
the  political  parties,  and  the  amounts  contributed,  as 
well  as  a detailed  account  of  the  expenditures  of  the 
committees  and  the  purposes  for  which  the  expenses 
were  incurred.  President  Taft  also  urged  the  pas- 
sage of  an  income  tax  amendment  to  the  federal  Con- 
stitution and  indicated  that  he  was  in  favor  of  an 
amendment  providing  for  the  popular  election  of 
senators.  Amendments  for  both  these  purposes 

1 A Commerce  Court  was  also  provided,  so  as  to  expedite  the  decision 
of  appeals  from  orders  of  the  Commission.  Its  career  was  brief,  for 
Congress  was  not  well-disposed  toward  the  project,  and  the  Court  was 
abolished  in  1913. 


488 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


passed  Congress;  but  they  were  not  ratified  and  put 
into  effect  until  1913. 

In  June,  1910,  Roosevelt  returned  from  Africa 
whither  he  had  gone  for  a hunting  trip,  after  the 
inauguration  of  President  Taft.  Both  elements  in  the 
Republican  party  were  anxious  for  his  sympathy  and 
support.  Roosevelt  himself  seems  to  have  desired  to- 
remain  outside  the  arena,  at  least  for  a time,  but  for 
many  reasons  permanent  separation  from  politics  was, 
impossible.  He  became  a candidate  for  the  position 
of  temporary  chairman  of  the  New  York  Republican 
State  Convention  against  Vice-President  James  S. 
Sherman.  The  contest  in  the  convention  brought  out 
opposition  to  him  on  the  part  of  the  old-guard,  and 
his  triumph  left  that  wing  of  the  party  dissatisfied  and 
disunited.  During  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1910 
he  made  extensive  political  tours.  At  Ossawatomie, 
Kansas,  he  developed  the  platform  of  the  “New  Na- 
tionalism,” which  included  more  thorough  control  of 
corporations,  and  progressive  legislation  in  regard  to 
income  taxes,  conservation,  the  laboring  classes, 
primary  elections  at  which  the  people  could  nominate 
candidates  for  office,  and  the  recall  of  elective  officials 
before  the  close  of  their  terms.  He  urged  such 
vigorous  use  of  the  powers  of  the  federal  government 
that  there  should  be  no  “neutral  ground”  between 
stale  and  nation,  to  serve  as  a refuge  for  law-breakers. 
Critics  pointed  out  that  these  proposals  had  been 
urged  by  the  insurgents  and  the  followers  of  Bryan, 
and  there  could  be  no  doubt  where-  the  sympathies  of 
Roosevelt  lay  in  the  factional  dispute  within  the  Re- 
publican party. 

While  conditions  within  the  organization  were  such 
as  were  indicated  by  the  hostile  criticism  of  the  Payne- 
Aldrich  act,  by  the  Pinchot-Ballinger  controversy, 


489 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

the  overturn  of  Speaker  Cannon  and  the  disintegra- 
tion of  the  Aldrich-Hale  group,  the  congressional  elec- 
tion of  1910  took  place.  Signs  of  impending  change 
had  already  become  evident.  Insurgent  Republicans 
were  carrying  the  party  primaries;  and  the  Demo- 
crats, who  were  plainly  confident,  emphasized  strongly 
the  tariff  act,  Cannonism  and  the  high  cost  of  living 
as  reasons  for  the  removal  of  the  Republicans.  The 
result  was  a greater  upheaval  than  even  the  Democrats 
had  prophesied.  In  nine  states  the  Republicans  were 
ousted  from  legislatures  that  would  elect  United 
States  senators;  the  new  Senate  would  contain  forty- 
one  Democrats  and  fifty-one  Republicans — too  narrow 
a Republican  majority  in  view  of  the  strength  of  the 
insurgents.  In  the  choice  of  members  of  the  lower 
branch  of  Congress  there  was  a still  greater  revolu- 
tion; the  new  House  would  contain  228  Democrats, 
161  Republicans  and  one  Socialist,  while  Cannon  would 
be  retired  from  the  speakership.  In  eastern  as  well 
as  western  states,  Democratic  governors  were  elected 
in  surprising  numbers.  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Con- 
necticut, New  York,  New  Jersey,  Ohio  and  Oregon 
were  among  them.  Of  particular  importance,  as  later 
events  showed,  was  the  success  in  New  Jersey  of 
Woodrow  IVilson,"  former  president  of  Princeton 
University.  t 

Not  long  after  the  election  of  1910  the  President  sent 
to  Congress  a special  message  urging  the  adoption  of 
a reciprocal  trade  agreement  with  Canada.  The  ar- 
rangement provided  for  freedom  of  trade  in  many 
raw  materials  and  food  products,  and  for  substantial 
reductions  on  some  manufactured  articles.  He 
believed  that  the  project  would  benefit  both  countries 
economically  and  improve  the  already  friendly  rela- 
tions existing  between  them,  and  he  set  his  heart  upon 


490 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


its  adoption.  Opposition  appeared  at  once ; the  farm- 
ers ’ organizations  protested  vigorously  at  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  taritf  on  agricultural  products;  the  high 
protectionists  were  fearful  of  an  entering  wedge  which 
might  lead  to  further  tariff  reductions ; and  the  paper 
and  wood  pulp  interests  also  objected.  Although  the 
agreement  eventually  passed  both  houses  of  Congress 
by  large  majorities,  the  opposition  was  composed 
chiefly  of  Republicans.  Objection  to  the  arrangement 
in  Canada  turned  out  to  be  stronger  than  had  been 
anticipated.  The  fear  that  commercial  reciprocity 
might  make  the  Dominion  somewhat  dependent  on  the 
United  States  seems  to  have  caused  a manifestation  of 
national  pride,  and  Sir  Wilfred  Laurier,  who  had  led 
the  forces  in  favor  of  the  agreement,  was  driven  out 
of  power  and  reciprocity  defeated.  The  result  for  the 
administration'  was  failure  and  further  division  in  the 
party. 

Democratic  control  of  the  House  during  the  second 
half  of  Taft’s  term  effectually  prevented  the  passage 
of  any  considerable  amount  of  legislation.  A parcel- 
post  law,  however,,  was  passed,  a Children’s  Bureau 
was  established  for  the  study  of  the  welfare  of  chil- 
dren, and  a Department  of  Labor  provided  for,  whose 
secretary  was  to  be  a member  of  the  cabinet.  Aided 
by  the  insurgents,  the  Democrats  attempted  a small 
amount  of  tariff  legislation.  Although  a general  re- 
vision of  the  entire  tariff  structure  would  be  a long 
and  laborious  task,  specific  schedules  could  be  revised 
which  would  indicate  what  might  be  expected  in  case 
of  Democratic  success  in  1912.  The  sugar,  steel, 
woolen,  chemical  and  cotton  schedules  were  taken  up 
in  accord  with  this  plan  and  bills  were  passed  which 
were  uniformly  vetoed  by  the  President. 

In  his  attitude  toward  the  regnilation  of  big  business. 


491 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

President  Taft  was  in  harmony  with  his  predecessor 
and  was  in  thorough  sympathy,  therefore,  with  suits 
brought  under  the  Sherman  law  against  the  Standard 
Oil  Company,  and  the  American  Tobacco  Company. 
In  May,  1911,  the  Supreme  Court  decided  that  both  of 
these  companies  had  been  guilty  of  combining  to 
restrain  and  to  monopolize  trade,  and  ordered  a dis- 
solution of  the  conspiring  elements  into  separate,  com- 
peting units.  The  Court  also  undertook  to  answer 
some  of  the  knotty  questions  that  had  arisen  in  rela-. 
tion  to  section  1 of  the  act,  which  declares  illegal 
‘‘every  contract,  combination  in  the  form  of  trust  or 
otherwise,  or  conspiracy,  in  restraint  of  trade.”  Did 
the  prohibition  against  every  contract  or  combination^ 
mean  precisely  every  contract,  whether  important  or 
not?  Or  did  it  refer  merely  to  large  and  unreason- 
able restraints?  The  phraseology^  of  the  statute  seems 
to  prohibit  restraints  of  all  kinds,  and  the  previous 
decisions  of  the  Court  had  been  in  line  with  this  view. 
"When,  then,  the  decisions  in  these  two  cases  erecte'd 
the  “rule  of  reason”  and  declared  that  only  those 
restraints  were  forbidden  that  were  unreasonable,  the 
attention  of  some  opponents  of  the  trusts  was  focussed 
on  the  obiter  dictum,  rather  than  upon  the  decisions 
themselves.  In  taking  this  position,  they  had  the  sup- 
port of  Mr.  Justice  Harlan  who  agreed  to  the  decision 
but  condemned  the  obiter  dictum,  asserted  that  the 
exact  words  of  the  law  forbade  every  contract,  and 
deprecated  what  he  believed  to  be  the  amendment  of 
statutes  by  the  courts.  The  dissolution  of  the  com- 
panies into  competing  units,  however,  had  no  apparent 
effect  that  was  of  benefit  to  the  public.  In  fact,  im- 
mediate increases  in  the  value  of  Standard  Oil  stocks 
indicated  that  the  decision  was  of  slight  consequence. 

In  the  meantime  the  widening  of  the  breach  in  the 


492 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Republican  party  was  indicated  by  the  formation  of 
the  National  Progressive  Republican  Leagme  on  Janu- 
ary 21,  1911.  Its  most  prominent  leaders  were 
Senators  Bourne,  Bristow  and  La  Follette;  and  lead- 
ing progressives  in  different  states  were  invited  to 
join — among  them  ex-President  Roosevelt.  It  was  the 
hope  that  if  the  latter  joined  the  League,  the  step 
might  help  to  place  him  in  more  open  opposition  to 
the  Taft  administration.  The  purpose  of  the  organi- 
zation was  the  passage  of  progressive  economic  and 
political  legislation,  especially  acts  providing  for  the 
election  of  senators  by  vote  of  the  people,  direct 
primaries  for  the  nomination  of  elective  officers,  direct 
election  of  delegates  to  national  conventions,  the  initia- 
tive, referendum  and  recall  in  the  states,  and  a 
thorough-going  corrupt  practices  act. 

Early  in  1912  the  factions  in  the  Republican  party 
began  to  consider  the  question  of  a leader  for  the  com- 
ing presidential  campaign,  some  of  the  progressive 
element  looking  to  La  Follette  as  the  natural  candi- 
date, and  others  to  Roosevelt  when  it  was  seen  that  he 
would  not  support  Taft  for  a renomination.  On  Feb- 
ruary 21,  Roosevelt  addressed  a constitutional  con- 
vention in  Columbus,  Ohio,  and  expressed  a political 
creed  that  closely  resembled  the  program  of  the  Na- 
tional Progressive  Republican  League.  In  the  mean- 
time the  demand  for  Roosevelt  as  a candidate  had  been 
incessant  on  the  part  of  numerous  Republicans  of  in- 
surgent sympathies,  who  realized  how  many  more 
progressive  principles  he  had  accepted  than  Taft. 
Finally  on  February  24  he  replied  to  an  appeal  from  a 
group  of  his  supporters,  including  seven  state  gov- 
ernors, that  he  would  accept  a nomination.  There- 
upon most  of  the  progressives  transferred  their  al- 
legiance from  La  Follette  to  the  ex-President.  Presi- 


493 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

dent  Taft’s  fighting  spirit  had  become  aroused,  in  the 
meanwhile,  and  he  had  declared  that  only  death  would 
keep  him  out  of  the  fight. 

The  call  had  already  been  issued  for  the  Republican 
Nominating  Convention  to  be  held  in  Chicago,  in  June, 
and  the  contest  began  for  the  control  of  the  1,078  dele- 
gates who  would  compose  its  membership.  The  sup- 
porters of  Taft,  being  in  possession  of  the  party  ma- 
chinery, were  able  to  dictate  the  choice  of  many  of 
these  delegates,  especially  from  the  South,  by  means 
that  had  been  usual  in  pofitics  for  many  years.  The 
friends  of  Roosevelt,  in  order  to  overcome  this  handi- 
cap, began  to  demand  presidential  preference  pri- 
maries, in  which  the  people  might  make  known  their 
wishes,  and  in  which  his  personal  popularity  would 
make  him  a strong  contender.  During  the  pre-con- 
vention campaign,  twelve  states  held  primaries  and 
the  others  held  the  usual  party  conventions.  At  first 
Taft  did  not  actively  enter  the  contest,  but  the  efforts 
of  Roosevelt  were  so  successful  and  his  charges  against 
the  President  so  numerous  that  he  felt  compelled  to 
take  the  stump.  The  country  was  then  treated  to  the 
spectacle  of  a President  and  an  ex-President  touring 
the  country  and  acrimoniously  attacking  each  other. 
The  progressives,  Taft  asserted,  were  “political  emo- 
tionalists” and  “neurotics”;  Roosevelt,  he  com- 
plained, had  promised  not  to  accept  another  nomina- 
tion, had  broken  his  agreement,  and  had  not  given  a 
fair  account  of  the  policies  which  the  administration 
had  been  following.  Roosevelt  charged  Taft  with  be- 
ing a reactionary,  a friend  of  the  “bosses”  and  with 
using  the  patronage  in  order  to  secure  a renomina- 
tion. And  he  grated  on  the  sensibilities  of  the  nation 
by  referring  to  his  influence  in  getting  Taft  elected 
in  1908  and  remarking,  “it  is  a bad  trait  to  bite  the 


494 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


hand  that  feeds  you.”  The  result  of  the  presidential 
preference  primaries  in  the  few  states  that  held  them 
was  overwhelmingly  in  favor  of  Roosevelt;  in  the 
states  where  conventions  chose  the  delegates,  Taft  ob- 
tained a majority;  in  the  case  of  over  200  delegates, 
there  were  disputes  as  to  whether  Taft  or  Roosevelt 
men  were  fairly  chosen.  These  contests,  as  usual, 
were  decided  by  the  National  Republican  Committee, 
with  the  right  of  appeal  to  the  Convention  itself.  The 
Committee  decided  nearly  all  the  contests  in  favor  of 
Taft’s  friends,  and  since  all  the  delegates  thus  chosen 
would  sit  in  the  Convention  and  vote  on  one  another’s 
eases,  the  decision  seemed  likely  to  be  final. 

The  scene  of  action  then  shifted  to  Chicago  where 
the  Convention  assembled  on  June  18.  Aroused  by 
the  action  of  the  Committee  in  the  contests,  Roosevelt 
went  thither  to  care  for  his  interests^  The  election 
of  a temporary  chairman  resulted  in  the  choice  of 
Elihu  Root,  who  was  favorable  to  Taft.  The  Roose- 
velt delegates,  declaring  that  the  contests  had  been  un- 
fairly decided,  enlivened  the  roll-call  by  shouts  of 
“robbers,”  “thieves”;  and  when  Root  thanked  the 
Convention  for  the  confidence  which  it  reposed  in  him, 
his  words  were  greeted  with  groans.  Upon  the  failure 
of  an  attempt  to  revise  the  decision  of  the  National 
Committee  in  the  cases  of  the  contested  delegates, 
Roosevelt  announced  that  he  was  “through.”  One  of 
his  supporters  read  to  the  Convention  a statement 
from  him  charging  that  the  Committee,  under  the  di- 
rection of  Taft,  had  stolen  eighty  or  ninety  delegates, 
making  the  gathering  no  longer  in  any  proper  sense 
a Republican  convention.  Thereafter  most  of  the 

1 When  Koosevelt  arrived  in  Chicago,  he  remarked  that  he  felt  like  a 
“bull  moose,”  an  expression  which  later  gave  his  party  its  popular 
name. 


495 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

Roosevelt  delegates  refused  to  share  either  in  the 
nomination  of  the  candidate  or  in  the  adoption  of  a 
platform.  The  choice  of  Taft  as  the  candidate  was 
then  made  without  difficulty. 

The  platform  contained  the  usual  planks  concerning 
the  party’s  past,  the  protective  tariff  and  the  civil 
service;  and  it  reflected  something  of  the  rising  in- 
terest in  economic  and  political  reforms  in  its  advo- 
cacy of  laws  limiting  the  hours  of  labor  for  women 
and  children,  workmen’s  compensation  acts,  reforms 
in  legal  procedure,  a simpler  process  than  impeach- 
ment for  the  removal  of  judges,  additions  to  the  anti- 
trust law,  the  revision  of  the  currency  system,  pub- 
licity of  campaign  contributions  and  a parcel-post. 

As  the  Republican  convention  was  drawing  its 
labors  to  a close,  the  dissatisfied  adherents  of  Roose- 
velt met  and  invited  him  to  become  the  candidate  of  a 
new  organization.  Upon  his  acceptance,  a call  was 
issued  for  a convention  of  the  Progressive  Party,  to  be 
held  in  Chicago  on  August  5.  The  discord  among  the 
Republicans  was  viewed  with  undisguised  content  by 
the  Democratic  leaders,  for  it  seemed  likely  to  open  to 
them  the  doorway  to  power.  Yet  the  same  difference 
between  liberals  and  conservatives  that  had  been  the 
outstanding  feature  of  the  Republican  convention  was 
evident  among  the  Democrats,  and  nobody  could  be 
sure  that  a schism  would  not  take  place. 

There  was  no  lack  of  aspirants  for  the  presidential 
nomination.  J.  B.  (“Champ”)  Clark,  Speaker  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  Governor  Judson  Harmon, 
of  Ohio,  0.  W.  Underwood,  Chairman  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Ways  and  Means,  and  Governor  Wood- 
row  Wilson,  of  New  Jersey,  all  had  earnest  support- 
ers. In  contests  in  the  state  conventions  and  pri- 
maries, Speaker  Clark  was  most  successful,  although 


496 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


not  enough  delegates  were  pledged  to  him  to  secure 
the  nomination. 

The  convention  met  in  Baltimore  on  June  25,  and  for 
the  most  part  centered  about  the  activities  of  Bryan. 
On  the  third  day  he  presented  a resolution  declaring 
the  convention  opposed  to  the  nomination  of  any  candi- 
date who  was  under  obligations  to  J.  P.  Morgan,  T.  F. 
Ryan,  August  Belmont,  or  any  of  the  “privilege-hunt- 
ing and  favor-seeking  class.”  An  uproar  ensued,  hut 
the  resolution  was  overwhelmingly  adopted,  Ballot- 
ing for  the  candidate  then  began.  Speaker  Clark  had 
a majority,  but  was  far  from  having  the  two-thirds 
majority  which  Democratic  conventions  require;  Gov- 
ernor Wilson  was  more  than  a hundred  votes  behind 
him.  While  the  fourteenth  ballot  was  being  taken, 
Bryan  created  a new  sensation  by  announcing  that  he 
should  transfer  his  vote  from  Clark  to  Wilson,  on  the 
ground  that  the  New  York  delegates  were  in  the  hands 
of  Charles  F.  Murphy,  the  leader  of  Tammany  Hall, 
and  that  Murphy  was  for  the  Speaker.  The  relative 
positions  of  the  two  leading  candidates  remained  un- 
changed, however,  for  five  ballots  more.  Then  the  tide 
began  to  turn.  At  the  thirtieth.  Governor  AVilson  led 
for  the  first  time,  and  on  the  forty-sixth  Clark’s  sup- 
port broke  and  Wilson  was  nominated. 

The  platform  resembled  that  of  1908.  It  called 
for  immediate  downward  revision  of  the  tariff,  the 
strengthening  of  the  anti-trust  laws,  presidential  pref- 
erence primaries,  prohibition  of  corporation  contri- 
butions to  campaign  funds,  a single  term  for  the 
president  and  the  revision  of  the  banking  and  cur- 
rency laws. 

The  organization  of  the  Progressive  party,  in  the 
meantime,  was  rapidly  proceeding,  and  on  Augmst  5 
the  national  convention  was  held.  It  was  an  unusual 


497 


POLITICS,  1908-1912 

political  gatliering  both  in  its  personnel — for  women 
delegates  shared  in  its  deliberations — and  in  the  emo- 
tional fervor  which  dominated  its  sessions.  At  the 
Democratic  convention  the  delegates  had  awakened  the 
echoes  with  the  familiar  song  “Hail!  Hail!  The 
gang ’s  all  here”;  the  Progressives  expressed  their 
convictions  in  “Onward,  Christian  Soldiers.”  Koose- 
velt’s  speech  was  called  his  “confession  of  faith”;  his 
charge  that  both  of  the  old  parties  were  boss-ridden 
and  privilege-controlled  epitomized  the  prevailing 
sentiment  among  his  hearers.  Without  a contest 
Roosevelt  was  nominated  for  the  presidency  and  Hiram 
Johnson  of  California  for  the  \uce-presidency. 

The  platform  adopted  was  distinctly  a reform  docu- 
ment. It  advocated  such  political  innovations  as 
direct  primaries,  the  direct  election  of  senators,  the 
initiative,  referendum  and  recall,  a more  expeditious 
method  of  amending  the  Constitution,  women’s  suf- 
frage, and  the  limitation  of  campaign  expenditures.  A 
detailed  program  of  social  and  economic  legislation  in- 
cluded laws  for  the  prevention  of  accidents,  the  prohibi- 
tion of  child  labor,  a “living  wage,”  the  eight-hour  day, 
a Department  of  Labor,  the  conservation  of  the  nation’s 
resources,  and  the  development  of  the  agricultural  in- 
terests. The  third  portion  of  the  platform  dealt  with 
“the  unholy  alliance  between  corrupt  business  and  cor- 
rupt politics.”  It  declared  the  test  of  corporate  effi- 
ciency to  be  the  ability  “to  serve  the  public”;  it  de- 
manded the  “strong  national  regulation  of  interstate 
corporations,”  a federal  industrial  commission  com- 
parable to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  and 
the  protection  of  the  people  from  concerns  offering 
worthless  investments  under  highly  colored  and  spe- 
cious appearances. 

The  results  of  the  election  indicated  how  complete  the 


i 


498 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


division  in  the  Republican  party  had  been.  In  the  elec- 
toral college  Wilson  received  435  votes  to  Roosevelt’s 
88  and  Taft’s  8,  Yet  Wilson’s  popular  vote — 6,300,- 
000 — fell  far  short  of  the  combined  Roosevelt-Taft  vote 
— 7,500,000 — and  was  less  than  that  of  Bryan  in  1896, 
1900,  and  1908.^  The  fact  that  the  combined  Roose- 
velt-Taft vote  was  less  than  that  received  by  Taft  in 
1908  seems  to  indicate  that  many  Republicans  refused 
to  vote.  The  control  of  Congress,  in  both  houses,  went 
to  the  Democrats,  even  such  a popular  leader  as 
Speaker  Cannon  failing  of  reelection.  In  twenty-one 
of  the  thirty-five  states  where  governors  were  chosen, 
the  Democrats  were  triumphant.  Whether,  then,  the 
schism  in  the  Republican  party  was  responsible  for 
the  success  of  the  opposition,  or  whether  the  electorate 
was  determined  upon  a change  regardless  of  conditions 
in  the  party  which  had  hitherto  controlled  popular 
favor,  the  fact  was  that  the  overturn  was  complete. 
And  circumstances  that  could  not  have  been  foreseen 
and  that  affected  the  entire  world  were  destined  to 
make  the  political  revolution  profoundly  significant. 


BIBLIOGKAPHICAL  NOTE 

In  the  main,  periodical  literature  written  with  more  or  less 
partisan  bias  must  be  relied  upon. 

For  the  election  of  1908,  F.  A.  Ogg,  National  Progress 
(1918),  and  the  better  newspapers  and  periodicals.  W.  H. 
Taft  may  be  studied  in  his  Presidential  Addresses  and  State 
Papers  (1910),  Present  Bay  Problems  (1908),  and  Our  Chief 
Magistrate  and  His  Powers  (1916). 

On  the  Payne-Aldrich  tariff:  S.  W.  McCall  in  Atlantic 
Monthly,  vol.  CIV,  p.  562;  G.  M.  Fisk  in  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  XXV,  p.  35;  H.  P.  Willis  in  Journal  of  Political 

1 Roosevelt,  4,000,000;  Taft,  3,500,000. 


POLITICS,  1908-1912  499 

Economy,  XVII,  pp.  1,  589,  XVIII,  1 ; in  addition  to  Tarbell 
and  Taussig. 

The  documents  in  the  Pinchot-Ballinger  controversy  are  in 
Senate  Documents,  61st  Congress,  2nd  session,  vol.  44  (Serial 
Number  5643),  and  3rd  session,  vol.  34  (Serial  Numbers  5892- 
5903). 

For  other  incidents:  C.  R.  Atkinson,  Committee  on  Rules 
and  the  Overthrow  of  Speaker  Cannon  (1911)  ; Canadian  reci- 
procity in  Senate  Documents,  61st  Congress,  3rd  session,  vol. 
34  (Serial  Number  5942)  ; Appleton’s  American  Year  Book 
(1911).  The  decisions  in  the  Standard  Oil  and  American 
Tobacco  cases  are  in  United  States  Reports,  vol.  221,  pp.  1, 
106;  a good  discussion  will  be  founnd  in  W.  H.  Taft,  Anti- 
Trust  Act  and  the  Supreme  Court  (1914).  For  the  rise  of 
the  insurgent  movement  and  the  election  of  1912,  F.  E. 
Haynes,  Third  Party  Movements  (1916)  ; R.  M.  La  Follette, 
Autobiography ; B.  P.  De  Witt,  Progressive  Movement  (1915)  ; 
W.  J.  Bryan,  Tale  of  Two  Conventions  (1912)  ; besides  Ogg, 
Beard  and  Stanwood. 

The  American  Year  Book  (1910-),  becomes  serviceable  in 
connection  with  major  political  events.  Its  articles  are  usu- 
ally non-partisan  and  may  be  relied  upon  to  bring  continuing 
tendencies  and  practices  up  to  date. 


CHAPTiER  XXII 


ECONOMIC  AND  POLITICAL.  TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 

During  the  four  decades  between  the  opening’  of 
the  Civil  War  and  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, the  United  States  became  in  many  respects  an 
economic  unit.  The  passage  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  in  1887,  for  instance,  was  an  early  recogni- 
tion of  the  fact  that  the  transportation  problem  of  the 
nation  transcended  state  bounds;  the  Sherman  Anti- 
trust law  of  1890  arose  from  the  realization  that  com- 
mercial and  industrial  unity  were  rapidly  coming  to 
pass ; the  American  Federation  of  Labor  brought  work- 
men from  all  states  and  many  trades  into  a single  or- 
ganization. The  election  of  1896  and  the  amazing  con- 
solidation of  business  enterprises  at  the  close  of  the 
century  were  further  proofs  that  the  day  had  passed 
when  any  section  of  the  United  States  could  live  an 
isolated  economic  life  without  relation  to  other  parts 
of  the  country.  Instead  of  remaining  a federation  of 
diverse  economic  sections,  we  became  increasingly 
homogeneous.  Much  of  the  economic  and  political 
legislation  enacted  after  1896,  and  many  of  the  prac- 
tices and  standards  which  were  adopted  by  leaders  in 
economic  and  political  life  were  an  outgrowth  of  the 
new  conditions. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  eighties  and  early 
nineties  had  been  years  of  labor  unrest.  Costly  and 
bitter  strikes  on  the  part  of  the  workmen,  and  resolute 
and  powerful  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  employers 

500 


TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 


501 


were  the  commonplaces  of  the  history  of  labor.  The 
culmination  was  the  Pullman  strike  of  1894.^  Its  cost 
in  money  and  suffering  was  appalling;  it  placed  the 
federal  military  power  in  the  hands  of  the  employers;' 
and  although  it  was  a failure  as  far  as  the  -strikers  were  * 
concerned,  yet  an  impartial  investigation  after  the 
struggle  was  over  established  the  justice  of  much  of 
which  the  men  had  complained.  If  discriminating  jus- 
tice were  to  be  measured  out  to  both  sides,  instead  of' 
victory  to  the  side  of  the  strongest  battalions,  and  if’ 
intolerable  waste  and  discomfort  were  to  be  avoided, 
some  remedies  for  industrial  unrest  must  be  discovered 
which  would  replace  strikes  and  violence.  Happily, 
signs  were  not  wanting  that  such  a change  was  slowly 
taking  place. 

A combination  of  influences  tended  to  place  the  labor 
problem  on  a new  footing  after  1896.  One  of  the  most 
important  of  these  forces  was  the  American  Federation 
of  Labor  which  greatly  increa'sed  its  size  and  activities, 
especially  about  the  opening  of  the  new  century,  grow- 
ing from  950,000  members  in  1901  to  4,302,148  in  April, 
1920.  Its  president,  Samuel  Gompers,  is  an  able;  re- 
sourceful leader,  who  has  remained  in  control  from 
1882  to  the  present  (1920),  with  the  single  exception  of 
the  year  1895,  so  that  the  organization  has  had  the  bene- 
fit of  experienced  leadership  and  continuity  of  purpose. 
Although  a radical,  socialistic  element  broke  away  in 
1905  and  formed  the  Industrial  Workers  of  the  World, 
yet  the  defection  was  not  immediately  serious  and  in 
general  schisms  have  been  avoided.  Several  other 
labor  organizations,  although  unconnected  vnth  the 
Federation  exerted  a strong  influence ; in  particular  the 
brotherhoods  of  railway  eihployees,  by  frequent  threats 
to  strike  and  thereby  tie  up  the  transportation  system, 

1 Above,  pp.  320-323. 


502 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  AVAE 


aided  in  bringing  the  demands  of  labor  to  public  notice. 

Aloreover,  after  1896  and  especially  after  the  coal 
strike  of  1902  there  was  an  increasing  recognition  on 
the  part  of  the  public  that  a labor  problem  existed  and 
that  it  must  be  solved  in  some  way  other  than  by  force 
of  arms.  Physicians  and  scientific  experts  ca:lled  at- 
tention to  the  lack  of  proper  care  for  the  health  of 
workmen  in  dangerous  industries;  the  movement  for 
the  preservation  of  the  forests  and  mineral  supplies 
emphasized  the  need  of  efforts  for  the  conservation  of 
human  lives ; social  reformers,  economists,  writers  and 
educators  upheld  the  needs  and  rights  of  the  neglected 
classes;  and  the  press  and  the  muck-rake  periodicals 
found  it  profitable  to  expose  extreme  abuses.  Distress 
that  had  hitherto  been  unnoticed  or  disregarded  became 
important,  and  remedies  were  demanded.  Change  was 
in  the  air,  and  not  alone  in  America,  for  England  and 
France  were  experiencing  the  same  problems,  and  at- 
tempting to  devise  new  expedients  to  solve  them. 
After  the  beginning  of  the  new  century,  also,  the  em- 
ploying class  came  to  a better  realization  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  labor  problem  and  sought  solutions  in  ways 
that  must  be  mentioned  later.^  There  was  a more 
widespread  acceptance  of  the  principle  of  trade  agree- 
ments, whereby  the  employer  and  the  men  determined 
the  conditions  of  labor  by  means  of  direct  negotiations. 

Although  it  had  been  the  policy  of*the  American  Fed- 
eration of  Labor  to  keep  out  of  politics,  it  was  almost 
inevitable  that  the  policy  should  receive  some  modifica- 
tions. Organizations  of  employers  were  influential  at 
AVAshington,  and  had  long^beeh  so.  Accordingly  in 
1908  the  Democratic  platform  was  endorsed  on  ac- 
count of  its  labor  planks,  and  again  in  1910  and  1912. 
By  the  latter  year  all  parties  were  earnestly  striving  to 

1 Below,  p.  508. 


TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 


503 


capture  the  labor  vote,  and  in  particular  the  Democratic 
and  Progressive  platforms  embodied  most  of  what  the 
wage  earner  had  been  demanding  for  the  previous  gen- 
eration. 

The  major  demands  in  the  labor  program  of  earlier 
years— higher  wages,  shorter  hours,  settled  conditions 
of  employment,  and  the  like — were  not  altered  after 
1896,  but  a few  striking  advances  were  made.  The  at- 
tempt to  legislate  concerning  hours  of  employment,  for 
example,  had  been  continually  obstructed  by  the  clauses 
in  the  Fifth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  forbidding 
any  legislation  depriving  the  individual  of  “life, 
liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law.  ’ ’ The 
courts  had  usually  interpreted  these  phrases  as  pro- 
hibiting laws  restricting  hours  of  labor,  on  the  ground 
that  the  liberty  of  the  workman  to  contract  freely  re- 
garding his  own  working  hours  was  thereby  infringed. 
A Massachusetts  law  of  1874,  nevertheless,  which 
limited  a day’s  work  for  women  and  children  to  ten 
hours,  had  followed  the  long-continued  assertion  that 
regulatory  legislation  could  be  based  on  the  “police 
power” — a somewhat  indefinite  authority  which  was* 
gradually  conceded  by  the  courts  to  the  states  and  the 
federal  government,  and  under  which  it  was  possible  to 
pass  legislation  concerning  the  conservation  of  the 
health  and  morals  of  the  people  without  violating  the 
Constitution.  Not  until  1908,  however,  was  the  con- 
stitutionality of  sucli  legislation  finally  settled  by  the 
Supreme  Court,  in  upholding  an  Oregon  ten-hour  law. 
“As  healthy  mothers  are  essential  to  vigorous  otf- 
spring, ” the  decision  asserted,  “the  physical  well- 
being of  women  becomes  an  object  of  public  interest 
and  care  in  order  to  preserve  the  strength  and  vigor  of 
the  race.”  In  other  words,  the  Court  was  prepared  to 
approve  limitations  on  the  freedom  of  contract  in  order 


504 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


to  further  the  public  interest.  The  Massachusetts  law 
was  imitated  far  and  wide,  so  that  at  the  present  time 
an  almost  negligible  number  of  states  have  failed  to 
restrict  the  length  of  the  working  day  for  women. 

Recently,  also,  substantial  progress  has  been  made 
in  restricting  working  hours  for  children.  As  long  ago 
as  1866  Massachusetts  had  restricted  the  employment 
of  children,  but  neither  this  law  nor  similar  laws  passed 
by  other  states  had  been  fully  enforced.  Greater  prog- 
ress has  been  made  since  1903,  when  Illinois,  followed 
l\v  the  majority  of  the  important  industrial  states,  es- 
tablished the  eight-hour  standard  for  children  under 
sixteen.  Impressed  with  the  need  of  federal  legislation 
to  coerce  backward  states,  the  reformers  took  their  case 
to  Congress  where  a federal  act  was  passed  in  1916. 
On  account  of  constitutional  limitations,  the  measure 
was  framed  so  as  to  forbid  shipment,  on  interstate 
railways,  of  the  products  of  factories  employing  chil- 
dren under  fourteen  years  of  age.  It  was  estimated 
that  150,000  out  of  nearly  2,000,000  working  children 
might  be  affected  by  the  act.  Its  fate,  however,  was 
that  of  many  another  piece  of  economic  legislation ; by 
a vote  of  five  to  four,  the  Supreme  Court  declared  the 
law  unconstitutional  on  the  ground  that  it  was  not  an 
attempt  to  regulate  commerce,  but  an  attempt  to  regu- 
late the  conditions  of  manufacture.  Early  in  1919  the 
effort  to  regulate  child  labor  \vas  renewed  through  the 
imposition  of  a tax  of  ten  per  cent,  on  the  net  profits  of 
factories  employing  children  under  fourteen  years  of 
age.  In  1922  this  law  was  also  declared  unconstitu- 
tional by  the  Supreme  Court. 

It  will  he  noted  that  all  the  foregoing  legislative  at- 
tempts to  reduce  the  working  day  affected  women  and 
children  only;  in  general,  little  attempt  has  been  ma^e 
to  limit  the  working  day  for  men.  Nevertheless,  large 


TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 


505 


numbers  of  cities,  more  than  half  the  states,  and  the 
federal  government  provide  for  an  eight-hour  day  on 
public  work ; and  western  states  have  followed  the  lead 
of  Utah  in  passing  eight-hour  laws  for  miners.  Hours 
of  labor  for  railway  employees  have  also  been  the  sub- 
ject of  study  and  legislation.  Cases  had  not  been  un- 
known where  employees  were  kept  at  their  posts  for 
thirty,  fifty  and  even  one  hundred  hours;  frequently 
such  workmen  fell  asleep  and  disastrous  accidents  oc- 
curred. In  1907  this  situation  was  met  by  a congres- 
sional act  limiting  the  hours  of  railway  engineers  to 
sixteen  and  providing  that  periods  of  work  must  be 
followed  by  specified  rest  periods.  Train-despatchers, 
telegraphers,  and  others  were  similarly  protected.  A 
majority  of  the  states  imitated  these  federal  statutes. 
In  a few  cases,  state  laws  have  been  passed  which  were 
intended  to  limit  working  hours  in  other  especial  in- 
dustries. The  most  famous  of  these  was  one  in  New 
York,  which  restricted  the  working  day  in  bakeries  to 
ten  hours.  In  the  decision  Lochner  v.  New  York,  the 
Supreme  Court  declared  the  law  unconstitutional.^ 

The  early  twentieth  century  also  saw  progress  on  the 
subject  of  compensation  for  industrial  accidents.  As 
far  back  as  1881  Germany  had  enacted  a law  which  put 
the  blame  for  all  accidents  on  the  employers,  except 
when  the  victim  was  wilfully  negligent;  in  1897  Eng- 
land had  passed  the  British  Workmen’s  Compensation 
Act  which  virtually  made  the  employer  the  insurer  of 
his  workmen  against  all  accidents.  The  theory  under- 
lying these  laws  was  that  accidents  were  like  wear  and 
tear  and  should  be  made  a charge  on  the  industry,  like 
, the  depreciation  of  buildings  and  machinery.  The 
United  States,  however,  lagged  behind  all  other  indus- 
trial nations,  despite  the  astonishing  number  of  acci- 

1 Above,  p.  442. 


506 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


dents  which  yearly  occurred.  In  1908,  for  example, 
it  was  estimated  that  two  million  men  were  injured,  of 
whom  200,000  were  permanently  disabled,  and  30,000 
died — a larger  number  than  the  federal  killed,  wounded 
and  missing'  in  the  Cettysburg-  campaign.  Under  pre- 
vious jjractice  in  this  country  compensation  for  indus- 
trial accidents  had  been  awarded  in  accord  with  com- 
mon law  principles,  under  which  the  employer  was  not 
responsible  for  an  employee  who  was  injured  through 
the  negligence  of  a fellow  servant.  Any  workman  who 
entered  hazardous  employment  was  assumed  under  the 
common  law  to  know  the  dangers  and  be  ready  to  ruii 
the  risks,  and  no  compensation  could  be  recovered  un-. 
less  it  could  be  shown  that  the  master  had  been  negli- 
gent and  the  employee  had  not  also  been  negligent.  It 
came  widely  to  be  thought  that  the  common  law  did  not 
justly  apply  to  the  complex  industrial  system  of  mod- 
ern times.  It  did  not  seem  equitable,  for  example,  that 
the  fellow  servant  doctrine  should  hold  in  case  of  a 
railway  employee  killed  through  the  negligence  of  a 
train  despatcher  many  miles  away,  whom  he  did  not 
know  and  had  never  even  seen. 

The  first  workmen’s  compensation  act  in  the  United 
States  was  passed  in  Maryland  in  1902.  Its  scope  was 
narrow  and  it  came  to  nothing  as  it  was  declared  un- 
constitutional. In  course  of  time,  however,  legislation 
was  framed  in  such  language  as  to  pass  muster  before 
the  courts,  and  moreover  judicial  decisions  changed,  as 
time  went  on,  in  the  direction  desired  by  popular  opin- 
ion. Beginning  in  1911  there  was  an  avalanche  of  lia- 
bility and  compensation  laws  and  by  1920  forty-two 
states,  together  with  Porto  Rico,  Alaska  and  Hawaii 
had  pass'^d  acts  that  placed  the  burden  more  or  less 
completely  on  the  employer,  and  provided  schemes  of 
compensation.  The  federal  government  also  took  ac- 


TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 


507 


tion.  At  the  suggestion  of  President  Eoosevelt  an  act 
was  passed  in  1908  making  interstate  railroads  respon- 
sible for  injuries  to  employees  and  expressly  doing 
away  with  former  common  law  practices^  At  the 
same  time  a similar  liability  was  placed  upon  the  United 
States  for  accidents  occurring  to  certain  classes  of  gov- 
ernment employees  and  a plan  of  compensation  was 
established.  In  1916  another  act  brought  all  civil  serv- 
ants under  the  system. 

Several  other  types  of  social  legislation  have  made 
considerable  progress  in  Europe,  but  have  found  little 
or  no  foot-hold  in  this  country,  such  as  minimum  wage 
laws,  health  insurance,  old  age  and  widows’  pensions, 
and  unemployment  insurance.  The  minimum  wage 
law,  establishing  a level  below  which  wages  must  not 
go,  has  been  adopted  by  Massachusetts  and  a few 
other  states  in  a restricted  form.  The  unemployment 
problem  has  hardly  been  touched,  although  the  federal 
Department  of  Labor  since  its  establishment  in  1913 
has  gathered  and  made  public  information  in  regard  to 
opportunities  for  work. 

Recent  years  have  likewise  seen  a vast  number  of 
laws  which  together  have  made  a new  era  in  American 
industrial  life,  although  separately  no  one  of  them  was 
revolutionary.  F or  example,  matches  containing  white 
phosphorous  were  subjected  to  a prohibitive  tax  be- 
cause of  the  harmful  effect  of  the  phosphorous  on  work- 
men in  match  factories ; greater  care  was  exercised  in 
guarding  dangerous  machines,  elevator  wells  and  the 
like ; fire  protection,  harmful  or  poisonous  fumes  and 
dust,  ventilation  and  safety  devices  in  mines,  safety  ap- 
pliances on  railway  trains,  together  with  numberless 
other  accompaniments  of  modern  industry  were  the 
subject  of  state  legislation.  Almost  as  important  as 


1 An  act  of  1906  had  been  declared  unconstitutional. 


508 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


legislative  enactments  were  the  changes  in  working 
conditions  voluntarily  made  by  the  most  progressive 
corporations.  One  who  compares  a factory  built 
within  twenty-five  years  of  the  close  of  the  Civil  War 
with  a building  erected  since  1900  discovers  revolu- 
tionary changes.  Later  buildings  are  constructed  with 
much  more  care  for  ventilation,  light  and  convenience ; 
in  some  cases  even  the  temperature  of  the  work-rooms 
is  a matter  for  painstaking  attention;  “welfare”  work 
is  now  a commonplace,  with  rest  rooms,  lunch  rooms, 
recreation  fields  and  factory  social  activities.  Fac- 
tory or  store  committees  that  confer  with  higher  offi- 
cers in  relation  to  hours  and  the  needs  and  desires  of 
the  employees  are  by  no  means  uncommon,  and  some  of 
the  large  corporations  even  provide  pension  systems 
for  their  employees. 

On  the  other  hand,  laws  and  statute  hooks  did  not 
always  guarantee  performance.  Laws  were  continu- 
ally avoided  both  by  the  employers  and  the  employees ; 
workmen  transgressed  rules  laid  down  for  their  wel- 
fare; the  passage  and  execution  of  many  laws  were 
hampered  to  the  last  degree  by  sh’ort-sighted  employ- 
ers ; the  courts  invalidated  much  legislation  on  the 
ground  of  unconstitutionality;  and  progress  was  fre- 
quently confined  to  leading  states  or  corporations  and 
was  bj’"  no  means  universal.  It  nevertheless  is  true 
that  the  tendencies  in  social  and  economic  legislation 
since  1896  have  been  widely  different  from  those  preva- 
lent before  that  year. 

In  several  cases  the  influence  of  the  labor  element 
in  federal  legislation  has  been  decisive.  The  use  of  the 
injunction,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  one  of  the 
grievances  most  frequently  mentioned  at  the  time  of 
the  Pullman  strike.  In  the  campaign  of  1908  both  par- 
ties strove  to  attract  the  labor  vote  by  proposals  of 


TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 


509 


reform,  but  not  until  1914  was  the  issuance  of  injunc- 
tions forbidden  “unless  necessary  to  prevent  irre- 
parable injury  to  property  . . . for  which  injury 
there  is  no  adequate  remedy  at  law.”  At  the  same 
time  the  labor  unions  were  exempted  from  the  opera- 
tion of  the  anti-trust  laws.^  The  influence  of  the  labor 
organizations  was  also  a factor  in  the  agitation  for  the 
restriction  of  immigration  which  continued  from  1897 
to  1917.  In  the  former  year  a bill  was  passed  which 
contained  a literacy  test — that  is,  a provision  excluding 
persons  who  were  unable  to  read  or  write  English  or 
some  other  language.  President  Cleveland  exercised 
his  veto,  as  did  later  presidents  when  similar  measures 
were  carried  in  1913,  1915  and  1917,  but  in  the  latter 
year  Congress  was  able  to  muster  sufficient  strength 
to  pass  the  act  over  the  President’s  veto.  One  of  the 
main  purposes  of  the  measure  seems  to  have  been  the 
restriction  of  the  labor  supply,  and  hence  it  enlisted  the 
support  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  and 
other  similar  organizations.^ 

The  ameliorative  measures  already  mentioned  have 
by  no  means  prevented  the  boycott  and  the  strike.  In- 
deed they  have  not,  except  in  rare  cases,  directly  af- 
fected the  two  great  causes  of  industrial  disputes — 
hours  and  wages  for  adult  male  laborers.  Many  for- 
midable and  violent  strikes  have  occurred  since  1896, 
such  as  those  of  the  shirt-waist  makers  in  New  York  in 
1909,  the  textile  operatives  in  Lawrence,  Massachusetts, 
in  1912,  and  the  Colorado  coal  miners  in  1913.  On  the 
whole,  however,  it  seems  that  the  labor  unions  have  de- 
veloped somewhat  greater  conseixmtism  and  that  their 
influence  has  been  against  violence  in  strikes. 

1 It  should  be  said,  however,  that  the  meaning  of  this  law  is  far  from 
clear  and  is  yet  ( 1920)  to  be  interpreted  by  the  courts. 

- Presidents  McKinley  and  Roosevelt  also  favored  it.  See  Ogg,  'Na- 
tional Progress,  123-130. 


510 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  V^AR 


Few  aspects  of  the  labor  problem  have  been  the  cause 
of  more  earnest  thought  than  the  search  for  ]maceful 
methods  of  settling  industrial  controversies.  In  ]89<S, 
by  the  Erdman  Act,  the  federal  government  provided  a 
means  for  arbitrating  disputes  on  interstate  railways. 
The  Newlands  Act  of  1913  superseded  this  by  the  crea- 
tion of  a formal  Board  of  Mediation  and  Conciliation, 
and  many  disputes  were  decided  under  the  terms  of 
these  laws.  The  Department  of  Labor  mediated  in 
many  industrial  disputes,  and  in  1916  when  the  four 
railway  brotherhoods  threatened  to  strike  for  an  eight- 
hour  day.  Congress  itself  intervened  with  a piece  of 
special  legislation,  the  Adamson  law,  which  was  framed 
to  settle  the  questions  under  dispute.^  In  some  cases, 
profit-sharing  plans  have  been  put  into  force;  in  others, 
disputes  have  been  referred  to  impartial  boards  of  out- 
siders; and  in  yet  others,  machinery  has  been  estab- 
lished for  continuous  conference  between  representa- 
tives of  the  employees  and  employers.  Neither  federal 
and  state  boards  and  commissions,  however,  nor  the 
efforts  of  individual  employers  have  been  sufficient 
fully  to  insure  industrial  peace. 

The  increased  activity  of  the  state  and  federal  gov- 
ernments in  the  fields  of  economic  legislation,  as  indi- 
cated in  the  passage  of  labor  laws,  was  also  illustrated 
in  two  important  measures  passed  in  1906.  The  adul- 
teration of  foods  had  been  brought  to  a state  of  dan- 
gerous perfection,  and  drugs  had  been  commonly  ad- 
vertised and  sold  all  over  the  countiy  which  had  none 
of  the  powers  ascribed  to  them  by  their  makers.  Since 
the  eighties,  many  states  had  forbidden  the  sale  of 
impure  or  tainted  food,  but  the  laws  were  varied  and 
difficult  to  enforce,  and  it  appeared  that  reliance  must 

1 Below,  p.  571. 


TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 


511 


be  placed  on  the  federal  government.  As  early  as  1890 
a federal  law  had  provided  for  the  inspection  of  meats 
which  were  to  be  exported,  but  otherwise  little  progress 
had  been  made.  In  1906  Upton  Sinclair  published  The 
Jungle,  a novel  which  purported  to  describe  the  ghastly 
conditions  under  which  the  meat  packers  of  Chicago 
conducted  their  business.  Sinclair’s  book,  together 
Avith  a campaign  of  education  conducted  by  the  muck- 
rake periodicals  against  harmful  patent  medicines 
aroused  public  interest  to  such  a degree,  that  two  im- 
portant laws  were  passed.  One  provided  for  federal 
inspection  of  meats  intended  for  interstate  commerce, 
so  as  to  make  sure  that  they  were  obtained  from 
healthy  animals  and  slaughtered  under  sanitary  condi- 
tions. The  other  act  concerned  foods  and  drugs,  and 
prohibited  the  sale  of  these  commodities  if  they  con- 
tained any  injurious  drugs,  chemicals  or  preservatives, 
while  a later  amendment  forbade  false  statements  on 
labels  attached  to  medical  compounds.  As  a result  of 
the  provisions  of  the  law  in  regard  to  patent  medicines, 
many  concerns  Avhich  had  been  selling  drugs  that  were 
falsely  advertised  as  having  curative  effects  were  com- 
pelled to  retire  from  business. 

InnoA’ations  in  the  field  of  politics  and  government 
since  1896  have  been  as  marked  as  in  the  held  of  social 
and  economic  legislation.  Possibly  the  most  outstand- 
ing development  has  been  the  rapid  expansion  of  the 
range  and  variety  of  the  activities  of  the  federal  gov- 
ernment. The  unification  of  the  economic  life  of  the 
nation,  as  has  been  shown,  compelled  a program  of  fed- 
eral economic  legislation,  and  helped  inculcate  a feel- 
ing of  greater  political  solidarity.  When  fires  and 
floods  and  other  disasters  occurred  which  were  too 
great  for  a single  city  or  state  to  take  care  of,  when 


512 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


state  laws  became  confusing  because  of  their  variety, 
when  railroads  crossed  a dozen  states  and  corporations 
that  were  chartered  in  New  Jersey  did  business  in 
Maine,  Florida  and  California,  only  at  the  federal  capi- 
tal could  the  requisite  authority  be  found,  which  would 
give  the  needed  relief.  As  the  theory  of  laissez  faire 
gradually  broke  down,  moreover,  giving  way  to  the  be- 
lief that  the  government  ought  to  be  the^servant  of  the 
mass  of  the  people,  it  was  inevitable  that  the  people 
should  themselves  turn  more  to  legislation  as  a remedy 
for  their  grievances.  To  Washington,  therefore,  hur- 
ried the  proponents  of  every  reform. 

This  tendency  was  not  only  counter  to  the  probable 
intention  of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution,  but  it 
trenched  upon  the  powers  specifically  granted  to  the 
states.  The  tenth  amendment  stated  in  so  many  words 
that  “The  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States 
. . . are  reserved  to  the  States.”  It  was  necessary 
for  the  federal  government  to  act,  however,  or  else  to 
leave  problems  that  had  become  national  in  character 
to  the  chaos  that  results  from  legislation  in  nearly 
fifty  states.  State  laws  concerning  railroads,  for  ex- 
ample, as  well  as  marriage  and  divorce,  child  labor  and 
trusts  are  even  now  in  a maze.  No  solution  of  the 
problem  seemed  possible  other  than  constant  stretch- 
ing of  the  terms  of  the  Constitution.  In  1906,  one  of 
the  most  conservative  statesmen  in  the  country,  Elihu 
Root,  even  went  so  far  as  to  utter  a warning  that  if 
the  states  did  not  use  their  powers  to  better  advantage 
a “construction  of  the  Constitution  will  be  found  to 
vest  the  power  where  it  will  be  exercised — in  the  Na- 
tional Government.”  The  burden  thus  shifted  from 
state  to  nation  was  somewhat  lightened  by  the  appoint- 
ment of  numerous  commissions  to  which  was  entrusted 
the  administration  of  specific  laws  or  the  accumulation 


TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 


513 


of  specific  data.  The  earliest  of  these  was  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission;  later,  others  were  ap- 
pointed to  administer  laws  concerning-  banking-,  the 
tariff  and  the  trusts. 

With  the  expansion  of  the  power  of  the  federal  gov- 
ernment went  the  elevation  of  the  office  of  chief  execu- 
tive. Cleveland’s  use  of  the  veto  power  had  given  an 
indication  of  the  possibilities  of  the  presidential  office 
in  ohstrncting  undesirable  legislation;  his  action  in 
bringing-  about  the  repeal  of  the  purchase  clause  of  the 
Sherman  silver  law  in  1890  had  shown  the  more  posi- 
tive force  which  a determined  officer  could  exert. 
Eoosevelt’s  activity  in  carrying-  his  anti-trust  program 
to  the  people,  and  his  mediation  in  the  coal  strike  car- 
ried the  prestige  of  the  presidency  to  greater  heights. 
President  Taft  was  by  no  means  radical  in  his  inter]n-e- 
tatioii  of  the  powers  and  possibilities  of  his  office; 
nevertheless  his  conception  of  it  was  far  removed  from 
the  conservative  philosophy  of  President  McKinley, 
and  he  even  suggested  in  a message  to  Congress  that 
the  cabinet  officers  be  given  seats,  although  without 
votes,  in  the  Senate  and  House.  His  immediate  suc- 
cessor augmented  rather  than  diminished  the  powers 
of  the  presidential  office. 

The  Senate,  on  the  contrary,  lost  both  in  power  and 
in  prestige.  iMany  reasons  for  the  increasing-  popu- 
lar distrust  of  the  Senate  after  the  middle  nineties  can 
be  given.  There  was  a widespread  belief  that  a con- 
trolling- fraction  of  the  body  had  achieved  membership 
through  wealth,  through  the  assistance  of  corporate 
interests  and  because  of  skill  in  the  manipulation  of 
political  wires.  The  charge  was  common  that  a small 
coterie  of  powerful  strategists  held  the  Senate  in  their 
hands  and  with  it  the  control  of  important  legislation. 
Most  of  all,  and  especially  in  the  West,  many  thought- 


,514 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


fill  people  believed  that  the  state  legislatures  were 
easily  influenced  to  choose  inferior  or  untrustworthy 
men  as  senators.  Whatever  the  reasons,  however, 
there  grew  increasingly  after  1870  and  particularly 
after  1893  a demand  for  the  popular  election  of  sena- 
tors. Between  the  latter  year  and  1911,  at  six  different 
times  resolutions  were  presented  to  Congress  propos- 
ing an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  which  should 
secure  popular  election.  At  length  Congress  gave  way, 
adopted  an  amendment,  and  sent  it  to  the  states. 
Within  ten  months  thirty-six  states  had  agreed,  and 
after  May  31, 1913,  senators  were  elected  by  the  peo))le. 

The  demand  for  greater  popular  control  over  the 
choice  of  senators  was  a part,  merely,  of  a somewhat 
general  political  trend.  Distrust  of  the  state  legisla- 
tures had  long  been  observable,  and  new  state  constitu- 
tions had  been  notable  for  detailed  prohibitions  ]flaced 
upon  law-making  bodies.  The  West,  which  had  gone 
to  greatest  extremes  in  framing  new  state  constitu- 
tions, was  also  the  testing-ground  for  the  initiative, 
referendum  and  recall.  The  first  of  these  devices — 
the  initiative — is  a plan  by  which  a specified  percentage 
of  the  voters  may  initiate  legislation — that  is,  propose 
a law  and  require  the  officials  of  the  state  to  submit  it 
to  the  electorate.  If  the  people  accept  the  proposal,  it 
becomes  law  as  if  enacted  by  the  legislature.  Under 
the  referendum  system,  any  measure  already  accepted 
by  the  legislature  is  held  in  abe^Me  on  petition  of  a 
specified  number  of  voters,  until  presented  to  the  peo- 
ple for  approval  or  rejection.  Both  the  initiative  and 
the  referendum  had  been  commonly  used  in  Switzer- 
land before  being  adopted  in  South  Dakota  in  1898.  In 
less  than  two  decades  they  had  been  accepted  in  twenty- 
one  states,  all  but  four  of  which  were  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi, and  in  one  of  the  four  eastern  states,  Mary- 


TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 


515 


land,  only  the  referendum  was  tried.  In  Oregon,  which 
made  the  most  complete  trial  of  these  methods  of 
legislation,  both  the  initiative  and  the  referendum  were 
extended  to  the  municipalities.  The  reasons  for  the 
innovation  were  to  be  found  in  the  determination  to 
discover  a means  of  compelling  negligent  or  boss-con- 
trolled state  legislatures  to  respond  to  public  opinion.^ 

The  recall  is  a process  by  which  any  public  official 
may  be  withdrawn  from  his  office  by  popular  vote  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  his  term.  Los  Angeles  adopted 
the  plan  in  1903  and  was  imitated  by  a small  number 
of  other  western  cities;  Oregon  in  1908  applied  the 
device  to  all  state  officers,  and  in  one  form  or  another 
it  has  been  adopted  in  ten  states  (1920).  During  the 
campaign  of  1912  Eoosevelt  proposed  that  the  voters 
be  allowed  to  ratify  or  reject  the  decision  of  the  courts 
on  the  constitutionality  of  legislation.  The  results  of 
the  suggestion  were  negligible. 

More  significant  than  the  recall  as  an  indication  of 
the  prevailing  desire  to  increase  popular  control  over 
the  processes  of  government  was  the  adoption  of  direct 
primaries.  Under  this  expedient  the  nominees  of  a 
party  for  office  are  chosen  directly  by  the  party  voters, 
rather  than  by  a party  convention.  Wisconsin  first 
used  the  system  in  1903  and  from  that  state  it  spread 
rapidly.  At  the  present  time  most  states  have  some 
form  of  direct  nomination.  The  peculiar  circum- 
stances surrounding  the  campaign  for  the  Republican 
nominations  in  1912  gave  force  to  the  demand  for 
presidential  preference  primaries  which  were  held  in 
about  a fourth  of  the  states.  Only  the  future  can  tell 
with  assurance  whether  the  demand  is  more  than  tem- 
porary. 

1 By  1920  twenty-three  states  had  adopted  the  referendum  or  the 
mitiative  and  referendum. 


516 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


The  agitation  for  women’s  suffrage  was  another  ex- 
ample of  the  increasing  desire  for  popular  control  of 
government.  Suffrage  for  women  was  first  granted  by 
Wyoming  in  1869  when  its  territorial  government  was 
organized,  but  the  movement  lagged  thereafter  until 
the  early  years  of  the  twentieth  century.  At  that  time 
increasing  numbers  of  states  began  to  grant  political 
privileges  to  women,  and  finally  in  1919  Congress 
passed  a proposed  constitutional  amendment  expressly 
stating  that  sex  should  not  he  a bar  to’the  sutfrage.^ 
Accompanying  the  increased  popular  control  of  gov- 
ernment after  1896  was  a gradual  demand  for  a higher 
level  of  political  ethics.  The  revelations  of  the  insur- 
ance investigations  of  1905  were  significant  of  this 
change.  Early  in  that  year  certain  newspapers  made 
charges  against  the  Equitable  Life  Assurance  Company 
which  were  taken  up  by  the  New  York  legislature  and 
referred  to  a committee  for  investigation.  The  com- 
mittee’s task  was  the  examination  of  the  affairs  of  life 
insurance  companies  doing  business  in  the  state  of  New 
York;  its  attorney  was  Charles  E.  Hughes.  The  re- 
sults of  the  investigation  amazed  the  country.  The 
exorbitant  salaries  paid  to  officers,  the  unreasonable 
expenses  incurred  and  the  disregard  of  the  rights  of 
the  policy  holders  were  of  concern  chiefly  to  persons 
doing  business  with  the  companies.  But  it  also  ap- 
peared that  several  of  the  larger  concerns  had  divided 
the  country  into  districts,  and  had  systematically  in- 
fluenced legislation  affecting  either  insurance  or  finan- 
cial interests  to  wfliich  they  or  their  officers  were  re- 

1 The  amendment  reads:  Section  1.  The  right  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  to  vote  shall  not  be  denied  or  abridged  by  the  United 
States,  or  by  any  State,  on  account  of  sex.  Section  2.  Congress  shall 
have  power,  by  appropriate  legislation,  to  enforce  the  provisions  of  this 
article.  The  amendment  was  ratified  by  the  required  number  of  states 
and  proclaimed  in  force  August  26,  1920. 


TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 


517 


lated;  enormous  sums  were  expended  and  records  not 
kept,  or  so  kept  as  to  conceal  the  real  purposes  of  tlie 
expenditure.  The  report  of  the  committee  showed  that 
Chauncey  M.  Depew,  a member  of  the  United  States 
Senate,  was  paid  $20,000  a year  for  legal  services, 
without  his  rendering  any  return  that  seemed  to  war- 
rant the  payments  made.  The  contributions  of  the 
companies  to  the  Eepublican  campaign  funds  were  very 
heavy — $50,000  by  one  company  in  1904.  It  appeared 
from  testimony  that  Democrats  also  sought  contribu- 
lions  from  the  companies  but  were  refused.  The  final 
report  of  the  committee  unsparingly  condemned  these 
abuses  and  embodied  a program  of  legislation  for  their 
reform,  which  was  put  into  effect.  The  public  received 
an  education  in  the  connection  of  corporations  with 
politics,  and  Hughes  himself  at  once  became  a figure  of 
national  importance,  the  favorite  of  the  reform  ele- 
ment, and  was  launched  upon  a career  that  made  him 
governor  of  New  York,  a member  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  and  candidate  for  the  presidency.^ 
Laws  regulating  campaign  expenditures  had  long- 
been  on  the  statute  books  although  they  had  been  little 
heeded,  but  as  the  result  of  the  insurance  investigation. 
New  York  in  19(16  forbade  contributions  by  corpora- 
tions for  political  purposes.  In  1907  Congress  passed 
a similar  law  concerning  federal  campaigns,  and  most 
of  the  states  have  since  passed  laws  placing  restrictions 
on  the  use  of  campaign  funds.  In  the  campaign  of 
1908  Bryan  requested  that  the  Democratic  National 
Committee  receive  no  contributions  from  corporations, 
that  no  sums  in  excess  of  $10,000  be  received  from  any 
source  and  that  a list  of  contributors  be  published  in 

1 The  election  of  Senator  Isaac  Stephenson  of  Wisconsin  occasioned 
another  outbreak  of  reform  sentiment.  Investigation  betrayed  the  fact 
that  he  had  expended  $107,703.05  in  his  primary  campaign.  The  salary 
of  a senator  at  that  time  was  $7,500  per  annum. 


518 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


advance  of  the  election.  By  a law  enacted  in  1911 
Congress  compelled  a statement  of  the  amounts  of 
money  spent  by  committees,  and  limited  the  amounts 
which  might  be  spent  by  candidates  for  Congress.  In 
1919  the  Chairman  of  the  Republican  National  Com- 
mittee announced  that  the  party  would  raise  funds  for 
the  next  campaign  in  amounts  from  $1  to  $1,000.  Both 
parties  were  discovering  that  public  sentiment  opposed 
large  contributions  from  individuals  and  corporations, 
because  they  expect  a quid  pro  quo  after  the  election.^ 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  best  brief  general  accounts  of  recent  conditions  are  in 
F.  A.  Ogg,  National  Progress,  with  an  excellent  bibliographj;-, 
which  may  be  supplemented  bj^  the  American  Year  Book.  On 
hours  and  conditions  of  labor,  J.  R.  Commons  and  J.  B.  An- 
drews, Principles  of  Labor  Legislation  (1916).  The  decision 
in  Lochner  v.  New  York  is  in  United  States  Reports,  vol.  198, 
p.  45.  For  the  courts  and  economic  legislation,  C.  G.  Haines, 
American  Doctrine  of  Judicial  Supremacy  (1914),  already 
referred  to.  An  excellent  historical  account  of  the  workmen’s 

1 An  investigation  of  federal  campaign  expenditures  conducted  in 
1912-1013  by  a committee  headed  by  Senator  Moses  Clapp  uncovered 
much  that  had  hitherto  been  only  the  subject  of  rumor.  The  Standard 
Oil  Company,  for  instance,  contributed  $12.5,000  in  1904.  Archbold,  the 
vice-president  of  the  company,  testified  that  he  told  Bliss,  the  Repub- 
lican treasurer,  “VVe  do  not  want  to  make  this  contribution  unless  it 
is  thoroughly  acceptable  and  will  be  thoroughly  appreciated  by  Mr. 
Roosevelt”;  and  that  Bliss  “smilingly  said  we  need  have  no  possible 
apprehension  on  that  score.”  Archbold  complained  later  when  the 
administration  attacked  the  company,  but  Roosevelt  declared  that  he 
was  unaware  of  the  contribution  at  the  time.  The  Republican  fund  in 
1908  was  $1,655,000.  The  testimony  of  Norman  E.  Mack,  Chairman  of 
the  Memocratic  National  Committee,  indicated  his  perfect  willingness 
to  accept  money  wherever  he  could  get  it,  and  that  he  refused  to  receive 
contributions  from  corporations  only  because  of  Bryan’s  scruples. 
Roosevelt  declared,  on  the  authority  of  an  insurance  officer,  that  the 
Democrats  in  the  campaign  of  1904  were  after  all  the  corporation  funds 
they  could  get. 


TENDENCIES  SINCE  1896 


519 


compensation  idea  is  l\v  A.  F.  Weber  in  Political  Science  Quar- 
terly (June,  1902).  Ida  M.  Tarbell,  New  Ideals  in  Business 
(1917),  describes  the  accomplishments  of  the  industrial  leaders 
rather  than  of  the  rank  and  file. 

Some  of  the  political  innovations  are  discussed  in  A.  L. 
Lowell,  Pul)lic  Opinion  and  Popular  Government  (1913)  ; 
Proceedings  of  the  American  Political  Science  Association, 
V,  37,  “The  Limitations  of  Federal  Government’’;  Elihu 
Eoot,  Addresses  on  Government  and  Citizenship  (1916), 
“How  to  Preserve  the  Local  Self-Government  of  the  State.” 
The  most  complete  account  of  the  historical  development  of 
the  power  of  the  president  is  in  Edward  Stanwood,  History 
of  the  Presidency , II  (1916),  Chap.  V.  The  fullest  account  of 
the  movement  for  popular  election  of  senators  is  G.  H.  Haynes, 
The  Election  of  Senators  (1906).  The  initiative,  referendum 
and  recall  have  given  rise  to  a literature  of  their  own.  Con- 
venient volumes  are : C.  A.  Beard  and  B.  E.  Shultz,  Docu- 
ments on  the  State-ivide  Initiative,  Referendum  and  Recall 
(1912)  ; W.  B.  IMuiiro,  The  Initiative,  Referendum  and  Recall 
(1912)  ; J.  D.  Barnett,  Operation  of  the  Initiative,  Referen- 
dum, and  Recall  in  Oregon  (1915). 

American  Political  Science  Review  (Aug.,  1915),  “Presi- 
dential Preference  Primaries.”  The  articles  in  A.  C.  (Mc- 
Laughlin and  A.  B.  Hart,  Cyclopaedia  of  American  Govern- 
ment (3  vols.,  1914),  are  a convenient  source  on  most  topics 
considered  in  this  chapter. 

On  the  use  of  money  in  politics:  Report  of  the  Legislative 
Insurance  Investigating  Committee  (10  vols.,  1905-1906), 
Armstrong-Hughes  committee;  Testimony  before  a Sub-com- 
mittee of  the  Committee  on  Privileges  and  Elections,  United 
States  Senate,  62d  Congress,  2d  session,  pursuant  to  Senate 
Resolution  79  (Clapp  Report). 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


LATER  international  RELATIONS  ^ 

At  the  close  of  the  war  with  Spain  it  was  commonly 
remarked  that  the  United  States  had  become  a 
world  power;  books  and  periodicals  written  on  the  his- 
tory of  the  period  were  based  upon  the  assumption 
that  America  had  swung  out  into  the  current  of  inter- 
national affairs  and  that  the  traditional  isolation  of 
this  country  had  become  a thing  of  the  past.  Time 
must  be  appealed  to,  however,  for  answers  to  funda- 
mental questions  concerning  the  character  of  this 
change.  Did  the  United  States  become  a world  power 
in  the  sense  that  the  majority  of  its  people  threw  off 
that  policy  of  steering  clear  of  permanent  alliances 
which  had  been  expressed  by  Washington  in  his  fare- 
well address,  in  favor  of  the  policy  of  participation  in 
world  affairs  on  a footing  with  the  larger  European 
states?  Did  the  people  of  the  United  States  after 
1898  take  a constant  and  informed  interest  in  world 
politics  and  international  relations?  Or  did  the  peo- 
ple, after  a slight  excursion  into  the  West  Indies  and 
the  Philippines,  return  to  the  traditional  attitude  of 
“splendid  isolation”?  Was  the  extent  to  which  the 
United  States  became  a world  power  sufficient  to  make 
probable  its  entry  into  a European  war? 

1 The  Presidents  and  Secretaries  of  State  during  this  period  were 
as  follows: 

McKinley,  1897-1001;  John  Sherman,  William  R.  Day,  John  Hay. 
Roosevelt,  1901-1909;  .John  Hay,  Elihu  Root,  Robert  Bacon. 

Taft,  1909-191:3;  P.  C.  Kno.x. 

Wilson,  1913-1921;  W.  J.  Bryan,  Robert  Lansing,  B.  Colby, 

520 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  521 


A cardinal  principle  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States  has  always  been  its  attachment  to  inter- 
national peace,  particularly  through  the  practice  of 
arbitration.  The  great  hopes  raised  by  the  two  Hague 
Conferences  were  • striking  proofs  of  this  fact.  In 
1899,  at  the  suggestion  of  Czar  Nicholas  II  of  Russia, 
twenty-six  leading  powers  conferred  at  The  Hague,  in 
order  to  discover  means  of  limiting  armaments  and  en- 
suring lasting  peace.  A second  conference  was  held 
in  1907  at  the  suggestion,  in  part,  of  President  Roose- 
velt. At  this  gathering  forty-four  states  were  repre- 
sented, including  most  of  the  Latin- American  republics. 
During  the  two  conferences  many  questions  relating  to 
international  law  were  discussed,  and  the  conclusions 
reached  were  expressed  in  the  form  of  “Conventions,” 
which  the  several  powers  signed.  In  the  main  these 
agreements  related  to  the  rights  and  duties  of  nations 
and  individuals  in  time  of  war.  Most  important  among 
the  agreements  was  one  for  the  pacific  settlement  of 
international  disputes,  according  to  which,  in  certain 
less  important  controversies,  the  states  concerned 
would  appoint  a “commission  of  inquiry”  which  would 
study  the  case  and  give  its  opinion  of  the  facts  in- 
volved. It  was  also  agreed  to  organize  a Permanent 
Court  of  Arbitration  to  be  available  at  all  times  for 
the  peaceful  settlement  of  differences.  Strictly  speak- 
ing this  body  was  not  a Court,  but  a list  of  judges  to 
which  each  nation  was  to  contribute  four,  and  when  any 
countries  became  involved  in  a controversy  they  could 
draw  arbitrators  from  the  list.  Moreover  the  powers 
agreed  “if  a serious  dispute  threatens  to  break  out 
between  two  or  more  of  them,  to  remind  these  latter 
that  the  Permanent  Court  is  open  to  them.” 

The  United  States  was  a party  to  four  of  the  fifteen 
cases  presented  to  the  Qourt  between  1902  and  1913. 


i 


522 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


The  first  controversy  was  between  the  United  States 
and  Mexico  and  involved  “The  Pious  Fund,”  a large 
sum  of  money  which  was  in  dispute  between  Mexico 
and  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  of  California,  and  the 
second  concerned  claims  of  the  United  States,  Mexico 
and  eight  European  countries  against  Venezuela.  As 
the  Court  was  successfully  appealed  to  in  case  after 
case,  high  hopes  began  to  be  entertained  that  the 
“Parliament  of  Man”  had  at  last  been  established. 
Elihu  Root,  the  Secretary  of  State,  asserted  in  a com- 
munication to  the  Senate  in  1907  that  the  Second  Con- 
ference had  presented  the  greatest  advance  ever  made 
at  a single  time  toward  the  reasonable  and  peaceful 
regulation  of  international  conduct,  unless  the  advance 
made  at  The  Hague  Conference  of  1899  was  excepted. 

In  the  meantime,  in  1904,  under  President  Roose- 
velt’s leadership,  treaties  were  arranged  with  France, 
Germany,  Great  Britain  and  other  nations,  under  which 
the  contracting  parties  agreed  in  advance  to  submit 
their  disputes  to  The  Hague  Court,  although  excepting 
questions  involving  vital  interests,  independence  or  na- 
tional honor.  While  the  Senate  was  discussing  the 
treaties,  it  fell  into  a dispute  with  the  President  in  re- 
gard to  its  constitutional  rights  as  part  of  the  treaty- 
making  power,  and  although  there  was  general  agree- 
ment on  the  value  of  the  principle  of  arbitration,  yet 
the  Senate  insisted  upon  amending  the  treaties,  where- 
upon the  President  refused  to  refer  them  back  to  the 
other  nations.  Secretary  Root  revived  the  project, 
however,  in  1908  and  1909  and  secured  amended  treaties 
with  a long  list  of  nations,  including  Austria-Hungary, 
France  and  Great  Britain.  President  Taft  signed 
treaties  with  France  and  England  in  1911  which  ex- 
panded the  earlier  agreements  so  as  to  include  “justi- 
ciable” controversies  even  if  they  involved  questions 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  523 


of  vital  interest  and  honor,  but  again  the  Senate  added 
such  amendnients  that  the  project  was  abandoned. 
Bryan,  Secretary  of  State  from  1913  to  1915,,  undertook 
still  further  to  expand  the  principles  of  arbitration, 
and  during  his  term  of  office  many  treaties  were  sub- 
mitted to  the  Senate,  under  which  the  United  States 
and  the  other  contracting  parties  agreed  to  postpone 
warfare  arising  from  any  cause,  for  a year,  in  order 
that  the  facts  of  the  controversy  might  be  looked  into. 
Many  of  these  treaties  were  ratified  by  the  Senate. 

The  attitude  of  the  American  people  toward  the 
pacific  settlement  of  international  disputes  found  ex- 
pression in  many  ways  in  addition  to  the  arrangement 
of  treaties.  At  Lake  Mohonk,  yearly  conferences  were 
held  at  which  leading  citizens  discussed  phases  of  inter- 
national peace.  Andrew  Carnegie  and  Edwin  Ginn, 
the  publisher,  devoted  large  sums  of  money  to  country- 
wide education  and  propaganda  on  the  subject.  The 
leaders  of  the  movement  and  the  membership  of  the 
organizations  included  so  many  of  the  most  prominent 
persons  of  their  time — public  officials,  university  presi- 
dents and  men  of  influence  as  to  prove  that  the  tradi- 
tional American  reliance  upon  international  arbitra- 
tion was  more  firmly  rooted  in  1914  than  ever  before  in 
our  history. 

The  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  purely 
European  controversies  was  illustrated  in  our  action 
on  the  Moroccan  question.  In  1905-1906  a controversy 
broke  out  between  Germany  and  France  in  relation  to 
Morocco,  and  in  January  of  the  latter  year  a conference 
was  held  at  Algeciras  in  southern  Spain  in  which  ten 
European  nations  and  the  United  States  took  part. 
The  result  of  the  meeting  was  an  “Act”  which  defined 
the  policy  of  the  signatory  powers  toward  Morocco. 
The  Senate,  in  ratifying  the  Act,  asserted  that  its  ac- 


524 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


tion  was  not  to  be  considered  a departure  from  our 
traditional  policy  of  aloofness  from  European  ques- 
tions. 

The  outstanding  incident  in  our  relations  with  that 
part  of  America  south  of  the  republic  of  Mexico  was 
the  controversy  with  Colombia  over  the  Panama  Canal 
strip.  The  project  for  a canal  across  the  Isthmus  of 


Panama  was  as  old  as  colonization  in  America.  For 
present  purposes,  however,  it  is  not  necessary  to  go 
farther  into  the  past  than  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  of 
1850,  by  the  terms  of  which  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  agreed  that  neither  would  obtain  any  control 
over  an  isthmian  canal  without  the  other.  As  time 
went  on,  however,  American  sentiment  in  favor  of  a 
canal  built,  owned  and  operated  by  the  United  States 
alone  grew  so  powerful  that  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty 
of  1901  was  arranged  with  Great  Britain.  This  agree- 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  525 


ment  permitted  a canal  constructed  under  the  auspices 
of  the  United  States.  Sentiment  in  Congress  wus 
divided  between  a route  through  Nicaragua  and  one 
through  that  part  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia  known 
as  Panama,  but  in  1902  an  act  was  passed  authorizing 
the  President  to  acquire  the  rights  of  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company,  of  France,  on  the  isthmus  for  not 
more  than  $40,000,000,  and  also  to  acquire  a strip  of 
land  from  Colombia  not  less  than  six  miles  wide.^  In 
case  the  President  was  unable  to  obtain  these  rights 
“within  a reasonable  time  and  upon  reasonable  terms,” 
he  was  to  turn  to  the  Nicaragua  route.  President 
Roosevelt  was  himself  in  favor  of  the  Panama  project. 

The  Hay-Herran  convention  with  Colombia  was  ac- 
cordingly drawn  up  and  signed  in  January,  1903,  giv- 
ing the  United  States  the  desired  rights  on  the  isthmus, 
but  the  Senate  of  Colombia  rejected  the  treaty.  There- 
upon the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  became  alarmed 
because  it  would  lose  $40,000,000  in  case  the  United 
States  turned  from  Panama  to  Nicaragua,  and  its 
agents  busied  themselves  on  the  isthmus  in  the  attempt 
to  foment  a break  between  Colombia  and  its  province 
of  Panama ; the  people  of  Panama  became  aroused  be- 
cause their  chief  source  of  future  profit  lay  in  their 
strategic  position  between  the  two  oceans;  and  the 
President  was  concerned  because  Congress  would  soon 
meet  and  might  insist  on  the  Nicaragua  route  or  at 
least  greatly  delay  progress.  He  hoped  for  a success- 
ful revolt  in  Panama  which  would  enable  him  to  treat 
vnth  the  province  rather  than  with  Colombia,  and  he 
even  determined  to  advise  Congress  to  take  possession 
forcibly  if  the  revolt  did  not  take  place. 

The  administration  meanwhile  kept  closely  in  touch 

1 The  French  company  had  a concession  on  the  isthmus  and  had 
already  done  considerable  work. 


526 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


with  affairs  in  Panama,  and  having  reason  to  suspect 
the  possibility  of  a revolution  sent  war  vessels  to  the 
isthmus  on  November  2,  1903,  to  prevent  troops,  either 
Colombian  or  revolutionary,  from  landing  at  any  point 
within  fifty  miles  of  Panama.  Since  the  only  way  by 
which  revolution  in  Panama  could  be  repressed  was 
through  the  presence  of  Colombian  troops,  the  action 
of  the  American  government  made  success  highly  prob- 
able in  case  a revolt  was  attempted.  On  the  next 
day  the  plans  of  the  Canal  Company  agents  or  of  some 
of  the  residents  of  Panama  came  to  a head;  early  in 
the  evening  a small  and  bloodless  uprising  occurred; 
and  while  the  United  States  kept  both  sides  from  dis- 
turbing the  peace,  the  insurgents  set  up  a government 
which  was  recognized  within  two  days,  and  Philippe 
Bunau-Varilla,  a former  chief  engineer  of  the  Com- 
pany, was  accredited  to  the  United  States  as  minister. 

A treaty  was  immediately  arranged  by  which  the 
United  States  received  the  control  of  a zone  ten  miles 
wide  for  the  construction  of  a b)anal,  and  in  return  was 
to  pay  $10,000,000  and  an  annuity  of  $250,000  beginning 
nine  years  later,  and  to  guarantee  the  independence  of 
Panama.  The  Secretary  of  State,  John  Hay,  described 
the  process  of  drawing  up  the  treaty. in  a private  letter 
of  November  19,  1903: 

Yesterday  morning  the  negotiations  with  Panama  were  far 
from  complete.  But  by  putting  on  all  steam,  getting  Root 
and  Knox  and  Shaw  together  at  lunch,  I went  over  my  project 
line  by  line,  and  fought  out  every  section  of  it;  adopted  a few 
good  suggestions : hurried  back  to  the  Department,  set  every- 
body at  work  drawing  up  final  drafts — sent  for  Varilla,  went 
over  the  whole  treaty  with  him,  explained  all  the  changes,  got 
his  consent,  and  at  seven  o’clock  signed  the  momentous  docu- 
ment. 

Although  the  Senate  ratified  the  treaty,  the  action  of  ! 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  527 


the  President  was  the  cause  of  a storm  both  in  that  body 
and  throughout  the  nation.  In  self-defence  Roosevelt 
condemned  Colombia’s  refusal  to  ratify  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty  and  asserted  that  no  hope  remained  of 
getting-  a satisfactory  agreement  with  that  country; 
that  a treaty  of  1846  with  Colombia  justified  his  inter- 
vention ; and  that  our  national  interests  and  the  inter- 
ests of  the  world  at  large  demanded  that  Colombia  no 
longer  prevent  the  construction  of  a canal.  On  the 
other  hand  the  President’s  critics  called  attention  to 
the  unusual  haste  that  surrounded  every  step  in  the 
“seizure”  of  Panama;  condemned  the  disposition  of 
war  vessels  which  prevented  Colombia  from  even  at- 
tempting to  put  down  the  uprising ; and  insinuated  that 
the  administration  was  in  collusion  with  the  insurgents. 
Roosevelt’s  successors  in  the  presidency  felt  there 
was  some  degree  of  justice  in  the  claim  of  Colombia 
that  she  had  been  unfairly  treated  by  her  big  neighbor 
and  several  different  attempts  were  made  to  negotiate 
treaties  which  would  carry  with  them  a money  payment 
to  Colombia.  On  July  29,  1919,  the  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  of  the  Senate  unanimously  reported  to  that 
body  the  favorable  consideration  of  a treaty  provid- 
ing for  a money  payment  of  $25,000,000,  but  other  mat- 
ters intervened  and  no  further  progress  resulted.^ 

The  work  of  constructing  the  waterway  was  delayed 
by  changes  of  plan  until  1906,  when  a lock  canal  was 
decided  upon,  and  shortly  afterward  a start  was  made. 
So  huge  an  undertaking — the  isthmus  is  forty-nine 
miles  wide  at  this  point — was  an  engineering  task  of 

1 Eoosevelt,  after  his  retirement  from  office  was  widely  reported  as 
having  said  in  an  address  at  the  University  of  California:  “If  I had 
followed  traditional,  conservative  methods,  I would  have  submitted  a 
dignified  state  paper  of  probably  two  hundred  pages  to  Congress,  and  the 
debate  on  it  would  have  been  going  on  yet;  but  I took  the  Canal  Zone 
and  let  Congress  debate.”  Cf.  Jones.  Caribbean  Interests,  2.38-239. 


528 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


unprecedented  size,  and  involved  stamping  out  tlie 
yellow  fever,  obtaining  a water  supply,  building  hos- 
pitals and  dwellings  and  finding  a sufficient  labor  force, 
as  well  as  the  more  difficult  problems  of  excavating  soil 
and  building  locks  in  regions  where  land-slides  con- 
stantly threatened  to  destroy  important  parts  of  the 
work.  At  length,  however,  all  obstacles  were  overcome 
and  on  August  15,  1914,  the  canal  was  opened  to  the 
passage  of  vessels. 

The  final  diplomatic  question  relating  to  the  canal 
concerned  the  rates  to  be  charged  on  traffic  passing 
through.  By  the  terms  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty 
with  Great  Britain,  the  United  States  agreed  that  the 
canal  should  be  free  and  open  to  all  nations  “on  terms 
of  entire  equality.”  In  1912  Congress  enacted  legisla- 
tion exempting  American  coast-wise  vessels  from  the 
payment  of  tolls,  despite  the  protest  of  Great  Britain. 
As  President  Wilson  was  of  the  opinion  that  our  action 
had  been  contrary  to  our  treaty  agreement,  ]ie  urged 
the  repeal  of  the  act  upon  his  accession  in  1913,  and 
succeeded  in  accomplishing  his  purpose. 

The  construction  of  the  Canal  under  American  aus- 
pices committed  the  United  States  to  new  responsibili- 
ties in  the  Caribbean.  Her  coaling  station  in  Cuba, 
the  possession  of  Porto  Rico  and  the  protection  of  the 
isthmus  made  it  a matter  of  national  safety  to  preserve 
stable  governments  in  Central  America  and  the  West 
Indies.  The  infiltration  of  American  capital  into  the 
region  served  to  ally  economic  with  political  interest, 
for  like  European  investors,  our  capitalists  have  taken 
a part  in  the  exploitation  of  South  American  sugar, 
fruit,  coffee,  oil  and  asphalt.  With  the  islands  and 
shores  of  the  Caribbean  Sea  alone,  American  trade 
doubled  in  the  decade  after  1903.  Orderly  government 
south  of  the  United  States  became  accordingly  essen- 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  529 


tial  to  the  welfare  of  our  outlying  possessions,  and  to 
the  commercial  interests  of  a group  of  investors.  The 
most  important  international  questions  that  have 
arisen  in  Spanish  America  related  to  Venezuela  in 
19U2  and  Santo  Domingo  in  1905. 

Venezuela  had  long  granted  concessions  to  foreign 
investors — Germans,  English,  Italians  and  others — in 
order  to  develop  her  mines,  timber  and  railroads,  but 
unsettled  conditions  in  the  country  frequently  resulted 
in  the  non-fultillment  of  the  obligations  which  had  been 
filtered  into.  Germany,  for  example,  claimed  that  the 
government  of  Venezuela  had  guaranteed  dividends  on 
the  stock  of  a railroad  built  by  German  subjects  and 
had  failed  to  live  up  to  the  contract.  Having  in  mind 
the  possible  use  of  force  to  compel  Venezuela  to  carry 
out  her  alleged  obligations,  Germany  consulted  our 
state  department  to  discover  whether  our  adherence  to 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  lead  us  to  oppose  the  con- 
templated action.  The  attitude  of  President  Roose- 
velt in  1901  was  that  there  was  no  connection  between 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  commercial  relations  of 
the  South  American  republics,  except  that  punishment 
of  those  nations  must  not  take  the  form  of  the  acquisi- 
tion of  territory.  In  1902  Germany,  Great  Britain  and 
Italy  proceeded  to  blockade  some  of  the  ports  of  Vene- 
zuela, and  the  latter  thereupon  agreed  to  submit  her 
ease  to  arbitration.  Apparently,  however,  Germany 
was  unwilling  to  relinquish  the  advantage  which  the 
blockade  seemed  to  promise,  and  in  the  meantime 
Roosevelt  became  fearful  that  the  result  of  the  block- 
ade might  be  the  more  or  less  permanent  occupation  of 
part  of  Venezuela.  He  therefore  told  the  German 
ambassador  that  unless  the  Emperor  agreed  to  arbitra- 
tion within  ten  days,  the  United  States  would  send  a 
fleet  to  Venezuela  and  end  the  danger  which  Roosevelt 


530 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


feared.  The  pressure  quickly  produced  the  desired 
results,  and  during  the  summer  of  1903  many  of  the 
claims  were  referred  to  commissions.  The  three  block- 
ading powers  believed  themselves  entitled  to  preferen- 
tial treatment  in  the  settlement  of  their  claims,  over  the 
non-blockading  nations,  while  the  latter  held  that  all  of 
Venezuela’s  creditors  should  be  treated  on  an  equality. 
This  portion  of  the  controversy  was  referred  to  the 
Hague  tribunal,  which  subsequently  decided  in  favor 
of  the  contention  raised  by  Germany,  Great  Britain 
and  Italy,  and  eventually  all  the  claims  were  greatly 
scaled  down  and  ordered  paid.^ 

The  Venezuela  case  made  evident  the  possibility  that 
European  creditors  of  backward  South  American  na- 
tions might  use  their  claims  as  a reason  for  getting 
temporary  control  over  harbors  or  other  parts  of  these 
countries.  There  was  also  ground  for  the  fear  that 
temporary  control  might  become  permanent  possession. 
Hence  in  the  Santo  Domingo -case,  the  United  States 
adopted  a new  policy.  The  debts  of  Santo  Domingo 
were  far  beyond  its  power  to  pay;  its  foreign  creditors 
were  insistent.  An  arrangement  was  accordingly 
made  by  which  the  United  States  took  over  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  custom  houses,  turned  over  forty- 
five  per  cent,  of  the  income  to  the  Dominican  govern- 
ment for  current ’expenses,  and  used  the  remainder  to 
pay  foreign  claims.  The  plan  worked  so  well  that  its 
main  features  were  continued  and  imitated  in  the  pro- 
tectorates over  Haiti  (1915)  and  Nicaragua  (1916). 

The  progress  which  has  been  made  in  composing  the 
jarring  relations  among  the  American  states  is  due  in 
part  to  the  Pan  American  Union  and  to  the  Pan  Ameri- 

1 For  the  Roosevelt  “threat,”  together  with  another  version  of  the 
story,  cf.  Thayer,  Hay,  II,  284-289  and  North  American  Review,  Sept., 
1919,  414-417,  418-420. 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  531 


can  Conferences.  The  Union  is  an  organization  of 
twenty-one  American  republics  which  devotes  itself 
to  the  improvement  of  the  commercial  and  political 
relations  of  its  member  states.  The  first  Pan  Ameri- 
can Conference,  held  at  Washington  in  1889,  has  al- 
ready been  mentioned.^  At  the  second,  at  Mexico 
City  in  1901,  the  American  republics  which  had  not 
already  done  so  agreed  to  the  conventions  signed  at 
The  Hague  in  1899.  At  the  third  conference  at  Rio  de 
Janeiro  in  1906  and  the  fourth  in  Buenos  Aires  in  1910, 
its  field  of  effort  was  further  broadened,  and  in  the 
latter  year  a recommendation  was  passed  that  the  Pan 
American  states  bind  themselves  to  submit  to  arbitra- 
tion all  claims  for  pecuniary  damages. 

President  Wilson  continued  unbroken  the  policy  of 
protectorates  which  President  Roosevelt  had  initiated 
in  the  case  of  Santo  Domingo.  His  statements  of  gen- 
eral policy  were  conciliatory  and  evidently  designed  to 
allay  suspicion,  and  he  constantly  expressed  the  view 
that  the  American  states  were  cooperating  equals. 
And  having  asserted  that  the  United  States  had  no 
designs  upon  territory,  and  nothing  to  seek  except  the 
lasting  interests  of  the  peoples  of  the  two  continents, 
he  gave  practical  evidence  of  his  purposes  by  urging 
that  all  unite  to  guarantee  one  another  their  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity,  that  disputes  be 
settled  by  investigation  and  arbitration,  and  that  no 
state  allow  revolutionary  expeditions  against  its  neigh- 
bors to  be  fitted  out  on  its  territory.^ 

American  relations  with  Great  Britain  between  1896 
and  1914  were  such  as  to  lend  themselves  to  amicable 

1 Above,  p.  289. 

2 The  latest  acquisition  of  the  U.  S.  in  the  Caribbean  Sea  was  the 
’STirgin  Islands  which  were  purchased  from  Denmark  in  1916. 


532 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


settlement.  The  question  of  the  boundary  between 
Alaska  and  Canada,  to  be  sure,  contained  some  of 
the  elements  of  trouble.  The  treaty  of  1825,  between 
Russia  and  Great  Britain,  had  established  the  boun- 
dary between  Alaska  and  Canada  in  terms  that  were 
somewhat  ambiguous,  the  most  important  provision 
being  that  the  line  from  the  56th  degree  of  north  lati- 
tude to  the  141st  degree  of  west  longitude  should  fol- 
low the  windings  of  the  coast,  but  should  be  drawn 
not  more  than  ten  marine  leagues  inland.  The  coast 
at  this  point  is  extremely  irregular,  and  the  few  im- 
portant towns  of  the  region  are  at  the  heads  of  the 
bays.  With  the  discovery  of  gold  in  the  Klondike 
region  in  1897  and  the  consequent  rush  of  population 
to  the  coast  settlements,  the  question  of  jurisdiction 
became  important. 

The  claim  of  Great  Britain  was  that  the  word 
“coast”  should  be  interpreted  to  include  adjacent  is- 
lands. Hence  the  ten  league  line  would  follow  the  gen- 
eral direction  of  the  shore  but  would  cut  across  the 
inlets  and  headlands  and  thus  leave  the  towns  in  the 
possession  of  Canada.  The  American  contention  was 
that  the  line  should  follow  closely  the  windings  of  the 
shore  of  the  mainland,  thus  giving  the  United  States  a 
continuous  strip  of  coast.  The  controversy  was  re- 
ferred in  1903  to  a board  composed  of  three  Americans, 
two  Canadians  and  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  England. 
On  all  the  important  points  the  English  representative 
concurred  with  the  Americans  and  a line  was  subse- 
quently drawn  in  general  conformity  with  our  conten- 
tion.^ 

1 The  American  members  of  the  Commission  were  Elihu  Root,  who 
was  then  Secretary  of  War,  Senator  H.  C.  Lodge,  and  ex-Senator  George 
Turner.  The  English  member  was  the  Lord  Chief  Justice,  Baron 
A1  verst  one;  the  Canadians  were  Sir  Louis  Amable  Jette,  Lieutenant 
Governor  of  Quebec,  and  Allen  B.  Aylesworth  of  Toronto. 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  533 


The  most  complicated  negotiation  of  the  period,  as 
well  as  one  of  the  most  complicated  in  our  history,  con- 
cerned the  North  Atlantic  Coast  fisheries.  Under  the 
treaty  of  1818  relating  to  matters  remaining  over  from 
the  IVar  of  1812,  the  United  States  possessed  certain 
rights  on  the  fishing  grounds  off  Newfoundland  and 
Labrador.  From  then  on  there  was  intermittent  nego- 
tiation concerning  the  meaning  of  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  and  the  justice  of  fishing  regulations  made  by 
Canada.  In  1908  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
made  a general  arbitration  treaty,  under  the  terms  of 
which  the  fisheries  question  was  referred  to  members 
of  the  Court  of  Arbitration  at  The  Hague. ^ The 
award,  made  in  1910,  upheld  the  rights  of  American 
fishermen  on  the  coasts  of  Newfoundland,  and  recom- 
mended the  establishment  of  a permanent  fishery  com- 
mission to  settle  all  future  controversies.  This  was 
accomplished  in  1912  and  an  irritating  and  long-stand- 
ing dispute  was  put  to  rest. 

“Dollar  diplomacy”  was  the  chief  novelty  in  our  re- 
lations vfith  China.  The  expression  was  used  in  Presi- 
dent Taft’s  administration,  when  his  Secretary  of 
State,  P.  C.  Knox,  devoted  much  attention  to  promoting 
loans,  contracts  and  concessions  in  Central  and  South 
America,  and  more  particularly  in  China.  The  argu- 
ment for  dollar  diplomacy  was  that  it  opened  new 
fields  for  the  use  of  American  capital,  and  thus  indi- 
rectly benefited  the  whole  people.  The  President  also 
believed  that  investments  in  China  would  further 
American  influence  there  and  react  favorably  in  con- 
tinuing the  open-door  policy  which  had  been  initiated 
by  Secretary  Hay.  The  objection  most  commonly 

1 The  American  member  of  the  tribunal  was  Judge  George  Gray.  The 
closing  argument  for  the  United  States  was  made  by  Elihu  Root.  Robert 
Lansing  was  one  of  the  associate  counsel. 


534 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


made  was  that  the  government  became  bound  up  in  the 
interests  of  investors  and  might  be  compelled  to  inter- 
pose with  armed  force  when  difficulties  arose  between 
the  investor  and  the  state  where  the  investment  was 
made. 

An  opportunity  for  large  investments  in  China  was 
presented  during  1912-1913.  In  the  former  year  a 
revolution  in  that  distracted  country  had  come  to  an 
end  and  a republic  had  been  set  up  with  Yuan  Shih-kai 
as  President.  Since  the  new  government  was  in  need 
of  funds,  it  undertook  to  borrow  through  an  associated 
group  of  bankers  from  six  foreign  nations,  the  Unitetl 
States  among  them.  The  financial  interests  agreed  to 
the  loan,  but  insisted  on  having  a hand  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  Chinese  finance,  so  as  to  ensure  repayment. 
At  this  point  President  Wilson’s  administration  began. 
The  bankers  at  once  asked  him  whether  he  would  re- 
quest them  to  participate  in  the  “six-power”  loan,  as 
President  Taft  had  done.  Wilson  declined  to  make 
the  request,  fearing  that  at  some  future  time  the  United 
States  might  be  compelled  to  interfere  in  Chinese  finan- 
cial and  political  affairs,  whereupon  the  American 
bankers  withdrew  and  the  six-power  group  subse- 
cpiently  disintegrated. 

Relations  with  Japan  have  been  a cause  for  negotia- 
tion on  several  occasions.  During  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  which  came  to  a close  in  1905,  American  sympa- 
thies were  mainly  with  the  Japanese.  The  correspond- 
ence which  brought  about  a cessation  of  hostilities  was 
initiated  by  President  Roosevelt,  and  the  peace  confer- 
ence was  held  in  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire.  Dur- 
ing the  course  of  the  sessions  American  sympathies 
shifted  somewhat  to  the  Russian  side,  and  when  the 
Japanese  did  not  receive  all  that  they  demanded  of 
Russia  they  felt  somewhat  dissatisfied. 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  535 


A subject  which  seemed  at  times  to  contain  unpleas- 
ant possibilities  was  the  restriction  of  Japanese  immi- 
gration into  the  LLiited  States.  The  western  part  of 
the  country,  especially  California,  has  objected  vigor- 
ously to  the  presence  of  the  Jai)anese  on  the  coast,  and 
as  Japan  refused  to  agree  to  such  a treaty  as  that  which 
restricts  Chinese  immigration,  recourse  was  had  to 
the  Root-Takahira  agreement  of  1908,  by  which  the 
Japanese  government  itself  undertook  to  prevent  the 
emigration  of  laborers  to  the  United  States.  It  was 
more  difficult  to  reach  an  agreement  concerning  Japa- 
nese who  were  already  living  in  the  LTnited  States.  In 
1913  the  legislature  of  California  had  before  it  a law 
forbidding  certain  aliens  from  holding  land  in  the  state. 
As  the  act  would  apply  almost  solely  to  the  Japanese, 
the  federal  government  was  placed  in  an  embarrassing 
position.  Linder  existing  treaties  the  Japanese  were 
granted  equal  rights  with  other  aliens,  but  the  states 
were  able  to  modify  the  practical  operation  of  treaty 
provisions,  as  California  planned  to  do,  by  declaring 
certain  aliens  ineligible  to  citizenship  and  then  placing 
particular  restrictions  upon  them.  The  Secretary  of 
State,  "William  J.  Bryan,,  went  to  California  and  at- 
tempted to  persuade  the  state  authorities  to  alter  their 
land  laws.  Although  the  law  was  eventually  passed,  it 
was  modified  to  the  extent  of  allowing  Japanese  to 
lease  agricultural  lands  for  terms  not  greater  than 
three  years. 

In  1917,  Robert  Lansing,  the  American  Secretary  of 
State,  and  Viscount  Ishii,  special  ambassador  of  Japan, 
reached  an  important  agreement  concerning  American 
relations  in  the  Orient.  By  it  the  LTnited  States  ad- 
mitted the  interest  of  Japan  in  China,  but  the  two 
placed  themselves  on  record  as  mutually  opposed  to  the 
acquisition  by  any  government  of  special  rights  in 


536 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


China  that  would  affect  the  independence  or  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  that  country.  Nevertheless  Japan 
had  already  forced  China  in  1915  to  grant  her  terri- 
torial and  economic  concessions  that  constituted  a 
grave  menace  to  Chinese  independence,  and  final  settle- 
ment between  the  two  awaited  later  events. 

It  is  impossible  at  the  present  time  to  give  an  ac- 
curate account  of  American  relations  with  Mexico  dur- 
ing the  decade  preceding  1920.  Mexico  and  Mexican 
affairs  are  but  ill  understood  in  the  United  States;  and 
the  purposes  and  acts  of  the  chief  figure  in  the  most  im- 
portant events,  President  Wilson,  will  not  be  fully 
known  until  papers  are  made  public  and  explanations 
presented  that  only  he  can  give.  His  conduct  of  Mexi- 
can affairs,  moreover,  had  to  face  constant  change  on 
account  of  the  outbreak  and  progress  of  a European 
war  in  1911,  and  many  critical  decisions  had  to  be  ar- 
rived at  during  1915-1916  when  political  partisanship 
in  the  United  States  was  at  fever  heat  and  when  the 
most  bitter  opponents  of  the  administration  were  ready 
to  pounce  upon  every  act  and  hold  it  up  to  public  scorn. 
Nor  is  the  exact  character  of  some  of  the  pressure 
brought  to  bear  upon  the  President  fully  known. 
American  capital  in  vast  amounts  had  gone  into  Mexico 
as  into  other  parts  of  Latin  America.  Mining  com- 
panies, railroad,  ranching  and  plantation  companies, 
and  private  individuals  had  invested  in  a land  that  has 
been  called  “the  storehouse  of  the  world,”  because  of 
its  fabulous  resources  in  mineral  wealth  and  fertile 
soil.  In  1912  President  Taft  said  that  American  in- 
vestments had  been  estimated  at  one  billion  dollars. 
President  Wilson  in  1916  warned  the  public  that  agents 
of  American  property  owners  in  Mexico  were  scattered 
along  the  border  originating  rumors  which  were  un- 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  537 


justified  by  facts,  in  order  to  bring  about  intervention 
for  the  benefit  of  mvestors.  For  these  reasons  most 
accounts  of  Mexican  relations,  whether  they  uphold  or 
condemn  the  steps  taken  by  the  administration,  arc 
rendered  defective  by  prejudice  or  lack  of  information. 
It  is  possible,  therefore,  to  give  only  a bare  narrative 
of  a few  of  the  most  important  events  following  1910. 

The  strong  hand  of  Porfirio  Diaz  ruled  Mexico  from 
1877  to  1880  and  from  1884  to  1911.  The  government 
was  autocratic;  the  resources  of  the  country  were  in 
the  hands  of  foreigners ; and  while  a few  magnates  were 
wealthy,  the  mass  of  the  people  were  poor  and  ignorant. 
The  country  was  infested  with  bands  of  robbers,  but 
Diaz  managed  to  control  them  and  even  made  some  of 
the  leaders  governors  of  states.  Such  was  the  country 
that  is  separated  from  Arizona  and  New  Mexico  by  an 
imaginary  line  and  from  Texas  by  a narrow  river  that 
shrinks  in  summer  almost  to  a bed  of  sand. 

In  1910  Francisco  Madero  organized  a revolt,  com- 
pelled Diaz  to  flee  to  Europe  in  1911,  and  was  himself 
chosen  President.  Taft  meanwhile  had  sent  troops  to 
the  border,  stray  bullets  from  across  the  line  killed  a 
few  American  citizens  and  the  demand  for  interven- 
tion began.  iNIadero  was  soon  overthrown  by  General 
Yictoriano  Huerta,  who  became  provisional  president. 
Shortly  afterward  Madero  was  shot  under  circum- 
stances that  pointed  to  Huerta  as  the  instigator  of  the 
assassination,  but  his  friends  kept  the  fires  of  revolt 
alive,  and  Governor  Carranza  of  Coahuila,  the  state 
across  the  border  from  northwest  Texas,  refused  to 
recognize  the  new  ruler.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that 
Wilson  succeeded  Taft.  General  Huerta  was  promptly 
recognized  by  the  leading  European  nations  but  Presi- 
dent Wilson  refused  to  do  so,  on  the  ground  that  the 
new  government  was  founded  on  violence,  in  defiance 


538 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  AVAR 


of  the  constitution  of  Mexico  and  contrary  to  the  dic- 
tates of  morality.  He  then  sent  John  Lind  to  Mexico 
to  convey  terms  to  Huerta — peace,  amnesty  and  a free 
election  at  which  Huerta  himself  would  not  be  a candi- 
date. AVhen  the  latter  refused  the  proposal,  President 
AVilson  warned  Americans  to  leave  Alexico  and  adopted 
the  policy  of  “watchful  waiting,”  hoping  that  Huerta 
would  be  eliminated  through  inability  to  get  funds  to 
administer  his  government.  In  the  meanwhile  the  de- 
struction of  lives  and  property  continued. 

A\"ar  was  barely  avoided  in  the  spring  of  1914  when  a 
boat’s  crew  of  American  marines  was  imprisoned  in 
Tampico.  An  apology  was  made,  but  General  Huerta 
refused  to  order  a salute  to  the  United  States  flag,  and 
troops  were  accordingly  landed  at  Vera  Cruz,  where 
slight  encounters  ensued.  At  this  juncture  Argentina, 
Brazil  and  Chile,  “the  ABC  powers”  made  a proposal 
of  mediation  which  was  accepted.  The  conference 
averted  war  between  the  United  States  and  Alexico, 
although  failing  to  solve  the  questions  at  issue. 
Shortly  afterward,  however,  Huerta  retired  from  the 
field  unable  to  continue  his  dictatorship,  and  the  Ameri- 
can troops  were  withdrawn. 

The  end  was  not  yet  however.  Carranza  and  his  as- 
sociate, Villa,  fell  to  quarreling.  Bands  of  ruffians 
made  raids  across  the  border,  and  Alexico  became  more 
than  before  a desolate  waste  peopled  with  fighting  fac- 
tions. At  President  AVilson’s  suggestion  six  Latin- 
American  powers  met  in  Almshington  in  1915  for  con- 
ference, and  decided  to  recognize  Carranza  as  the  head 
of  a de  facto  government.  Diplomatic  relations  were 
then  renewed  after  a lapse  of  two  and  a half  years.  In 
a message  to  Congress  the  President  reviewed  the 
imbroglio,  but  expressed  doubts-  whether  Alexico  had 
been  benefited. 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  539 


His  fears  soon  proved  to  be  well  founded.  In  1916 
Villa  crossed  into  New  Mexico  and  raided  the  town  of 
Columbus.  With  the  consent  of  Carranza  the  United 
States  sent  troops  under  General  Pershing  across  the 
line  to  run  down  the  bandits,  but  the  only  result  was  to 
•drive  the  Villistas  from  the  region  near  the  border. 
Renewed  raids,  this  time  into  Texas,  indicated  the  need 
of  larger  forces  and  the  state  militia  were  called  upon, 
but  after  nearly  a year  of  service  they  were  withdrawn 
early  in  1917.  Not  long  afterward  Carranza  was 
elected  president  for  a term  of  four  years,  but  in  1920 
another  revolt  ended  in  his  assassination.  The  coun- 
try is  in  a condition  of  wretchedness,  and  neither  life 
nor  property  is  safe  from  bands  of  marauders.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  has  patiently  attempted  to  give  Mexico  a 
chance  to  work  out  her  own  salvation  without  hin- 
drance from  other  countries  and  without  exploitation 
by  investors, — but  the  problem  remains  unsettled.^ 

In  view  of  some  aspects  of  the  foreign  relations  of 
the  United  States  since  1914,  it  is  apparent  that  such 
diplomatic  incidents  as  those  concerned  with  bounda- 
ries, fisheries  and  Latin-American  protectorates  were 
not  the  most  important  forces  in  determining  the  out- 
look of  America  upon  Europe.  In  spite  of  the  huge 
immigration  of  Europeans  into  America  since  the  Civil 
War,  the  United  States  has  seldom  drawn  upon  Euro- 
pean experience  and  has  never  sought  to  model  itself 
on  European  lines.  American  legislators  have  not 
commonly  studied  either  English  or  continental  prac- 
tices; our  institutions  and  our  constitutional  limita- 
tions have  been  so  peculiarly  our  own  that  slight  atten- 

1 The  number  of  Americans  killed  in  Mexico  as  given  by  the  ambas- 
sador in  1919  was  as  follows:  1911,  10;  1912,  6;  1913,  24;  1914,  30; 
1915,  26;  1916,  46;  1917,  39;  1918,  31.  N.  Y.  Times,  July  20,  1919, 
For  the  revolution  of  1920  consult  N,  Y.  Times,  May  16  ff. 


540 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


tion  has  been  paid  to  the  outside  world.  Even  the  an- 
cient resentment  against  England  had  dwindled  by 
1914,  leaving  the  United  States  without  any  traditional 
“enemy.”  Tradition,  as  well  as  geographical  isola- 
tion, tended  to  keep  us  apart  from  the  currents  of 
European  action. 

Nevertheless  America  w'as  being  inter-related  with 
the  rest  of  the  world  through  means  with  which  the 
dii3lomats  had  little  to  do.  In  1867  the  Atlantic  cable 
had  finally  been  placed  in  successful  operation,  and 
forty  years  afterward  the  globe  was  enmeshed  in  270,- 
000  miles  of  submarine  telegraph  wires.  In  1901  wire- 
less telegraphic  messages  were  sent  across  the  ocean, 
and  within  a few  years  private  and  press  notices  were 
being  sent  across  the  Atlantic,  vessels  were  commonly 
equipped  with  instruments,  and  international  regula- 
tions concerning  radio-telegraphy  were  adopted  by  the 
chief  powers  of  the  world.  Most  important  of  all  was 
the  constant  passage  of  merchant  vessels  shuttling  back 
and  forth  between  America  and  Europe,  and  weaving 
the  two  into  one  commercial  fabric.  With  Great  Brit- 
ain, with  Germany,  with  France,  Italy  and  the  Nether- 
lands, during  1913,  the  United  States  exchanged  prod- 
ucts valued  at  nearly  two  and  a half  billion  dollars. 
This  wms  an  amount  more  than  twice  as  great  as  the 
entire  trade  with  Europe  twenty  years  before.  Over 
half  a billion  dollars’  worth  was  with  Germany,  to 
which,  country  we  sent  cotton,  copper,  food-stuffs,  lard 
and  furs  in  return  for  fertilizers,  drugs,  dyes,  cotton 
manufactures  and  toys.  American  corporations  had 
branches  in  Germany,  while  German  manufacturers  in- 
vested hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars  in  factories  here. 
So  huge  a volume  of  commerce  concerned  the  welfare 
not  only  of  the  ordinary  commercial  classes — ship  own- 
ers, exporters  and  investors — but  the  much  larger  num- 


LATER  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  541 


bor  of  producers,  manufacturers,  miners,  meat-packers, 
and  farmers  who  directly  and  indirectly  supplied  the 
materials  for  export. 

In  the  meantime  a change  was  taking  place  in  the  at- 
titude of  America  toward  world  affairs.  Inaccurate  as 
it  was  to  describe  the  United  States  as  a world  power 
at  the  time  of  the  Spanish  War,  nevertheless  the  war 
itself  and  the  colonial  responsibilities  which  it  entailed 
helped  to  a small  degree  to  break  down  the  isolation  of 
America;  frequent  communication  with  Europe,  and 
the  expansion  of  American  commerce  tended  in  the 
same  direction. 

The  international  relations  of  the  United  States  for 
the  twenty  years  immediately  preceding  1914  may  then 
be  briefly  summarized.  The  one  international  problem 
which  interested  the  greatest  numbers  of  people  was  the 
best  method  of  arriving  at  international  peace.  Other 
problems,  except  the  Mexican  question,  were  simple  and 
inconspicuous,  and  the  majority  of  Americans  knew 
little  of  European  politics  or  international  relations. 
Only  in  the  fields  of  communication  and  commerce  was 
the  United  States  becoming  increasingly  and  intimately 
related  to  the  remainder  of  the  world,  and  the  extent 
to  which  this  change  supplemented  the  effect  of  the  war 
with  Spain  in  broadening  the  American  international 
outlook  was  a matter  of  conjecture. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  general  texts  mentioned  at  the  close  of  Chapter  XIII 
continue  to  be  useful. 

On  the  Hague  Conferences  reliance  should  be  placed  upon 
G.  F.  W.  Holls,  The  Peace  Conference  at  the  Hague  (1900), 
by  the  secretary  of  the  American  delegation ; A.  D.  4Yhite, 
Autobiography  of  Andrew  D.  White  (2  vols.,  1905),  by  a 


542 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


member  of  the  delegation ; J.  W.  Foster,  Arbitration  and  the 
Hague  Court  (1904)  ; P.  S.  Reinsch,  in  American  Political  Sci- 
ence Review,  II,  204  (Second  Conference). 

The  best  brief  account  of  the  acquisition  of  the  canal  strip 
is  in  Latane;  Theodore  Roosevelt’s  story  is  in  his  Autobiog- 
raphy and  his  Addresses  and  Presidential  Messages.  On  the 
Caribbean,  C.  L.  Jones,  Caribbean  Interests  of  the  United 
States  (1916).  The  Venezuela  arbitrations  are  in  Senate 
Documents,  58th  Congress,  3rd  session.  No.  119  (Serial  Num- 
ber 4769).  The  Alaskan  boundary  question  is  clearly  dis- 
cussed in  Latane,  with  a good  map,  and  J.  W.  Foster,  Diplo- 
matic Memoirs  (2  vols.,  1909).  The  Proceedings  in  the  North 
Atlantic  Coast  Fisheries  Arbitration  are  in  Senate  Document 
No.  870,  61st  Congress,  3rd  session  (12  vols.,  1912-1913)  ; more 
briefly  in  G.  G.  Wilson,  Hague  Arbitration  Cases  (1915). 
S.  K.  Hornbeck,  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East 
(1916),  is  useful  for  Asiatic  relations.  Ogg,  Fish,  and  the 
American  Year  Book  provide  material  on  Mexican  affairs. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


WOODBOW  WILSON 

A DEFINITE  account  of  the  eventful  years  fol- 
lowing’ 1913  can  be  written  only  after  time  has 
allayed  partisanship;  after  long-  study  of  the  social, 
economic  and  political  history  has  separated  the  essen- 
tial from  the  trivial;  after  papers  that  are  now  locked 
in  private  files  have  been  opened  to  students ; and  after 
the  passage  of  years  has  given  that  perspective  which 
alone  can  measure  the  wisdom  or  the  folly  of  a policy. 
It  will  be  little  less  difficult  to  make  a just  appraisal  of 
the  chief  American  participants  in  those  years,  and 
particularly  of  President  "^oodrow  Wilson.  At  pres- 
ent it  is  possible  only  to  avoid  partisanship  so  far  as 
it  can  be  done,  read  with  open  mind  whatever  docu- 
ments are  available,  and  refrain  from  either  praise  or 
condemnation.  On  all  sides  it  is  agreed  that  during 
his  administration  Wilson  became  one  of  the  three  or 
four  world-figures,  and  for  that  reason  his  character- 
istics, as  well  as  the  events  of  his  presidency  demand 
unusual  attention. 

Woodrow  Wilson  was  born  in  Staunton,  Virginia,  in 
1856.  His  ancestors  were  Scotch-Irish  and  his  father 
an  educator  and  Presbyterian  clergyman.  After 
graduating  from  Princeton  College  he  practiced  law, 
studied  history  and  politics,  and  taught  these  subjects 
at  several  different  institutions.  Subsequently  he  be- 
came a professor  at  Princeton  and  later  its  President. 
He  was  a prolific  and  successful  writer.  His  book  on 
Congressional  Government,  for  example,  went  through 

543 


544 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


twenty-four  impressions  before  he  became  President 
of  the  United  States.  The  State,  an  account  of  the 
mechanism  of  government  in  ancient  and  modern  times, 
and  some  of  his  portrayals  of  American  history  were 
hardly  less  in  demand.  His  election  as  Governor  of 
New  Jersey  in  1910  and  his  election  to  the  presidency 
two  years  later  have  already  been  mentioned. 

The  outstanding-  characteristic  of  Wilson  is  a finely- 
organized,  penetrating-  mtelligence.  Somewhat  like  a 
silent  chess-player  he  thinks  many  moves  in  advance,  a 
fact  which  makes  it  difficult  to  judge  a single  act  of  his 
without  a knowledge  of  the  whole  plan.  Before  coming 
to  the  presidency  he  had  long  pondered  on  the  proper 
and  possible  function  of  that  office,  and  had  drawn  in 
imagination  the  outlines  and  many  of  the  details  of  the 
role  which  he  was  to  play.  Years  of  careful  study  had 
drilled  him  in  the  accumulation  of  facts.  As  a special- 
ist in  politics  and  history  he  was  accustomed  to  make 
up  his  mind  on  the  basis  of  his  own  researches,  and  to 
change  his  judgments  without  embarrassment  when 
new  facts  presented  themselves.  His  literary  style  is 
characterized  by  precision,  a close  texture  and  fre- 
quently by  suppressed  emotion.  He  thinks  on  an  inter- 
national scale  and  with  a profundity  that  often  dwarfs 
associates  who  are  by  no  means  pygmies  themselves. 
An  unbending  will,  an  alert  conscience,  stubborn  cour- 
age, restrained  patience,  political  sagacity,  a thorough- 
going belief  in  democracy  and  above  all  an  instinctive 
understanding-  of  the  spiritual  aspirations  of  the  com- 
mon people  made  him  the  most  powerful  political  figure 
in  America  within  a brief  time  after  his  accession  to 
the  presidency.  On  the  other  hand,  his  aloofness  from 
counsel  during-  the  later  part  of  his  presidency  ex- 
ceeded that  of  Cleveland,  and  his  abnormal  self-reliance 
was  greater  than  that  of  Roosevelt. 


WOODROW  WILSON 


545 


In  reviewing  the  history  of  the  years  following  1913, 
it  is  necessary  to  have  a sense  of  the  immensity  of  the 
problems  involved,  as  well  as  a restrained  judgment 
and  some  knowledge  of  the  chief  actors.  Beginning  in 
1914,  the  great  nations  of  Europe  were  cpnstantly  men- 
aced by  appalling  dangers;  their  leaders  were  daily 
confronted  with  decisions  of  the  utmost  importance. 
Because  of  the  close  commercial,  industrial  and  finan- 
cial bonds  between  the  two  continents,  America  could 
not  fail  to  be  affected.  She  too  was  compelled  to  take 
her  part  in  a drama  which  was  far  greater  than  any  in 
which  she  had  before  engaged.  Both  the  President 
and  Congress  were  confronted  with  problems  the  solu- 
tion of  which  would  vitally  affect  not  only  the  people  of 
America,  but  the  people  of  the  world;  never  before  had 
their  decisions  been  so  subject  to  the  possibilities  of 
mistakes  which  would  certainly  be  momentous  and 
might  be  tragic. 

When  Wilson  and  his  party  came  into  power  in  1913, 
as  the  result  of  the  schism  among  the  Republicans,  their 
position  was  by  no  means  secure.  The  President  had 
been  elected  by  a distinct  minority  in  the  popular  vote 
and  his  practical  political  experience  had  been  less  than 
that  of  any  chief  executive  since  Grant.  His  party  had 
been  in  power  so  little  since  the  Civil  War  that  it  had 
no  body  of  experienced  administrators  from  which  to 
pick  cabinet  officers,  and  no  corps  of  parliamentary 
leaders  practiced  in  the  task  of  framing  and  passing  a 
constructive  program.  The  party  as  a whole  was  lack- 
ing in  cohesion  and  had  perforce  played  the  role  of 
destructive  critic  most  of  the  time  for  more  than  half  a 
century;  its  principles  were  untested  in  actual  ex- 
perience, and  although  its  majority  in  the  House  was 
large,  in  the  Senate  its  margin  of  control  was  so  narrow 


546 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


as  to  suggest  the  near  possibility  of  the  failure  of  a 
party  program.  Wilson  was  under  no  illusions  as  to 
the  circumstances  of  his  election  and  he  realized  that 
both  he  and  his  party  were  on  probation. 

The  appointment  of  the  cabinet  occasioned  unusual 
interest.  Bryan,  the  one  Democrat  who  had  a large 
and  devoted  personal  following,  became  Secretary  of 
State.  His  influence  in  nominating  Wilson  had  been 
ver}'  great  and  the  adherence  of  his  admirers  was  nec- 
essary if  the  party  was  to  be  welded  into  an  effective 
organization.  Several  of  the  other  members  of  the 
cabinet  proved  themselves  to  be  men  of  unusual  capa- 
city, and  their  ability  to  cooperate  with  one  another 
provided  the  “teamwork.”  which  the  President  was 
anxious  to  obtain.^ 

His  conception  of  the  part  which  the  chief  executive 
ought  to  play  was  a definite  one.  He  looked  upon  the 
President  as  peculiarly  the  representative  of  the  whole 
people  in  the  federal  government,  as  the  leader  of  the 
party  in  power  and  as  commissioned  by  the  voting 
population  to  carrj^  out  the  platform  of  principles  upon 
which  the  party  and  its  leader  were  elected.  He  be- 
lieved that  the  unofficial  leaders  who  are  better  known 
as  “bosses”  existed  partly  because  of  the  absence  of 
official  leaders.  As  Governor  of  New  Jersey  he  had 
acted  on  the  principles  that  he  had  outlined  for  the 
chief  executive  of  the  nation,  and  upon  his  accession 
to  the  presidency  he  began  at  once  to  put  into  effect  a 
similar  program. 

1 The  cabinet,  1913-1920,  was  as  follows:  Secretary  of  State,  W.  J. 
Bryan  (to  1915),  R.  Lansing  (to  1920),  B.  Colbj'-,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  W.  G.  McAdoo,  C.  Glass,  D.  F.  Houston;  Secretary  of  War, 
L.  M.  Garrison,  N.  D.  Baker;  Attorney-General,  J.  C.  IMcReynolds,  T.  W. 
Gregory,  A.  M.  Palmer;  Postmaster-General,  A.  S.  Burleson;  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  J.  Daniels;  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  F.  K.  Lane,  J.  B. 
Payne;  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  D.  F.  tlouston,  E.  T.  Meredith;  Sec- 
retary of  Commerce,  W.  C.  Redfield,  .1.  W.  Alexander;  Secretary  of 
Labor,  W.  B.  IMlson. 


WOODROW  WILSON 


547 


Congress  was  called  for  a special  session  on  April 
7,  1913,  in  order  to  revise  the  tariff.  It  was  a danger- 
ous task — one  which  had  discredited  the  Democrats  in 
1894  and  divided  the  Republicans  in  1909 — hut  ])lans 
had  been  laid  vith  care  in  order  to  avoid  previous  mis- 
takes. The  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means  in  the  House,  Oscar  W.  Underwood,  had  begun 
the  preparation  of  a bill  during  the  session  before  and 
had  discussed  it  with  Democratic  members  of  the  Sen- 
ate Committee  on  Finance,  and  with  the  President. 

At  the  opening  of  the  session  Wilson  broke  the  prece- 
dent established  by  Jefferson  in  1801,  and  read  his 
message  personally  to  Congress,  instead  of  sending  it 
in  written  form  to  he  read  by  a clerk.  In  substance 
the  message  expressed  the  President’s  conviction  that 
the  appearance  of  the  chief  executive  in  Congress 
would  assist  in  developing  the  sjnrit  of  cooperation, 
and  outlined  the  tariff  problem  which  they  were  to- 
gether called  upon  to  settle.  He  declared  that  the 
country  wished  the  tariff  changed,  that  the  task  ought 
to  be  completed  as  quickly  as  possible  and  that  no  spe- 
cial privileges  ought  to  be  granted  to  anybody.  He 
advocated  a tariff  on  articles  which  we  did  not  produce 
and  upon  luxuries,  but  he  urged  that  otherwise  the 
schedules  be  reduced  vigorously  but  without  undue 
haste.  Other  considerations  were  more  important, 
however,  than  the  substance  of  the  message.  Previous 
documents  of  this  kind  had  been  long,  and  filled  with  a 
wide  variety  of  recommendations  concerning  both  in- 
ternational and  domestic  relations;  Wilson’s  speech  oc- 
cupied but  a few  moments,  it  focused  the  attention  of 
Congress  upon  one  subject,  and  fixed  the  eyes  of  the 
country  upon  the  problem.  The  nation  knew  that  one 
task  was  in  hand,  and  knew  where  to  lay  the  blame  if 
delay  should  ensue.  It  was  a great  responsibility  that 


548  SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

the  President  had  assumed,  but  he  assumed  it  without 
hesitation. 

Underwood  presented  his  bill  at  once  and  it  passed 
the  House  without  difficulty,  but  in  the  Senate  the 
Democratic  majority  of  six  was  too  small  to  guarantee 
success  in  the  face  of  the  objections  of  Louisiana  sena- 
tors to  the  proposal  for  free  sugar,  and  the  usual  bar- 
gaining for  the  protection  of  special  interests.  When 
the  lobby  appeared — the  group  that  had  so  mangled  the 
Wilson-Gorman  bill  and  discredited  the  Payne-Al- 
drich  Act — the  President  issued  a public  statement 
warning  the  country  of  the  “extraordinary  exertions” 
of  a body  of  paid  agents  whose  object  was  private 
profit  and  not  the  good  of  the  public.  So  vigorous  an 
action  resulted  in  hostility  to  Wilson,  but  Congress 
found  itself  unusually  free  from  objectionable  pres- 
sure. Hence  while  experts  differed  in  regard  to  the 
wisdom  of  one  part  or  another  of  the  bill,  it  was  not 
charged  that  its  schedules  bore  the  imprint  of  favorit- 
ism for  any  particular  private  interests.  Discussion 
in  the  Senate  was  so  extended  that  the  Underwood 
act  did  not  finally  pass  and  receive  the  President’s 
signature  until  October  3. 

The  general  character  of  the  measure  is  indicated  by 
the  number  of  changes  made  in  the  tariffs  as  they  ex- 
isted at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  act.  On  958 
articles  the  duties  were  reduced ; on  307  they  were  left 
unchanged;  and  on  eighty-six  (mainly  in  the  chemical 
schedule),  they  were  increased.  Despite  the  numerous 
reductions,  the  Underwood  law  retained  much  of  the 
protective  purpose  of  preceding  enactments.  At- 
tempts were  made  to  decrease  the  cost  of  living  by  con- 
siderable reductions  on  certain  agricultural  products 
and  by  placing  others  on  the  free  list ; wool  was  to  be 
free  after  December  1,  1913,  and  the  duty  on  sugar 


WOODROW  WILSON 


549 


was  to  be  reduced  gradually  and  taken  oft  completely 
oil  May  1,  1916 ; duties  on  cotton  goods  and  on  woolens 
(“Schedule  K”)  were  heavily  reduced.  Underwood 
represented  an  iron  manufacturing  section  of  Ala- 
bama, but  he  showed  an  uncommon  attention  to  the 
general  interest  by  favoring  large  reductions  on  pig- 
iron  and  placing  iron  ore  and  steel  rails  on  the  free 
list.  An  important  part  of  the  law  was  a provision 
for  an  income  tax,  which  had  been  made  possible  by 
the  Sixteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  pro- 
claimed on  February  25,  1913.  Incomes  over  $3,000 
($4,000  in  the  case  of  married  persons),  were  to  be 
taxed  one  per  cent.,  with  an  additional  one  per  cent, 
on  incomes  of  $20,000  to  $50,000,  and  similar  graded 
“surtaxes”  on  higher  incomes,  reaching  six  per  cent, 
on  those  above  $500,000.  The  board  which  the  Repub- 
licans had  established  for  the  scientific  study  of  the 
tariff  had  been  allowed  to  lapse  by  the  Democrats, 
but  was  revived  in  1916  through  the  appointment  of  a 
bi-partisan  Commission  of  six  members  with  twelve- 
year  terms. 

On  June  23, 1913,  after  the  tariff  bill  had  been  piloted 
around  the  chief  difficulties  in  its  way,  the  President 
again  addressed  Congress — this  time  on  currency  leg- 
islation. Again  he  laid  down  certain  principles — a 
more  elastic  currency,  some  means  of  mobilizing  bank 
reserves,  and  public  control  of  the  banking  system. 
Before  mentioning  the  further  history  of  this  recom- 
mendation, however,  it  is  necessary  to  have  in  mind 
the  main  facts  in  the  development  of  the  monetary  is- 
sue since  1900.  Complaint  had  been  common  since 
that  year.  One  difficulty  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  vol- 
ume of  the  currency  could  not  quickly  increase  and  de- 
crease as  busy  times  demanded  more  or  quiet  times  re- 
quired less  of  the  circulating  medium.  At  those  parts 


550 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


of  the  year,  for  example,  when  the  crops  were  being 
moved  there  was  a greater  demand  for  currency  than 
the  banks  could  conveniently  meet.  They  could,  to  be 
sure,  buy  United  States  bonds  and  issue  national  bank 
notes  upon  them  as  security,  but  this  was  a slow  and 
costly  process.  The  dangers  of  the  existing  inelastic 
arrangement  were  illustrated  in  the  panic  of  1907. 

In  that  year  occurred  a financial  crisis  which  re- 
sulted in  business  failures,  unemployment  and  the  in- 
dictment of  prominent  figures  in  the  commercial  world ; 
it  was  precipitated  by  a gamble  in  copper  stocks.  An 
unsuccessful  attempt  to  corner  the  stock  of  a copper 
company  led  to  the  examination  of  the  Mercantile  Na- 
tional Bank  of  New  York,  with  which  the  speculators 
had  intimate  connections.  Meanwhile  the  president  of 
the  bank  and  all  the  directors  were  forced  to  resign. 
One  of  the  associates  of  a director  in  the  Mercantile 
was  the  president  of  the  Knickerbocker  Trust  Com- 
pany, and  depositors  in  the  latter  bank  thereupon  be- 
came frightened,  and  $8,000,000  were  withdrawn  in 
three  hours.  The  alarm  then  spread  to  the  depositors 
of  the  Tnist  Company  of  America — the  president  of 
the  Knickerbocker  was  one  of  its  directors — and  $31,- 
000,000  were  withdrawn  by  the  now  thoroughly  anxious 
depositors,  who  stood  in  line  at  night  in  order  to  be 
ready  for  the  next  day.  The  panic  spread  to  other 
parts  of  the  nation;  country  banks  withdrew  funds 
from  the  city  banks,  and  they  from  New  York;  and  at 
length  the  government  came  to  the  aid  of  the  distressed 
institutions  and  deposited  $36,000,000  between  October 
19  and  31.  Nevertheless,  at  the  time  when  depositors 
were  trying  to  get  their  money  there  was  sufficient 
currency  in  existence  to  satisfy  all  needs.  The  defect 
lay  in  the  lack  of  machinery  for  pooling  resources  in 
such  a way  as  to  relieve  any  institution  that  was  in 


WOODROW  AVILSON 


551 


temporary  straits.  The  experts  pointed  also  to  the 
unscrupulous  manipulation  of  the  supplies  of  currency 
by  New  York  financiers.  There  was  widespread  com- 
ment on  the  fact  that  if  the  magnates  did  not  actually 
constitute  a “money  trust”  they  were  nevertheless  able 
to  expand  and  contract  the  available  supply  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  serve  their  own  ends  and  embarrass  the 
public. 

In  the  meanwhile  many  experts,  among  them  Sena- 
tor Nelson  W.  Aldrich,  had  been  studying  the  entire 
banking  system.  The  result  of  this  work  was  the  Aid- 
rich- Vreeland  Act  of  1908  providing  a temporary 
method  for  making  the  supply  of  currency  more  flex- 
ible and  also  arranging  for  a National  Monetary  Com- 
mission to  investigate  the  currency  and  banking  sys- 
tems in  this  and  other  countries.  The  Commission 
published  thirty-eight  volumes  of  information  and 
recommendations,  which  were  a storehouse  of  facts 
concerning  the  problem,  although  no  legislation  re- 
sulted. All  that  Taft  did  was  to  pass  the  task  along 
to  Wilson. 

As  has  been  seen.  President  Wilson  seized  the  op- 
portunity at  once.  Senator  Owen  and  Carter  Glass, 
Chairmen  of  the  Senate  and  House  Committees  on 
Banking  and  Currency,  together  with  William  G.  Mc- 
Adoo,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  the  Presi- 
dent himself  drafted  the  Federal  Reser\^e  bill.  This 
measure  received  careful  attention,  being  the  cause  of 
extended  hearings  and  debate  in  Congress  and  of  dis- 
cussion in  banking  circles.  The  special  session  wore 
on  and  came  to  an  end,  but  the  regular  session  began 
at  once  (December  1),  and  consideration  of  the  meas- 
ure continued  without  interruption.  At  length  on  De- 
cember 22  the  House  acted  favorably,  thirty-four  Re- 
publicans, eleven  Progressives^  and  one  Independent 


552 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


assisting  the  Democrats  in  passing  the  bill;  on  the 
following  day  the  Senate  passed  it,  one  Progressive 
and  three  Republicans  voting  with  the  majority.  In 
many  details  the  act  as  passed  differed  from  the  orig- 
inal plan,  but  in  its  essential  points  it  was  not  amended. 
Although  its  precise  form  was  the  work  of  a few  men, 
the  project  in  general,  of  course,  represented  the  labors 
of  many  persons  extending  over  many  years,  and  for 
that  reason  embodied  the  best  that  American  experts 
could  give. 

The  Act  provided  for  the  establishment  of  Federal 
Reserve  Banks,  to  be  placed  in  districts — the  number 
being  eventually  fixed  at  twelve.  The  capital  for  each 
Reserve  Bank  was  to  be  supplied  by  the  banks  in  its 
district  which  became  member  banks.  In  other  words 
the  Reserve  Banks  were  to  act  as  banks  for  their 
members,  but  not  for  private  individuals.  In  control 
of  the  twelve  was  a Federal  Reserve  Board,  composed 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  the  Comptroller  of 
the  Currency  and  five  persons  appointed  by  the  presi- 
dent for  terms  of  ten  years.  It  was  at  this  point  that 
the  chief  controversies  raged  between  the  bankers  and 
the  proponents  of  the  administration  measure.  The 
hankers  desired  one  central  bank,  which  the  adminis- 
tration opposed  because  it  feared  centralized  control 
over  the  currency  supply;  and  the  bankers  disliked  the 
proposal  for  a Reserve  Board  appointed  by  the  presi- 
dent, because  they  apprehended  the  entrance  of  poli- 
tics into  the  appointments.  The  President  and  his 
supporters  were  determined,  however,  not  to  allow  the 
bankers  to  appoint  the  Board  or  any  portion  of  it,  be- 
cause they  wished  the  system  to  be  operated  solely  in 
the  public  interest. 

Greater  elasticity  was  given  to  the  currency  supply 
through  the  issuance  of  federal  reserve  notes,  at  the 


WOODROW  WILSON 


553 


discretion  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  to  the  sev- 
eral regional  Federal  Reserve  Banks.  These  notes 
were  to  be  obligations  of  the  government  and  were  ex- 
pected to  replace  the  former  national  bank  notes. 
When  a local  bank  requires  more  currency  it  may  de- 
posit with  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  such  valuable 
commercial  paper  as  may  be  acceptable — for  example, 
promissory  notes  of  reliable  business  firms — and  re- 
ceive at  once  a supply  of  federal  reserve  notes.  When 
business  is  brisk  and  large  supplies  of  currency  are 
demanded,  the  local  banks  will  deposit  whatever  paper 
may  be  necessary  to  meet  their  needs ; when  the  emer- 
gency has  passed  they  will  withdraw  notes  from  cir- 
culation, return  them  to  the  reserve  bank  and  receive 
their  paper  again.^  The  second  great  purpose  of  the 
new  system  was  to  supply  central  reservoirs  for  the 
storage  of  the  reserves  of  the  member  banks.  Each 
local  bank  is  required  to  keep  certain  prescribed  bal- 
ances in  the  reserve  bank  of  its  district,  and  the  federal 
government  may  also  deposit  funds  in  it.  In  conform- 
ity with  strict  regulations  the  reserves  thus  ac- 
cumulated in  a Federal  Reserve  Bank  may  be  directed 
here  and  there  in  the  district  as  needed,  and  even  from 
district  to  district,  under  the  control  of  the  Federal  Re- 
serve Board.  Moreover  they  are  not  available  for 
those  speculative  ventures  which  have  caused  so  much 
trouble  in  the  past.^  The  operation  of  the  law  has  ap- 
parently more  than  met  the  expectation  of  its  friends. 
It  had  hardly  been  established  when  .a  war  broke  out 
in  Europe,  but  the  unusual  financial  situation  which 
resulted  in  America  was  cared  for  without  great  strain. 

The  third  major  plank  in  the  Democratic  platform 

1 On  Apr.  23,  1920,  the  amount  of  federal  reserve  notes  outstanding 
was  .$3,068,307,000. 

2 On  Apr.  23,  1920,  the  reserves  deposited  by  member  banks  reached  a 
total  of  $2,083,568,000. 


554 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


of  1912  called  for  legislation  concerning  trusts,  and  the 
President  accordingly  turned  his  attention  to  that  topic 
in  his  address  to  Congress  on  January  20,  1914.  He 
declared  that  there  was  no  intent  to  hamper  business 
as  conducted  by  enlightened  men,  but  that,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  antagonism  between  business  and  govern- 
ment had  passed.  He  recommended  the  prohibition  of 
interlocking  directorates  by  which  railroads,  banks  and 
industrial  corporations  became  allied  in  one  monopo- 
listic group,  and  he  suggested  that  the  processes  and 
methods  of  harmful  restraint  of  trade  be  forbidden 
item  by  item  in  order  that  business  men  might  know 
where  they  stood  in  relation  to  the  law.  Finally,  he 
believed  that  the  country  demanded  a commission 
which  should  act  as  a clearing  house  for  facts  relat- 
ing to  industry  and  Avhich  should  do  justice  to  busi- 
ness where  the  processes  of  the  courts  were  inadequate. 
The  results  of  this  undertaking  were  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission  act  of  September  26,  1914,  and  the  Clayton 
Anti-trust  act  of  October  15. 

The  former  of  these  laws  created  a Commission  of 
five  persons  to  administer  the  anti-trust  laws  and  to 
prevent  the  use  of  unfair  methods  by  any  persons  or 
corporations  which  were  subject  to  the  anti-trust  laws. 
^Whenever  it  had  reason  to  believe  that  such  expedients 
Avere  being  used,  the  Commission  was  to  issue  an  order 
requiring  the  cessation  of  the  practice.  If  the  order 
was  not  obeyed,  the  Commission  was  to  apply  for  as- 
sistance to  the  circuit  court  of  appeals  in  the  district 
Avhere  the  offense  was  alleged  to  have  been  committed. 
The  purpose  of  the  provision  Avas  evidently  to  preA^ent 
unfair  practices  rather  than  to  punish  them.  Another 
section  of  the  laAv  empoAvered  the  Commission  to  gather 
information  concerning  the  practices  of  industrial  or- 
ganizations, to  require  them  to  file -reports  in  regard 


WOODKOW  WILSON 


555 


to  their  affairs,  and  to  investigate  the  manner  in  which 
decrees  of  the  Courts  against  them  were  carried  out. 
Under  direction  of  the  president  or  Congress,  the 
Commission  could  investigate  alleged  violations  of  the 
law,  and  on  its  own  initiative  it  might  report  recom- 
mendations to  Congress  for  additional  legislation.^ 

The  Clayton  act  specifically  prohibited  many  of  the 
practices  common  to  industrial  enterprises.  Sellers  of 
commodities  were  forbidden  to  discriminate  in  price 
between  different  purchasers — after  making  due  al- 
lowance for  differences  in  transportation  costs;  cor- 
porations were  forbidden  to  acquire  any  of  the  stock 
of  other  similar  industries,  where  the  effect  would  be 
substantially  to  lessen  competition;  and  directors  of 
banks  and  corporations  were  prohibited,  with  stated  ex- 
ceptions, from  serving  in  two  or  more  competing  or- 
ganizations. The  Clayton  act  also  settled,  at  least  for 
the  time,  several  of  the  complaints  raised  by  the  labor 
interests,  especially  at  the  time  of  the  Pullman  strike. 
Labor  and  agricultural  organizations  were  specifically 
declared  not  to  be  conspiracies  in  restraint  of  trade; 
injunctions  were  not  to  be  granted  in  labor  disputes 
unless  necessary  to  prevent  irreparable  injury;  and 
trials  for  contempt  of  court  were  to  be  by  jury,  except 
when  the  offense  was  committed  in  the  presence  of  the 
court.  The  law  also  prohibited  the  railroads  from 
dealing  with  concerns  in  which  their  directors  were  in- 
terested, except  under  specified  conditions. 

The  success  of  the  President  in  pushing  his  party 
program  made  his  prestige  the  outstanding  fact  in  poli- 
tics. His  leadership  was  indisputable  and  it  was  evi- 
dent that  he  regarded  a party  platform  as  a serious 
program,  to  the  fulfilment  of  which  the  party  was  com- 
mitted by  its  election.  While  the  trust  legislation  was 

1 The  Commission  sunerseded  the  Bureau  of  Corporations. 


556 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


under  discussion,  however,  he  asked  for  an  act  which 
required  all  the  strength  that  he  could  muster. 

It  will  he  remembered  that  the  Panama  Canal  act  of 
1912  had  exempted  American  coast-wise  traffic  through 
the  canal  from  the  payment  of  tolls.  The  law  had  been 
passed  under  a Eepuhlican,  President  Taft,  and  both 
the  Progressive  and  Democratic  platforms  of  1912  had 
favored  exemption.  On  March  5,  1914,  Wilson  ap- 
peared before  Congress  and  urged  the  repeal  of  the 
act  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a violation  of  that  part 
of  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain  in  which  this  country 
agreed  that  the  canal  should  be  open  to  all  nations 
iipon  an  equality,  and  that  it  was  based  on  a mistaken 
economic  policy.  He  was  opposed  by  Under\vood  and 
Champ  Clark,  two  of  the  most  powerful  Democratic 
leaders,  but  he  had  the  aid  of  Senator  Root,  a dis- 
tinguished Republican  who  had  been  Secretary  of  State 
under  President  Roosevelt,  and  in  the  end  he  was 
victorious.  The  division  in  the  party  was  quickly 
healed  and  forgotten. 

The  Congressional  elections  of  1914  greatly  reduced 
the  Democratic  majority  in  the  House,  although  leav- 
ing control  with  that  party,  but  they  slightly  increased 
its  margin  in  the  Senate.  European  affairs  and  the 
election  of  1916  occupied  political  attention  during  the 
second  half  of  the  administration,  nevertheless  the 
President  and  Congress  proceeded  with  their  program 
of  legislation.  Important  acts  were  those  providing 
for  the  development  of  the  resources  of  Alaska,  the 
Newlands  act  for  the  arbitration  of  disputes  among 
railway  employees,  a law  providing  for  federal  aid  in 
the  building  of  state  highways,  measures  giving  a 
larger  amount  of  self-government  to  the  Philippines 
and  Porto  Rico,  and  one  establishing  a series  of  Fed- 
eral Farm  Loan  Banks  intended  to  enable  the  agricul- 


WOODROW  WILSON 


557 


tural  population  to  get  capital  at  low  rates  of  interest.^ 
The  major  items',  as  well  as  the  smaller  ones  in  the 
Democratic  program  were  in  line  with  many  of  the 
proposals  made  by  the  Progressives  in  their  platform 
in  1912.  Attracted  by  these  accomplishments  and  by 
the  forceful  leadership  of  the  President  large  numbers 
of  the  Progressives  made  the  transition  into  the  Demo- 
cratic party,  and  from  1913  to  1916  much  of  the  politi- 
cal strategy  of  both  Democrats  and  Republicans  was 
devoted  to  attracting  the  insurgent  wing  of  the  Re- 
publican organization. 

The  enactment  of  such  a body  of  legislation,  with 
the  resulting  appointment  of  many  officials  and  clerks, 
brought  the  President  face  to  face  with  the  same  civil 
service  problem  that  had  caused  so  much  trouble  for 
Cleveland.  Upon  their  accession  in  1913  the  Demo- 
crats had  been  out  of  power  so  long  that  they  exerted 
the  pressure,  usual  under  such  circumstances,  for  a 
share  in  the  offices.  The  merit  system,  however,  was 
even  more  firmly  entrenched  than  in  1897  when  Cleve- 
land had  made  such  additions  to  the  classified  lists,  for 
both  Roosevelt  and  Taft  had  extended  the  merit  prin- 
ciple to  certain  parts  of  the  consular  and  diplomatic 
service.  Roosevelt  had  also  made  considerable  exten- 
sions in  the  application  of  the  system  to  deputy  col- 
lectors of  internal  revenue,  fourth-class  postmasters, 
and  carriers  in  the  rural  free-delivery  service;  Taft 
had  also  increased  the  number  of  employees  who  were 
appointed  under  the  merit  system,  notably  about  36,000 

1 The  appointment  of  Louis  D.  Brandeis  to  the  Supreme  Court  brought 
to  that  body  a well-known  proponent  of  the  newer  types  of  social  and 
economic  theory.  At  first  the  opposition  to  confirming  his  nomination 
in  the  Senate,  based  upon  certain  facts  in  his  career  and  allegations 
concerning  them,  was  uncommonly  pronounced.  Dissent  diminished, 
however,  in  the  face  of  investigation,  and  the  nomination  was  confirmed 
by  a large  majority  on  June  1,  1916. 


558 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


fourth-class  postmasters  not  touched  by  his  predeces- 
sor. Some  of  the  acts  passed  early  in  President  Wil- 
son’s administration — the  Federal  Reserve  law,  for  ex- 
ample— expressly  -excepted  certain  employees  from 
civil  service  examinations.  Bryan,  as  Secretaiy  of 
State,  showed  a lack  of  devotion  to  the  cause  of  re- 
form in  the  conduct  of  his  department.  On  the  other 
hand  the  President  took  a most  important  step  in  re- 
lation to  postmasters  of  the  first,  second  and  third 
classes,  which  had  always  been  appointed  by  the  presi- 
dent with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  and  had 
been  among  the  plums  in  the  gift  of  the  executive  that 
had  been  most  sought  after.  On  March  31,  1917,  Wil- 
son announced  that  thereafter  the  nominees  for  post- 
masters of  the  first  three  classes  would  he  chosen  as 
the  result  of  civil  service  examination. 

While  the  United  States  was  absorbed,  in  these 
various  ways,  in  the  task  of  internal  construction,  an 
event  was  occurring  in  a town  in  Bosnia  which  was  des- 
tined to  affect  profoundly  the  course  of  American  his- 
toiy.  On  June  28,  1914,  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand, 
the  heir-apparent  to  the  throne  of  the  Austro-Hungar- 
ian monarchy  was  assassinated  by  a youth  of  Serbian 
blood  and  sympathies  in  Sarajevo.  In  Austria  the  act 
was  looked  upon  as  an  incident  in  a revolutionary 
movement  intended  to  detach  a part  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  monarchy  and  unite  it  with  Serbia.  A 
month  later  Austria  declared  war  on  Serbia,  and  in  a 
brief  time,  such  was  the  state  of  the  European  al- 
liances, x\ustria  and  Germany  were  opposed  to  Serbia, 
Russia,  Belgium,  France,  Montenegro  and  Great 
Britain  in  a devastating  war.  In  August,  Japan 
joined  the  “Allies,”  as  the  nations  on  Serbia’s  side 
Avere  knovui,  and  Turkey,  in  November,  took  the  side 
of  the  Teutonic  powers.  The  act  that  brought  Belgium 


WOODROW  WILSON 


559 


into  the  war  was  of  interest  to  the  United  States. 
Germany  had  declared  war  on  Russia,  the  friend  of 
Serbia,  and  expected  that  France,  Russia’s  ally,  would 
step  into  the  fray.  Being  thoroughly  prepared  for 
war,  Germany  believed  that  she  could  crush  France  be- 
fore the  latter  could  take  any  effective  steps.  The 
most  convenient  path  into  France  lay  through  Belgium, 
a small,  neutral  nation  with  no  interest  in  the  conflict, 
and  the  German  armies  were  thereupon  poured  across 
the  boundary.  High  German  authority  freely  admitted 
the  wrong  of  the  act,  but  excused  it  on  the  ground  of 
military  necessity.  Belgium  felt  that  she  could  not  do 
otherwise  than  resist  the  invader  and  was  thus  drawn 
into  the  vortex.  Her  danger  helped  bring  Great  Brit- 
ain into  the  conflict. 

The  relation  of  the  United  States  to  the  conflict 
seemed  remote,  and  President  Wilson  on  August  4 
issued  a formal  proclamation  of  neutrality,  which  was 
soon  followed  by  an  address  to  the  people  of  the  coun- 
try urging  them  to  be  neutral  both  in  thought  and  in 
act.  For  a time  it  was  not  difficult  for  the  country  to 
obey  the  injunction.  Although  stories  of  the  ruthless- 
ness of  the  German  soldiery  in  Belgium  poured  into 
the  columns  of  American  periodicals,  the  people  found 
difficulty  in  believing  them  because  they  had  long  ad- 
mired the  efficiency  and  virility  of  the  Germans. 
Scarcely  a year  before  the  war  broke  out,  ex-Presi- 
dents  Roosevelt  and  Taft  had  extolled  the  German  Em- 
peror as  an  apostle  of  peace,  and  President  Butler  of 
Columbia  University  had  declared  that  the  people  of 
any  nation  would  gladly  elect  him  as  their  chief  execu- 
tive. More  than  a month  and  a half  after  the  invasion 
of  Belgium,  Roosevelt  published  an  article  in  The  Out- 
look in  which  he  expressed  pride  in  the  German  blood 
in  his  veins,  asserted  that  either  side  in  the  European 


560  SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

conflict  could  be  sincerely  taken  and  defended,  and 
continued : 

When  a nation  feels  that  the  issue  of  a contest  in  which  . . . 
it  finds  itself  engaged  will  be  national  life  or  death,  it  is  in- 
evitable that  it  should  act  so  as  to  save  itself.  . . . The  rights 
and  wrongs  of  these  eases  where  nations  violate  the  rules  of 
abstract  morality  in  order  to  meet  their  own  vital  needs  can 
be  precisely  determined  only  when  all  the  facts  are  known 
and  when  men’s  blood  is  cool.  ...  Of  course  it  would  be 
folly  to  jump  into  the  gulf  ourselves  to  no  good  purpose;  and 
very  probably  nothing  that  we  could  have  done  would  have 
helped  Belgium.  We  have  not  the  smallest  responsibility  for 
what  has  befallen  her. 

In  view  of  the  mass  of  conflicting  rumors  concerning 
the  war,  which  reached  American  attention,  it  was  nat- 
ural to  take  the  neutral  position  adopted  by  Roosevelt, 
but  it  was  inevitable,  because  of  our  ravial  diversities, 
that  sympathies  and  opinions  should  soon  differ  widely. 
AVithin  a short  time,  pamphlets  were  published  contain- 
ing the  correspondence  among  the  several  European 
powers  which  had  taken  place  just  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  war.  These  and  other  documents  were  widely 
studied  in  the  United  States  and  led  to  the  belief  that 
England,  France  and  Russia  had  been  the  real  peace 
lovers  and  that  Germany  had  been  the  aggressor. 

The  immediate  economic  effect  of  the  war,  in  the 
meanwhile  was  the  unsettlement  of  American  financial 
and  industrial  affairs,  but  when  the  English  navy  ob- 
tained the  mastery  of  the  seas,  the  vessels  of  the  Teu- 
tonic powers  were  driven  to  cover  in  neutral  ports  or 
kept  harmlessly  at  home,  and  American  trade  with  neu- 
tral nations  and  the  Allies  took  on  new  life.  More- 
over the  latter  were  in  need  of  food,  munitions  and 
war  materials  of  all  kinds  and  they  turned  to  Ameri- 


WOODROW  WILSON 


561 


can  factories.  Manufacturers  who  could  accept  “war 
orders”  began  at  once  to  make  fortunes;  wages  and 
prices  rose,  and  it  became  evident  that  the  United 
States  would  be  profoundly  affected  by  the  struggle. 
England’s  control  of  the  sea,  moreover,  early  presented 
other  problems.  According  to  international  practice, 
both  sides  in  the  European  conflict  might  purchase 
munitions  from  neutrals,  of  which  the  United  States 
was  the  largest,  but  on  account  of  her  weakness  on  the 
sea  Germany  was  unable  to  take  advantage  of  this  op- 
portunity, while  the  Allies  constantly  purchased  what- 
ever supplies  were  needed.  At  first,  the  German  gov- 
ernment protested  through  diplomatic  channels,  but 
our  government  was  able  to  show  not  only  that  inter- 
national practice  approved  the  course  followed  by  the 
United  States,  but  also  that  Germany  had  herself  fol- 
lowed it  in  previous  wars. 

There  then  followed  propaganda  on  a large  scale  by 
German  agents  under  the  direction  of  Dr.  Bernhard 
Dernburg,  which  was  intended  to  influence  public  opin- 
ion to  demand  the  prohibition  of  the  shipment  of  muni- 
tions to  the  Allies.  As  this  activity  failed  of  its  pur- 
pose, resort  was  then  had  to  fraudulent  clearance  pa- 
pers by  which  military  supplies  for  German  use  were 
shipped  from  the  United  States  without  conforming  to 
our  customs  regulations;  bombs  were  placed  in  ships 
carrying  supplies  to  England;  fires  were  set  in  muni- 
tions factories;  strikes  and  labor  difficulties  were  fo- 
mented by  German  agents  and  at  length  the  govern- 
ment had  to  ask  for  the  recall  of  the  Austrian  Ambassa- 
dor, Dr.  Dumba,  and  the  German  military  and  naval 
attaches  at  Washington,  Captain  Franz  von  Papen  and 
Captain  Karl  Boy-Ed. 

Relations  with  the  Allies,  in  the  meantime,  were 
far  from  satisfactory.  The  unprecedented  scale  on 


562 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


which  the  war  was  being  fought  made  huge  supplies  of 
munitions,  food  and  raw  materials  such  as  copper  and 
cotton  absolute  necessities.  England  was  able  to  shut 
off  the  direct  shipment  into  Germany  of  stores  having 
military  value,  but  this  advantage  was  of  little  use  so 
long  as  the  ports  of  Holland  and  the  Scandinavian 
countries  were  open  to  the  transit  of  such  supplies  in- 
directly to  Teutonic  soil.  When  England  attempted  to 
regulate  and  restrict  trade  with  these  countries,  the 
United  States  was  the  chief  sufferer.  Ships  were  held 
up  and  their  cargoes  examined — during  1915,  for  ex- 
ample, copper  valued  at  $5,500,000  was  seized  while  on 
the  way  from  the  United  States  to  neutral  nations. 
On  December  26,  1914,  the  United  States  protested 
against  the  number  of  vessels  that  were  stopped,  taken 
into  British  ports  and  held,  sometimes,  for  weeks ; and 
in  reply  England  pointed  out  the  large  increase  in  the 
amount  of  copper  and  other  materials  sent  to  countries 
near  Germany,  and  declared  that  the  presumption  was 
strong  that  these  stores  were  being  forwarded  to  the 
enemy. 

With  her  navy  driven  from  the  seas,  Germany  began 
to  feel  the  effects  of  the  blockade,  and  according! 3" 
turned  to  the  submarine  as  the  hope  for  victor3^  On 
February  4,  1915,  Germany  declared  the  English  chan- 
nel and  the  waters  around  Great  Britain  a war  zone, 
in  which  enemy  merchant  vessels  would  be  destroj^ed 
“even  if  it  may  not  be  possible  always  to  save  their 
crews  and  passengers.”  Great  Britain  replied  on 
March  11  by  an  order  that  merchant  vessels  going  into 
Germany  or  out  of  her  ports,  as  well  as  merchant  ves- 
sels bound  for  neutral  countries  and  carrying  goods 
bound  for  the  enemy,  must  stop  at  a British  or  allied 
port.  At  these  points  the  cargoes  were  looked  over 
and  any  war  materials  or  goods  which  were  regarded 


563 


AVOODROW  WILSON 

as  “contraband”  were  seized.  Even  though  the  own- 
ers were  eventually  reimbursed  for  the  cargoes  taken, 
the  delay  and  the  interference  with  trade  were  burden- 
some, and  the  United  States  accordingly  protested  that 
England  was  establishing  an  illegal  blockade  and  that 
the  United  States  would  champion  the  rights  of  neu- 
trals. Some  slight  retaliatory  legislation  aimed  at  the 
Allies  was  passed  by  Congress,  but  for  the  most  part 
interest  in  this  controversy  died  in  the  face  of  the 
growing  irritation  with  Germany.  The  German  dec- 
laration of  February  4,  1915,  in  regard  to  submarine 
warfare  caused  an  energetic  protest  by  the  United 
States  on  the  ground  that  an  attack  on  a vessel  made 
without  any  determination  of  its  belligerent  character 
and  the  contraband  character  of  its  cargo  wmuld  be  un- 
precedented in  naval  wmrfare.  The  xUmerican  note  de- 
clared Germany  wmuld  be  held  to  a “strict  account- 
ability” for  any  injury  to  American  lives  and  property. 
Nevertheless,  the  results  of  the  submarine  campaign 
began  to  appear  at  once,  and  in  ten  weeks  sixty-three 
merchant  ships  belonging  to  various  nations  were  sunk, 
with  a loss  of  250  lives.  On  May  7 the  United  States 
w’as  astounded  to  hear  that  the  passenger  ship  Lusi- 
tania had  been  torpedoed,  and  1,153  persons  drowned, 
including  114  Americans.  The  allied  and  neutral  na- 
tions wmre  profoundly  stirred,  and  from  that  moment 
there  grew^  an  increasing  demand  in  the  United  States 
for  wmr  with  Germany.  The  President  called  for  a 
disavowal  of  the  acts  by  w^hich  the  Lusitania  and  other 
vessels  had  been  sunk,  all  possible  reparation,  and  steps 
to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  such  deeds. 

Within  a few  days  of  the  Lusitania  catastrophe  and 
before  the  protest  of  our  government  was  made  public, 
President  AA^ilson  spoke  in  Philadelphia,  and  in  the 
course  of  his  remarks  said,  “There  is  such  a thing 


564 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAB 


as  a man  being  too  proud  to  fight.”  The  address  had 
no  relation  to  the  international  situation,  and  more- 
over the  objectionable  phrase  carried  an  unexpected 
and  different  meaning  when  separated  from  its  context 
and  linked  to  the  Lusitania  atfair.  The  words  were 
seized  upon  by  the  President’s  critics,  however,  as  an 
indication  of  the  policy  of  the  government  in  the  crisis 
and  were  severely  condemned.  On  the  other  hand  the 
formal  protest  was  received  with  marked  satisfaction. 
It  was  understood  to  be  the  work  of  Wilson  himself, 
who  practically  took  over  the  conduct  of  the  more  im- 
portant foreign  affairs.  When  the  German  govern- 
ment replied  without  meeting  the  demands  of  the  Presi- 
dent, he  framed  a second  note  which  brought  the  pos- 
sibility of  war  so  near  that  Secretary  Bryan  resigned 
rather  than  sign  it.^  A second  reply  merely  prolonged 
the  controversy  and  Wilson  thereupon  renewed  his  de- 
mands and  declared  that  a repetition  of  submarine  at- 
tacks would  be  regarded  as  “deliberately  unfriendly.” 
The  statement  brought  the  nation  appreciably  nearer 
war,  but  if  the  comments  of  the  newspaper  press  may 
be  relied  upon  as  an  index  of  public  opinion,  the  Presi- 
dent had  again  expressed  the  feelings  of  the  people. 
In  the  meanwhile  German  submarine  warfare  was 
modified  in  the  direction  desired  by  the  United  States. 
Instead  of  sinking  merchant  vessels  on  sight  and  with- 
out warning,  the  commanders  of  submarines  stopped 
them,  visited  and  searched  them,  and  gave  the  passen- 
gers and  crews  opportunity  to  escape.  On  August  19, 
1915,  the  Arabic  was  sunk  without  warning,  but  the 
German  government  in  conformity  with  its  new  policy 
disavowed  the  act,  apologized  and  agreed  to  pay  an 
indemnity  for  American  lives  lost.  The  negotiations 

1 Bryan  remained  in  sympathy  with  the  administration  in  other  re- 
spects, and  aided  in  the  campaign  of  1916. 


WOODROW  WILSON 


565 


concerning  tlie  Lusitania  continued  to  drag  on,  but 
otherwise  relations  between  Germany  and  the  United 
States  had  reached  the  point  where  peace  could  be 
maintained  if  no  further  accident  or  provocation  inter- 
vened. 

Despite  the  general  approval  of  the  President ’s  firm 
stand  against  Germany,  there  was  an  inclination  in 
some  quarters  to  do  everything  possible  to  avoid  a con- 
flict, even  if  the  effort  necessitated  the  relinquishment 
of  rights  that  had  hitherto  been  well  recognized.  In 
February,  1916,  Representative  McLemore  introduced 
a resolution  requesting  the  President  to  warn  Ameri- 
can citizens  to  refrain  from  traveling  on  armed  bel- 
ligerent vessels,  whether  merchantmen  or  otherwise 
and  to  state  that  if  they  persisted  they  would  do  so  at 
their  own  peril.  The  House,  according  to  the  Speaker, 
was  prepared  to  pass  the  resolution.  The  positions 
taken  on  this  subject  by  the  administration  had  not 
been  entirely  consistent,  but  the  President  was  now 
holding  that  Americans  had  the  right  under  interna- 
tional law  to  travel  on  such  vessels  and  that  the  gov- 
ernment could  not  honorably  refuse  to  uphold  them  in 
exercising  their  right.  “Once  accept  a single  abate- 
ment of  right,”  he  asserted,  “and  many  other  humilia- 
tions would  certainly  follow,  and  the  whole  fine  fabric 
of  international  law  might  crumble  under  our  hands 
piece  by  piece.”  Moreover  he  felt  that  the  conduct  of 
international  relations  lay  in  the  hands  of  the  execu- 
tive and  that  divided  counsels  would  embarrass  him  in 
dealing  with  Germany.  He  therefore  asked  the  House 
to  discuss  the  McLemore  resolution  at  once  and  come  to 
a vote.  Under  this  pressure  the  House  gave  way  and 
tabled  the  resolution,  ninety-three  Republicans  joining 
with  182  Democrats  against  thirty-three  Democrats  and 
102  Republicans. 


566 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


On  March  24  the  French  channel  steamer  Sussex  was 
sunk,  with  the  loss  of  several  Americans,  and  the  sub- 
marine issue  was  thus  brought  forward  again.  The 
President  accordingly  appeared  before  Congress  and 
reviewed  the  entire  controversy.  “Again  and  again,” 
he  reminded  his  hearers,  “the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment has  given  this  Government  its  solemn  assur- 
ances that  at  least  passenger  ships  would  not  be  thus 
dealt  with,  and  yet  it  has  again  and  again  permitted 
its  undersea  commanders  to  disregard  those  assurances 
with  entire  impunity.”  He  asserted  that  America  had 
been  very  patient,  while  the  toll  of  lives  had  mounted 
into  the  hundreds,  and  informed  Congress  that  he  was 
presenting  a warning  that  “unless  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Government  should  now  immediately  declare  and 
effect  an  abandonment  of  its  present  methods  of  war- 
fare against  passenger  and  freight  carrying  vessels 
this  Government  can  have  no  choice  but  to  sever  diplo- 
matic relations  with  the  Government  of  the  German 
Empire  altogether.”  The  Lusitmiia  notes,  the  Sussex 
address  and  other  speeches  made  by  the  President 
were  read  all  over  the  United  States  and,  indeed, 
throughout  a great  part  of  the  world.  He  was  attempt- 
ing the  novel  and  daring  experiment  of  framing  a for- 
eign policy  in  public  view,  and  was  thus  becoming  the 
recognized  spokesman  of  the  neutral  world. 

Our  international  relations  were  in  a disturbed  and 
critical  condition  when  the  presidential  campaign  of 
1916  came  on.  The  Republicans  and  the  Progressives 
planned  to  meet  in  Chicago  on  June  7 for  the  nomina- 
tion of  candidates,  in  the  hope  that  the  two  parties 
might  unite  upon  a single  nominee  and  platform,  and 
thus  defeat  Wilson  who  was  sure  to  be  the  Democratic 
candidate.  At  first,  however,  the  two  wings  of  the  Re- 
publican party  were  in  complete  disagreement.  As 


AVOODKOW  WILSON 


567 


far  as  principles  went  they  had  not  thoroughly  recov- 
ered from  the  schism  of  1912.  For  their  candidate  the 
Progressives  looked  only  to  Roosevelt,  whom  the  Re- 
publicans would  not  have.  Roosevelt  himself  refused 
to  enter  any  fight  for  a nomination  and  announced, 
“I  will  go  further  and  say  that  it  would  be  a mistake 
to  nominate  me  unless  the  country  has  in  its  mood 
something  of  the  heroic.”  After  conferences  between 
Republican  and  Progressive  leaders  which  failed  to 
bring  about  unanimity,  the  Republican  convention 
nominated  Justice  Charles  E.  Hughes  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  and  the  Progressives  chose  Roosevelt.  Hughes 
was  a reformer  by  nature,  recognized  as  a man  of 
high  principles,  courageous,  able  and  remembered  as 
a vigorous  and  popular  governor  of  New  York. 

The  Republican  platform  called  for  neutrality  in  the 
European  war,  peace  and  order  in  Mexico,  prepared- 
ness for  national  defence,  a protective  tariff  and 
women’s  suffrage.  It  also  advocated  some  of  the  eco- 
nomic legislation  favored  by  the  Progressives  in  1912. 
The  Progressive  platform  laid  most  emphasis  on  prep- 
aration for  military  defence — a navy  of  at  least  sec- 
ond rank,  a regular  army  of  250,000  and  a system  for 
training  a citizen  soldiery.  It  also  urged  labor  legis- 
lation, a protective  tariff  and  national  regulation  of 
industry  and  transportation.  The  Republican  plat- 
form severely  denounced  the  administration,  but  the 
Progressives  stated  merely  their  own  principles. 

In  the  course  of  his  actions  after  the  nomination, 
however,  Roosevelt  indicated  his  belief  that  the  public 
welfare  demanded  the  defeat  of  the  Democrats.  He 
declared  that  he  did  not  know  Hughes’s  opinions  on  the 
vital  questions  of  the  day  and  suggested  that  his  “con- 
ditional refusal”  be  put  into  the  hands  of  the  National 
Progressive  Committee  and  that  a statement  of  the 


568 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE 


Republican  candidate ’s  principles  be  awaited.  If  these 
principles  turned  out  to  be  satisfactory  then  Roose- 
velt would  not  run;  otherwise  a conference  could  bo 
held  to  determine  future  action.  Subsequently  Roose- 
velt issued  a declaration  expressing  his  satisfaction 
with  Hughes,  condemning  Wilson  and  urging  all  Pro- 
gressives to  join  in  defeating  the  Democrats.  Such 
an  action  would,  of  course,  spell  the  doom  of  the  Pro- 
gressives as  a political  organization,  but  he  declared 
that  the  people  were  not  prepared  to  accept  a new 
party  and  that  the  nomination  of  a third  party  candi- 
date would  merely  divide  the  Republicans  and  ensure 
a Democratic  victory.  The  action  of  Roosevelt  com- 
mended itself  to  a majority  of  the  National  Committee, 
but  a minority  were  displeased  and  supported  Wilson. 

The  Democrats  met  at  St.  Louis  on  June  14  and  re- 
nominated President  Wilson  in  a convention  marked 
by  harmony  and  enthusiasm.  For  the  first  time  in 
many  years  the  party  could  point  to  a record  of  actual 
achievement  and  it  challenged  “comparisons  of  our 
record,  our  keeping  of  pledges,  and  our  constructive 
legislation,  with  those  of  any  party  at  any  time.” 
After  recalling  the  chief  measures  passed  during  the 
administration,  the  party  placed  itself  on  record  as 
favoring  labor  legislation,  women’s  suffrage,  the  pro- 
tection of  citizens  at  home  and  abroad,  a larger  army 
and  navy  and  a reserve  of  trained  citizen  soldiers.^ 

The  campaign  turned  upon  the  question  whether  the 
country  approved  Wilson’s  foreign  policy,  rather  than 
upon  the  record  of  the  Democratic  party  and  its  plat- 
form of  principles,  and  in  such  a contest  each  side  had 
definite  advantages.  As  the  candidate  of  the  party 

1 Despite  Roosevelt’s  refusal  to  run,  the  Progressive  Vice-Presidential 
candidate  continued  the  campaign.  The  Socialist  Labor  party,  the 
Socialist  party  and  the  Prohibitionists  also  presented  candidatea. 


WOODROW  WILSON 


569 


which  had  been  in  power  most  of  the  time  for  half  a 
century,  Hughes  had  the  support  of  the  two  living  ex- 
presidents and  the  backing  of  a compact  organization 
with  plenty  of  money.  He  had  been  out  of  the  turmoil 
of  politics  for  six  years  as  a member  of  the  Supreme 
Court  and  hence  had  not  made  enemies.  His  party 
was  strong  in  the  most  populous  portions  of  the  coun- 
try and  in  the  East  where  dissatisfaction  with  the 
President’s  foreign  policy  was  strongest.  In  particu- 
lar the  unhappy  Mexican  difficulty,  which  has  already 
been  mentioned,  had  not  been  settled,  and  it  was  an 
easy  matter  for  Hughes  to  point  out  real  or  alleged 
inconsistencies  and  mistakes  in  his  opponent’s  acts. 
Wilson  had  been  elected  four  years  before  by  a minor- 
ity vote  and  had  served  through  a term  of  years  that 
had  brought  forward  an  unusual  number  of  perplexing 
questions  on  which  sincere  men  disagreed,  and  had, 
therefore,  aroused  a host  of  enemies.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  had  the  advantage  of  being  in  power,  and  his 
supporters  could  urge  the  danger  of  “swapping  horses 
while  crossing  a stream.”  He  had  a foreign  policy 
which  the  people  knew  about,  experience  in  the  Presi- 
dency and  a record  for  leadership  in  constructive  ac- 
complishment.^ 

The  particular  characteristics  of  the  campaign  were 
mainly  the  results  of  the  activities  of  Hughes,  Roose- 
velt and  Wilson.  In  his  speech  accepting  the  nomina- 
tion Hughes  attacked  the  record  of  the  administration 
in  regard  to  the  civil  service,  charged  the  President 
with  interfering  in  Mexican  affairs  without  protecting 
American  rights,  and  asserted  that  if  the  government 
had  shown  Germany  that  it  meant  what  it  said  by 
“strict  accountability”  the  Lusitania  would  not  have 

1 The  Republican  campaign  fund  was  $2,445,421  contributed  by  34,205 
persons;  the  Democratic  fund,  $1,808,348  given  by  170,000  persons. 


3^0 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


been  sunk.  He  also  announced  that  he  favored  a con- 
stitutional amendment  providing  for  Avomen’s  suffrage. 
Later  he  made  extended  stumping  tours  in  which  ho 
reiterated  his  attacks  on  the  administration,  but  he 
disappointed  his  friends  by  failing  to  reveal  a con- 
structive program.  RooseAmlt,  meanwhile,  assisted 
the  Republican  candidate  by  a series  of  speeches,  one 
of  the  earliest  of  which  was  that  of  August  31,  in 
iMaiiic.  That  state  held  its  local  elections  on  Septem- 
ber 11  and  it  was  deemed  essential  by  both  parties  to 
make  every  effort  to  carry  it  so  as  to  have  a good 
effect  on  party  prospects  elsewhere.  Roosevelt’s 
speech  typified  his  criticisms  of  the  administration. 
He  declared  that  Wilson  had  ostensibly  kept  peace 
Avith  Mexico  but  had  really  Avaged  war  there;  he  as- 
serted that  the  President  had  shown  a lack  of  firmness 
in  dealing  Avith  Mexico  and  had  kissed  the  hand  that 
slapped  him  in  the  face  although  it  Avas  red  with  the 
blood  of  American  women  and  children;  he  compared 
American  neutrality  in  the  European  War  with  the 
neutrality  of  Pontius  Pilate  and  believed  that  if  the 
administration  had  been  firm  in  its  dealings  Avith  Ger- 
many there  Avould  have  been  no  invasion  of  Belgium, 
no  sinking  of  Amssels  and  no  massacres  of  women  and 
children. 

Wilson  folloAved  the  example  of  McKinley  in  1896 
and  conducted  his  campaign  chiefly  through  speeches 
delivered  from  the  porch  of  “ShadoAV  Lawn,”  his  sum- 
mer residence  in  New  Jersey.  In  this  Avay  he  empha- 
sized the  legislative  record  of  the  Democrats,  de- 
fended his  foreign  policy  and  attacked  the  Republi- 
cans as  a party,  although  not  referring  to  individuals. 
An  important  part  of  his  strategy  Avas  an  attempt  to 
attract  the  Progressives  to  his  support.  He  met  his 
opponent’s  vigorous  complaints  in  regard  to  his  atti- 


WOODROW  WILSON 


571 


tilde  toward  Mexico  and  the  European  War  by  press- 
ing the  question  as  to  the  direction  in  which  the  Re- 
publicans would  change  it.  As  Hughes  was  apparently 
unwilling  to  urge  immediate  war  on  Germany,  he 
could  only  retort  that  a firm  attitude  in  the  beginning 
would  have  prevented  trouble,  and  there  the  matter 
rested  throughout  the  campaign.  Supporters  of  Wil- 
son also  defended  his  foreign  policy,  summing  up  their 
contentions  in  the  phrase,  “He  kept  us  out  of  war.” 

Foreign  policy  as  a political  issue  was  pressed  tem- 
porarily into  the  background  by  the  sudden  demand  of 
the  railroad  brotherhoods  for  shorter  hours  and  more 
pay,  threatening  a nation-wide  strike  if  their  plea  was 
unheeded.  Neither  party  wished  to  risk  the  labor  vote 
by  opposing  the  unions,  and  the  public  did  not  desire 
a strike,  much  as  it  deprecated  the  attitude  of  the  labor 
leaders  in  threatening  trouble  at  this  juncture.  The 
President  took  the  lead  in  pressing  a program  of  rail- 
road legislation,  part  of  which  was  a law  granting  the 
men  what  they  desired.  This  was  immediately  passed, 
although  the  remaining  recommendations  were  laid 
aside.  In  the  House  the  Republicans  joined  with  the 
Democrats  in  putting  the  law  through,  although  nearly 
thirty  per  cent,  of  the  members  refrained  from  voting 
at  all,  but  in  the  Senate  party  lines  were  more  strictly 
dravm.  In  many  quarters  the  President  was  vigor- 
ously condemned  on  the  ground  that  he  had  “surren- 
dered” to  a threat.  Hughes  joined  in  the  dissent,  but 
somewhat  dulled  its  effect  by  giving  no  evidence  of 
opposition  until  the  law  was  passed  and  by  stating 
that  he  would  not  attempt  to  repeal  it  if  elected.  Dur- 
ing the  closing  days  of  the  campaign  Hughes  issued  a 
statement  declaring  that  he  looked  upon  the  presidency 
as  an  executive  office  and  stated  that  if  chosen  he  would 
consider  himself  the  administrative  and  executive  head 


572 


WOODROW  AVILSON 


573 


only,  and  not  a political  leader  commissioned  with  the 
responsibility  of  determining  policies.  At  the  close 
of  the  campaign,  also,  the  benefits  of  a protective  tariff 
were  urged  as  a reason  for  electing  Hughes. 

The  result  of  the  balloting  on  November  7 was  in 
doubt  for  several  days  because  the  outcome  hinged  on 
the  votes  of  California  and  Minnesota,  either  of  which 
would  turn  the  scale.  In  the  end  AA'ilson  was  found 
to  have  received  9,128,837  votes  and  Hughes,  8,536,- 
380.  The  vote  in  the  electoral  college  was  277  to  254. 
The  outcome  was  remarkable  in  several  respects. 
Each  candidate  received  a larger  popular  vote  than 
had  ever  before  been  cast;  AVilson  won  without  New 
A'ork  or  any  of  the  other  large  eastern  states,  finding 
his  support  in  the  South  and  the  Far  AA^est;  each  side 
was  able  to  get  satisfaction  from  the  result,  the  Re- 
publicans because  their  party  schism  was  sufficiently 
healed  to  enable  them  to  divide  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives evenly  with  their  opponents,  and  the  Demo- 
crats because  their  candidate  was  successful  in  states 
which  elected  Republican  senators  and  governors  by 
large  majorities. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

In  the  nature  of  the  case,  any  bibliography  which  concerns 
the  events  of  so  recent  and  important  a period  is  of  temporary 
value  only.  Ogg  presents  an  excellent  one,  but  many  im- 
portant volumes  have  been  printed  since  1917,  his  date  of 
publication. 

A reliable  account  of  the  chief  events  is  contained  in  the 
American  Year  Boole.  The  numerous  biographies  of  President 
Wlson  are  written  under  the  difficult  conditions  that  surround 
the  discussion  of  recent  events.  Available  ones  are:  E.  C. 
Brooks,  Woodrow  Wilson  as  President  (1916),  eulogistic,  but 
contains  extracts  from  speeches;  W.  B.  Hale,  Woodrow 


574 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Wilson,  The  Story  of  His  Life  (1912)  ; II.  J.  Ford,  Woodrow 
Wilson  (1916)  ; A.  M.  Low,  Woodrow  Wilson,  an  Interpreta- 
tion (1918),  a friendly  and  substantial  analysis  bj^  an  Eng- 
lish newspaper  correspondent;  W.  E.  Dodd,  Woodrow  Wilson 
and  His  Work  (1920),  sympathetic,  written  in  the  spirit  of 
the  investigator,  and  the  best  life  up  to  the  time  of  its  publi- 
cation. Better  than  any  biography  is  a careful  study  of 
AVilson's  addresses  and  speeches,  editions  of  which  have  been 
prepared  by  A.  B.  Hart,  J.  B.  Scott,  A.  Shaw  and  others. 

Periodical  literature  concerning  the  legislative  program  of 
the  first  Wilson  administration  is  especially  abundant.  On 
the  tariff,  in  addition  to  Taussig,  consult;  Quarterly  Journal 
of  Economics  (1913),  “The  Tariff  Act  of  1913’’;  Journal  of 
Political  Economy  (1914),  “The  Tariff  of  1913.’’  On  the 
federal  reserve  system.  Political  Science  Quarterly  (1914), 
“Federal  Reserve  System’’;  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics 
(1914),  “Federal  Reserve  Act  of  1913’’;  American  Economic 
Review  (1914),  “Federal  Reserve  Act’’;  Journal  of  Political 
Economy  (1914),  “Banking  and  Currency  Act  of  1913’’; 
II.  P.  AVillis,  The  Federal  Reserve  (1915)  ; E.  W.  Kemmerer, 
The  A B C of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  (1918).  On  the 
anti-trust  acts.  Political  Science  Quarterly  (1915),  “New 
Anti-Trust  Acts’’;  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics  (1914), 
“Trust  Legislation  of  1914’’;  American  Economic  Review 
(1914),  “Trade  Commission  Act.’’  For  the  early  stages  of 
the  European  conflict  see  the  references  under  Chapter  XXV. 

The  best  accounts  of  the  election  of  1916  are  in  the  American 
Year  Book,  and  in  Ogg.  Other  readable  accounts  are; 
Nineteenth  Century  (Dec.,  1916),  “The  Re-Election  of  Presi- 
dent AVilson”;  W.  E.  Dodd,  Woodrow  Wilson  (1920). 


CHAPTER  XXV 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  reelectioii  of  iWilson  in  November,  1916,  could 
hardly  be  interpreted  in  any  other  light  than  as 
an  approval  of  his  patient  foreign  policy.  Neverthe- 
less, for  the  ensuing  five  months  the  problem  of  our  in- 
ternational relations,  and  especially  the  question 
whether  we  ought  to  enter  the  World  War,  continued 
to  divide  the  American  people  into  hostile  camps. 
The  opponents  of  the  President,  led  by  Roosevelt,  con- 
tended that  Wilson  was  lacking  in  “patriotism,  cour- 
age and  foresight”;  that  the  failure  of  the  adminis- 
tration to  protest  against  Germany’s  march  across  Bel- 
gium was  due  to  timidity  and  a “mean  commercial  op- 
portunism” which  caused  the  President  to  act  in  the 
spirit  of  refusing  to  perform  a duty  unless  there  was  a 
pecuniary  profit  to  be  gained  thereby ; and  that  the  in- 
terchanges of  diplomatic  notes  with  the  German  gov- 
ernment were  “benevolent  phrase-mongering”  which 
did  not  accomplish  anything.  When  Germany  used 
the  submarine  to  sink  vessels  despite  the  President’s 
“strict  accountability”  note  and  when  the  administra- 
tion did  not  then  take  forceful  action  against  the  of- 
fender, his  opponents  declared  that  the  President 
meant  “precisely  and  exactly  nothing”  by  his  words. 
Late  in  1915  Wilson  became  convinced  of  the  neces- 
sity of  an  increase  in  our  means  of  defense,  and  in  or- 
der to  arouse  Congress  to  action  he  went  out  into  the 
Aliddle  West  where  he  addressed  large  audiences  on 

575 


576 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


“preparedness.”  After  long  discussion  Congress 
passed  the  National  Defense  Act  by  the  provisions  of 
which  the  military  strength  of  the  country  was  to  be 
expanded  to  645,000  officers  and  men  during  a period 
of  five  years.  The  President’s  conversion  to  prepared- 
ness was  interpreted  as  a tardy  recognition  of  an  ob- 
vious duty,  and  his  plan  deprecated  as  no  more  than 
a “shadow  program.”  And  later,  as  his  attitude  be- 
came more  warlike,  the  opposition  declared  that  he 
had  at  last  acted  because  of  “pressure”  and  “criti- 
cism,” rather  than  because  of  a definite  and  positive 
purpose  of  his  own.  In  brief,  then,  a considerable  por- 
tion of  the  country  insisted  upon  America’s  early  en- 
trance into  the  European  conflict,  and  judged  Wilson 
to  be  a timid  politician  who  lacked  a courageous  for- 
eign policy  and  who  was  being  driven  toward  war  by 
the  force  of  public  opinion. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  traditional  American  disin- 
clination to  become  entangled  in  foreign  complications 
was  the  decisive  force  with  the  majority.  In.  an  ad- 
dress which  the  President  delivered  in  New  York  he 
said  that  he  received  a great  many  letters  from  un- 
known and  uninfluential  people  whose  one  prayer  was, 
“Mr.  President,  do  not  allow  anybody  to  persuade  you 
that  the  people  of  this  country  want  war  with  any- 
body.” There  were,  moreover,  Americans  who  still 
retained  the  traditional  dislike  of  England  and  who 
hesitated  to  support  an  alliance  with  that  nation ; oth- 
ers did  not  relish  association  with  Russia,  which  had 
long  been  looked  upon  as  the  arch-representative  of 
autocracy;  and  others  were  indifferent  or  confused  or 
inclined  to  the  German  side. 

The  attitude  of  the  President,  meanwhile,  constantly 
found  expression  in  addresses  to  Congress  and  the 
people,  which  were  so  widely  read  and  discussed  and 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  57? 


which  had  so  great  an  influence  in  forming  public  opin- 
ion that  the  more  prominent  of  them  must  be  men- 
tioned. Beginning  with  the  proclamation  of  neutrality 
on  August  18,  1914,  and  a speech  at  Indianapolis  on 
January  8,  1915,  he  asserted  the  belief  that  the  United 
States  should  remain  neutral,  not  only  because  it  was 
the  traditional  policy  to  stand  aloof  from  European 
controversies  but  also  because  “it  was  necessary,  if  a 
universal  catastrophe  was  to  be  avoided,  that  a limit 
should  be  set  to  the  sweep  of  destructive  war  ...  if 
only  to  prevent  collective  economic  ruin  and  the  break- 
down throughout  the  world  of  the  industries  by  which 
its  populations  are  fed  and  sustained.”  He  also  hoped 
that  the  time  might  quickly  come  when  both  sides 
would  welcome  mediation  by  a great  people  that  had 
preserved  itself  neutral,  self-possessed  and  sympa- 
thetic with  the  burdens  of  the  warring  powers.  Be- 
fore the  close  of  1915  he  gave  up  his  earlier  opposition 
to  military  preparation,  as  has  been  seen,  and  while 
the  project  for  a larger  defensive  force  was  being  dis- 
cussed, he  made  a significant  address  on  May  27,  1916, 
to  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace.  With  the  causes  and 
objects  of  the  war,  he  declared,  America  was  not  con- 
cerned; the  “obscure  fountains”  of  its  origins  we  were 
not  interested  to  explore ; in  its  spread,  however,  it  had 
so  “profoundly  affected”  America  that  we  were  no 
longer  “disconnected  lookers-on,”  but  deeply  con- 
cerned. “We  are  participants,”  he  asserted,  “whether 
we  would  or  not,  in  the  life  of  the  world.  The  inter- 
ests of  all  nations  are  our  own  also.  We  are  partners 
with  the  rest.”  Oddly  enough  the  statement  that  the 
origins  of  the  war  and  the  purposes  for  which  it  was 
started  did  not  concern  us  was  widely  circulated,  and 
misinterpreted  as  indicating  a lack  of  sympathy  with 
the  ideals  for  which  the  Allies  were  fighting  at  the  time 


578 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


of  the  speech,  while  the  remainder  of  the  address, 
which  was  far  more  significant,  was  largely  overlooked. 
Nevertheless  the  declaration  that  the  war  had  become 
our  concern  was  an  important  part  of  Wilson’s  series 
of  utterances  on  the  issues  of  the  day,  and  demands 
emphasis  at  this  point  because  the  President  was  rep- 
resentative, in  holding  this  opinion,  of  a great  body 
of  his  countrymen.  The  conviction  that  the  European 
war  had  become  our  affair  was  deepened  in  the  minds 
of  many  Americans  when  news  arrived  late  in  1916, 
that  the  Teutonic  military  authorities  were  seizing  and 
deporting  Belgian  workmen  and  compelling  them  to 
labor  in  German  fields  and  factories. 

In  December,  President  Wilson  again  claimed  the 
attention  of  the  world  by  his  reply  to  a proposal  by 
Germany  that  peace  negotiations  be  entered  upon. 
He  declared — and  his  note  was  sent  to  all  belligerents 
— that  the  leaders  of  the  two  sides  had  stated  their  ob- 
jects in  general  terms  only; 

But,  stated  in  general  terms,  they  seem  the  same  on  both 
sides.  Never  yet  have  the  authoritative  spokesmen  of  either 
side  avowed  the  precise  objects  which  would,  if  attained, 
satisfy  them  and  their  people  that  the  war  had  been  fought 
out. 

The  support  of  America  in  the  war  had  long  since  be- 
come the  great  stake  for  which  both  sides  in  the  con- 
flict were  playing,  and  the  crisis  of  the  game  wms  at 
hand.  On  January  22,  1917,  Wilson  addressed  the 
Senate  and  stated  the  results  of  his  action.  The  reply 
of  the  Germans,  he  declared,  had  merely  stated  their 
readiness  to  meet  their  antagonists  in  conference  to 
discuss  terms  of  peace;  the  Allies  had  detailed  more 
definitely  the  arrangements,  guarantees  and  acts  of 
reparation  which  would  constitute  a satisfactory  set- 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  579 


tlement.  He  proceeded  then  to  add  that  the  United 
States  was  deeply  concerned  in  the  terms  of  peace 
which  would  be  made  at  the  close  of  the  conflict,  and 
to  enumerate  some  of  those  for  which  Americans  would 
be  most  insistent : equality  of  rights  among  nations ; the 
recognition  of  the  principle  that  territories  should  not 
be  handed  about  from  nation  to  nation  without  the 
consent  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  territories;  an  out- 
let to  the  sea  for  every  nation  where  practicable;  the 
freedom  of  the  seas;  and  the  limitation  of  armaments. 
The  interchange  of  notes  had  made  two  things  clear; 
that  the  concern  of  the  United  States  in  the  war  was 
intimate,  and  that  the  people  of  this  country  would 
know  definitely  the  purposes  of  the  conflict  before  they 
decided  to  enter  it. 

On  January  31,  Germany  announced  an  extension  of 
Jier  submarine  warfare.  A wide  area  surrounding  the 
British  Isles,  France,  and  Italy,  and  including  the 
greater  part  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean  Sea  was  de- 
clared to  be  a barred  zone.  All  sea  traffic,  neutral  as 
well  as  belligerent,  the  note  warned,  would  be  sunk, 
except  that  one  American  ship  would  be  allowed  to 
pass  through  the  zone  each  week  provided  that  it  fol- 
lowed a designated,  narrow  lane  to  the  port  of  Fal- 
mouth, England,  that  it  was  marked  with  broad  red 
and  white  stripes,  and  carried  no  contraband.  The 
President  promptly  broke  off  relations  'wfith  Germany, 
sent  the  German  ambassador  home  and  appeared  be- 
fore Congress  to  state  to  that  body  and  to  the  people 
the  reasons  for  his  decision.  He  recounted  the  sub- 
stance of  his  earlier  correspondence  with  Germany  in 
regard  to  submarine  warfare  and  recalled  the  promise 
of  the  German  government  that  merchant  vessels 
would  not  be  sunk  without  warning  and  without  sav- 
ing human  lives.  He  declared  that  the  American  gov- 


580 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


ernmeiit  had  no  alternative  but  to  sever  relations,  al- 
though refusing  to  believe  that  Germany  would  ruth- 
lessly use  the  methods  which  she  threatened,  until 
convinced  of  her  determination  by  “overt  acts.”  In- 
formation of  the  move  made  by  the  United  States  was 
sent  to  American  diplomatic  representatives  in  neutral 
countries  with  the  suggestion  that  they  take  similar 
action.  Shortly  afterward  the  President  requested 
Congress  to  pass  legislation  enabling  him  to  supply 
armament  and  ammunition  to  merchant  vessels,  and 
an  overwhelming  majority  of  both  houses  was  ready 
to  accede  to  the  request.  A small  minority  in  the  Sen- 
ate, however,  was  able,  under  existing  rules,  to  pre- 
vent Congressional  action,  although  the  President 
found  authority  in  existing  statutes  and  was  able  to 
proceed.^ 

Every  important  event  in  March,  1917,  tended  to- 
ward war  between  the  United  States  and  Germany. 
On  the  first  day  of  the  month  the  State  Department 
made  public  a note  from  the  German  Secretary  of 
State  to  the  German  minister  in  Mexico  which  sug- 
gested a German-Mexican  alliance  in  case  of  the  entry 
of  the  United  States  into  the  war.  Germany  was  to 
contribute  financial  support  to  Mexico  and  the  latter 
was  to  recover  Arizona,  New  Mexico  and  Texas,  which 
had  been  lost  to  the  United  States  many  years  before. 
Knowledge  of  this  intrigue  gave  a distinct  impetus 
to  the  war  spirit  in  all  parts  of  the  country.  On 
March  5,  President  Wilson  was  inaugurated  for  the 
second  time  and  took  occasion  to  state  again  the  atti- 
tude of  the  United  States  toward  the  war.  Although 
disclaiming  any  desire  for  conquest  or  advantage,  and 

1 As  a result  of  this  incident  the  Senate  decided  to  limit  somewhat 
its  rule  allowing  unlimited  debate.  Under  the  “closure”  rule  adopted 
March  8,  1917,  a two-thirds  majority  may  limit  discussion  on  any 
measure  to  one  hour  for  each  member. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  581 


reaffirming  the  desire  of  the  United  States  for  peace, 
he  expressed  the  belief  that  we  might  be  drawn  on,  by 
circumstances,  to  a more  active  assertion  of  our  rights 
and  a more  immediate  association  with  the  great  strug- 
gle. Once  more  he  stated  the  things  for  which  the 
United  States  would  stand  whether  in  war  or  in  peace : 
the  interest  of  all  nations  in  world  peace;  equality  of 
rights  among  nations;  the  principle  that  governments 
derive  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned; the  freedom  of  the  seas;  and  the  limitation  of 
armairrents.  Later  in  the  month  informatioir  reached 
America  that  there  had  beeir  a revolution  in  Russia, 
that  tire  Czar  had  been' compelled  to  abdicate  and  that 
a republican  government  had  beeir  established.  The 
news  was  gladly  heard  in  the  United  States  as  it 
seemed  to  presage  the  overthrow  of  autocracy  every- 
where. On  March  22,  the  new  Russian  government 
was  formally  recognized  by  the  United  States  and  later 
a loan  of  $100,000,000  was  made. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  “overt  acts”  which  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  American  people  hoped  might  not  be 
committed  became  sufficiently  numerous  to  prove  that 
Germany  had  indeed  entered  upon  the  most  ruthless 
use  of  the  submarine.  Seven  American  vessels  were 
torpedoed,  with  the  loss  of  thirteen  lives,  and  man}" 
more  vessels  of  belligerent  and  neutral  nations  were 
sunk,  in  most  cases  without  warning.  The  President 
accordingly  summoned  Congress  to  meet  in  special  ses- 
sion on  April  2.  When  that  body  assembled  he  again 
and  for  the  last  time  explained  the  character  of  Ger- 
man submarine  warfare,  charging  that  vessels  of  all 
kinds  and  all  nations,  hospital  ships  as  well  as  mer- 
chant vessels  were  being  sunk  “with  reckless  lack  of 
compassion  or  of  principle.”  International  law,  he 
complained,  was  being  swept  away;  the  lives  of  non- 


582 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


combatant  men,  women  and  children  destroyed; 
America  filled  with  hostile  spies  and  attempts  made 
to  stir  up  enemies  against  us;  armed  neutrality  had 
broken  down  in  the  face  of  the  submarine,  and  he 
therefore  urged  Congress  to  accept  the  state  of  war 
which  the  action  of  Germany  had  thrust  upon  the 
United  States.  Such  action,  he  believed,  should  in- 
volve the  utmost  cooperation  Avith  the  enemies  of  Ger- 
many— liberal  loans  to  them,  an  abundant  supply  of 
war  material  of  all  kinds,  the  better  equipment  of  the 
navy  and  an  army  of  at  least  500,000  men  chosen  on  the 
principle  of  universal  liability  to  service.  An  im- 
portant part  of  the  President’s  address  Avas  that  in 
which  he  distinguished  betAveen  the  German  people  and 
the  German  government.  With  the  former,  he  as- 
serted, Ave  had  no  quarrel,  for  it  was  not  upon  their 
impulse  that  their  government  acted  in  entering  the 
war.  But  the  latter,  the  Prussian  autocracy,  “was 
not  and  never  could  be  our  friend.”  Once  more  he 
disclaimed  any  desire  for  conquest  or  dominion: 

We  are  glad,  ...  to  fight  thus  for  the  ultimate  peace  of  the 
world  and  for  the  liberation  of  its  peoples,  the  German  peoples 
included : for  the  rights  of  nations  great  and  small  and  the 
privilege  of  men  everywhere  to  choose  their  way  of  life  and  of 
obedience.  The  wmrld  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy. 
Its  peace  must  be  planted  upon  the  tested  foundations  of 
political  liberty. 

The  response  of  Congress  Avas  prompt  and  nearly 
unanimous.  In  the  House  by  a vote  of  373  to  fifty,  and 
in  the  Senate  by  eighty-two  to  six,  a resolution  ac- 
cepting the  status  of  war  Avas  quickly  passed  and  pro- 
claimed by  the  President  on  April  6.^  His  position 

1 AVar  was  declared  against  Austria  on  December  7,  1917.  The 
United  States  was  followed  immediately  by  Cuba  and  Panama,  and 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  583 


^Yas  a strong  one.  His  i)atiGnce  and  self-control,  to 
be  sure,  bad  been  carried  to  the  extreme  where  they 
seemed  like  cowardice  and  lack  of  policy  to  the  more 
belligerent  East ; but  they  had  convinced  the  more  pa- 
cific West  that  he  could  not  be  hurried  into  war  with- 
out adequate  reasons.  All  sections  and  all  parties 
were  united  as  the  country  had  never  been  united  be- 
fore. His  insistence  that  the  United  States  had  no 
ulterior  motives  in  entering  the  war  and  his  constant 
emphasis  on  ideals  and  the  moral  issues  of  the  con- 
flict placed  the  struggle  on  a lofty  plane,  besides  giv- 
ing him  and  his  country  at  that  time  a position  of  lead- 
ership in  the  world  such  as  no  man  or  nation  had  ever 
hitherto  enjoyed.  Moreover  the  evolution  through 
which  the  President  went,  from  adherence  to  the  tra- 
ditional aloofness  from  European  affairs  to  throwing 
himself  enthusiastically  into  the  conflict,  was  an  evolu- 
tion through  which  most  of  his  countrymen  were  pass- 
ing. Every  public  address  which  the  President  de- 
livered, every  message  to  Congress,  every  request  to 
the  legislative  branch  of  the  government  was  read 
widely,  disagreed  to  or  received  with  enthusiasm  in 
one  quarter  or  another  and  discussed  everywhere  with 
interest  and  energy.  The  result  was  the  education  of 
America  in  a new  foreign  policy.  It  was  no  slight 
matter  to  discard  the  traditions  of  a century  and  a 
quarter,  and  the  brevity  and  inconsiderable  size  of  the 
controversy  was  the  marcel,  rather  than  its  length  and 
bitterness.^ 

before  the  close  of  the  year  by  Siam,  Liberia,  China  and  Brazil.  Many 
other  Central  and  South  American  states  severed  relations  with  Germany 
and  before  the  close  of  the  struggle  several  of  them  declared  M’ar. 

1 The  purpose  and  effect  of  Wilson’s  patient  foreign  policy  were  briefly 
expressed  by  .Joseph  H.  Choate,  a Republican  advocate  of  early  entry 
into  the  war,  in  a speech  in  New  York  on  April  2.5,  1917.  Choate  de- 
clared that  a declaration  of  war  after  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania 
would  have  resulted  in  a divided  country  and  remarked:  “But  we  now 


584 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAE- 


America  had  need  of  her  unity  and  her  enthusiasm. 
The  size  of  the  conflict,  the  number  of  men  that  must 
be  raised  and  trained,  the  quantity  of  materials  re- 
quired, the  amount  of  money  needed,  and,  above  all, 
the  mental  readjustment  necessary  in  a nation  that  had 
hitherto  buried  itself  in  the  pursuits  of  peace — all  these 
considerations  emphasized  the  importance  of  the  task 
that  the  United  States  was  undertaking.  Into  Wash- 
ington there  poured  a bewildering  stream  of  offers  of 
assistance ; organizations  had  to  be  built  up  over  night 
to  take  hold  of  problems  that  were  new  to  this  coun- 
try; men  found  themselves  hurried  into  tasks  for 
which  they  must  prepare  as  best  they  might,  and  under 
crowded  working  conditions,  changing  circumstances 
and  confusion  of  effort  that  beggar  description.  In 
many  cases,  America  could  learn  valuable  lessons  from 
European  experience,  and  to  that  end  commissions  of 
eminent  statesmen  and  soldiers  were  sent  to  this  coun- 
try to  give  us  the  benefit  of  their  successes  and  failures. 

An  important  step  had  already  been  taken  in  the 
creation  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  on  August 
29,  1916,  an  act  which  indicated  a realization  that  the 
United  States  might  at  any  time  be  drawn  into  the 
European  struggle.  The  body  Avas  composed  of  six 
members  of  the  Cabinet,  with  the  Secretary  of  War 
as  chairman,  and  was  assisted  by  an  Advisory  Com- 
mission composed  of  seven  experts  in  the  various  in- 
dustries that  would  be  most  essential  to  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war.  The  Council  furnished  the  means  of 
coordinating  the  industries  of  the  country  and  getting 
them  into  touch  Avith  the  executive  departments  of  the 
goAmrnment.  State  councils  of  defense  were  likeAvise 

see  what  the  President  was  waiting  for  and  how  wisely  he  waited.  He 
was  waiting  to  see  how  fast  and  how  far  the  American  people  would 
keep  pace  with  him  and  stand  up  for  any  action  that  he  pioposed.” 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  585 


organized  to  arouse  the  people  to  the  performance  of 
their  share  in  the  nation’s  work,  to  circulate  informa- 
tion and  to  assist  the  several  agencies  of  the  federal 
government.  A National  Research  Council  mobilized 
the  scientific  talent  of  the  country  and  brought  it  to 
bear  on  certain  of  the  problems  of  warfare.  A Naval 
Consulting  Board  examined  inventions  offered  to  the 
Navy  Department.  The  Committee  on  Public  Infor- 
mation furnished  condensed  war  news  to  town  and 
country  papers,  circulated  millions  of  pamphlets  ex- 
plaining the  causes  of  the  war  and  upholding  Amer- 
ica’s purposes  in  it,  and  directing  speakers  who  aided 
in  campaigns  for  raising  money  and  educating  the 
people  in  their  duty  during  the  crisis.  The  War  Indus- 
tries Board  developed  plans  for  the  production  of  the 
multifarious  supplies  needed.  The  United  States 
Shipping  Board  took  hold  of  the  problem  of  building 
sufficient  ships  to  transport  troops  and  cargoes,  and 
to  replace  vessels  sunk  by  submarines.  By  means  of 
a Committee  on  Labor  the  laboring  men  gave  their 
support  to  the  conduct  of  the  war  and  agreed  to  delay 
controversies  until  the  war  was  over. 

The  exhausted  condition  of  the  supplies  of  food 
among  the  Allies,  and  the  size  of  the  armies  which 
America  decided  to  raise,  made  the  Food  Administra- 
tion one  of  importance.  At  the  time  Avhen  the  United 
States  entered  the  war  there  was  a dangerous  short- 
age of  food  in  Europe  due  to  the  decrease  in  produc- 
tion and  to  the  lack  of  the  vessels  necessary  to  bring 
supplies  from  distant  parts  of  the  world.  The  prob- 
lem centered  mainly  in  wheat,  meat,  fats  and  sugar. 
The  demand  upon  the  United  States  Avas  not  only  large 
but  increasing.  Accordingly,  legislation  Avas  passed 
on  August  10,  1917,  AAliich  made  it  unlaAvful  to  destroy 
or  hoard  food;  it  proAuded  for  the  stimulation  of  agri- 


586 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


culture;  and  it  authorized  the  President  to  purchase 
and  sell  foods  and  fix  the  price  of  wheat.  Wilson  ap- 
pointed as  the  chief  of  the  Food  Administration  Her- 
bert C.  Hoover,  whose  experience  with  the  problem  of 
Belgian  relief  enabled  him  to  act  promptly  and  effec- 
tively. Hoover’s  one  great  purpose  was  to  utilize  all 
food  supplies  in  such  a way  as  would  most  help  to  win 
the  war.  He  cooperated  with  the  Department  of  Agri- 
culture which  had  already  started  a campaign  for 
stimulating  the  cultivation  of  farms  and  gardens  on 
all  available  land.  Food  administrators  were  ap- 
pointed in  the  states  and  local  districts.  Speakers, 
imsters,  libraries  and  other  agencies  were  utilized  to 
urge  the  people  to  eat  less  wheat,  meats,  fats  and 
sugar  in  order  that  more  might  be  exported  to  the 
Allies.  Millions  of  housewives  hung  cards  in  their  win- 
dows to  indicate  that  they  were  cooperating  with  the 
LTnited  States  Food  Administration.  “Wheatless” 
and  “meatless”  days  were  set  apart.  These  volun- 
tary efforts  were  supplemented  by  government  regula- 
tion, and  dealers  in  food  products  were  compelled  to 
take  out  federal  licenses  which  enabled  the  Adminis- 
tration to  control  their  operations  and  to  prevent 
prices  from  going  to  panic  levels.  The  Food  Admin- 
istration established  a Grain  Corporation  which  bought 
and  sold  wheat ; it  placed  an  agency  in  Chicago  to  buy 
meat  for  ourselves  and  the  Allies;  it  called  a confer- 
ence of  the  sugar  refiners,  who  agreed  to  put  in  its 
hands  the  entire  supply  of  that  commodity.  In  a 
word,  by  stimulating  voluntary  efforts  and  by  means 
of  government  regulations,  the  Food  Administration 
increased  production,  decreased  consumption,  and  co- 
ordinated the  purchase  of  food  for  the  army,  the  navy, 
the  Allies,  the  Red  Cross  and  Belgian  relief.  The 
Food  Administration  was  hardly  established  before  it 


LWITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  587 


!)L'came  necessary  to  organize  a Fuel  Administration 
lo  teach  economy  in  the  use  of  coal,  to  stimulate  pro- 
duction, adjust  disputes  between  employers  and  em- 
ployees, fix  prices  and  control  the  apportioning  of  the 
supply  among  the  several  parts  of  the  country. 

The  vital  relation  of  the  transportation  system  of 
the  country  to  the  winning  of  the  war  was  apparent 
at  the  start.  As  soon  as  war  was  declared,  therefore, 
nearly  700  representatives  of  the  railroads  formed  a 
Railroads’  War  Board  to  minimize  the  individual  and 
competitive  activities  of  the  roads,  coordinate  their  op- 
eration, and  produce  a maximum  of  transportation  ef- 
ficiency. The  attempt  of  the  railroad  executives,  how- 
ever, quickly  broke  down.  In  the  first  place,  as  has 
been  seen,  our  entire  body  of  railroad  legislation  is 
based  upon  the  idea  of  separating  the  several  systems 
and  compelling  them  to  compete  rather  than  cooperate. 
The  habits  and  customs  thus  formed  could  hardly  be 
(lone  away  with  in  an  instant.  In  the  second  place 
the  cost  of  labor  and  materials  was  constantly  mount- 
ing, and  the  demand  for  more  equipment  was  insistent. 
The  railroads  could  meet  these  greater  costs  only  by 
raising  rates,  a process  which  involved  obtaining  the 
assent  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  and 
required  a considerable  period  for  its  accomjfiishment. 
The  roads  were  also  embarrassed  by  an  unprecedented 
congestion  of  traffic  on  the  eastern  seaboard,  from 
vhich  men  and  cargoes  must  be  shipped  to  Europe. 
Accordingly,  on  December  26,  1917,  the  President  took 
possession  of  the  railroad  system  for  the  government 
and  appointed  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  William 
(t.  McAdoo,  as  Director  General.  As  rapidly  as  pos- 
sible the  railroads  were  merged  into  one  great  sys- 
tem. The  entire  country  was  divided  into  districts  at 
the  head  of  which  were  placed  experienced  railroad 


588 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


executives.  Terminals,  tunnels  and  equipment  were 
used  regardless  of  ownership  in  the  effort  to  get  the 
greatest  possible  service  out  of  existing  facilities. 
The  passenger  service  was  greatly  reduced  in  order 
to  free  locomotives  and  crews  for  freight  trains,  dupli- 
cation of  effort  was  done  away  with  where  possible,  offi- 
cials who  were  not  necessary  under  the  new  plan  were 
dropped,  and  equipment  was  standardized.  Existing 
legislation  allowed  the  government  to  change  freight 
and  passenger  rates,  and  on  May  25,  1918,  these  were 
considerably  raised.  The  winter  of  1917-1918  was 
memorable  for  its  severity,  and  placed  great  difficul- 
ties in  the  way  of  the  railroads ; nevertheless,  between 
.January  1,  1918,  and  November  11  of  the  same  year 
nearly  six  and  a half  million  actual  and  prospective 
soldiers  were  carried  for  greater  or  smaller  distances. 

An  important  part  of  American  preparation  for  war 
was  the  attention  paid  to  the  “morale”  organizations, 
Avhich  were  designed  to  maintain  the  courage  and  spirit 
of  the  fighting  man.  As  far  as  legislation  could  do 
it,  the  most  flagrant  vices  were  kept  away  from  the 
camps.  Moreover  the  Commissions  on  Training  Camp 
Activities  attempted  to  supply  wholesome  entertain- 
ment and  associations.  Under  their  direction,  various 
organizations  established  and  operated  theatres, 
libraries  and  writing-rooms,  encouraged  athletics  in 
the  camps,  and  offered  similar  facilities  for  soldiers 
and  sailors  when  on  leave  in  towns  and  cities  near  by. 
The  Red  Cross  conducted  extensive  relief  work  both 
in  this  country  and  abroad;  surgical  dressings  were 
made,  clothing  and  comfort  kits  supplied,  and  money 
contributed.  In  France,  Belgium,  Russia,  Roumania, 
Italy  and  Serbia  the  Red  Cross  conducted  a fight 
against  the  suffering  incident  to  war. 

The  legislation  which  estahlished  the  system  of  al- 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  589 


lotmeiits,  allowances  and  War  Risk  Insurance  was  also 
designed  in  part  to  maintain  the  morale  of  the  army 
and  navy.  The  pay  of  the  “enlisted  man”  or  private 
was  $30.00  per  monthv.  In  the  case  of  men  with  de- 
pendents, an  “allotment”  of  $15.00  was  to  be  sent 
home  and  the  government  thereupon  contributed  an 
“allowance”  which  normally  amounted  to  $15.00  or 
more,  and  was  graded  according  to  the  number  of  the 
man’s  dependents  and  the  closeness  of  their  relation- 
ship to  him.  Provision  was  made  also  for  compensa- 
tion for  officers  and  men  injured  or  disabled  in  the  line 
of  duty,  and  for  training  injured  men  in  a vocation. 
In  addition,  the  War  Risk  Insurance  plan  provided 
means  by  which  both  officers  and  men  could  at  low  cost 
take  out  government  insurance  against  death  or  total 
disability.  In  this  way,  it  was  hoped,  some  of  the  dis- 
tresses of  war  would  be  alleviated  so  far  as  possible 
and  a repetition  of  the  pension  abuses  of  the  Civil  War 
somewhat  guarded  against. 

The  total  direct  money  cost  of  the  war  from  April, 
1917,  to  April,  1919,  was  estimated  by  the  War  De- 
partment at  $21,850,000,000,  an  average  of  over  a mil- 
lion dollars  an  hour,  and  an  amount  sufficient  to  have 
carried  on  the  Revolutionary  War  a thousand  years. 
In  addition,  loans  were  extended  to  the  Allies  at  the 
rate  of  nearly  half  a million  dollars  an  hour.  This 
huge  amount  was  raised  in  part  through  increased 
taxes.  Income  taxes  were  heavily  increased;  levies 
were  made  on  such  profits  of  corporations  as  were  in 
excess  of  profits  made  before  the  war,  during  the  three 
years  1911-1913 ; additional  taxes  were  laid  upon  spirits 
and  tobacco,  on  amusements  and  luxuries;  and  the 
postage  rates  were  raised.  In  part,  also,  the  cost  of 
the  war  was  defrayed  through  loans.  A portion  of  the 
amount  borrowed  was  by  the  sale  of  War  Savings 


590 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


Stamps.  This  expedient  was  designed  doubtless  not 
merely  to  encourage  persons  of  small  means  to  aid  in 
winning  the  war — a beginning  could  be  made  with 
twenty-five  cents — but  also  to  encourage  thrift  among 
all  classes.  Most  of  the  borrowed  money,  however, 
was  raised  through  the  five  “Liberty  Loans,”  a series 
of  popular  subscriptions  to  the  needs  of  the  govern- 
ment. In  each  case  the  government  called  upon  the 
people  to  purchase  bonds,  ranging  from  two  billions  at 
first  to  six  billions  at  the  time  of  the  fourth  loan. 
There  were  four  and  a half  million  subscribers  for  the 
first  loan,  but  after  a little  experience  the  number  was 
readily  increased  until  21,000,000  people  responded  to 
the  fourth  call.  Popular  campaigns  such  as  never  had 
been  seen  in  America,  campaigns  of  publicity,  house-to- 
house  canvassing  and  appeals  to  the  win-the-war  spirit 
resulted  in  unprecedented  financial  support.  Isolated 
communities  in  the  back  country  and  people  of  slender 
means  in  the  cities,  no  less  than  the  great  banks  and 
wealthy  corporations  cooperated  to-  make  the  Liberty 
loans  of  social  and  economic  as  well  as  financial  im- 
portance. 

Evidence  seems  to  be  sufficient  to  indicate  that  the 
resources  of  the  United  States  were  thrown  into  the 
conflict  none  too  soon.  When  it  was  determined  to 
place  armed  guards  on  merchant  ships,  Rear  Admiral 
W.  S.  Sims  was  sent  to  Great  Britain  to  keep  the  Navy 
Department  informed  on  problems  connected  with  the 
possible  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  conflict. 
After  the  American  declaration  of  war  the  Admiral 
was  placed  in  charge  of  the  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  abroad  and  thereafter  worked  in  close  coopera- 
tion with  our  European  associates.  The  German  sub- 
marine policy  had  been  put  fully  into  effect;  no  solu- 
tion of  the  submarine  menace  had  been  reached;  and 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  591 


English  officials  were  fearful  that  England  could  not 
last  longer  than  November  1.  In  taking  this  view  the 
British  were  probably  in  harmony  with  the  Germans 
who  expected  to  crush  England  before  the  weight  of 
the  United  States  could  be  felt.  Although  insufficient 
for  so  great  a conflict,  the  American  navy  was  thor- 
oughly prepared  for  active  service,  and  six  destroyers 
were  sent  to  European  waters  for  a prolonged  stay, 
within  eighteen  days  of  the  declaration  of  war.  This 
early  force  was  quickly  followed  by  others  until,  at  the 
close  of  the  war,  5,000  officers  and  70,000  enlisted  men 
were  serving  abroad.  A three-year  naval  construc- 
tion program  which  had  been  adopted  in  1916  was 
pushed  forward  and  somewhat  expanded;  new  craft 
were  commandeered  wherever  they  could  be  found; 
private  citizens  loaned  vessels  or  leased  them  at  nomi- 
nal sums;  and  German  ships  interned  in  American 
ports  were  taken  over.  Existing  stations  for  the  train- 
ing of  seamen  were  enlarged  and  new  ones  established, 
and  schools  were  set  up  in  colleges  and  at  other  points 
for  radio  operators,  engineers  and  naval  aviators.  By 
such  means  the  number  of  vessels  in  commission  was 
increased  from  197  to  2,003  and  the  personnel  from 
65,777  to  497,030. 

The  most  dreaded  enemy  of  the  navy,  the  subma- 
rine, was  successfully  met  by  two  devices.  When 
transports  and  merchant-vessels  were  being  sent  across 
the  ocean,  they  were  gathered  into  groups  or  convoys 
and  were  protected  by  war  vessels,  especially  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers.  The  depth  charge  was  also  used  with 
telling  effect.  This  consisted  of  a heavy  charge  of  ex- 
plosive which  was  placed  in  a container  and  dropped 
into  the  sea  where  the  presence  of  a submarine  was  ex- 
pected. The  charge  was  exploded  at  a pre-determined 
depth  by  a simple  device,  and  any  under-seas  craft 


592 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


within  190  feet  was  likely  to  he  destroyed  or  to  have 
leaks  started  that  would  compel  it  to  come  to  the  sur- 
face and  surrender. 

Aside  from  combatting  the  submarine,  the  greatest 
activity  of  the  navy  was  the  transportation  of  men  and 
supplies  to  France.  First  and  last  more  than  2,000,000 
troops  were  carried  to  Europe,  and  although  Great 
Britain  transported  more  than  half  the  men,  yet  924,- 
578  made  the  passage  through  the  danger  zones  under 
the  escort  of  United  States  cruisers  and  destroyers. 
The  cargo  fleet  was  substantially  all  American.  The 
transportation  of  supplies  alone  required  the  services 
of  5,000  officers  and  29,000  enlisted  men,  and  involved 
the  accumulation  of  a vast  fleet,  the  acquisition  of 
docks,  lighters,  tugs,  and  coaling  equipment,  as  well 
as  the  establishment  of  an  administrative  organiza- 
tion, at  the  precise  time  when  the  shipping  facilities 
of  the  world  were  being  strained  to  the  breaking  point 
by  submarines. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  ocean  naval  bases  were  es- 
tablished in  England,  Ireland,  Scotland,  Franco  and 
Italy;  a considerable  force  operated  from  Gibraltar 
and  others  from  Corfu,  along  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  in  the 
North  Sea  and  at  Murmansk  and  Archangel.  Besides 
cooperating  with  the  navy  of  the  Allies  in  keeping  the 
Germans  off  the  seas,  the  American  navy  laid  about 
four-fifths  of  the  great  mine  barrage  which  extended 
from  the  Orkney  Islands  to  Norway,  a distance  of  230 
miles.  This  astonishing  enterprise — America  alone 
laid  56,000  mines — together  with  a similar  chain  laid 
across  the  Strait  of  Dover  was  intended  to  pen  the  suh- 
marine  within  the  North  Sea. 

In  the  main  the  raising  of  an  army  for  European 
service  rested  upon  the  act  of  May  18,  1917.  It  ]n-o- 
vided  for  the  increase  of  the  regular  army  from  ap- 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  593 


proxiinately  200, OOU  to  488,000 ; for  the  expansion  of 
the  strength  of  the  National  Guard;  and  for  the  selec- 
tion of  a National  Army  by  draft  from  men  between 
the  ages  of  twenty-one  and  thirty  years  inclusive.  The 
determination  to  raise  a draft  army  was  based  upon 
the  belief  that  in  this  way  successive  and  adequate  sup- 
plies of  men  could  be  found  without  disproportionate 
calls  on  any  section  of  the  country  and  without  undue 
disturbance  of  the  industrial  life  of  the  nation.  Al- 
though the  plan  ran  counter  to  American  practice  dur- 
ing most  of  our  history,  the  draft  army  became  deserv- 
edly popular  as  a democratic  and  efficient  method  of 
finding  men.  Officers  were  supplied  mainly  through 
training  camps,  of  which  the  best  known  was  that  at 
Plattsburg,  New  York.  A novelty  in  the  new  army 
was  a plan  for  the  appointment  and  promotion  of  offi- 
cers on  a scientific  rating  system  which  took  account 
of  ability  and  experience,  thereby  doing  away  with 
some  of  the  favoritism  formerly  connected  with  our 
military  system.  At  a later  time  an  organization  was 
perfected  by  which  enlisted  men  were  grouped  accord- 
ing to  their  ability  and  occupations,  so  that  each  di- 
vision of  the  army  might  have  assigned  to  it  the  num- 
ber of  mechanics,  carpenters,  clerks  and  the  like  that  it 
might  require.  For  the  housing  and  training  of  the 
enlarged  National  Guard,  sixteen  tent-camps  were  es- 
tablished in  the  South;  and  for  the  National  Army,  six- 
teen cantonments,  built  of  wood  and  capable  of  hous- 
ing 40,000  men  each.  A cantonment  comprised  1,000 
to  1,200  buildings,  and  was  virtually  a city  with  high- 
ways, sewers,  water  supply,  laundries  and  hospitals.^ 
The  problem  of  obtaining  supplies  was  as  great  as  that 

lAn  official  of  the  War  Department  estimated  that  the  lumber  used 
in  the  sixteen  cantonments  if  made  into  sidewalks  would  go  four  times 
around  the  world. 


594 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


of  housing  and  training  the  army.  An  entire  city  was 
erected  in  West  Virginia  for  the  making  of  part  of  the 
smokeless  powder  required;  the  British  Enfield  rifle 
was  modified  to  use  American  ammunition  so  that  ma- 
chinery already  making  arms  for  England  could  be 
utilized  with  a minimum  of  change ; and  European  ex- 
perience having  indicated  the  value  of  the  machine 
gun,  a new  and  improved  type  was  invented  by  John 
-M.  Browning.  In  many  cases,  however,  it  was  impos- 
sible immediately  to  equip  both  the  soldiers  in  training 
here,  and  those  who  could  be  sent  abroad.  Hence  sur- 
plus equipment  of  certain  kinds  was  supplied  by  France 
and  England.  Furthermore,  actual  combat  had  em- 
phasized the  vital  importance  of  aviation  and  had  de- 
veloped warfare  with  poisonous  gases  and  with  tanks, 
so  that  it  became  necessary  to  establish  new  branches 
of  the  service  to  meet  these  needs. 

Shortly  after  the  declaration  of  war.  General  John 
J.  Pershing,  who  had  already  experienced  active  oper- 
ations in  the  Philippines  and  on  the  Mexican  border, 
was  sent  to  France  to  act  as  Chief  of  the  American  Ex- 
peditionary Force — the  A.  E.  F.  as  it  was  commonly 
called.  General  Pershing  was  followed  by  a division 
of  regulars  in  June,  1917,  and  by  the  “Rainbow”  di- 
vision of  the  National  Guard,  a body  composed  of 
guardsmen  from  various  states  so  as  to  distribute 
widely  the  honor  of  early  participation  in  the  war.  In 
France  the  American  troops  were  detailed  either  for 
the  Service  of  Supply  or  for  combat.  The  former, 
with  headquarters  at  Tours,  developed  port  facilities, 
constructed  ship  berths,  built  railroads  and  ware- 
houses, and  took  care  of  the  multifarious  duties  that 
have  to  be  performed  behind  the  lines.  Divisions  des- 
tined for  combat  were  usually  given  one  or  two  months 
of  training  in  France  before  going  to  the  front,  and 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  595 


were  then  kept  for  another  month  in  a quiet  sector  be- 
fore engaging-  in  more  active  service. 


Between  April,  1917,  when  America  declared  war, 
and  approximately  a year  later  when  her  weight  began 


596 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


to  be  felt,  the  Allies  suffered  reverses  tliat  were  thor- 
oughly disheartening  and  were  almost  disastrous. 
Russia,  who  had  conducted  a powerful  offensive  in 
1916,  began  to  retreat  in  the  summer  of  1917  and  was 
thereafter  no  longer  a military  factor.^  Italy  had 
driven  back  the  Austrians  in  the  summer  of  1916,  but 
in  the  fall  of  1917  was  compelled  to  conduct  a retreat 
that  became  all  but  a disaster.  Allied  conferences 
were  accordingly  held  in  Paris  in  November  and  De- 
cember, 1917,  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  closer 
unity  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  Nation  after  na- 
tion, on  the  other  hand,  had  severed  relations  or  de- 
clared war  on  the  Teutonic  powers  until  a great  part  of 
the  world  had  ranged  itself  on  the  side  of  the  Allies. 
In  March,  1918,  the  Germans  precipitated  a series  of 
crises — the  final  ones  as  it  turned  out.  In  that  month 
they  began  a terrific  drive  on  a fifty-mile  front  against 
their  opponents  in  the  western  theatre  of  the  war.  In 
order  to  meet  this  thrust  the  Allies  decided  to  give  over 
the  supreme  command  of  all  their  forces  to  Marshal 
Ferdinand  Foch,  chief  in  command  of  the  French  army, 
and  General  Pershing  thereupon  offered  him  all  the 
American  troops  in  Prance.  American  efforts  were 
redoubled,  in  the  face  of  the  new  danger,  and  forces 
were  transported  across  the  ocean  in  numbers  which 
had  not  been  anticipated  and  which  soon  began  to  give 
the  Allies  a substantial  advantage.  One  vessel,  the 
Leviathan,  landed  in  France  the  equivalent  of  a Ger- 
man division  each  month.  The  enemy,  nevertheless, 
continued  to  advance  and  on  May  31  were  at  Chateau- 
Thierry,  only  forty  miles  from  Paris,  where  the  Amer- 
ican Third  Division  assisted  in  preventing  any  further 

1 Roumania  had  entered  the  conflict  in  August,  1916,  but  had  been 
immediately  overrun,  her  capital  Bucharest  taken  in  December,  and  that 
country  rendered  no  longer  important  before  the  entrance  of  America. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WOULD  WAR  597 


forward  movement.  The  leading  military  experts  in 
the  United  States,  meanwhile,  with  the  support  of  a 
large  portion  of  the  public  w'ere  demanding  a still 
larger  army  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  Newton  D. 
Baker,  accordingly  laid  before  Congress  a plan  which 


developed  eventually  into  the  “Man  Power”  act  of 
August  31,  1918.  It  changed  the  draft  ages  and  added 
more  than  13,000,000  registrants  to  the  available  sup- 
ply of  men.  A clause  of  this  law,  designed  in  part  to 
provide  further  supplies  of  officers,  allowed  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  to  send  soldiers  to  educational  institutions 


598 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


at  the  public  expense,  thus  establishing  the  Students’ 
Army  Training  Corpsd 

At  the  time  when  General  Pershing  placed  hi§  forces 
at  the  disposal  of  Marshal  Eoch,  the  Americans  num- 
bered 343,000  and  were  used  mainly  to  relieve  the 
French  and  British  at  quiet  parts  or  “sectors”  on  the 
western  front.  In  April,  1918,  however,  the  First  Di- 
vision was  placed  in  a more  active  position,  and  on 
May  28  took  Cantigny;  the  Second  Division  was  on 
the  Marne  River  early  in  June,  and  later  in  the  month 
helped  prevent  a German  advance  at  Belleau  A¥ood. 
Other  forces  were  sent  to  operate  with  the  British,  a 
regiment  was  sent  to  Italy,  and  a small  force  to  north- 
ern Russia  and  Siberia.  In  mid-July  the  Germans  re- 
newed their  attacks  but  were  shortly  turned  back  again 
at  Chateau-Thierry,  and  Marshal  Foch  judged  this  to 
be  the  time  for  the  Allies  to  make  a general  offensive 
movement.  On  the  18th  the  First  and  Second  Di- 
visions, with  picked  French  troops,  made  a successful 
drive  toward  Soissons.  On  August  30  the  Americans 
were  given  a permanent  portion  of  the  front,  and  two 
weeks  later  came  the  first  distinctly  American  action 
in  the  reduction  of  the  St.  Mihiel  salient — a wedge 
driven  by  the  Germans  into  the  allied  line.  Infantry, 
artillery,  aircraft,  tanks  and  ambulances  were  gath- 
ered— about  600,000  men  all  told — mostly  under  cover 

1 The  earl?er  draft  law  resulted  in  about  11,000,000  registrants.  The 
draft  ages  were  21-30  years.  Under  the  later  law  the  ages  were  18-45. 

The  so-called  Training  Detachments  had  already  been  established, 
providing  for  the  training  of  mechanics,  carpenters,  electricians,  teleg- 
raphers, and  other  necessary  skilled  artisans  at  a number  of  colleges 
and  scientific  institutions. 

Almost  coineidently  with  the  expansion  of  the  army  came  an  epidemic 
of  the  Spanish  influenza.  Hitherto  the  health  of  the  army  had  been 
e.xtraordinarily  good,  but  the  epidemic  was  so  widespread  and  so  malig- 
nant in  its  attack  that  during  eight  weeks  there  w’ere  more  than  twice 
as  many  deaths  as  in  the  entire  army  for  the  year  preceding. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  599 


of  darkness.  Preceding  the  drive  a heavy  artillery 
tire  was  directed  upon  the  enemy  for  four  hours,  dur- 
ing- which  brief  period  thirty  times  as  many  rounds  of 
ammunition  were  fired  as  were  used  by  the  Union  forces 
at  Gettysburg  in  three  days.  Then  at  five  o’clock 
in  the  morning,  on  September  12,  the  troops  fell  upon 
an  enemy  which  had  been  demoralized  by  the  artillery, 
and  routed  them.  The  American  losses  were  7,000 — 
injuries  for  the  most  part — and  the  gains,  16,000  pris- 
oners, 443  guns  and  a great  quantity  of  war  materials, 
together  with  an  advantageous  position  for  further  ad- 
vance. The  “American  Army  was  an  accomplished 
fact.” 

The  most  important  action  in  which  the  Americans 
participated  was  the  Meuse-Argonne  offensive.  The 
goal  of  this  attack  was  the  Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres 
lailroad,  which  ran  parallel  to  the  front  and  comprised 
the  main  supply  line  of  the  enemy.  The  drive  began 
late  in  September  and  continued  with  greater  or  less 
intensity  and  with  increasing  success  until  November 
11,  when  it  became  evident  that  the  Germans  Avere  in 
serious  difficulties.  Their  line  was  cut,  and  only  sur- 
render or  an  armistice  could  prevent  thorough-going 
disaster.^ 

While  the  allied  armies  were  first  stemming  the  Ger- 
man advance  and  later  making  their  counter-offensive, 
the  statesmen  were  attempting  to  preserve  the  morale 
of  the  Allies  and  break  down  that  of  the  enemy  by 
means  of  a Avide-spread  peace  offensive.  Because  of 

1 By  November  11,  26,059  prisoners  and  847  guns  had  been  captured 
and  at  one  point  near  Sedan  the  American  advance  had  covered  twenty- 
five  miles.  1,200,000  American  troops  had  been  engaged  and  the  weight 
of  the  ammunition  fired  was  greater  than  that  used  by  the  Union  armies 
during  the  entire  Civil  AA'ar.  In  November  the  American  army  held 
twenty-two  per  cent,  of  the  western  front.  The  losses  of  the  A.  E.  F. 
during  the  entire  period  of  its  activities  up  to  November  18,  1918,  were 
by  death  53,160;  the  wounded  numbered  179,625. 


GOO 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


his  position  as  President  of  the  United  States  and  his 
skill  in  the  expression  of  the  purposes  of  the  Allies, 
Wilson  became  by  common  consent  the  spokesman  of 
the  enemies  of  Germany,  much  as  he  had  earlier  been 
the  representative  of  the  neutral  nations.  In  August, 
1917,  the  Pope  proposed  peace  on  the  basis  of  “ recipro- 
cal condonation”  for  past  offenses,  and  the  reciprocal 
return  of  territories  and  colonies.  In  reply  WTlsoii 
contended  that  the  suggested  settlement  would  not  re- 
sult in  a lasting  peace.  Peace,  he  believed,  must  be 
between  peoples,  and  not  between  peoples  on  the 
one  hand  and  “an  ambitious  and  intriguing  govern- 
ment ’ ’ on  the  other.  “We  cannot, ’ ’ he  declared,  ‘ ‘ take 
the  word  of  the  present  rulers  of  Germany  as  a guar- 
antee of  anything  that  is  to  endure  unless  explicitly 
supported  by  such  conclusive  evidence  of  the  will  and 
purpose  of  the  German  people  themselves  as  the  other 
peoples  of  the  world  would  be  justified  in  accepting.” 
The  reply  continued,  of  course,  the  attempt  made  in 
the  address  to  Congress  calling  for  a declaration  of 
war — the  attempt  to  drive  a wedge  between  the  Ger- 
man people  and  their  rulers,  but  for  the  moment  the 
attempt  was  fruitless. 

On  January  8,  1918,  President  Wilson  again  ex- 
plained the  attitude  of  the  United  States,  in  an  address 
to  Congress  in  which  he  gave  expression  to  the  famous 
“fourteen  points.”  “The  program  of  the  world ^s 
peace,”  he  stated,  must  include:  the  beginning  of  an 
era  of  “open  diplomacy”  and  the  end  of  secret  inter- 
national understandings;  the  freedom  of  the  seas  in 
peace  and  war;  the  removal  of  economic  barriers  be- 
tween nations ; the  reduction  of  armaments ; the  impar- 
tial adjustment  of  colonial  claims;  the  evacuation  of 
territories  occupied  by  Germany,  such  as  Russia,  Bel- 
gium, France  and  the  Balkan  states;  the  righting  of 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  601 


the  wrong’  done  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  provinces 
wrested  from  France  by  Germany  in  1871 ; an  oppor- 
tunity for  peoples  subject  to  Austria  and  Turkey  to 
develop  along  lines  chosen  by  themselves;  the  estab- 
lishment of  a Polish  state  which  should  include  terri- 
tories inhabited  by  indisputably  Polish  populations; 
and  an  association  of  nations  to  guarantee  the  safety 
of  large  and  small  states  alike.  Both  Austria  and  Ger- 
many replied  to  this  address,  but  not  in  a manner  to 
make  possible  a cessation  of  warfare.  In  setting  these 
replies  before  Congress,  as  well  as  in  later  speeches 
both  to  that  body  and  to  public  audiences,  the  Presi- 
dent reiterated  the  peace  program  of  the  Allies. 

In  the  meanwhile  conditions  in  the  Teutonic  coun- 
tries were  reaching  a serious  point.  Germany,  Austria, 
Bulgaria  and  Turkey  were  facing  an  enraged  world. 
Their  man  power  was  almost  exhausted,  the  numbers 
of  killed  and  wounded  in  Germany  alone  being  esti- 
mated at  6,000,000  men;  famine,  agitation  and  mutiny 
were  at  the  door  and  revolution  on  the  horizon;  food 
was  scarce  and  of  poor  quality;  Austria  was  disinte- 
grating; signs  were  evident  of  dissensions  in  the  Ger- 
man government  and  suggestions  were  even  made  that 
the  Kaiser  abdicate.  Allied  pressure  in  the  field  to- 
gether with  insistent  emphasis  on  the  Allied  distrust  of 
the  German  government  were  at  last  having  their  com- 
bined effect;  the  Teutonic  morale  was  breaking  down. 
On  October  4 the  German  chancellor  requested  Presi- 
dent Wilson  to  take  steps  toward  peace  on  the  basis 
of  the  “fourteen  points.”  An  interchange  of  notes 
ensued  which  indicated  that  the  Teutonic  powers  were 
humbled  and  that  the  Chancellor  was  speaking  in  be- 
half of  the  people  of  Germany.  The  Inter-allied 
Council  then  met  at  Versailles  and  drew  up  the  terms 
of  an  armistice  which  were  delivered  to  Germany  on 


602 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


November  7.  That  nation  was  already  in  a tumult, 
in  the  midst  of  which  demonstrations  in  favor  of  a re- 
public were  ju’ominent,  and  while  the  German  govern- 
ment was  considering  the  terms  of  the  armistice  the 
Kaiser  abdicated  and  fled  to  Holland,  and  a new  cabi- 
net was  formed  with  a Socialist  at  the  head.  The 
end  was  evidently  at  hand  and  on  November  11  the 
world  was  cheered  with  the  news  that  Germany  had 
signed  the  armistice  and  the  war  was  over.^ 

As  far  as  the  United  States  was  concerned  the  ques- 
tions of  greatest  public  interest  after  the  close  of  the 
conflict,  fell  into  two  categories:  one  connected  with 
the  complicated  question  of  the  exact  terms  of  settle- 
ment between  the  Allies  and  the  Teutonic  powers,  in- 
cluding modifications  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States;  the  other,  that  concerning  the  read- 
justments necessary  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  na- 
tion— economic,  social  and  moral,  as  well  as  political. 
Any  adequate  discussion  of  these  matters  requires  so 
much  more  information  and  perspective  than  can  now 
be  had,  that  only  the  barest  outlines  can  be  given. 

The  conference  for  the  determination  of  the  settle- 
ments of  the  war  was  to  meet  in  Paris.  The  Ameri- 
can representatives  were  to  include  Robert  Lansing, 
the  Secretary  of  State,  Henry  White,  who  had  repre- 
sented the  United  States  in  many  diplomatic  matters, 
especially  as  ambassador  to  Italy  and  to  France, 
Colonel  Edward  M.  House,  a trusted  personal  advisor 
of  the  President,  and  General  Tasker  H.  Bliss,  the 
American  military  representative  on  the  Inter-allied 
Council.  President  Wilson  himself  was  to  head  the 
delegation. 

In  November,  1918,  shortly  before  the  departure  of 

1 An  armistice  had  been  signed  with  Turkey  on  October  31,  and  with 
Austria  on  November  4. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  603 


the  President  for  Paris,  occurred  the  Congressional 
elections,  which  were  destined  to  have  an  important 
effect  on  the  immediate  future.  Until  late  October  the 
usual  display  of  partisan  politics  had  been,  on  the  sur- 
face at  least,  uncommonly  slight.  On  the  25th,  how- 
ever, the  President  urged  the  country  to  elect  a Demo- 
cratic Congress,  declaring  that  the  Republican  leaders 
in  Washington,  although  favorable  to  the  war,  had 
been  hostile  to  the  administration,  and  that  the  elec- 
tion of  a Republican  majority  would  enable  them  to 
obstruct  a legislative  program.  The  Republicans  as- 
serted that  the  request  was  a challenge  to  the  motives 
and  fidelity  of  their  party,  and  a partisan  and  menda- 
cious accusation.  As  a result  of  the  ensuing  contest 
the  control  of  both  Senate  and  House  were  won  by 
the  Republicans.  It  is  impossible  to  judge  whether 
the  President’s  appeal  recoiled  seriously  against  his 
own  party  or  whether  the  tendency  to  reaction  against 
the  administration  at  mid-term,  which  has  been  so  com- 
mon since  the  Civil  War,  was  the  decisive  force.  In 
any  case,  however,  Wilson  was  compelled  to  go  to  Paris 
encumbered  with  the  handicap  of  political  defeat  at 
home. 

Nevertheless  he  was  received  with  unbounded  en- 
thusiasm by  the  French  people  and  at  once  became  one 
of  the  central  figures  among  the  leaders  at  Paris.  Not 
only  did  the  American  delegates  work  in  conjunction 
with  the  representatives  of  the  Allies,  but  Wilson  be- 
came a member  of  an  inner  council,  the  other  partici- 
pants in  which  were  Premier  Lloyd  George  of  Eng- 
land, Premier  Georges  Clemenceau  of  France  and  Pre- 
mier Orlando  of  Italy.  The  “Big  Four,”  as  the  group 
was  known,  led  the  conference  and  made  its  most  im- 
portant decisions.  The  day  of  the  aloofness  of  the 
United  States  from  international  alfairs,  which  had 


604 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


been  ended  oidy  temporarily  by  the  war  with  Spain, 
was  apparently  brought  to  a final  closed 

At  length  the  treaty  with  Germany  was  completed, 
President  Wilson  returned  to  America,  and  on  July 
10,  1919,  he  appeared  before  the  Senate  to  outline  the 
purposes  and  contents  of  the  agreement  and  to  offer 
his  services  to  that  body  and  to  its  Committee  on  For- 
eign Relations  in  order  to  enable  them  intelligently  to 
exercise  their  advisory  function  as  part  of  the  treaty- 
making power.  The  Treaty  was  seen  to  contain  two 
general  features:  a stern  reckoning  with  Germany 
which  commended  itself  to  all  except  a small  minority 
of  the  Senate;  and  a plan  for  a League  of  Nations 
which  provided  for  concerted  action  on  the  part  of 
the  nations  of  the  world  to  reduce  armaments  and  to 
minimize  the  danger  of  war.  President  Wilson’s  in- 
terest in  the  League  was  intense  and  of  long  stand- 
ing. He  had  hoped — and  in  this  he  was  supported 
doubtless  by  the  entire  American  people — that  the  Eu- 
ropean conflict  might  be  a “war  to  end  war,”  and  to 
this  conclusion  he  believed  that  a world  association  was 
essential.  Public  interest  in  the  project  was  indicated 
by  the  efforts  put  forth  in  its  behalf  by  Ex-President 

1 Something  little  short  of  a revolution  in  American  international 
relations  was  taking  place  when  the  President  of  the  United  States 
received  in  Paris  lists  of  callers  such  as  that  mentioned  in  the  news- 
papers of  May  17,  1919: 

Prince  Charron  of  the  Siamese  delegation ; Dr.  Markoff,  of  the 
Carpatho-Russian  Committee;  M.  Ollivier,  President  of  the  French  Na- 
tional Union  of  Railwaymen;  M.  Jacob,  a representative  of  the  Celtic 
Circle  of  Paris;  Messrs.  Bureo  and  Jacob  of  the  Uruguyan  delegation; 
Turkhan  Pasha,  the  Albanian  leader;  Enrique  Villegas,  former  Foreign 
IMinister  of  Chile;  Foreign  Minister  Benez  and  M.  Kramer,  of  the 
Czecho  slovak  delegation,  to  discuss  the  question  of  Silesia  and  Teschen; 
Deputy  Damour,  concerning  the  American  commemorative  statue  to  be 
erected  in  the  Gironde  River;  a delegation  from  the  Parliament  of 
Kuban,  Northern  Caucasus;  the  Archbishop  of  Trebizond,  Joseph 
Reinach,  the  French  historian,  and  Governor  Richard  L.  Manning  of 
South  Carolina. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  605 


Taft,  George  W.  Wickersham,  who  had  been  Attorney- 
General  in  the  Taft  cabinet,  President  Lowell  of  Har- 
vard University,  and  other  influential  citizens. 

Although  interest  in  the  Treaty  and  the  League  of 
Nations  overshadowed  all  other  issues,  nevertheless 
many  problems  relating  to  internal  reconstruction 
pressed  forward  for  settlement.  It  was  commonly,  if 
not  universally  felt  that  somehow  the  United  States 

£oo 
qS 

fSQ 
its 

/ 0Q 

7^ 

ZS 


if/3 

IBasZ/cl  <3/7  T^e.  LaLoi-T^C/^ 

/oo  f<,Jbfe.se^rT-^s  /6/-/ce  of  f,od  for  /yrs. 

would  be  different  after  the  war,  but  in  what  ways  and 
to  what  degree  remained  to  be  determined.  Recon- 
struction in  the  Avorld  of  industry  was  complicated  by 
the  demobilization  of  several  millions  of  men  from 
the  army  and  navy,  as  well  as  the  freeing  of  a still 
larger  number  of  both  men  and  women  from  various 
kinds  of  war  work.^  When  the  armistice  was  signed, 
the  industries  of  the  country  were  under  contract  with 
the  War  Department  to  provide  supplies  valued  at  six 
billion  dollars,  and  these  contracts  had  to  be  termin- 
ated with  as  little  dislocation  of  industrial  life  as  might 
be  consistent  with  the  necessity 'of  stopping  the  pro- 

1 The  Secretary  of  War  estimated  the  total  of  all  these  groups  at 
13,650,000. 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


G()G 

ductioii  of  materials  which  the  government  could  not 
use.  The  laboring  classes  had  loyally  supported  the 
war  and  had  largely  relinquished  the  use  of  the  strike 
for  the  time  being.  In  the  meantime  the  cost  of  liv- 
ing had  doubled,  while  wages  in  most  industries  had 
not  responded  equally.  After  the  war,  therefore,  it 
was  inevitable  that  the  laboring  classes  should  become 
restive  under  prevailing  economic  conditions.  No 
more  important  question  faced  the  country,  a keen  ob- 
server declared,  than  that  concerning  the  wages  of  the 
laboring  man:  “How  are  the  masses  of  men  and 
women  who  labor  with  their  hands  to  be  secured  out 
of  the  products  of  their  toil  what  they  will  feel  to  be 
and  will  be  in  fact  a fair  return?” 

The  huge  purchases  of  war  materials  in  the  United 
States  by  European  nations  had  transformed  this  coun- 
try to  a creditor  nation  to  which  the  chief  countries 
of  the  world  owed  large  interest  payments.  The  situa- 
tion was  a distinct  contrast  to  the  past,  for  the  indus- 
trial development  of  the  country  especially  since  the 
Civil  War,  had  been  made  possible  in  considerable 
measure  by  capital  borrowed  in  European  countries. 
Hitherto,  therefore,  the  United  States  had  been  a 
debtor  nation  sending  large  yearly  interest  payments 
abroad.  Moreover,  America  was  being  increasingly 
looked  to  for  raw  materials  as  well  as  manufactured 
articles,  and  was  likely  to  become  more  than  ever  an 
exporting  nation. 

The  mobilization  of  the  large  armies  required  for 
the  war  proved  the  need  of  energetic  reforms  in  fields 
that  had  earlier  been  too  much  neglected.  The  fact 
that  so  many  as  twenty-nine  per  cent,  of  the  young  men 
examined  for  the  army  between  the  ages  of  twenty-one 
and  thirty  had  to  be  rejected  because  of  physical  de- 
fects was  a cause  of  astonishment.  The  need  of 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  60? 


greater  efforts  in  behalf  of  education  was  proved  by 
the  large  number  of  illiterates  discovered,  and  the 
necessity  of  training  immigrants  in  the  fundamentals 
of  American  government  was  so  clearly  demonstrated 
as  to  give  rise  to  wide-spread  plans  for  Americaniza- 
tion. 

More  definite  were  the  effects  of  the  war  on  the  pro- 
hibition movement.  For  many  years  a small  but  grow- 
ing minority  of  reformers  had  urged  the  adoption  of 
means  for  stopping  the  use  of  intoxicating  liquors  and 
they  had  been  successful  in  procuring  constitutional 
amendments  in  about  half  the  states  by  the  close  of 
1916.  The  war  presented  an  opportunity  for  further 
progress.  In  September,  1918,  they  procured  the  pas- 
sage of  a resolution  in  Congress  allowing  the  Presi- 
dent to  establish  zones  around  places  where  war  ma- 
terials were  manufactured ; liquors  were  not  to  be  sold 
within  these  areas.  Soon  afterward  the  manufacture 
of  beer  and  wine  was  forbidden  until  the  conclusion  of 
the  war,  on  the  ground  that  the  grains  and  fruits 
needed  for  the  production  of  these  beverages  could 
better  be  used  as  foods.  In  the  meantime  a federal 
constitutional  amendment  establishing  prohibition  had 
been  referred  to  the  states  for  ratification.  P)V  ,Tan- 
uary  16,  1919,  it  had  received  the  necessary  ratification 
by  three-fourths  of  the  states  and  took  effect  a year 
later.^ 

1 The  Eighteenth  Amendment  is  as  follows : 

Section  1.  After  one  year  from  the  ratification  of  this  article  the 
manufacture,  sale,  or  transportation  of  intoxicatijig  liquors  within,  the 
importation  thereof  into,  or  the  exportation  theieof  from  the  United 
States  and  all  territory  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof  for  beverage 
purposes  is  hereby  prohibited. 

Section  2.  The  Congress  and  the  several  states  shall  have  concurrent 
power  to  enforce  this  article  by  appropriate  legislation. 

Section  3.  This  article  shall  be  inoperative  unless  it  shall  have  been 
ratified  as  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  by  the  legislatures  of  the 


608 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


The  railroads  constituted  another  difficult  problem. 
Agreement  seemed  to  be  general  that  they  could  not 
be-  relinquished  by  the  government  to  private  control 
without  significant  changes  in  existing  legislation,  and 
several  forces,  especially  the  insistence  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  of  the  opponents  of  government  ownership, 
combined  to  spur  Congress  to  act  on  the  matter  at  an 
early  date.  The  Esch-Cummins  law  of  February  28, 
192U,  was  an  important  addition  to  the  body  of  inter- 
state commerce  legislation.  It  enlarged  and  increased 
the  powers  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission; 
it  authorized  the  Commission  to  recommend  govern- 
ment loans  to  the  railroads;  established  a Railroad 
Labor  Board  to  settle  disputes  between  the  carriers 
and  their  employees;  empowered  the  Commission  to 
require  the  joint  use  of  track  and  terminal  facilities 
in  emergencies;  forbade  the  construction  of  new  lines 
and  the  issuance  of  stocks  and  bonds  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  Commission;  directed  the  preparation  and 
adoption  of  plans  for  the  consolidation  of  the  railway 
properties  into  a limited  number  of  systems ; permitted 
pooling  under  the  authorization  of  the  Commission; 
and  provided  for  the  accumulation  of  reserve  funds  and 
a fund  for  purchasing  additions  to  railway  equipment. 
Whether  a final  solution  of  the  transportation  problem 
or  not,  the  new  act  embodied  much  of  the  experience 
gained  since  the  passage  of  the  law  of  1887. 

In  the  field  of  politics  and  government  an  important 
part  of  reconstruction  was  the  readjustment  of  rela- 
tions between  the  federal  executive  and  Congress. 
During  the  war  it  was  inevitable  that  the  President 
should  provide  most  of  the  initiative  in  legislation ; but 
it  was  likewise  inevitable  that  the  legislative  branch 

several  states,  as  provided  in  the  Constitution,  within  seven  years  from 
the  date  of  the  submission  hereof  to  the  states  by  the  Congress. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  609 


should  reassert  itself  as  soon  as  possible.  The  fact 
that  the  consideration  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
necessarily  concerned  the  Senate  rather  than  the  House 
of  Representatives,  gave  the  upper  chamber  an  oppor- 
tunity to  attempt  the  repression  of  executive  power 
to  the  proportions  which  had  characterized  it  imme- 
diately before  the  war.  Moreover  if  the  members  of 
the  Senate  should  imitate  the  example  of  their  prede- 
cessors in  the  conflict  with  President  Johnson  in  1867, 
that  body  might  attempt  to  regain  for  itself  the  pri- 
macy in  the  federal  government  which  had  been  par- 
tially lost  under  Cleveland’s  regime  and  completely 
superseded  through  Roosevelt’s  development  of  the 
presidential  office. 

The  course  of  the  Treaty  in  the  Senate  was  such  as  to 
stimulate  any  friction  which  might  result  from  the 
difficult  process  of  reconstruction.  Despite  the  early 
sentiment  favorable  to  prompt  ratification,  that  part 
of  the  Treaty  which  related  to  a League  of  Nations 
met  a variety  of  opposing  forces.  Some  of  them  were 
based  on  personal,  political  and  partisan  considera- 
tions, and  some  of  them  founded  upon  a sincere  hesi- 
tancy about  adventuring  into  new  and  untried  fields 
of  internatioual  effort.  In  the  main,  party  lines  were 
somewhat  strictly  dravm  in  the  Senate,  the  Democrats 
favoring  and  the  Republicans  opposing  ratification  of 
the  treaty  as  it  stood. ^ All  debates  in  the  Senate  re- 
lating to  the  treaty  were  for  the  first  time  in  our  his- 
tory open  to  the  public,  and  popular  interest  was  keen 
and  sustained.  Among  people  outside  of  Congress 
party  lines  were  more  commonly  broken  than  in  the 
Senate,  and  members  of  that  body  were  deluged  with 
petitions  and  correspondence  for  and  against  ratifica- 

1 As  the  Congress  was  that  which  had  been  elected  in  1918,  the 
Senate  was  controlled  by  the  Republicans. 


610 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR  ' 


tioii.  At  length  it  appeared  that  a considerable  frac- 
tion of  the  Senate  desired  ratilication  without  any 
change  whatever,  a smaller  number  desired  absolute 
rejection  and  a “middle  group”  wished  ratification 
with  certain  reservations  which  would  interpret  or 
possibly  amend  portions  of  the  plan  for  a League  of 
Nations — portions  which  they  felt  were  vague  or  dan- 
gerous to  American  interests.  After  long-continued 
discussion,  the  friends  of  the  project  were  unable  to 
muster  the  necessary  two-thirds  for  ratification,  and 
its  enemies  failed  to  obtain  the  majority  required  to 
make  amendments,  and  the  entire  matter  was  accord- 
ingly postponed,  pending  the  results  of  the  presiden- 
tial election  of  1920, 

The  United  States,  therefore,  found  itself  after  the 
close  of  the  World  War  in  much  the  same  position  that 
it  had  been  in  more  than  half  a centuiy  earlier  at  the 
end  of  the  Civil  War.  The  unity  of  purpose  and  the 
devotion  to  ideals  which  had  overcome  all  difficulties 
during  the  combat  had  seemingly,  at  least,  given  way  to 
partisan  diversity  of  endeavor,  to  strife  for  suprem- 
acy in  government  and  to  the  avoidance  of  the  great 
problems  of  reconstruction.  Time,  patience  and  con- 
troversy would  be  necessary  to  bring  about  a wise  set- 
tlement. The  United  States  was  face  to  face  with  the 
greatest  problems  that  had  arisen  since  the  Civil  War. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  opposition  to  the  Wilson  foreign  policy  is  best  ex- 
pressed in  Theodore  Roosevelt,  Fear  (Jod  and  Take  Your  Own 
Part  (1916).  Roosevelt’s  condonation  of  the  invasion  of 
Belgium  is  in  The  Outlook  (Sept.,  1914),  “The  World  War.’’ 
Wilson’s  changing  attitude  toAvard  tlie  war  is  explained  in 
A.  M.  Low,  Woodrow  Wilson,  an  Interpretation  (1918),  but 
is  best  followed  in  his  addresses  and  messages.  The  early 


UNITED  STATES  AND  WORLD  WAR  611 


stages  of  the  war  and  American  interest  in  it  are  described  in 
Ogg:  The  American  Year  Book;  J.  B.  MeiMaster,  The  TJnited 
States  in  the  ^yortd  ^yar  (1918)  ; J.  W.  Gerard,  My  Four 
Years  in  Germany  (1918),  superficial  but  interesting  and 
written  by  the  American  Ambassador;  Brand  Whitlock,  Bel- 
gium (2  vols.,  1919),  verbose,  but  well  written  by  Ibe  United 
States  minister  to  Belgium;  Dodd,  already  mentioned;  J.  S. 
Bassett,  Our  War  with  Germany  (1919),  written  in  excellent 
spirit.  The  President’s  address  calling  for  a declaration  of 
war  is  contained  in  the  various  editions  of  his  addresses,  and 
in  War  Information  Series,  No.  1,  “The  War  Message  and 
Facts  Behind  It,”  published  by  the  Committee  on  Public 
Information. 

The  subject  of  federal  agencies  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  is  fully  discussed  in  W.  F.  Willoughby,  Government 
Organization  in  War  Time  and  After  (1919)  ; there  is  no  ade- 
quate account  of  the  Committee  on  Public  Information.  On 
the  government  and  the  railroads,  consult  F.  H.  Dixon  in 
Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics  (Aug.,  1919),  “Federal 
Operation  of  Railroads  during  the  War.”  E.  L.  Bogart, 
Direct  and  Indirect  Costs  of  the  Great  World  War  (1918),  is 
useful. 

Combat  operations  are  described  in  the  general  histories  of 
the  war  already  mentioned,  and  in  “Report  of  General 
Pershing”  in  War  Department,  Annual  lieport,  1918. 

Accounts  of  the  Peace  Conference,  the  Treat}'  and  the 
League  of  Nations  labor  under  the  attempt  to  prove  President 
Wilson  right  or  wrong,  in  addition  to  such  insurmountable 
difficulties  as  lack  of  information  and  perspective.  J.  S.  Bas- 
sett, Our  War  with  Germany  (1919),  has  some  temperate 
chapters ; Dodd  is  friendly  to  Wilson,  but  not  offensively  parti- 
san; R.  S.  Baker,  What  Wilson  did  at  Paris  (1919)  is  read- 
able; J.  iM.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace 
(1920),  is  interesting  and  designed  to  prove  a point;  see  also 
C.  H.  Haskins  and  R.  H.  Lord,  Some  Problems  of  the  Peace 
Conference  (1920)  ; the  account  in  the  American  Year  Book 
for  1919  lacks  something  of  its  usual  non-partisan  balance. 
On  the  League  of  Nations  a thorough  study  is  S.  P.  H.  Duggan, 


612 


SINCE  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


The  League  of  Nations  (1919).  Material  opposing  the  treaty 
may  be  found  in  The  New  Republic,  The  Nation,  and  the  North 
American  Review;  favorable  to  it  is  the  editorial  page  of  the 
New  York  Times,  whose  coh;mns  contain  the  best  day-to-day 
accounts  of  the  debates  in  the  Senate. 

A full  bibliography  is  A.  E.  McKinley  (ed.),  Collected  Ma- 
terials for  the  Study  of  the  War  (1918). 


INDEX 


ABC  powers,  538 
Accidents:  compensation  for  in- 
dustrial. 50.5 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  45,  126 
Adams,  Charles  Francis,  Jr.,  cited 
on  Cleveland,  187;  on  rail- 
road abuses,  206,  208;  on  rail- 
road pooling,  214,  215 
Adams,  John  Quincy:  comparison 
of  Hayes  and,  125 ; and  Latin- 
American  relations,  288 
.Adamson  law,  510 
Adee.  A.  A.,  281 

"Addresses  on  Government  and 
Citizenship,”  by  Elihu  Root, 
83,  84,  519 
Aguinaldo,  412 

Agriculture:  development  of,  in 
United  States,  61  et  seq.;  in- 
crease of,  420  et  seq. 
Alahama  claims:  England  and  the, 
39,  40 

Alabama : mineral  resources  of,  66 
Alaska : negotiations  in  relation  to, 
purchase,  21,  22,  282;  seal 
fisheries  dispute,  285  et  seq.j 
in  relation  to  industrial  acci- 
dents, 506;  resources,  470n.; 
and  Canada  boundarj'  ques- 
tion, 532 

Aldrich,  Senator  Xelson  W. : and 
Great  Tariff  Debate,  222;  480; 
486 : in  relation  to  currencv, 
551 

Aldrich -Vreeland  Act,  551 
Ale.xander,  DeA.  S.,  241 
Alexander.  .J.  W.,  546,  note 
Alger,  Russell,  A.:  381;  short- 

comings of  as  Secretary  of 
AA’ar,  398,  399 

Algeciras  conference,  523  « 

Allen,  Senator  W.  V. : on  free 
coinage  of  silver,  342 
Allies:  558,  586;  United  States’ 
loans  to,  589 ; and  work  of 
barring  seas  to  Germany,  592  ; 
situation  of,  when  United 


States  entered  AA’orld  AA'ar, 
596 ; Wilson  chosen  as  mouth 
piece  of,  599,  600;  561  et  seq. 
Allison,  William  T3. : and  tariff  re- 
vision, 106;  and  purchase  of 
bullion,  139,  140;  and  Great 
Tariff  Debate,  222 
Allowance  and  allotment  systems 
during  AVorld  War,  589 
Alsace-Lorraine,  600 
Altgeld,  Governor  John  P.:  and 
Chicago  anarchists,  318;  pro- 
test of,  321,  322;  354 
Alverstone,  Lord  Chief  Justice, 
532,  note 

America:  labor  problem  in,  500  et 
seq.;  status  of,  after  War 
with  Spain,  520  et  seq. ; out- 
look of,  upon  Europe,  539 ; and 
European  War,  575-612.  See 
also  United  States 
“American  Doctrine  of  Judicial 
Supremacy,”  by  C.  G.  Haines, 
518 

American  Economic  Review,  31, 
574 

American  Expeditionary  Force ; 
594  et  seq.;  on  the  Marne, 
598;  losses,  599,  note 
American  Federation  of  Labor, 
310  et  seq.;  effect  of,  upon 
economic  conditions,  500  et 
seq.;  509 

American  Free  Trade  League,  106 
American  Historical  Review,  31 
American  Iron  and  Steel  Associa- 
tion, in  relation  to  the  tariff 
and  Congress,  105,  106 
American  Political  Science  Review, 
31,  519 

American  Railway  Union,  321 
American  Sugar  Refining  Com- 
pany : 257 ; frauds,  464 
American  Tobacco  Company,  491 
American  Year  Book:  on  seal  fish- 
eries, 288,  note;  518,  574,  611 
Americans : in  Mexico,  538 ; num- 
613 


614 


INDEX 


ber  killed  in  Mexico  (1911- 
1919),  539 

Ames,  Oakes:  and  Credit  Mobilier 
scandal,  41,  42 
Amnesty  Act,  23,  24 
Anarchists:  in  Chicago,  316  et 
seq. 

Ancient  Order  of  Hibernians,  308 
Andrews,  E.  B.,  30 
Andrews,  J.  B.:  J.  R.  Commons 
and,  “Principles  of  Labor  Leg- 
islation,” 518 

Andrews,  Samuel:  and  John  D 
Rockefeller,  245 
Angell,  James  B.,  145 
Annual  Cyclopaedia,  31,  241 
Annual  Register,  438,  note 
Anti-Monopolists,  172,  253,  324 
Anti-trust  Law:  in  relation  to  la- 
bor, 580.  See  Sherman  Anti- 
trust Law. 

Apia.  283 

Arabic  incident,  564,  565 
Archangel,  592 

Archbold,  J.  D.:  quoted  on  Stand- 
ard Oil  campaign  contribution, 
518,  note 
Argentina,  538 

Army,  raising  of  World  War,  by 
United  States,  592  et  seq. 
Arrears  Act  of  1879,  333 
Arthur,  Chester  A. : in  relation  to 
Hayes  and  removal  from  the 
collectorship  of  the  port  of 
New  York,  132;  vice-presiden- 
tial nominee,  153;  first  mes- 
sage of,  to  Congress,  158; 
qnoted  on  the  carrying  of  In- 
diana for  Garfield,  158;  ele- 
vation of,  to  presidency,  and 
character,  162,  163;  cabinet, 
164,  note;  and  the  tariff,  168; 
second  term  aspirations  of, 
172;  and  tariff  reduction,  219, 
221;  240;  and  armament,  335 
Ashley,  James  M.,  and  impeach- 
ment of  Andrew  Johnson,  18 
Associated  Press:  100;  expansion 
of,  439 

Atkinson,  Edward,  and  free  trade, 
106 

Atlantic  Monthly:  31,  129,  252. 
280,  450 


Australian  ballot:  233,  note; 

adopted,  265 
Austria-Hungary : treaty  with  ( 

(1908,  1909),  522;  558  et  seq.; 
United  States  declares  war  on,  > 
582,  note;  answer  of,  to  Wil-  ' 
son’s  peace  program,  601 
Aylesworth,  Allen  B.,  532,  note 


Babcock,  General  0.  E. : and  the 
Whiskey  Ring  Scandal,  47 
Bacon,  Robert,  420,  note 
Baer,  George  F.,  quoted  on  prop- 
erty control,  455 
Baker,  Newton  D.,  546,  note;  and  i 
“Man  Power”  law,  597,  598  i 
Baker,  Ray  Stannard,  “What  Wil-  i 
son  Did  at  Paris,”  611  1 

Balkan  States,  600 
Ballinger,  Richard  A.,  483  et  seq.  \ 

Balmaceda,  President,  of  Chile,  290  | 

Baltimore:  and  electric  street  rail-  , 

ways,  60,  note  j 

Baltimore,  the,  at  Valparaiso,  290,  j 

291  I 

Baltimore  convention  (Democratic,  i 

1912),  496  ' 

Baltimore  & Ohio  Railroad:  69;  t 

strike,  133  ; 

Barnett,  J.  D.,  519  i 

Bassett,  J.  S. : 30 ; “Our  War  With 
Germany,”  611 

Bayard,  Thomas  F. ; 174;  in  Cleve- 
land’s cabinet,  184;  as  a presi- 
dential possibility,  223 ; and 
the  Samoan  situation,  283 
Beard,  C.  A.,  30,  519 
Beecher,  Henry  Ward,  157 
“Beef  Trust  ” investigation,  163 
Bering  Sea  dispute,  285  et  seq. 
Bellamy,  Edward,  “Looking  Back- 
ward,” cited  on  socialism,  252 
Belknap,  W.  W.,  and  Indian  serv- 
ice scandal,  48 
Belgian  Relief,  585 
Belgium : 558 ; invasion  of,  559 ; 
Wilson  and,  575;  Red  Cross 
relief  work  in,  588;  600 
Belleau  Wood : American  Expedi- 
tionary Force  at,  598 
Belmont,  August,  498 
Benez,  M.,  604,  note 


INDEX 


615 


Bennett,  James  Gordon,  founds 
New  York  Herald,  90 
Bibliographical  Notes: 

American  diplomacy,  302 
Anti-trust;  movement,  258;  cam- 
paign, 472 

Arthur,  Chester  A.,  170 
Background  of  the  new  issues, 
101,  102 

Boxer  uprising,  423 
Brvan,  William  .Jennings,  446 
Campaign  of  1.896,  376 
Canal  Strip,  542 
Chinese,  146,  423 
Civil  Service,  122,  241 
Cleveland:  193;  administration, 
280 

Coal  strike  of  1902,  471 
Conservation,  472 
Consolidation  in  industry,  rail- 
roads, etc.,  445 

Democrats  return  to  power 
(1884),  192,  193 
Dingley  tariff,  400 
Economic  aspects,  76,  77 
Election  of  1880,  170 
Election  of  1908,  498 
Financial  history,  121 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  446 
Foreign-born  population,  445 
Garfield’s  administration,  170 
Grant’s  time,  53 
Hague  Conference,  541 
Harrison’s  administration,  241 
Hawaii,  302 

Hayes’  administration,  145,  146 
House  of  Eepresentatives  during 
Heed’s  'speakership,  241 
Imperialism,  422 
Income  tax,  280 
International  relations.  541,  542 
Island  possessions  of  the  United 
States,  422,  423 
Japan.  302 

LaFollette,  Robert  M.,  446 
Labor,  325 

ilonetary  problems,  348 
^McKinley's  administration,  400 
Newspapers  and  periodicals,  446 
Payne- Aldrich  tariff,  498 
Pensions,  241 

Pinchot-Ballinger  controversy, 

499 


Politics  (1908-1912),  498,  499 
Populist  movement,  280,  576 
Reconstruction  and  its  after 
math,  29-31 
Roosevelt,  471 
Samoa,  302 
Seal  fisheries,  301 
Spanish- American  War,  400 
Standard  Oil  Company,  258 
Strikes,  325 
Tariff,  121,  241 

Tendencies  since  1896,  518,  519 
Transportation  and  its  control, 
216 

Treaty  of  1898,  422 
Trusts,  258,  259 
United  States  and  the  World 
War,  610-612 
Venezuela,  302,  542 
Wilson,  Woodrow,  573,  574 
World  War,  610-612 
“Big  Four,”  603 
Bimetallic  League,  355 
“Black  Friday,”  38 
Black  Hills,  73 

Blaine,  James  G.;  attack  by,  on 
Jefferson  Davis,  49 ; the 
“Plumed  Knight,”  49;  124; 
before  Chicago  Convention 
(1880),  153;  in  Garfield’s 

cabinet,  159;  in  Republican 
convention  of  1884,  172;  nomi- 
nated for  President,  173; 
sketch  of,  175;  the  Mulligan 
letters  and,  178;  “Paris  mes- 
sage” on  tariff  reduction,  221; 
presidential  possibility,  224, 
225;  head  of  Harrison’s  cabi- 
net, 230;  and  McKinley  tariff, 
239;  and  Pan-American  con- 
ference, 289 ; and  Chilean  dis- 
agreement, 290,  291;  and  Ital- 
ian dispute,  291,  292 
Blair  bill,  335 

Blanco,  Captain-General  C.,  397 
Bland,  Richard  P. ; and  silver  coin- 
age, 139;  quoted,  140;  354 
Bland-Allison  Silver  Coinage  Act, 
164;  327  et  seq. 

Bliss,  General  Tasker  H. : in  Cuba, 
409 ; at  Paris,  602 
Board  of  Mediation  and  Concilia- 
tion 510 


616 


INDEX 


Bogart,  E.  L.,  611 
Bonaparte,  Charles  J.,  in  Cleve- 
land campaign,  175 
Boston  fire,  71 

Boston  Herald  supports  Cleveland, 
175 

Bosnia,  558 

Boutwell,  George  S.,  38 
Boxer  uprising,  420 
Boy-Ed,  Captain  Karl:  recall  of, 
561 

Brazil:  40;  enters  World  War, 
583,  note 

Brandeis,  Louis  D. : appointed  to 
Supreme  bench,  557,  note 
Brady,  Thomas  J.,  and  Star  Route 
cases,  161 
Brice,  Calvin,  275 
Bristow,  Benjamin  H. : 47,  481, 
402 

British  Guiana-Venezuelan  bound- 
ary dispute,  296  et  seq. 
British  Workmen’s  Compensation 
Act,  505 

Brook  Farm  experiment,  307,  308 
Brooks,  E.  C.,  “Woodrow  Wilson 
as  President,”  573 
Brown,  Colonel  B.  Gratz,  and 
Grant,  43 

Brown,  Justice  H.  B.,  417 
Brown,  Senator  J.  E.,  167 
Browning,  John  M.,  and  the  ma- 
chine gun,  594 

Bryan,  William  Jennings:  on  gov- 
ernment gold  transaction  with 
Morgan,  348;  and  free  silver, 
at  Democratic  convention, 
367-369;  408;  and  reform, 

443;  445;  at  1904  convention, 
460;  principles  and  those  of 
Roosevelt,  463  ; carries  Denver 
convention,  476;  on  Cannon. 
485 ; at  Baltimore  convention, 
496 ; attitude  of,  toward  cam- 
paign funds,  517 ; in  relation 
to  corporation  election  funds, 
518;  520,  note;  in  relation  to 
1913-1915  treaties,  528;  and 
California’s  land  laws,  535 ; 
influence  of,  upon  Wilson’s 
election,  546;  opposition  of,  to 
war,  564 
“Bryanism,”  380 


Buchanan,  James,  266 
Buck,  S.  J.,  280 

Butler,  Benjamin  F. : and  John- 
son's impeachment,  18;  elected 
governor  of  Massachusetts  by 
Anti-Monopoly  part}',  172 
Butler,  President  N.  M.;  on  the 
Kaiser,  559 


California : gold  fever,  58 ; devel- 
opment of,  70;  Chinese  trou- 
bles in,  during  Hayes  admin- 
;^stration,  143;  512;  attitude 
of,  toward  Japanese  immigra- 
tion, 535;  573 
Calliope:  at  Samoa,  284 
Cambon,  M.  Jules,  398 
Cameron,  Senator  Donald;  and 
Hayes,  128;  148;  at  Chicago 
(1880)  convention,  150,  151; 
revolt  against,  171 
Canada:  Alaska  lioundary  ques- 
tion, 532 

Canal  Zone:  acquisition  of,  526 
et  seq. 

Cannon,  Joseph  G. : 241,  474;  and 
Speaker’s  powers,  484,  485, 
489 

Cantonments,  593 
Carignan-Sedan-M&ieres  railroad, 
599 

Carlisle,  John  G. : tariff  principles 
of,  219;  in  Great  Tariff  De- 
bate of  1888,  221 

Carnegie,  Andrew:  quoted  on  dis- 
tribution of  wealth,  94,  95; 
244,  note ; on  length  of  work- 
ing day,  313;  in  relation  to 
international  arbitration,  523 
Carnegie  Steel  Company,  537 
Carranza,  Venustiano,  537 
Carpet-baggers,  16 
Catchings,  T.  C.,  276 
Central  America:  528;  and  World 
War,  583,  note 
Central  Pacific  Railroad,  70 
Century  Magazine,  31,  326 
Cervera,  Admiral  P.  de:  and  fleet 
sail  for  Cuba,  393 ; enter 
Santiago  Harbor,  394;  fleet  of, 
destroyed,  397 

Chamberlain,  Daniel  H.,  quoted  on 


INDEX 


617 


Republicanism  in  South  Caro- 
lina, 129,  note 

Chandler,  William  E. : attack  on 
Hayes,  130,  191 
Channing,  Edward,  31 
Charleston:  and  the  Itata,  290 
Charron.  Prince,  604,  note 
Chase.  Salmon  P.,  Chief  Justice: 
34,  80;  opinion  on  greenbacks 
as  legal  tender,  112 
Chateau-Thierry,  596 
Chicago:  development  of,  69;  fire, 
71 

Chicago  conventions:  1868,  33; 

1892,  Democratic,,  264;  1904, 
Republican,  nominates  Roose- 
velt, 459;  1908,  Republican, 

474 

Chicago  Times^  supports  Cleveland. 
175 

Chichester,  Captain  Edward,  393 
Child  labor,  503  et  seq. 

Chile:  relations  of  United  States 
and,  290 

China:  and  United  States,  143, 
144,  281,  282;  enters  World 
War.  583,  note 
Chinese-Japanese  War,  419 
Chinese  treaty  of  1868,  143,  144 
Choate,  Joseph  H.,  quoted  on  Wil- 
son’s foreign  policy,  583,  note 
Civil  service : in  Grant’s  adminis- 
tration, 39 ; and  accident  com- 
pensation. 507 

Civil  Service  Commission,  231,  382 
Civil  Service  Reform,  117  et  seg.; 
Hayes  and,  130  et  seq.;  Harri- 
son and,  231  et  seq.;  Cleveland 
and,  273;  McKinley  and,  381; 
Roosevelt,  Taft  and  Wilson 
and,  557 

Clapp,  Senator  Moses;  in  relation 
to  federal  campaign  expendi- 
tures, 518,  note;  519 
Clark,  J.  B.  (“Champ”):  495, 
496;  and  Panama  tolls,  556 
Clarkson,  J.  S.,  and  appointments, 
232,  233 

Clay,  Henry,  124  266;  and  Latin- 
America,  288 

Clayton  Anti-trust  Act,  553  et  seq. 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  524 
Clayton,  Powell,  172 


Clemenceau,  Georges,  603 
Cleveland,  Grover:  and  political 
integrity,  86 ; and  governor- 
ship of  Xew  York,  166;  elected 
Governor,  172;  presidential 
nomination  of,  1884,  174;  con- 
trasted with  Blaine,  175  et 
seq.;  campaign  abuse  of,  181; 
elected  President,  183,  184; 
policy,  185;  and  reform,  187; 
and  pensions  bill,  189  et  seq.; 
and  veto  power,  189  et  seq.; 
in  relation  to  railroads  and 
government,  194  et  seq.;  as  a 
political  leader,  218  et  seq.; 
tariff  reform  message  of,  219. 
quoted  220 ; Sackville-West 
and,  228;  popular  majority  in 
1888,  228;  attitude  of  Harri- 
son toward,  231;  tariff  views 
of,  and  McKinley,  240;  as 
Democratic  leader,  260;  and 
free  coinage  of  silver,  262, 
263;  in  retirement  between 
terms,  262;  characteristics  of, 
271  et  seq.;  third  nomination 
of,  264,  265 ; second  election 
of,  266 ; and  Sherman  Silver 
law,  274;  second  administra- 
tion of,  270  et  seq.;  second 
cabinet  of,  274,  note;  letter 
of,  on  Wilson-Gorman  Act, 
quoted,  276;  and  Canadian 
fisheries,  285;  and  Costa  Rica, 
289;  and  Hawaiian  situation. 
292  et  seq.;  and  British 
Guiana-Venezuela  boundary 
dispute,  296  et  seq.;  quoted 
on  Venezuelan  dispute,  299 ; 
message  of,  on  labor  problem. 
318;  and  Pullman  strike,  321; 
and  monetary  problems,  327 
et  seq.;  quoted  on  his  veto  of 
appropriation  bill,  331,  332; 
and  national  defense,  335 ; and 
the  silver  question,  355,  356; 
attitude  of,  toward  presidency, 
378;  and  Cuban  situation, 
385;  460;  proposed  appoint- 
ment by  Roosevelt  to  arbitrate 
coal  strike,  455 ; in  relation 
to  literacy  test  bill,  509;  pre- 
cedent established  by,  in  ob- 


618 


INDEX 


structing  undesirable  legisla- 
tion, 513;  comparison  of  Wil- 
son and,  544 

Coal  combination,  2'4n  et  seq. 
Cockran.  Bourke;  in  relation  to 
Cleveland’s  third  nomination, 
265 

“Coin's  Financial  School,”  by  Wil- 
liam H.  Harvey,  352 
Colby,  B.,  520,  note ; 546,  note 
Colfax,  Schuyler:  33;  and  Credit 
Mobilier  scandal,  42 
Colombia : 288 ; controversy  be- 

tween United  States  and,  524 
et  seq. 

Colorado:  gold  in,  58;  mining 
strike  in,  1913,  509 
Columbus,  N.  M. : Villa’s  raid  on, 
539 

Combinations : 242  et  seq. 
Commissioner  of  Corporations:  ac- 
tivities of,  463 

Commissions  on  Training  Camp 
Activities,  588 
Committee  on  Labor,  585 
Committee  on  Public  Information, 
585 

Commons,  J.  R.,  46,  518 
Comstock  Lode,  58 
Confederacy:  Lincoln’s  attitude  to- 
ward leaders  of,  3,  4;  7 
Congress:  attitude  of,  toward  An- 
drew Johnson,  5;  of  1865,  9; 
activities  of,  of  ’65,  11;  Civil 
Rights  bill  in,  11;  and  “force 
acts,”  24 ; effect  of  Reconstruc- 
tion on,  29 ; and  Credit  Mo- 
bilier scandal,  41,  42;  increase 
of  salary  bill  passed  by,  46; 
after  Hayes-Tilden  dispute. 
51;  quarrel  between  Johnson 
and,  86;  tax-levying  activi- 
ties of,  103  et  seq.;  and  the 
financial  situation,  108  et  seq.; 
and  greenbacks.  111  et  seq.; 
and  the  specie  resumption 
question,  113  et  seq.;  first  civil 
service  activities  in,  117;  and 
the  silver  question-,  139;  and 
Chinese  problem  in  Arthur’s 
administration,  164;  attitude 
of,  toward  reform,  188;  and 
return  of  Confederate  flags. 


199;  and  railroad  legislation, 
211;  and  Cleveland  tariff  re- 
form message,  220  et  seq.; 
“Great  Tariff  Debate  of  1888” 
in,  221;  and  monopolies,  255; 
and  Pan-American  Conference, 
289 ; and  Venezuelan  dispute, 
2^9  et  seq.;  and  the  Hawaiian 
situation,  294-296 ; and  the 
labor  question,  314  et  seq.. 
31.8;  and  monetary  problems, 
328  et  seq.;  extra  session  of, 
to  repeal  Sherman  law,  341; 
McKinley  and,  377  ; and  Span- 
ish War  appropriation,  388; 
and  railroad  legislation,  465; 
attitude  of,  toward  Roosevelt, 
473  et  seq.;  and  federal  cam- 
■ paign  funds,  517,  518;  and  na- 
tional defense,  575;  legislation 
in  respect  to  armed  merchant- 
men, 580;  declares  war 
against  Germany,  582 ; war  re- 
lations of  Wilson  and,  603; 
and  Prohibition,  607 ; and  re- 
construction, after  World 
War,  608 

“Congressional  Government,”  by 
Woodrow  Wilson,  543,  544 

Congressional  Record,  on  Great 
Tariff  Debate  of  1888,  222; 
342 

Conkling,  Roscoe;  cited  on  Demo- 
cratic motives,  80;  argument 
of,  on  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
92,  93;  94;  quoted  on  civil 
service  reform,  118;  speech  of, 
against  civil  service  reform. 
120;  attitude  of,  toward 
Evarts,  128;  and  Arthur’s  re- 
moval from  New  York  custom 
house,  132;  147,  148;  at  Re- 
publican convention  of  1880. 
154;  156;  Blaine’s  comparison 
of,  and  Davis,  159;  resigns 
from  Senate,  160 

Connecticut:  for  Tilden,  1876, 
50 

Constitution : cited  on  impeach- 
ment, 17,  18;  and  the  negro, 
22 

Cooke,  -Jay,  70 

Corporations,  242  et  seq.;  and  po- 


INDEX 


619 


litical  campaign  funds,  517, 
51S 

Council  of  National  Defense,  584, 

Cornell,  A.  B.,  132 
Cortelvou,  Secretary  G.  B.;  Park- 
er's charges  against,  461 
Cox,  Governor  Jacob  D. : 37,  resig- 
nation of,  39 ; 44 ; and  free 
trade,  106 

Credit  Mobilier  scandal,  41  et  seq., 
46,  53,  71,  154 
“Crime  of  1873,”  138 
Crocker,  Charles,  70 
Croly,  Herbert,  “The  Promise  of 
American  Life,”  244 
Cuba : United  States  in  relation 
to,  385  et  seq.;  401  et  seq.; 
408 ; and  the  tariff,  409  ; 528  ; 
enters  the  World  War,  582, 
note 

Cullom,  Senator  Shelby  M. : 213; 
cited  on  Blaine-Harrison  rela- 
tions, 261:  and  the  tariff,  261 
Cunningham,  Clarence,  484 
Curtis,  Benjamin  R.,  19 
Curtis,  George  William:  and  civil 
service  reform,  117,  119,  120; 
173;  in  Cleveland  campaign, 
175;  “Orations  and  Address- 
es,” by,  cited,  241 
Custer,  General  G.  A.,  and  the 
Indians,  75 

Cyclopcedia  of  American  Govern- 
ment, 519 

Czar  Nicholas  II,  581 


Damour,  M.,  604 
Dana.  Charles  A.,  99 
Daniel,  Senator  J.  W.,  364 
Daniels,  Josephus,  546,  note 
Dartmouth  College  case,  254 
Davis,  Senator  C.  K.,  401,  note 
Davis,  Judge  David,  45,  52 
Davis  Henry  Winter ; Blaine's  com- 
parison of  Conkling  and,  159 
Davis,  Jefferson:  imprisonment  of. 
6,  note;  negro  successor  of, 
in  Senate,  7 ; Blaine’s  attack 
on.  49 

Davis.  W.  W..  30 
Dawes  Act,  73,  191 


Day,  William  R.:  in  McKinley's 
cabinet,  .381,  401,  520,  note 
Debs,  Eugene : conviction  of,  322 ; 

Socialist  nominee,  477 
Democrats:  attitude  of,  toward 
President  Johnson,  11;  and 
trial  of  Johnson,  20;  conven- 
tion of,  1868,  33;  hopes  of,  in 
Greeley-Grant  campaign,  45 ; 
in  1874,  46;  nominate  Samuel 
J.  Tilden,  50;  status  of  North- 
ern, SO;  and  tariff  revision. 
107 ; in  relation  to  Hayes, 
130;  and  bribery,  134;  return 
to  power,  171  et  seq.;  and 
tariff,  218  et  seq.;  attitude 
of.  toward  Cleveland  in  1888. 
223;  and  “Czar”  Reed,  236;  in 
relation  to  monopolies,  253; 
demoralization  of,  260  et  seq.; 
and  tariff  of  1893,  274  et  seq.; 
gold,  355 ; and  free  silver  at 
Chicago  convention  of  1896. 
364;  platform  of  (1896),  365 
et  seq.;  370;  platform  of 
(1908,  1910,  1912),  502,  503: 
and  campaign  funds,  517,  518; 
546,  551;  and  trusts,  553  et 
seq.;  legislative  record  of, 
570;  and  Congressional  con- 
trol after  war,  603;  and  t^er- 
sailles  Treaty,  609 
Democratic  National  Committee: 
and  corporation  contributions. 
517 

Denmark:  acquisition  of  Virgin 
Islands  from,  531 
Denver  (Democratic)  convention, 
475 

Dernburg,  Dr.  Bernhard,  and  Ger- 
man propaganda,  561 
Department  of  Agriculture:  estab- 
lished, 191;  activities  of,  in 
Roosevelt  administration,  468 
et  seq. 

Department  of  Commerce  and 
Labor:  established,  457;  and 
problem  of  the  unemployed, 
507 

Depew,  Chauncey  M.,  and  life  in- 
surance investigations,  517 
Devens,  Charles,  127,  note 
Dewey,  D.  R.,  29 


620  INDEX 


Dewey,  Admiral  George:  proceeds 
to  Philippines,  389;  at  Ma- 
nila, 390,  391;  destruction  of 
Spanish  fleet  by,  391,  392,  401, 
402 

Dewitt,  D.  W.,  30 
Diamond  Match  Company,  249, 
251 

Diaz,  General  Porfirio:  agreement 
of,  with  the  United  States, 
142,  143 ; administration  of, 
537 

Dietrichs,  Vice  Admiral  von,  in 
Manila  Bay,  392,  393 
Digest  of  International  Law,  31 
Diiigley,  Nelson,  383  et  seq. 
Ditigley  Tariff  Act,  407 
Di[)lomacy:  trend  of,  281  et  seq. 
Direct  primaries;  defined,  515 
Division  of  Forestry:  activities  of, 
468  et  seq. 

Dixon,  F.  H.,  611 
Dodd,  S.  C.  T.,  “Trusts,”  258 
Dodd,  W.  E.,  574 
Dole,  Judge  S.  B.,  293 
“Dollar  Diplomacy”:  origin  of 
phrase,  533 

Dolliver,  Senator  J.  P.,  481 
Dolph,  Senator  J.  N. : quoted  on 
surplus,  332 

Dorsey,  Senator  S'.  W.,  157,  158; 
and  “star  route”  investigation, 
161 

Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  32 
Downes  v.  Bidwell,  417 
Drew,  Daniel : and  railroad  stock 
manipulation,  202 
Drum,  General  R.  C.:  and  the  re- 
turn of  Confederate  flags,  190 
Dudley,  W.  W. : “boodle”  letter 
of,  cited,  227 
Duggan,  S.  P.  H.,  611 
Dumba,  Dr.  C.  T. : 561 
Dunne,  F.  P.  (Mr.  Dooley),  cited 
on  tariff,  483,  note 
Dunning,  W.  A.,  29 
Duskin,  George  M.,  186 

Eaton,  Dorman  B. : and  civil  serv- 
ice reform,  119;  and  civil  serv- 
ice reform  bill,  166;  first  civil 
service  commissioner,  168 
Edmunds,  Senator  George  F. : as  a 


presidential  possibility,  149, 
172;  on  Sherman  Anti  trust 
act,  236 

Eighteenth  Amendment:  text  of, 
687,  688,  note 
El  Caney,  battle  of,  396 
“Election  of  Senators,  The,”  G.  H. 
Haynes,  519 

Electoral  Commission  in  Hayes- 
Tilden  dispute,  51  et  seq. 
Electoral  Count  Act,  19i 
Elkins,  Stephen  B.,  172 
Endicott,  William  C.,  184,  note 
England:  and  Mexico,  21;  and 
Alabama  claims  39,  40;  labor 
problem  in,  502 ; in  relation  to 
industrial  accidents,  505;  522; 
and  trade  restrictions  during 
World  War,  562;  attitude  of, 
toward  America’s  entering  the 
war,  591,  592;  equipment 

work  of,  594.  See  also  Great 
Britain. 

Erie  Canal,  68 
Erie  Railroad,  69,  205 
Esch-Cummins  law,  608 
Evarts,  William  M. : 19;  in  Hayes’ 
cabinet,  126 


Fairbanks,  Charles  W.,  361 
Far  West,  development  of,  57  et 
seq. 

Farrand,  Professor  Max,  30:  “De- 
velopment of  the  United 
States,”  by,  quoted,  206,  note 
Federal  Reserve  Banks:  operation 
of,  552  et  seq. 

Federal  Reserve  bill,  551,  552 
Federal  Reserve  Board,  552  et  seq. 
Federal  Farmers’  Loan  Banks,  556, 
557 

“Federal  Operation  of  Railroads 
During  the  War,”  Dixon,  611 
Federal  Steel  Company,  430 
Federal  Trade  Commission,  554  et 
seq. 

Fessenden,  William  Pitt,  6 
Field,  Justice  S.  J.,  278 
Fifteenth  Amendment,  17,  33 
Fink,  Albert,  204 
“First  Battle,”  William  Jennings 
Bryan,  376 


INDEX  621 


First  Division,  A.  E.  F. : activities 
of,  508 

Fish,  C.  R.,  ‘‘American  Diplomacy,” 
quoted,  28‘2 ; 542 
Fish,  Hamilton : 37 ; and  the  Ala- 
bama claims,  40 

Fisher,  Warren,  Jr.,  and  Blaine. 
178,  179,  ISO 

Fisk,  James,  .Jr.;  and  the 
gold  conspiracy  of  1869,  37, 
38 

Fisk  & Hatch,  71,  72 
Flagler,  H.  M.,  246 
Flanagan,  Webster,  quoted,  152 
Fleming,  W.  L.,  30,  31 
Florida:  in  Hayes-Tilden  dispute, 
50  ei  seq.,  56,  512 
Foch,  Marshal  Ferdinand,  598 
Follett,  !Mary  P.,  241 
Folsom,  Frances  (Mrs.  Grover 
Cleveland),  184,  note 
Food  administration,  activities  of. 
585  et  seq. 

Food:  increased  cost  of,  428,  429 
Foraker,  .Joseph  B. : 184,  357,  361; 
at  Chicago  convention  (1908), 
474 

Foraker  Act,  412 
Forbes,  John  Murray,  201 
‘‘Force  Acts,”  24 
Ford,  H.  .1.,  574 
“Forty-niners,”  57  et  seq. 

Forum,  quoted,  322,  323 
Foster,  J.  W.,  541 
Foulke  W.  D.,  “Fighting  the 
Spoilsman”  241 

Fourteenth  Amendment:  12;  atti- 
tude of  the  South  toward,  13, 
14;  features  of,  14,  15;  Sec- 
tion 1 of,  quoted,  25 ; Supreme 
Court  decisions  bearing  upon, 
25  et  seq.;  interpretations  of, 
89  et  seq.;  254,  439-442 
“Fourteen  points,”  600,  601 
France:  redemption  fund  of,  113; 
labor  problem  in,  502;  treaty 
(1907)  with,  522;  and  Moroc- 
can question,  523 ; and  Ameri- 
can products,  540;  Panama 
Canal  and,  525 ; 558,  559 ; Red 
Cross  relief  in,  588 ; 592 ; 

equipment  work  of.  594,  600 
Franco-Prussian  war,  40 


Franz  Ferdinand,  Archduke:  as- 
sassination of,  558 
Freedmen’s  Bureau,  11 
Fuller,  H.  B.,  “The  Speakers  of 
the  House,”  241 
Frye,  Senator,  401,  note 


Gary,  .Judge  Joseph  E.,  317 
Garfield,  .James  A.:  and  Credit 
Mobilier  scandal,  42;  in  re- 
lation to  tarifT  revision,  106; 
at  National  Republican  Con- 
vention (1880),  151;  nominee 
for  president,  153;  campaign 
song,  154,  note;  cabinet,  159; 
assassination  of,  161,  162;  and 
Pan-American  Conference  289 ; 
quoted  on  appropriation,  333 
Garland,  A.  H.,  184,  note 
Garland,  Hamlin,  “iSlain  Travelled 
Roads,”  66,  note 
Garner  .J.  W.,  31 
Garrison,  L.  M.,  540,  note 
George,  Henry,  “Progress  and  Pov- 
erty,” cited  on  taxation,  252 
Gerard,  James  W.,  ‘‘My  Four 
Years  in  Germany,”  611 
Germany:  redemption  fund  of. 
113;  and  Samoa,  283,  284; 
warships  of,  defy  Dewey’s 
blockade,  392,  393;  in  relation 
to  industrial  accidents.  505 ; 
treaty  ( 1907 ) with,  522 ; and 
Moroccan  question,  523 ; Vene- 
zuelan claims  of,  529;  and 
American  products,  540  ; 558  ; 
declares  war  on  Russia,  559 ; 
submarine  warfare  declaration 
of,  552  et  seq.;  attitude  of 
JMited  States  toward,  in  1916, 
575  et  seq.;  peace  proposal 
(1916)  of,  576;  extends  sub- 
marine warfare,  579;  Mexi- 
can alliance,  580 ; submarine 
atrocities  of,  590,  591;  great 
drive  of,  on  Allies,  596 ; peace 
terms  of,  600  et  seq.;  answer 
of,  to  Wilson’s  peace  program. 
601 

Gibraltar,  592 

Ginn,  Edwin,  523 

Glasson,  W.  H.,  “History  of  Mili- 


622 


INDEX 


tary  Pension  Legislation  in 
the  United  States,”  241 
Glass,  Carter,  546,  note;  551 
Glavis,  L.  R.,  484 
Godkin,  Edwin  L. : 99 ; attitude 
of,  toward  free  trade,  106; 
and  civil  service  reform,  119 
Gold:  the,  conspiracy  of  1869,  37: 

discovery  of,  57  et  seq. 
Gomez,  Maximo,  386 
Gompers,  Samuel : on  Cannon,  485  ; 

as  labor  leader,  501 
Gorman,  Senator  A.  P.,  275 
Gould,  Jay:  and  the  gold  conspir- 
acy, 37,  38;  and  Erie  deal, 
201 ; and  telegraph  consolida- 
tion, 243 

Grand  Army  of  the  Republic,  188 
‘‘Grandfather  clause,”  28 
Granger  cases,  210 
Grant,  Ulysses  S. : and  Lee,  6, 
note;  the  military  campaigner. 
32;  relation  of,  and  Johnson. 
33;  presidential  campaign  of. 
33  et  seq.;  administration,  33- 
54 ; sketch  of,  36 ; cabinet  of. 
37 ; in  relation  to  Tenure  of 
Office  Act,  37 ; and  Hoar’s 
resignation,  38,  39;  study  of. 
as  an  executive.  42,  43 ; in 
campaign  of  1872,  44  et  seq.; 
and  Whiskey  Ring  seandal,  47, 
48 ; relation  of,  to  political 
corruption,  48,  49;  79;  147; 
and  civil  service  reform,  117, 
120;  before  1880  convention, 
151;  157,  545 

Gray,  Judge  George;  and  the  coal 
strike,  456;  476,  533,  note 
Great  Britain ; in  relation  to  the 
Civil  War,  39;  40;  117;  and 
Samoa,  283;  and  British 
Guiana-Venezuelan  boundary 
dispute.  296  et  seq.;  treaty 
with  (1007),  522;  Ilay- 

Pauncefote  agreement,  524. 
528 ; 528  et  seq. ; relations  be- 
tween, and  the  United  States 
(1896-1914),  531  et  seq.; 

and  American  products.  540 ; 
558;  Admiral  Sims  in,  590 
Great  Northern  Railway  Company. 
457 


Greenback  party;  154;  171  et  seq 
209,  253,  265 

Greeley,  Horace:  presidential 

candidacy  of,  44  et  seq. : 
founds  New  York  Tribune,  99 
Greenebauim,  Consul  B.:  and 
Samoan  protectorate,  283 
Gregory,  T.  W.,  546,  note 
Gresham’s  law,  328,  note 
Guiteau,  C.  J.,  162 

Habeas  corpus,  suspended,  24 
Hague  conference,  521,  522,  533 
Haines,  C.  G.,  “American  Doctrine 
of  Judicial  Supremacy,”  518 
Haiti,  530 

Hale,  Senator  Eugene,  486 
Hale,  W.  B.,  573 
Hamilton,  J.  G.  deR.,  31 
Hampton,  Wade;  24;  ends  Repub- 
lican rule  in  South  Carolina, 
129 

Hancock,  Winfield  S. : presidential 
nominee  of  the  Democrats,  155 
Hanna,  Marcus  A.:  sketch  of,  356 
et  seq.;  377 ; organizing  power 
of,  379,  380;  opposed  to  Roose- 
velt, 459 

Harlan,  Justice  J.  M. : opinion  of 
in  Standard  Oil  case,  251 ; 443 
Harmon,  .Judson,  495 
Harper's  Magazine,  119,  241 
Harper's  Weekly,  31;  and  Tweed 
Ring,  41 ; in  Greeley  cam- 
paign, 46;  100;  and  civil  serv 
ice  reform,  119;  and  Hayes’ 
policy,  130;  quoted  on  Repub- 
lican platform,  152;  on  Cleve- 
land campaign,  175;  and  the 
Mulligan  letters,  180,  182 
Harriman,  E.  H.,  434 
Harrison,  Benjamin : nominated, 
225 ; elected,  228 ; character- 
istics of,  229;  cabinet,  230; 
and  civil  service  reform.  231 
et  seq.;  and  the  Italian  dis- 
agreement, 292 ; and  trusts. 
255;  second  nomination,  261; 
and  Pan-American  conference. 
289;  and  monetary  problems. 
332  et  seq. 

Harrison.  Mayor  Carter,  317 
Harrison,  William  Henry,  225 


INDEX  623 


Hart.  A.  B.,  31,  519,  574 
Harte,  Bret,  quoted,  144 
Harvard  Law  Revieio,  31,  423 
Harvey,  W.  H.,  “Coin’s  Financial 
School,”  352 
Haskins,  C.  H.,  611 
Havemeyer,  Henry  0.,  277 
Hawaii Cleveland  and,  292  et 
seq.;  506 

Haworth,  P.  L.,  30 
Hay,  John;  381;  quoted  on  civil 
service,  382 ; in  relation  to 
American  interests  in  China, 
419;  520,  note;  quoted  on_Co- 
lombian-Panama  treaty,  526 ; 
Chinese  policy,  533 
Hay-Herran  convention,  525 
Hay-Paiincefote  treaty,  524,  525j 
‘ 528 

Hayes,  John  L.,  168 
Hayes'  Rutherford  B.;  nominated, 
49;  was  fairly  elected?  53; 
and  political  integrity,  86 ; 
and  civil  service  reform,  117  ; 
administration,  123-146 ; atti- 
tude of  toward  intoxicants, 
124—125,  note;  sketch  of,  123- 
126;  cabinet,  126,  127;  and 
reform,  130  et  seq.;  and  the 
monetary  question,  138,  139 ; 
and  silver  coinage,  140,  147 ; 
comparison  of,  administration 
with  Cleveland’s,  223,  230, 

240 

Hayes-Tilden  election  dispute,  50- 
54 

Haymarket  affair,  Chicago,  316  et 
seq. 

Haynes,  F.  E.,  280 
Haynes,  G.  H„  “The  Election  of 
Senators,”  519 
Hearst,  William  R.,  460 
Hedges,  C,,  241 

Hendrick,  B.  .J.,  “Age  of  Big  Busi- 
ness,” 258 

Hennessy,  D.  C.,  and  the  Mafia,  291 
Hepburn  v.  Griswold,  112 
Hepburn  Committee,  2.52 
Hepburn  Act,  465,  487 
Hill,  David  Bennett ; presidential 
aspirant.  229:  political  cliar- 
acteristics  of,  263,  264 ; and 


income  tax,  275;  and  nomina- 
tion of  1896,  367,  370 
Hill,  James  J. ; on  Interstate  Com- 
merce Bill,  215;  and  Northern 
Securities  Company,  458 
“History  of  the  Presidency,”  by 
Edward  Stanwood,  519 
“History  of  the  Standard  Oil  Com- 
pany,” by  Ida  M.  Tarbell,  438 
History  Teachers"  Magazine,  31 
Hoar,  Judge  E,  R.,  37,  39,  44 
Hoar,  Senator  G.  F. ; cited  on  Re- 
publican party,  70;  81;  on  po- 
litical integrity,  86 ; on  power 
of  the  Senate,  87 ; on  Hayes’ 
policy,  130;  in  1880  conven- 
tion, 151 ; “Autobiography” 
cited,  165;  on  Sherman  Anti- 
trust Act,  256 ; on  appoint- 
ment of  Senators  as  peace  com- 
missioners, 401 ; on  Spanish 
American  treatv,  403 
Holls,  G.  H.  W.,  541 
Holmes,  Justice  0.  W.,  443 
Homestead  law,  191 
Homestead  strike,  265,  266;  320 
Hoover,  Herbert  C,,  and  Food  Ad 
ministration  activities,  586 
Hornbeck,  S.  K.,  542 
House,  Colonel  Edward  M.,  at 
Paris,  602 
Houston,  D.  F.,  546 
Hudson  River  Railroad,  69 
Huerta,  Victoriano;  and  the  flag 
incident,  537,  538 
Hughes,  Charles  E. ; and  life  in- 
surance investigation,  516, 
517;  in  the  1916  campaign, 
567  et  seq.;  on  Wilson’s  rec- 
ord, 569 ; in  relation  to  rail- 
road legislation,  571 
Hunt,  W.  H.,  159,  note 
Huntington,  Collis  P.,  70 

Idaho,  58 

Illinois;  56;  standard  for  child 
labor,  504 

Imperialism,  401-423 
Income  tax;  (1866-1872),  111; 
(1893-1894),  275;  before  the 
Supreme  Court,  278;  in  Re- 
publican platform,  365 
Indiana;  in  Tilden  campaign,  50 


624 


INDEX 


Independent:  on  Cleveland  cam- 
paign rumors,  181 
Indian  land  titles,  73 
Industrial  Brotherhood,  309 
Industrial  Workers  of  the  World, 
501 

Industrialism,  242  et  seq. 

Ingersoll,  Robert  G.,  on  Blaine,  49 
“Initiative,  Referendum  and  Re- 
call,” W.  B.  Munro,  519 
Initiative  system,  514 
Insurance  investigation,  516  et  seq. 
Inter-Allied  Council,  601,  602 
International  Bureau  of  American 
Republics,  289 

International  Monetary  Confer- 
ence, Paris,  327 

International  Relations : from 

1896,  520-542 

International  Typographical 
Union,  310 

Interstate  Commerce  Act,  213,  250, 
257,  456 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
500,  513,  608 
Ireland,  592 
Ishii,  Viscount,  535 
Italy:  40;  and  the  Hennessy  case, 
291;  and  American  products, 
540 ; American  Red  Cross 
work  in,  588;  and  Venezuela 
case,  592 

Itata  incident,  290 

.Tackson,  Andrew,  266 
.lackson,  ,Tustice  H.  E.,  279 
Jacob,  M.,  004 

James,  Thomas  L. : and  reform, 
131;  159,  note;  and  star  route 
investigation,  161 
■Tapan:  relations  of  United  States 
and,  282;  534  et  seq.;  558 
Jett^,  Sir  Louis  Anable,  532,  note 
Johnson,  Andrew:  attitude  toward 
Confederate  leaders,  3;  sketch 
of,  4;  critical  study  of  activi- 
ties, 4 et  seq.;  and  states 
rights,  8;  and  Thaddeus  Ste- 
vens. 9 ; and  Reconstruction 
Act,  15;  impeachment,  17,  19; 
trial,  20;  and  French  invasion 
of  Mexico,  21;  in  relation  to 
expansion  of  executive  power, 


29;  relations  with  Grant,  63, 
note;  quarrel  with  Congress, 
86;  and  internal  revenue  cor- 
ruption, 116;  and  Evarts,  126 
Johnston,  General  Joseph  E.,  as  a 
Hayes  cabinet  possibility,  127 
Jones  Act  of  1916,  414 
Jones,  Senator  J.  K.:  on  trusts, 
255;  on  silver  coinage,  342 
Journal  of  Political  Economy,  3, 
574 

Judge,  Cleveland  cartoons  in,  181 
Juarez,  21 

Kaiser:  and  Venezuela  case,  529, 
530;  Taft  and  Roosevelt  on, 
559;  abdication  of,  (iOl,  602 
Kalakaua,  King,  293 
Kearney,  Dennis,  143 
Kelley,  O.  H.,  209 
Kern,  John  W.,  476 
Key,  D.  M.,  in  Hayes’  cabinet,  127 
Keynes,  J.  M.,  611 
Kirkwood,  S.  J.,  159 
Klondike,  532 

Knickerbocker  Trust  Company,  of 
New  York:  run  on,  550 
Knights  of  Labor,  309  et  seq. 
Knox,  P.  C.,  472;  Secretary  of 
State,  520,  note;  526;  and  for- 
eign concessions,  533 
Knox  V.  Lee,  112 
Kramer,  M.,  604 
Ku  Klux  Act,  24,  26 
Ku  Klux  Klan,  23,  35 

Labor:  rise  of,  30.3-326;  problem, 
after  1906,  500  et  seq.;  vote, 
502,  503 ; legislation,  503  et 
seq.:  510  et  seq.;  relation  of, 
to  World  War,  606 
Labor  party;  1888  program  of, 
225;  vote,  1888,  228 
Labor  reformers,  209 
Labrador,  533 
Ladrone  Islands,  398 
La  Follette,  Rol)ert  M.:  and  re- 
form, 443  et  seq.;  at  Chicago 
convention,  474;  484,  492 
Lamar,  L Q.  C.,  in  cabinet,  184 
Landis,  Judge  K.  M.,  and  Standard 
Oil  decision,  464 

Lansing,  Robert:  520,  note;  535; 
546.  at  Paris  conference,  602 


INDEX 


625 


Lansing-Ishii  agreement,  535 
Las  Guasimas,  battle  of,  396 
Latan^,  J.  H.,  29,  542 
Latin  Monetary  Union,  139 
Laurier,  Sir  Wilfred,  490 
Lawrence,  Mass.,  strike,  509 
Lawton,  General  H.  W.,  at  Siboney, 
396 

Lea,  Henry  C.,  and  Cleveland,  175 
Lease,  Mrs.  M.  E.,  354 
League  of  Nations,  604,  605;  be- 
fore the  Senate,  609,  610 
League  to  Enforce  Peace:  Wilson’s 
address  to,  cited,  577 
Lee,  General  R.  E.,  6,  note 
Leupp,  “National  Miniatures,” 
cited,  354,  note 

Leviathan:  transport  work  of  the, 
in  World  War,  596 
Liberal  Republican  party,  44  et 
seq.,  107 

Liberia,  in  World  War,  583,  note 
Liberty  Loans,  589 
Liliuokalani,  Queen,  293 
Lincoln,  Abraham:  attitude  of,  to- 
ward Confederate  leaders,  3 ; 
comparison  of,  and  Johnson, 
4 ; in  relation  to  negro  suf- 
frage, 7 ; and  Stanton,  18 ; 
comparison  of,  and  Grant,  32; 
79;  and  the  political  machine, 
86 : and  the  “spoils  system,” 
115;  and  civil  service  reform, 
120 

Lincoln,  Robert  T.,  159,  note 
Lind,  John,  Wilson’s  emissary  to 
Mexico,  538 
Literacy  test,  509 
Lloyd  George,  Premier,  603 
Lloyd.  Henry  D. : “Wealth  Against 
Commonwealth,”  quoted  on 
monopolies,  242 ; “The  Story 
of  a Great  Monopoly,”  cited, 
251,  252 

Lochner  v.  New  York,  505 
Lodge,  Henry  Cahot:  and  Federal 
election  law,  237;  355;  361; 
and  Alaska  coast  commission, 
532 

Loewe  v.  Lawlor,  463,  464 
Logan,  John  A.:  quoted  on  civil 
service  reform,  118;  attitude 
of,  toward  Hayes,  128;  148; 


nominee  for  vice-president,  173 
Lome,  Senor  Enrique  Dupuy,  de ; 

case  of,  386;  recall  of,  387 
Long,  John  D.:  on  Republicanism, 
234 

Lord,  R.  H.,  611 

Los  Angeles,  Cal. : 60 ; and  the 
recall,  515 

Lusitania,  563  et  seq.,  565,  566, 
569 

Louisiana:  and  the  grandfather 
clause,  28;  in  the  Hayes-Til- 
den  election,  50,  51 ; guberna- 
torial contest  (1877)  in,  129 
Louisiana  Lottery,  233,  note 
Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad, 
196 

Low,  A.  M.,  574;  “Woodrow  Wil- 
son, An  Interpretation,”  610 
Lowell,  President  A.  Lawrence: 
“Public  Opinion  and  Political 
Governments,”  519;  and 
League  of  Nations,  605 
Lowell,  James  Russell:  tribute  of, 
to  Cleveland,  221 

Mack,  Norman  E. : and  campaign 
contributions,  518,  note 
MacPherson,  Edward:  quoted  on 
Republican  party,  79,  81 
MacVeagh,  Wayne,  159,  note 
Madero,  Francisco,  537 
Mafia,  291 

“Main  Travelled  Roads,”  Hamlin 
Garland,  65,  note 
Maine,  blow'ing  up  of  the,  388  et 
seq. 

Malloy,  W.  M.,  302 
“!Man  Power”  Act,  597 
Manning,  Daniel,  184,  note 
Manning,  Governor  Richard  L., 
604,  note 

“Manual  of  General  Parliamentary 
Law,”  Thomas  B.  Reed,  cited, 
236,  237,  note 

Manufactories:  development  of,  65 
et  seq.,  426  et  seq. 

“Marcus  A.  Hanna,”  H.  Croly,  241 
Markoff,  Dr.,  604,  note 
Marne:  A.  E.  F.  on  the,  598 
Massachusetts:  labor  law  in,  503, 
504;  wage  law,  507 
Maryland:  and  workmen’s  compen 


626 


INDEX 


sation,  506 ; the  referendum 
in,  514,  515 

Maximilian,  Archduke:  Emperor  of 
Mexico,  21 

McAdoo,  W.  G.,  546,  551;  and 
railroad  system  during  World 
War,  587,  588 

McCall,  S.  W.:  241;  “Reed,”  404 
McClure,  A.  K.,  “Recollections,” 
233,  note 

McClures  Magazine,  438 
McCrary,  W.,  127,  note 
McCulloch,  Hugh,  and  national 
debt,  100,  110 

McKinley,  A.  E.,  “Collected  Ma- 
terials for  the  Study  of  the 
War,”  612 
McKinley  Act,  262 
McKinley  Bill,  238  et  seq. 
McKinley,  William:  in  the  Great 
Tariff  Debate  of  1888,  221  et 
seq.;  and  protection,  234;  264, 
290;  356  et  seq.;  campaign 
and  the  silver  problem,  360, 
370  et  seq.;  results  of,  cam- 
paign, 374,  375;  administra- 
tion, 377  et  seq.;  and  protec- 
tive tariff,  378  ; cabinet,  381 ; 
and  Cuban  situation,  387  et 
seq.;  calls  on  Congress  for  in- 
tervention in  Cuba,  388;  and 
the  Philippine  Islands,  402  et 
seq.;  re-nomination  of,  405; 
campaign  of  1900,  406  et  seq.; 
and  Cuban  independence,  411; 
and  literacy  test  bill,  509 ; at- 
titude of,  toward  presidential 
powers,  513;  520,  note 
McLaughlin,  A.  C.,  519 
McMaster,  J.  B.,  “The  United 
States  in  the  World  War,”  611 
McParlan,  Janies,  and  the  Molly 
^Maguires,  308  et  seq. 
IMcReynolds,  J.  C.,  546,  note 
Mercantile  National  Bank  of  New 
York,  550 

IMerritt,  General  Wesley,  at  Ma- 
nila, 393 

Methodist  Episcopal  Church : and 
trial  of  Andrew  Johnson,  20 
Mexican  War,  288 
Mexico:  French  invasion  of,  21; 
troubles  with,  during  Hayes’ 


administration,  149 ; and 
claims  against  Venezuela,  522; 
and  the  “Pious  Fund”  con- 
troversy, 522;  524;  Pan-Amer- 
ican Congress  held  in.  City 
531;  American  relations  witli, 
536  et  seq.;  Wilson  and,  569, 
570 

Metropolitan  Museum  of  Art,  119 
Meuse- Argonne : A,  E.  F,  in,  de- 
fensive, 599 

Middle  West:  expansion  of,  56, 
426  et  seq. 

Miles,  General  Nelson  A.;  and  In- 
dian campaigning,  73;  395 
Miller,  W.  H,  H.,  Attorney  Gen- 
eral, 231,  note 
Milligan  case,  15 

Mills,  Roger  Q. : tariff  bill,  221 
et  seq. 

Mine  barrage:  United  States 
Navy’s  work  on,  592 
Mississippi:  and  negro  voters,  27, 
28 

Missouri,  43 
Mitchell,  John,  455 
Mohonk,  Lake,  arbitration  confer 
ence,  523 

Molly  Maguires,  308  et  seq. 
Monroe  Doctrine:  in  relation  t^, 
Venezuelan  boundary,  297 , 
529 

Montenegro,  558 

Moody,  John,  “The  Railroad  Build- 
ers,” 216 

Moore,  Professor  John  Bassett. 
31,  281,  302 

IMorgan,  J.  P. : and  government 
gold  purchase  (1895),  347; 
extension  of,  interests,  430 ; 
and  coal  strike,  456 ; and 
Northern  Securities  Company, 
458;  496 

Morgan-Hill : control  of  roads,  434 
Mormons,  59 

Morocco:  action  of  United  States 
in,  question,  523 
Morrill  Act,  94 

Morrill,  Justin  S. : quoted  on  the 
tariff,  105;  221 
Motley,  John  Lothrop,  39 
Mugwump  movement,  81 
Mulligan  letters,  178-180 


INDEX 


61. 


Munro,  W.  B.,  “The  Initiative, 
Referendum  and  Recall,  519 
Munn  1;.  Illinois,  210,  211 
Murmansk,  592 

Murchison,  Charles  F. : letter,  227, 
228 

Murphy,  Charles  F.,  496 

Xast,  Thomas:  cartoons  of  Boss 
Tweed,  41;  Greeley  cartoons, 
46;  100;  and  Blaine  cartoons, 
181 ; Cleveland  cartoon  by, 
184,  185 

Xaiion  The:  cited  on  President 
Johnson’s  speaking  tour,  13; 
31;  99;  and  civil  service  re- 
form, 119;  149;  on  tariff 

schedule,  169 ; supports  Cleve- 
land, 175;  on  John  Wana- 
maker’s  appointment  by  Har- 
rison, 230;  attacks  Speaker 
Cannon,  485;  612 
National  Army,  593 
National  Association  of  Wool 
ilanufacturers;  and  tariff, 
105 

National  Civil  Service  Reform 
League,  119;  133 

National  Conservation  Commis- 
sion, 469 

National  Defense  Act,  576 
National  Farmers’  Alliance,  268 
et  seq. 

National  Guard,  593 
National  Labor  Union,  309 
National  Monetary  Commission, 
550 

“National  Progress,”  F.  A.  Ogg, 
518 

National  Progressive  Republican 
League,  492  et  seq. 

National  Research  Council,  585 
National  Tube  Company,  430 
National  Union  Republican  Party, 
33 

Nayal  Consulting  Board,  585 
Nayy:  Arthur  and,  164;  building 
up  of  U’ar,  591 ; Cleveland 
and,  191;  transport  work  of, 
592 

Negroes ; and  franchise,  6 ; legis- 
lation for  the  protection  of 
the,  11  et  seq.;  suffrage  of  the. 
13,  15;  and  office-holding  in 


the  South,  16:  erowtli  of. 
domination  in  the  South,  22, 
23;  at  the  polls,  24,  25,  note; 
elimination  of,  from  politics 
in  the  South,  27 ; effect  of  re- 
construction on  the  status  of, 
28,  29 ; at  the  time  of  Grant’s 
election,  33 ; in  Georgia  legis- 
lature, 34;  and  Constitutional 
amendments,  90  et  seq.;  Hayes 
and  the,  129 
Nevada:  silver  in,  58 
Netherlands : and  American  prod- 
ucts, 540 

New  England  Magazine,  302 
“New  Ideals  in  Business,”  Ida  M. 
Tarbell,  518 

New  Jersey:  in  Tilden  campaign 
50;  66,  512 
New  iMexico,  537 
New  Nationalism,  488 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  of 
France,  525 
New  Republic,  612 
New  York:  Democratic  Convention 
of  1868,  33,  34;  in  Tilden  cam- 
paign, 50;  66;  68;  working 
day  in,  505;  legislature  in  re- 
lation to  Kquitable  investiga- 
tion, 516;  laws  of,  in  relation 
to  campaign  expenditures,  518 
New  York  Central  Railroad,  198, 
205 

New  York  Civil  Service  Reform 
Association,  133 

New  York  Custom  House:  and  re- 
form, 132 

New  York  Evening  Post:  99,  175, 
354,  note;  on  McKinley’s  ca- 
reer, 363 

New  York  Herald:  founded,  99 
New  York  Hun,  99;  and  the  Credit 
Mobilier  Scandal,  41,  42 
New  York  State  Republican  Con- 
vention (1880),  147 
New  York  Times:  cited  on  the 
Tweed  Ring,  41;  and  Tam- 
many bossism,  84,  85 ; 

founded,  99;  100;  on  Louisi- 
ana settlement,  130;  175;  354, 
356,  612 

New  York  Tribune:  44,  45,  99: 
on  campaign  bribes,  134;  cited 
on  election  fraud  cipher  dis 


628 


INDEX 


patches,  135,  note;  quoted  on 
currency;  on  Democratic  con- 
vention of  1880,  155;  on 

Cleveland,  181;  356;  on  16  to 
1 issue,  369 ; quoted  on 
Bryan,  373 

New  York  World : on  Morgan  gold 
purchase,  348;  Roosevelt  car- 
toons, 453 
Newfoundland,  533 
Newlands  Act,  510 
Newspapers:  transformation  of,  99 
et  seq. 

Nicaragua  route,  530 
Nicholls,  Governor  F.  T.,  of  Lou- 
isiana, 129 

Nicholas  II,  and  the  Hague  con- 
ference, 521.  See  also  Czar 
Nineteenth  Century,  574 
Norfolk  & Western  Railroad,  66 
Norris,  Frank,  447 
North:  attitude  of,  toward  the 
South  after  the  Civil  War,  6 
North  American  Revieic:  31,  95, 
530,  note;  612 

North  Atlantic  Coast  Fisheries 
controversy,  532,  533 
Northern  Pacific  Railroad,  71,  72 
Norway,  592 

Noyes,  A.  D.,  “Forty  Years  of 
American  Finance,”  431 

Oberholtzer,  E.  P.,  30 
Ogg,  F.  A.,  29,  518,  542 
Oil  War  of  1872,  247 
Olcott,  C.  S.,  241 
Olivier,  M.,  604,  note 
Olney,  Secretary  Richard:  and  the 
Venezuelan  matter,  297  et  seq. 
Olympia:  at  Manila,  390,  391 
“Operation  of  the  Initiative,  Ref- 
erendum, and  Recall  in  Ore- 
gon,” J.  D.  Barnett,  519 
Ord,  General  E.  O.  C.,  and  Mexico, 
142 

Oregon:  in  the  Hayes-Tilden  dis- 
pute, 50,  note;  ten-hour  law, 
503 ; initiative,  referendum, 
and  recall  in,  514,  515 
“Organized  Labor,”  John  Mitchell, 
455,  note 

Orkney  Islands,  592 
Orlando,  Premier,  603 


Outlook,  The:  on  Cannonism,  485, 
559,  UlO 

Owen,  Robert:  communistic  settle- 
ment of,  307 

Owen,  Senator  R.  L.,  551 

Packard,  S.  B.,  in  Louisiana,  129 
Pagopago,  283 
Palmer,  A.  M.,  546,  note 
Palmer,  John  M. : sound  money 
nominee,  370 

Pan  American  Conference,  530,  531 
Pan  American  Union,  530 
Panama:  in  World  War,  582,  note 
Panama  Canal : and  Colombian- 
American  controversy,  524 ; 
construction  of,  527  et  seq.; 
Wilson  and,  tolls,  556 
Panic  of  1907,  550  et  seq. 

Papen,  Captain  Franz  von : recall 
of,  561 

Paris:  war  conference  (1917)  at, 
596 

Paris  Conference,  602  et  seq. 
Parker,  Alton  B.:  nominee  for 
President,  460 
Parker  v.  Davis,  112 
Patrons  of  Husbandry  (The 
Grange) , 209 

Pattison,  Robert  E.,  166,  171 
Pauncefote,  Sir  Julian:  and  Vene- 
zuelan boundary  settlement, 
301 

Payne-Aldrich  Act,  48'1,  488,  548 
Payne,  Senator  Henry  B.:  and 
Standard  Oil  Company,  250 
Payne,  J.  B.,  546,  note 
Payne,  Sereno:  and  tariff  bill,  480 
Paxson,  F.  L.,  30 
Peabody  Educational  Fund,  98 
Peck,  H.  T.,  “Twenty  Years  of  the 
Republic,”  30,  233,  353,  377, 
455 

Pendleton  Act,  166,  167 
Pendleton,  George  H. : 34 ; and 

civil  service  reform  bill,  160 
Pennsylvania  Railroad,  198 
Pensions:  Civil  War,  589 
People’s  party.  See  Populists. 
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration, 
521  et  seq. 

Perry,  Commodore  Matthew  C.. 
and  Japanese  relations,  282 


INDEX  629 


Pershing,  General  John  J. ; 594; 

and  Foch,  596,  598 
Philippine  Act,  414 
Philippines:  399  et  seq.;  problems 
of  the,  412  et  seq.;  described, 
413,  note 

Pinchot-Ballinger  controversy,  483 
et  seq.,  488 

Pinchot,  Gifford:  activities  of,  468 
et  seq. 

“Pious  Fund,  The,”  controversy. 
522 

Platt  Amendment,  411 
Platt,  Thomas  C. : “Autobiogra- 
phy,” cited  on  political  pa- 
tronage, 118;  attitude  of,  to- 
ward Hayes,  128;  148,  149; 
153,  note;  and  spoils  system, 
157 ; “me  Too,”  retires  tem- 
porarily from  public  life,  160; 
on  Quay,  226 ; disappointment 
of,  by  Harrison,  231,  260,  263, 
361;  attitude  of,  toward 
Eoosevelt,  405 

Plattsburg,  H.  A".,  Officers’  Train- 
ing Camp,  593 
Pocahontas  coal,  66 
Politics:  relation  of  labor  and, 
500-519 

Political  Science  Quarterly:  31. 
280,  519,  574 

Political  Science  Revieic,  294 
Pollock  V.  Farmers’  Loan  and 
Trust  Co.,  278  et  seq. 

Poncas,  73 

Poor,  H.  V.,  on  watered  railway 
stocks,  203 

Pope:  peace  proposal  (1917)  of, 
600 

Population : Shifting,  of  the 

United  States,  55  et  seq. ; 60, 
61 ; America’s  foreign  born, 
424  et  seq. 

Populists:  265,  267,  324;  strength 
of,  266 : Roosevelt  and  the, 
353 

Porto  Rico:  408.  411  et  seq.;  in 
relation  to  industrial  acci- 
dents, 506 ; 528 
Portsmouth  Conference,  534 
Potter  Committee,  134,  135 
Presidential  Preference  Primaries. 
519 


“Presidential  Problems,”  Grover 
Cleveland,  280,  302 
Presidential  Succession  Act,  162, 
note;  191 

Princeton  College,  543 
Proceedings  of  the  American  Po- 
litical Science  Association,  519 
Proctor,  Redfleld,  Secretary  of 
War,  231,  note 

Progressive  party:  organization  of, 
496  et  seq.;  platform  of,  503; 
557;  in  campaign  of  1916,  566, 
567;  570 

Prohibition : effect  of  War  upon, 
607;  amendment  quoted,  607, 
608 

Prohibitionists:  172;  1888  pro- 

gram of,  225 ; vote,  228 ; 253, 
568,  note 

Public  libraries,  435  et  seq. 

“Public  Opinion  and  Political  Gov- 
ernment,” A.  L.  Lowell,  519 
Puck:  cartoon  of  Jay  Gould,  243 
Ptillman  strike:  320  et  seq.,  365, 
501 ; and  injunctions,  508,  509 

Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics, 
•280,  574,  611 

Quay,  Matthew  S.:  and  1888  cam- 
paign, 226;  260;  quoted  on 
Sugar  Trust,  277,  278;  at  St. 
Louis  convention,  363 

Railroad  Labor  Board,  608 
Railroads : segregation  of  negroes 
on  Southern,  26 ; strike  of,  in 
1877,  133,  134;  during  Cleve- 
land’s administration,  194  et 
seq.;  stock  watering  by,  202 
et  seq.,  and  rate  wars,  204; 
244,  315;  control  of,  430,  432. 
433 ; Roosevelt  and  the,  464 
et  seq.;  and  workmen’s  com- 
pensation, 507 ; and  govern- 
ment arbitration  of  disputes, 
510;  issue  in  Congress,  571; 
under  government  control, 
586,  587 ; post-war  problem  of, 
608 

Railroads’  War  Board;  function 
of,  587 

Rainbow  Division,  594 
Ramsdell,  C.  W.,  31 


630 


INDEX 


Ranching;  development  of,  74  et 
seq. 

Randall,  Samuel  J. ; and  the  tariff, 
107,  174,  219.  222 
Ransom,  Senator  M.  W. : quoted  on 
rivers  and  harbors  appropria- 
tion, 165 

Raymond,  Henry  J.,  99 
Recall:  defined,  515 
“Recollections,”  A.  K.  McClure, 
233,  note 

Reconstruction  Act,  14 
Reconstruction:  after  the  Civil 
War,  3-31;  military,  15  ei 
seq.;  results  of  military,  in 
the  South,  34,  35;  after  the 
World  War,  605-610 
Red  Cross,  586,  588 
Redfield,  W.  C.,  546,  note 
Reed,  Thomas  B.:  and  the  tariff, 
169;  in  the  Great  Tariff  De- 
bate, 221  et  seq.;  Speaker  of 
the  House,  233  et  seq.;  anec- 
dote, 234,  note;  “Czar,”  236; 
and  the  McKinley  bill,  238 ; 
240 ; quoted  on  monopolies, 
253,  254 ; 260 ; at  the  St.  Louis 
convention,  363;  Speaker  of 
the  House,  383  et  seq.;  retire- 
ment of,  404 

Referendum  system,  514,  515 
Reform  Club,  262 
Reid,  Whitelaw,  401 
Reinach,  .Joseph,  604 
Republican  National  Committee: 
and  corporation  contributions, 
517 

Republicans:  and  the  trial  of  An- 
drew Johnson,  20;  revolt 
(1872)  of,  44;  nominate 
Hayes,  49 ; intellectual  and  so- 
cial status  of,  in  North,  78; 
and  the  tariff,  107,  108;  221; 
and  Kansas-Nebraska  bill, 
236;  and  monopolies,  253;  and 
the  coinage  plank  of,  1892, 
261,  262;  insurgent,  489;  and 
campaign  funds,  517,  518;  in 
campaign  of  1916,  566  et  seq.; 
570;  control  Congress,  603; 
and  the  Peace  Treaty,  609 
Resumption  of  specie  payments, 
141 


Revolutionary  War : comparative 
money  cost  of,  589 

Rhodes,  J.  F.,  30 

Richardson,  J.  D.,  241 

Richmond:  Grant’s  march  on,  32; 
and  electric  street  railways, 
60,  note 

Rio  de  Janeiro:  Pan  American 
Congress  at,  531 

Robertson,  William  H. ; case  of, 
1.59-161 

Rockefeller,  John  D.:  and  the 
Standard  Oil  Co.,  245  et  seq. 

Roman  Catholic  Church  of  Cali- 
fornia; and  the  “Pious  Fund” 
controversy,  522 

Roosevelt,  Theodore:  quoted,  120; 
Civil  Service  Commissioner, 
231;  retained  as  commissioner 
by  Cleveland,  273;  and  the 
Populists,  354;  in  Cuba,  395; 
and  the  vice-presidential  nomi- 
nation, 405,  406 ; becomes 

President,  422;  and  the  ex- 
pression “muck  rake,”  438, 
note;  and  reform,  443;  quoted 
on  LaFollette,  445;  sketcli  of 
448  et  seq.;  and  control  of 
railroads,  451,  452;  and  .Sher- 
man Anti-trust  Law,  452  ei 
seq. : and  the  coal  strike,  454- 
458;  nominee  of  the  Chicago 
convention,  459;  elected  461; 
and  conservation,  407  et  seq. ; 
and  recess  appointments,  473; 
and  Taft  policies,  479;  and 
Payne- Aldrich  Act,  481 ; re- 
turn of,  from  Africa,  488;  and 
Progressive  party  program, 
492 ; in  pre-convention  cam- 
paign, 493,  494 ; attitude  of, 
toward  accident  compensation, 
507 ; and  literacy  test  bill, 
509,  note;  anti-trust  program 
of,  513,  515;  and  federal  cam- 
paign expenditures,  518,  note; 
520,  note;  in  relation  to  Flaguc 
Conference,  521 ; and  treaty- 
making power,  522;  quoted. 
527,  note;  in  relation  to  the 
Venezuela  case,  529 ; “threat” 
of,  530,  note;  protection  policy 
of,  531;  542;  comparison  of 


INDEX 


631 


Wilson  and,  544;  556;  and 
civil  service,  557 ; and  the 
Kaiser,  559 ; article  by,  on 
Germany  quoted,  560;  in  1916 
campaign,  567  et  seq.;  criti- 
cism by,  of  Wilson  administra- 
tion, 570;  attitude  toward 
Wilson’s  World  War  policy, 
575;  “Fear  God  and  Take 
Your  Own  Part,”  610 
Rough  Eiders,  395 
Roumania : Red  Cross  relief  work 
in,  588;  and  the  World  War, 
596,  note 

Root,  Elihu:  quoted  on  the  “boss,” 
83,  84;  Secretary  of  War,  381; 
and  the  Philippine  Commis- 
sion, 413;  and  the  coal  strike 
of  1902,  456;  at  the  conven- 
tion of  1912,  494;  “Addresses 
on  Government  and  Citizen- 
ship,” 519;  and  international 
treaties,  522;  526;  and  Alas- 
kan Coast  Commission,  532, 
note;  533,  note;  and  Panama 
tolls,  556 

Root-Takahira  Agreement,  535 
Russia:  and  Alaskan  purchase,  21; 
558;  political  affairs  in,  581; 
Red  Cross  relief  work  in,  588 ; 
retreat  of  army  of,  596;  598, 
600 

Rusk,  J.  M.,  231 
Russo-Japanese  War,  534 
Ryan,  T.  F.,  498 

Salisbury,  Lord:  and  the  Murchi- 
son letter  incident,  227,  228 ; 
and  Newfoundland  fisheries. 
287 ; and  Venezuelan  case,  297 
et  seq. 

Samoa,  283 

Sampson.  Admiral  W.  T. : moves 
against  Cuba,  389;  395 
Sampson-Schley  controversy,  399 
San  Domingo:  in  Grant’s  adminis- 
tration, 39;  case  (1905),  529 
et  seq. 

San  Juan  Hill,  battle  of,  306 
San  ilateo  County  v.  Southern  Pa- 
cific Railroad.  92 

Santa  Clara  County  v.  Southern 
Pacific  Railroad,  93 


Santiago:  operations  about,  394, 
395;  battle  of,  harbor,  397 
Saturday  Evening  Post,  quoted  on 
free  coinage  of  silver,  341,  342, 
note 

Schley,  Commodore  W.  S.,  at  San- 
tiago, 397 

Schools:  98  et  seq.;  436 
Schouler,  James,  30 
Schultz,  B.  E.,  519 
Schurmann,  Jacob  G.,  of  the  Phil- 
ippine Commission,  413 
Schurz,  Carl:  and  Grant,  43;  and 
free  trade,  106;  and  civil  serv- 
ice reform,  119;  in  Hayes’ 
cabinet,  126,  127;  131;  in 

Cleveland  campaign,  175 
Schwab,  Charles  M.,  cited,  244 
Scientific  American:  cited  on  the 
destruction  of  the  Maine,  388, 
note 

Scott,  Dred,  279 
Scott,  J.  B.,  574 
Scribners  Magazine,  31 
Second  Division : activities  of  the, 
598 

Senate:  reconstruction  policy,  12; 
in  relation  to  Stanton’s  re- 
moval, 18;  scenes  in,  on  trial 
of  Andrew  Johnson,  19;  and 
the  Alaska  purchase,  21,  22; 
domination  of,  87 ; attitude  of. 
toward  Hayes,  123  et  seq.; 
civil  service  reform  bill  in. 
166  et  seq.;  and  Lodge  elec- 
tion plan,  237 ; in  relation  to 
Standard  Oil  Co.,  250  et  seq.; 
and  the  (1893)  tariff.  275; 
silver  advocates  in  the,  342 
et  seq.;  Spanish- American 
peace  treaty  before  the,  403 ; 
and  Cuban  self-government, 
411;  growth  of  popular  dis- 
trust of,  513  et  seq.;  and  pop- 
ular control,  514;  and  inter- 
national treaty-making,  522: 
in  relation  to  railroad  legis- 
lation, 571  et  seq.;  Wilson’s 
address  to,  on  Germany’s  an- 
swer to  his  note  to  belliger- 
ents, 578,  579;  attitude  of. 
toward  President’s  armed  mer- 
chantmen proposals,  580;  in 


632 


INDEX 


relation  to  declaration  of  war, 
582,  609 

Serbia : 558 ; Red  Cross  Relief 

work  in,  588 
Service  of  Supply,  594 
Sewall,  Arthur,  370 
Seward,  William  H. ; 8;  in  relation 
to  the  French  invasion  of 
Mexico,  21;  quoted,  64;  79 
Seymour,  Horatio : unanimous 
nomination  of,  by  Democrats, 
34;  and  the  national  debt,  110 
“Shadow  Lawn,”  570 
Shatter,  General  William  R.:  in 
Santiago  campaign,  395 
Shaw,  A.,  526,  574 
Sheridan,  General  P.  H. : on  the 
Mexican  border,  21;  and  the 
Indians,  73 

Sherman  Anti-trust  Law : 240, 

242 ; quoted  256,  257 ; author- 
ship of,  257,  note;  379,  456, 
491  ; significance  of,  500 
Sherman,  James  S.,  475,  488 
Sherman,  John ; and  political  in- 
tegrity, 86 ; and  the  national 
debt,  109,  110;  in  the  Hayes 
cabinet,  126;  attitude  of  to- 
ward Hayes’  policy,  130;  and 
silver  coinage,  140;  and  green- 
back redemption,  142;  in  the 
Chicago  convention  of  1880, 
153 ; as  a presidential  possi- 
bility, 225;  357;  in  McKin- 
ley’s cabinet,  380,  381;  520, 
note 

Sherman  Silver  Act,  237;  Cleve- 
land and,  274  V 338,  339,  340, 
513 

Sherman,  General  W.  T.,  127 
Shores,  V.  L.,  146 
Siam,  and  the  World  War,  583 
Siberia,  598 

Siboney,  General  Lawton  at,  396 
Sigsbee,  Captain  C.  D.,  and  the 
Maine,  388 

Silver,  free,  352  et  seq. 

Simpson,  “Sockless  Jerry,”  354 
Sims,  Rear  Admiral  W.  S. : war 
activities  of,  590,  591 
Sinclair,  Upton,  447 
Sioux  War,  73 

^?laughter  House  cases,  90  et  seq. 


Socialism,  252 

Socialist  Labor  Party,  324,  568, 
note 

Socialists,  447 
Soissons,  598 

South : relations  of  North  and,  at 
close  of  Civil  War,  6 ; attitude 
of,  toward  negroes,.  7;  growth 
of  negro  domination  in,  22  et 
seq.;  economic  life,  61  et  seq.. 
66;  withdrawal  of  troops 
from,  123;  426 

South  America:  Monroe  Doctrine 
and,  529  et  seq. 

South  Carolina : ballot-box  stuff- 
ing in,  26;  in  Tilden  cam- 
paign, 50 ; gubernatorial  con- 
test (1877)  in,  129 
South  Dakota : the  initiative  and 
referendum  in,  514 
Spain:  and  Mexico,  21;  effect  of 
war  with,  upon  United  States 
international  policy,  520;  and 
peace  terms,  398 ; 524 
Spanish-American  Peace  Confer- 
ence at  Paris,  401  et  seq. 
Spanish-American  War,  385  et 
seq.  ; effect  of,  upon  McKinley 
administration,  399,  400;  541. 
See  also  War  with  Spain. 
Sparks,  E.  E.,  29 
“Spoils”  system,  115 
Springer,  Representative  W.  M., 
234,  note 

Springer  v.  the  United  States,  2^8 
Springfield  Republican,  356 
“Stalwarts,”  129 

Stanbery,  Attorney  General  Henry, 
19 

Standard  Oil  Company:  evolution 
of,  245  et  seq.;  255;  contribu- 
tion to  the  McKinley  cam- 
paign, 372;  investments,  430; 
in  court,  464;  491;  in  rela- 
tion to  federal  campaign  ex- 
penditures, 518,  note 
Stanton,  Edwin  M. : removed  from 
cabinet,  18,  19;  80 
Stanwood,  Edward,  30,  241,  519 
Star  routes  investigation,  161 
“State,  The,”  by  Wilson,  544 
Steffens,  Lincoln,  “The  Shame  of 
the  Cities/’  438 


INDEX 


633 


Stephens,  Alexander  H.,  24 
Stephens,  Uriah:  and  Knights  of 
Labor,  309 

Stevens,  J.  L. : quoted  on  Hawaiian 
situation,  294 

Stevens,  Thaddeus : 6 ; leader  of 
the  House,  9 et  seq.;  and  re- 
construction, 12;  20;  and  the 
‘‘Ohio  idea,”  110 
Stevenson,  Adlai  E.,  265 
Stevenson,  Robert  L.,  302 
Stewart,  A.  T.,  37 
St.  John,  John  P.,  172 
Storey,  Moorfield,  175 
Strikes:  railroad,  133;  Homestead, 
265;  315  et  seq.;  coal,  454 
et  seq.;  study  of,  since  1896, 
500  et  seq.;  508,  510;  rail- 
road, issue  before  Congress, 
571 

Students’  Army  Training  Corps, 
598 

Submarine  warfare  of  Germany, 
579,  590,  591 

Sugar  Trust:  255;  and  tariff,  276 
et  seq. 

Sumner,  Charles:  6;  and  recon- 
struction, 12 ; in  relation  to 
negro  suffrage,  15 ; and  San 
Domingo,  39;  79 

Supreme  Court:  decision  in  Milli- 
gan case,  15 ; interpretation  of 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
25,  26;  pay  of,  justices  in- 
creased, 46;  89  et  seq.;  deci- 
sion in  Greenbacks  cases,  112; 
and  monopolies.  251,  254;  and 
income  tax,  278;  monopoly 
control  of,  suspected,  371;  and 
insular  cases,  417 
Swift  & Co.  V.  the  United  States, 
463 

Taft,  William  H. : presidential 
nominee,  474;  elected,  477; 
record,  477,  478;  cabinet,  479, 
note ; quoted  on  Payne-Ald- 
rich  bill,  482 ; message  of,  on 
trade  agreement  with  Canada. 
489,  490;  split  of,  and  Roose- 
velt, 493;  in  relation  to  Presi- 
dential powers,  513;  520, 

note;  and  treaties,  522;  and 


American  investments  in  Mex- 
ico, 536,  537 ; and  Panama 
tolls,  556 ; and  the  monetary 
problem,  551;  and  civil  serv- 
ice, 557 ; and  the  League  of 
Nations,  604,  605 
Tanner,  Corporal  James,  and  pen- 
sion claims,  232 

Tarbell,  Ida  M.,  241,  438,  519 
Tammany  Hall:  33;  under  Boss 
Tweed,  40,  174 
Tampico,  Mexico,  538 
Tariff:  80;  senate  Finance  com- 
mittee and,  88;  study  of,  prob- 
lem, 103  et  seq.;  plank  in 
Democratic  platform  of  1868, 
107,  108;  in  Arthur’s  admin- 
istration, 168;  Cleveland  and 
the,  218  et  seq.;  McKinley 
Tariff  Bill,  238  et  seq.;  effect 
of  McKinley,  bill,  240;  issue 
in  1892,  264;  in  1896,  350  et 
seq.;  McKinley  and  protec- 
tive, 378;  revision  in  Taft 
administration,  479,  480;  547 
et  seq. 

Tariff  Act  of  1897,  384  et  seq. 
Tariff  Commission,  221 
Taussig,  F.  W. ; “Principles  of 
Economics,”  97,  note;  241; 
and  tariff  revision,  480; 
quoted  on  Payne-Aldrich  act, 
481,  574 

Teller,  Senator  Henry  M. : and  the 
Republicans’  silver  plank,  362, 
363 

Tennessee:  and  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  13;  and  the  Ku 
Klux,  23 

Tenure  of  Office  Act:  18,  19;  re- 
peal of  part  of,  32 
Ten  Years’  War,  386 
Thayer,  W.  R.,  “Hay,”  530,  note 
Third  Division:  at  Chateau- 
Thierry,  596 

Tliirteenth  Amendment:  8,  10,  90 
Thomas,  H.  ^C. : “Return  of  the 
Democratic  Party  to  Power,” 
192 

Thompson,  Richard  W.,  127,  note 
Thurman,  Allan  G.,  174:  vice- 
presidential  nominee,  224 
Tilden,  Samuel  J.;  Governor  of 


634 


INDEX 


New  York,  46;  presidential 
campaign  of,  50;  Henry  Wat- 
terson  cited  on,  53;  defeated, 
123;  investigation  of  title  of, 
to  Presidency,  134  et  seq.;  and 
question  of  renomination,  154 
Tillman,  Benjamin  R.:  and  Cleve- 
land, 354;  474 
Tracy,  Secretary  B.  F.,  231 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  604 
Treaty  of  Washington,  40 
Trumbull,  Lyman,  6,  45 
Trust  Company  of  America,  550 
Trusts:  242  et  seq.;  553  et  seq. 
Turner,  F.  J.,  30,  31,  280 
Turner,  George:  and  Alaska  Coast 
Commission,  532,  note 
Turkey,  558,  601,  002 
Tweed  Ring,  40,  100 
Tweed,  William  M.  (“Boss”),  40, 
50 


Underwood,  Oscar  W. : 495 ; and 
tariff  revision,  547  et  seq.; 
and  Panama  tolls,  556 
Union  Labor  Party,  253,  324 
Union  Pacific  Railroad : and  Credit 
Mobilier  scandal,  41 ; 206 
United  Mine  Workers,  310 
Unitarian  Review,  182 
United  States:  and  French  inva- 
sion of  Mexico,  21 ; and  Alaska 
purchase,  21,  22;  Alabama 

claims  of,  against  England,  39, 
40;  paper  notes.  111  et  seq.; 
and  monopolies,  242-258 ; 
trend  of,  diplomacy,  281  et 
seq.;  and  Samoa,  283,  284; 
and  seal  hunting  controversy, 
285  et  seq.;  and  Latin-Ameri- 
can  relations,  288  et  seq.;  and 
Hawaiian  relations,  292 ; 
monetary  problems,  327-348 ; 
attitude  of,  toward  war  with 
Spain,  389,  note;  and  Cuba, 
407  ; and  Porto  Rico,  411;  and 
the  Philippine  problem,  412  e? 
seq.;  development  of,  colonial 
policy,  418;  and  Boxer  up- 
rising, 420^22 ; economic 
unity  of,  500  et  seq. ; and 
Venezuelan  claims,  522;  and 


Moroccan  question,  423;  and 
Colombia  controversy,  524  et 
seq.;  and  the  Virgin  Islands, 
531,  note;  relations  of,  with 
Japan,  534  et  seq.;  attitude 
of  toward  England’s  blockade, 
562;  and  World  War,  575- 
612;  relations  of,  and  Mexico, 
536;  break  between,  and  Ger- 
many, 579;  and  Gcrman- 
Mexican  intrigue,  580;  money 
cost  of  War  to,  589;  work  of, 
in  closing  the  seas  to  Ger- 
many, 592 ; in  relation  to 
peace  program,  600  et  seq.; 
questions  arising  from  War, 
602;  policy  of  aloofness  aban- 
doned by,  603,  604 ; and  recon- 
struction after  World  War, 
605  et  seq.  See  also  America. 
United  States  v.  Harris,  26 
United  States  Reports,  518 
United  States  Shipping  Board, 
585 

United  States  Steel  Corporation, 
431,  432 

Utah : and  the  8-hour  law,  505 

Vanderbilt,  Commodore  Cornelius, 
study  of,  207,  208 
Van  Metro,  T.  W.,  216 
Venezuela:  dispute,  296  et  seq.; 
claim  of  United  States,  Mex- 
ico, et  al.  against,  522;  ques- 
tion (1902),  529  et  seq. 
Versailles:  inter-allied  council  at, 
601 ; treaty  of,  004 
Vicksburg,  Grant  at,  32 
Vilas,  William  F.,  184,  note 
Villa,  Pancho:  break  between,  and 
Carranza,  538;  raids,  539 
Villegas,  Enrique,  604 
“Virginia  Consolidated,”  58 

War  Department:  estimate  of 
money  cost  of  World  War,  589 
War  Industries  Board,  585 
War  Risk  Insurance,  589 
War  with  Spain:  causes,  385-388; 
declaration  of,  389.  See  also 
Spanish-American  War. 
Washington:  Pan  American  Con- 
gress at,  531 


INDEX 


635 


Watterson,  Henry;  on  Tilden,  53; 

on  Cleveland,  262 
Weaver,  James  B.,  154,  265 
Weber,  A.  F.,  519 
Wells,  David  A.,  and  tariff  reform, 
105,  106 

West  Indies,  528 
Weyler,  Valeriano,  386 
Whiskey  Ring  scandal,  47,  53 
White,  Andrew  D.,  542 
IMiite,  Horace:  30;  and  free  trade, 
106 

White,  Henry:  at  Paris  confer- 
ence, 602 

Whitlock,  Brand,  611 
Whitney,  William  C.,  184 
Wheeler,  General  Joseph,  396 
Wickersham,  George  W. : and  the 
League  of  Nations,  605 
Wildman,  M.  S.,  280 
Williams,  C.  R. : quoted,  125,  note ; 

on  Hayes’  inauguration,  120 
Willoughby,  W.  F.,  611 
Wilson-Gorman  Act,  276,  336,  350, 
548 

Wilson,  W.  B.,  546 
Wilson,  William  L.,  274  et  seq. 
Wilson,  Woodrow:  495;  nominated 
by  the  Baltimore  convention, 
496  ; elected,  498  ; 520,  note ; 
and  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty,  528 ; American  policy 
of,  531;  and  China’s  finances, 
534;  and  ^Mexican  Relations, 
536;  study  of,  543-573;  char- 
acteristics of,  544,  545,  546; 
cabinet,  546 ; conception  of 
President’s  functions,  546; 
first  message  of,  547,  548 ; and 
the  monetary  problem,  551  et 
seq.;  and  the  trusts,  553  et 
seq.;  and  the  civil  service 


problem,  557 ; attitude  of,  to- 
wards the  War,  563,  564; 
in  1916  campaign,  568  et 
seq.;  and  railroad  legislation. 
571;  foreign  policy  of,  575  et 
seq.;  and  preparedness,  576  et 
seq.;  and  armed  merchantmen, 
580 ; summons  Congress  on 
War  issue,  581;  quoted  582; 
assumes  control  of  railroads, 
587 ; mouthpiece  of  Allies, 
599,  600;  attitude  of  French 
toward,  603 ; relations  of,  and 
Republicans,  603 

Windom,  William,  159,  note;  231; 

and  silver  coinage,  336 
Women:  and  labor,  503  et  seq.; 

suffrage  and,  516 
Wood,  General  Leonard;  in  Cuba. 
395,  401;  promotion  of,  by 
Roosevelt,  473 
Woodburn,  J.  A.,  30,  280 
Workmen:  problems,  500  et  seq.; 

care  of,  502  et  seq. 

Wright,  C.  D.,  “Industrial  Evolu- 
tion of  America,”  319 
World  War:  beginning  of,  558; 
economic  effect  of,  on  United 
States,  560  et  seq.;  United 
States  and  the,  575-612; 
Lnited  States  enters,  581; 
monej'  cost  of,  589;  great  Ger- 
man drive  in,  596 ; end  of. 
602;  effect  upon  international 
policy  of  United  States,  602 ; 
reconstruction  after,  605  et 
seq. 


Yale  Review,  31 
Yuan  Shih-kai:  head  of  Chinese 
government,  534 


DUKE  UHIVEHSITV  ubrarcs 


